CHAPTER XXXIII

RECONSTRUCTION: THE WORKING OUT

So the North turned cheerfully to its own affairs--and very engrossing

affairs they were--and the South faced its new conditions. It was still

struggling with the economic wreckage left by four years of battle,

invasion and defeat. It had borne the loss of its separate nationality

and the flag endeared by countless sacrifices. It had accepted the

sudden emancipation of its servile class by the conqueror's hand. It had

been encouraged by President Johnson to resume with little change its

old ways of government. For two years it had gone along precariously

with State organizations of the earlier pattern, subject to occasional

interruption by military authority or officials of the Freedmen's

Bureau. Then, in 1867, all State governments were set aside, and

military rule pure and simple held the field,--in most States for about

fifteen months; in Mississippi, Texas and Virginia, by their own choice,

for as much longer. Though as it was generally administered the military

government was just, as well as economical, yet its maintenance was a

bitter ordeal for a people with the American political habit; a people,

too, who had fought gallantly for four years; who had, upon accepting

their defeat, been assured that the object of their conqueror was

attained in restoring them to their old position, except for

emancipation of the slaves; and who now for a year or two longer were

held under martial law.

At last--for most of them in mid-summer of 1868--they were again

restored to self-government of the American pattern. Self-government

for all, thought the North complacently; whites and blacks were equal,

not only as subjects of the law but as makers of the law; and so freedom

and democracy were established. But the Southern whites asked in dismay,

What kind of fellow-lawmakers have we got? The question answered itself.

The million or so of new voters were most of them ignorant in a sense of

which illiteracy gives but a hint. They were unversed even in genuine

family life; skilled only in manual industry; unpracticed in

citizenship; utterly untaught in the principles, the facts of history,

the theory and art of self-government, which make up the proper

equipment of the voter. A great part of them, field hands on the great

cotton and sugar plantations, were rude and degraded, trained to live

solely under close and constant control.

How were the whites to deal with these new-made voters? From the

standpoint of expediency, three courses offered,--to conciliate and

educate them; to outvote them by massing the whites together; or to

suppress them by force or fraud. From the standpoint of unregenerate

human nature, the whites as a body at first took none of these

courses,--they stood apart from the whole business of politics, in wrath

and scorn. Unregenerate perhaps, but most natural, most human! At first,

some crude policy mingled with the sentiment that kept them aloof; there

was the hope that if the whites generally abstained from voting, at the

elections held in November, 1867, to pass on the question whether to

hold constitutional conventions, the proposal might fail for want of the

requisite majority of the registered voters. It was a fallacious hope;

suppose the conventions were to fail, what better terms were now to be

expected from Congress? But the conventions were all held; and as in the

same spirit most of the whites refused to vote for delegates, these were

chosen from the negroes, their friends from the North, and the few

Southern whites who accepted the inevitable.

Is it not the wisest, the manliest course, to accept the inevitable? So

asked General Longstreet, in a letter to a friend, June 3, 1867. He had

just listened to Senator Wilson, and had been surprised by his fairness

and frankness. For himself he says, "I will be happy to work in any

harness that promises relief to our discomfited people, whether bearing

the mantle of Mr. Davis or Mr. Sumner." Negro suffrage is for the

present an established fact; if after a fair trial it works

disastrously, we will appeal to Congress to repeal it. "If every one

will meet the crisis with proper appreciation of our condition and

obligations, the sun will rise to-morrow on a happy people." But his

words fell on deaf ears, and when he acted with the Republicans he was

visited with ostracism, denunciation, and attack upon his war record.

The typical attitude, at first, was that of the planter who, after

listening to a discussion of the final reconstruction act, inquired,

"Does it say anything about raising cotton?" "No." "Then, damn Congress

and its laws! I'm going to raise cotton." So he and a good many others

gave themselves to raising cotton, and for a while left the choice of

State officers and legislators to "niggers," "carpet-baggers," and

"scalawags." A "scalawag" was any Southern white who allied himself

politically with the negroes, and a "carpet-bagger" was a Northern

adventurer, for whose worldly goods a gripsack sufficed,--or, in

general, any Northerner whatever.

