[Again, since a man may do unjust acts and not yet have formed a
character of injustice, the question arises whether a man is unjust in
each particular form of injustice, say a thief, or adulterer, or
robber, by doing acts of a given character.
We may say, I think, that this will not of itself make any difference;
a man may, for instance, have had connection with another’s wife,
knowing well with whom he was sinning, but he may have done it not of
deliberate choice but from the impulse of passion: of course he acts
unjustly, but he has not necessarily formed an unjust character: that
is, he may have stolen yet not be a thief; or committed an act of
adultery but still not be an adulterer, and so on in other cases which
might be enumerated.][21]
Of the relation which Reciprocation bears to the Just we have already
spoken: and here it should be noticed that the Just which we are
investigating is both the Just in the abstract and also as exhibited in
Social Relations, which latter arises in the case of those who live in
communion with a view to independence and who are free and equal either
proportionately or numerically.[22]
It follows then that those who are not in this position have not among
themselves the Social Just, but still Just of some kind and resembling
that other. For Just implies mutually acknowledged law, and law the
possibility of injustice, for adjudication is the act of distinguishing
between the Just and the Unjust.
And among whomsoever there is the possibility of injustice among these
there is that of acting unjustly; but it does not hold conversely that
injustice attaches to all among whom there is the possibility of acting
unjustly, since by the former we mean giving one’s self the larger
share of what is abstractedly good and the less of what is abstractedly
evil.
This, by the way, is the reason why we do not allow a man to govern,
but Principle, because a man governs for himself and comes to be a
despot: but the office of a ruler is to be guardian of the Just and
therefore of the Equal. Well then, since he seems to have no peculiar
personal advantage, supposing him a Just man, for in this case he does
not allot to himself the larger share of what is abstractedly good
unless it falls to his share proportionately (for which reason he
really governs for others, and so Justice, men say, is a good not to
one’s self so much as to others, as was mentioned before), therefore
some compensation must be given him, as there actually is in the shape
of honour and privilege; and wherever these are not adequate there
rulers turn into despots.
But the Just which arises in the relations of Master