For the blacks, the sudden opening of political power and preferment,

however designed, was in effect a very doubtful benefit. It turned their

hopes and aspirations in a way which was really "no thoroughfare." To

the more promising and ambitious it offered sudden and brilliant prizes,

instead of the patient apprenticeship which they needed. Of those who

quickly rose to office, a few were by character and attainments really

fit for their position; many won favor by shallow arts; and others were

thrown up like driftwood by the tide. The negroes as a body could follow

only a personal leadership,--how many whites, North or South, really

follow any other?--could be organized in bodies, attached to a party

name and watchwords, and voted in mass by the men who had their

confidence. They understood that their freedom and their right to vote

had been given them by the North and by the Republican party, and to

that party they naturally turned. Their old masters--in many cases their

best friends--frankly told them they were unfit to vote, and wanted no

dealings with them in political affairs. So they found leadership

principally in the men who had come from the North.

There was a Northern immigration which may be classified as business

men, teachers and adventurers. A considerable number sought an

opportunity in reviving and developing industry,--substantial men and

good citizens. Sometimes a patriotic motive mingled with the industrial.

Governor Andrew, on retiring to private life as a lawyer, tried for some

time to advance a company for bringing into conjunction Southern lands

and Northern enterprise and capital. There were various projects of this

kind, but they met with little success. Private individuals, however,

added something to the industrial and civic forces of the South. A

larger class were the teachers. Men and women by hundreds went to the

South, some sent by missionary organizations, some independently, to

organize schools and to teach the children of the freedmen. Many of them

were of the highest character, devoted, self-sacrificing, going to the

blacks simply because they supposed their need was greatest. But

Beecher's warning proved sound--because as a whole this movement took

the negroes as a distinct field, ignoring the needs of the whites, it

incurred odium as an alien and half-hostile work. The barbaric element

among the whites--and slavery had left a deep taint of barbarism--came

out at its worst in insults to the "nigger teachers," with occasional

burning of a school-house. The better social elements looked askance at

those whose presence was a reminder of conquest and humiliation.

From the business and the educational immigration, a few Northern men

were drawn into public affairs, less by choice than by necessity of the

situation. With these mingled a different class, men who had been

disreputable hangers-on of the army or the Freedmen's Bureau, or who had

come for the sole purpose of plunder. It was a very mixed company of

whites and blacks that made up the conventions and then filled the

legislative halls and the public offices. The constitutions were not

badly framed, except as they, for the most part, continued the exclusive

clauses. The general legislation was various in its character. There

were some excellent features, above all the institution in every State

of a genuine public school system, where before there had been only

makeshifts or make-believes. Some other good constructive work was done,

toward establishing society on the new basis. Certainly nothing was

enacted so bad as the "black codes" of a few years earlier, not to speak

of the legislation under slavery. There were some unsuccessful attempts

at engrafting institutions, like the township system, which had worked

well in their native soil but could not be created out of hand. In

general the white leadership of the dominant party averted much that

might have been expected from the ignorance of its legislators as a

mass. But plenty of waste and mischief was wrought. Place a crowd of

hungry and untaught men next the public treasury with the lid off, and

some results are sure. The men will not be safer guardians of the

treasure for having had for most of their lives no property rights of

their own, not even the ownership of their own souls and bodies. Yet

most of the plunder seems to have gone into the pockets of knaves of the

superior race. There was a degree of extravagance, waste and corruption,

varying greatly with localities and times, but sufficient to leave a

permanent discredit on the Southern Republican governments as a class.

To judge accurately of the merits and demerits of these governments is

perhaps as difficult a task as historian ever undertook. So fierce is

the passion which invests these events in the memory of the present

generation, that it is almost hopeless to sift and adjudicate the sober

facts. Time has softened much; even the Civil War begins to stand forth

in some firmness of outline and clarity of atmosphere. But when we come

to reconstruction--grave historians grow almost hysterical, romancers

pass the bounds of possibilities, and even official figures contradict

one another with sublime effrontery.

Yet this very passion of remembrance, which in one way obscures, in

another way illuminates the historical situation. The grievance most

profoundly felt in the reconstruction period was not unwise laws nor

waste of public money nor oppressive taxes. It was the consciousness by

the master class of political subjection to the servile class. It was

the spectacle of rude blacks, yesterday picking cotton or driving mules,

sitting in the legislators' seats and executive offices of Richmond and

Columbia, holding places of power among the people of Lee and Calhoun.

Fancy the people of Massachusetts, were the state-house on Beacon hill

suddenly occupied by Italian, Polish and Russian laborers,--placed and

kept there by a foreign conqueror. Add to the comparison the prouder

height of the slaveholder, and the lower depth of his serf. Put this as

the case of a people high-strung and sensitive, still fresh from the

passion of war, still smarting from defeat. They had fought to

exhaustion, and their banner had fallen without disgrace. Now the

victors who had won by superiority of force had placed their late

bondmen as their rulers. The offices from which their own captains and

chiefs were shut out were filled by plantation field-hands.

It was not likely that the first attitude of scornful passivity would

long continue, and it did not. The warnings vainly uttered

beforehand,--that the natural leaders would surely lead, and had best be

won as allies, were proved right when it was too late. Said the

_Republican_, August 10, 1868, in protesting against the plan of the

party managers in organizing the Southern wing to consist mainly of the

blacks: "The Republican party cannot long maintain its supremacy at the

South by negro votes alone. The instincts of submission and dependence

in them and of domination in the whites, are too strong to permit such a

reversal of the familiar relations and the natural order. The

slave-holding element has learned to combine, conspire and command, in

the best school on earth, and they will certainly come to the top. Nor

is it desirable that such a state of things should continue."

The old official class being excluded--to the number, it was estimated,

of 160,000,--and the stand-aloof policy, or drift rather, prevailing in

the political field, it was the more lawless element that first began to

conspicuously assert the white supremacy. There grew up an organization

called "the Ku-Klux Klan," designed at first partly as a rough sport and

masquerade, partly to overawe the negroes. There were midnight ridings

in spectral disguises, warnings, alarms and presently whippings and even

murders. The society, or imitations of it, spread over most of the

South. It was at its height in 1868-70, and in the latter year it

gradually gave way, partly owing to vigorous measures ordered from

Washington, and partly perhaps as legitimate political combinations

again occupied the whites. But it is to be noted that throughout the

decade of reconstruction, though the present fashion is to lay exclusive

stress on the wrong-doing of the negroes and their friends, yet the

physical violence, frequent and widespread, was almost wholly practiced

by the whites.

From the political torpor, due to discouragement and resentment, there

was an early recovery. When it was found that cotton-planting pure and

simple, with ignoring of politics, resulted in heavy taxes for the

planter; when to the first numbness there succeeded the active

smart,--the whites betook themselves to the resource which in most

States soon proved adequate,--the ballot, and political combination. In

several States the whites were easily in the majority, and where they

were slightly outnumbered their superior intelligence soon gave them the

advantage. In Georgia, finally readmitted at the end of 1869, the

Democrats--constituting the great body of the whites--carried the

election in the next year, and remained in control of the State.

Virginia, which had advisedly kept under military rule until, with

President Grant's aid, she came in without the excluding clauses, early

in 1870, passed at once under Democratic rule. In the same year North

Carolina became Democratic. Texas and Arkansas remained under Republican

sway until the majority shifted to the Democrats in 1874. In Alabama,

the Democrats gained the Governorship and the lower House as early as

1870; two years later the result was disputed, the Democrats conceding

the Governor but claiming the Legislature, while the Republicans

organized a rival Legislature; the Republican Governor-elect called for

United States troops, which were promptly dispatched, and with their

backing a Republican Legislature was secured. In 1874 a Democratic

Governor and Legislature were chosen and installed without dispute. The

Federal interference in Alabama, and the experience of others of the

reconstructed States,--South Carolina, Mississippi, and

Louisiana,--recalls us to that phase of the history which deals with

Washington and the national government.

Through the eight years of Grant's administration, the public life of

the nation was concerned mainly with clearing away the wreckage left by

the war. There was an enormous debt to be handled and an inflated

currency to be reduced; there was to be curbed administrative

extravagance and corruption, bred of profuse expenditure; a bitter

quarrel with England was to be guided toward war or peace; and the

disordered South was to be composed. These tasks were encountered by men

whose habits and sentiments had been formed in a long and desperate

contest, and in an atmosphere slowly cooling from the fiery glow of

battle. The soldier had to beat his sword into a plowshare, and small

wonder if the blacksmithing was sometimes clumsy.

Grant was too completely a soldier to be changed into a statesman. He

could deal with a definite, limited, though gigantic business,--the

overcoming of the armies of the Confederacy. But it was beyond his power

to comprehend and master the manifold and intricate problems that center

in the Presidency. Given a specific, well-defined question, within the

reach of his sturdy sense and loyal purpose, and he could deal with it

to good effect, as he did with the English arbitration and the Inflation

bill. But he was incapable of far-reaching and constructive plans

carefully laid and patiently pursued. When he communicated to Congress

the adoption of the Fifteenth Amendment, he urged in wise and forcible

language that the new electorate could only be qualified through

education, and that to provide such education was a pressing duty of

Congress so far as its power extended, and of the people through all the

agencies it could command. But having once said this, he let the subject

drop. National education for the freedmen was left unnoticed, save by an

occasional lonely advocate like Sumner. Nor did President Grant take any

personal and positive measures to win and hold the old South to the new

order; he failed to invite and consult its representative men, he made

no journeys among the people.

In most matters of public policy, save in emergencies, Grant let matters

be shaped by the men whom he had taken into his counsel--in his official

Cabinet or the "kitchen cabinet"--and by the Republican leaders in

Congress, of whom the controlling group, especially in the Senate, were

in close touch with the White House. His affiliations were with men of

material power, men who had strongly administered civil or military

affairs, stout partisans, faithful friends and vigorous haters. His

tastes did not draw him to the idealists, the scholars, the reformers.

He was accessible to good fellowship, he was easily imposed on by men

who were seeking their own ends, and he was very slow to abandon any one

whom he had once trusted. Absolutely honest, the thieves stole all round

him. Magnanimous at heart, the bitter partisans often made him their

tool. Of the great questions of the time, the English quarrel was

brought to an admirable healing, under the management of the Secretary

of State, Hamilton Fish, in 1871, by the joint high commission, the

treaty of Washington, and the Geneva award. In the long contest for a

sound currency, the inflation policy received its death-blow by the

President's veto in 1874, and resumption was undertaken when Sherman

carried his bill through Congress in 1875. As to honesty of

administration, the president's good intentions were constantly baffled

through his misplaced and tenacious confidences. The vast expenditures

of the war, the cheating incident to its great contracts, the

speculation favored by a fluctuating currency, the huge enterprises

invited by the return of peace,--had infected private and public life

with a kind of fever; the treasury was an easy mark; and while the

people held to Grant for his personal honesty, and re-elected him, an

army of rogues throve under his lax administration.

The let-alone policy toward the South, to which Grant was prompted both

by his virtues and his limitations, would not on the whole have been

unacceptable to the mass of the Southern whites. Left wholly to

themselves, those States would soon have righted themselves from the

unstable equilibrium in which they had been placed by the imposition of

an ignorant electorate. Natural forces,--just or unjust, benignant or

cruel,--would soon have reversed the order. But the nation at large

would not at once abandon its protectorate over its recent wards, the

freedmen. For their greatest need, education, it assumed no

responsibility. But when stories were rife of abuse and terrorism under

the masquerade of the Ku-Klux, Congress interfered, even if by some

stretch of its constitutional power, to bring the raiders under the arm

of Federal law. When elections were reported to be controlled by fraud

and intimidation, it seemed incumbent on the national government to

protect the ballot-box by which its own members were chosen. When rival

bodies claimed each to be the legitimate government of a State, it was

necessary for the Washington authorities to decide which they would

recognize, and it was a natural sequence to back their decision by the

military force. And in all of these cases, the maintenance of law and

order easily became confused with the support of factions allied

politically with the party in power at Washington. As the Southern

Republicans were gradually outvoted or overpowered at home, their

appeals for help from the general government became more urgent, while

the continuance of such interference became more questionable to

thoughtful men.

Before this state of things, there was a gradual division of opinion

among Republicans at the North, and especially among their leaders.

Against the call to protect the freedmen and bridle the slave-holding

spirit in its new forms, rose the call to return to the old respect for

local rights, and let each Southern State manage its own affairs, as did

each Northern State. To this changed attitude came some of the

staunchest of the old anti-slavery leaders, and many of the younger

generation. During the early years of Grant's administration, the

question did not present itself in acute forms. The Ku-Klux law of 1870,

though it might strain the Constitution a little, received general

acquiescence because the abuse it aimed at was so flagrant. But the

ostracism of the entire official class of the old South was growingly

recognized as a grievance and a wrong. It was the spirit of proscription

that brought on the political crisis of 1872. That proscriptive spirit

broke up the Republican party in Missouri; the liberal element, led by

Carl Schurz and B. Gratz Brown, held a State convention. Their movement

fell in with a strong rising tide of opposition to Grant's

administration within the Republican party. Its grounds were

various,--chiefly, a protest against wide and gross maladministration, a

demand for a reformed and scientific civil-service, opposition to the

high tariff, and the desire for a more generous and reconciling policy

toward the South. The movement was especially prompted by a group of

leading independent journals conducted by very able men,--the New York

_Evening Post_, under William Cullen Bryant; the _Nation_, edited by E.

L. Godkin; the Cincinnati _Commercial_ of Murat Halstead; the

Louisville _Courier-Journal_ of Henry Watterson; the Springfield

_Republican_ of Samuel Bowles. Sympathetic in the main was Horace

Greeley's New York _Tribune_. In more or less close alliance were a few

of the congressional leaders, notably Sumner, who had quarreled bitterly

with Grant over the proposed annexation of San Domingo; Trumbull, who

was never in close touch with his old party after the impeachment trial;

and Carl Schurz, who was now in the Senate.

A national convention was held at Cincinnati, in May, 1872. The

Democrats had so little hope of separate success that they stood ready

to fall in with the new departure, and this gave greater importance to

its action. For its Presidential candidate, the foremost name had been

that of the elder Charles Francis Adams. Of the most distinguished

family in the country's political annals; one of the founders of the

Free Soil party; a conservative but resolute Republican; minister to

England through the war, and most serviceable there by his firmness and

wisdom; eminent by character, experience, and mental equipment; so

indifferent to office that he almost openly scorned the proffered

honor,--he seemed to the reformers a nearly ideal candidate, however

much his reserved and distant manners might handicap him before a

popular constituency.

But the spite of a disappointed aspirant, B. Gratz Brown, and the

caprice of the convention, turned its choice by a sudden impulse to

Horace Greeley. It was a choice that from the first moment not only

defeated but almost stultified the liberal movement. It mattered not

much what principles the convention set forth. Tariff reform it had

already set aside, and Greeley was a zealous protectionist. For

scientific civil-service reform he cared nothing, and to mistakes in his

personal choices he was at least as liable as Grant. His revolt against

Grant was due partly to a dispute about State patronage. Only in

generous sentiment toward the South did he fitly represent the original

and best element of the convention. He was dropped at once by the

_Evening Post_, the _Nation_, and a large part of the liberals. The

Democrats, despairing of any other way to success, indorsed his

nomination. But the acceptance of a candidate who for thirty years had

been showering hard words on the Democracy was almost grotesque. The

South was halfhearted in his support. A few of the faithful nominated

Charles O'Conor on an independent Democrat ticket. The question was only

of the size of the majority against Greeley.

His wisest supporters avowed as the best significance of his candidacy:

"It means that the war is really over." Greeley had proved the sincerity

of his friendliness toward the South at a heavy cost. President Johnson

held Jefferson Davis in long imprisonment, with the aggravation not only

of close confinement and even a temporary manacling, but of a public

accusation of complicity in the murder of Lincoln. It was treatment

wholly unfit for a prisoner of state and a man of Davis's character. Its

effect on the South may be judged by imagining how the North would have

felt had Lincoln fallen into Southern hands and been kept in shackles

and under the charge of assassination. The imprisonment of Davis and the

avowed purpose to try him as a traitor were utterly out of keeping with

the general recognition that secession and its sequel were to be dealt

with as a political wrong and not a personal crime.

Greeley, who on the very morning after Lee's surrender had called for a

universal amnesty, showed his faith by his works when at the opportunity

in May, 1867, he offered himself, in company with Gerrit Smith, as

bondsmen for Davis, thus obtaining his release, and incurring for

himself a storm of obloquy. The storm was short-lived, but revived in

greater fury when Greeley became a Presidential candidate against Grant,

with the support of the Democracy and the South. The campaign was full

of bitterness and abuse. In _Harper's Weekly_, of which the editorial

page was conducted by the high-spirited and gentle George William

Curtis, Nast assailed the liberals in savage cartoons; in one Sumner was

depicted as scattering flowers on the grave of Preston Brooks, and

another showed Greeley shaking hands with the shade of Wilkes Booth over

the grave of Lincoln. From the other side Grant was attacked with equal

ferocity.

Greeley went down in overwhelming defeat, and died of exhaustion and a

broken heart before the electoral votes were counted. But something had

been gained. There had been a breaking of old lines. And one of the

South's main grievances had been almost removed. Within a month after

the Cincinnati convention, its call for amnesty was vindicated by a bill

passed in Congress removing the disabilities of almost all the excluded

class. Out of some 160,000, only about 700 were left on the proscribed

list.

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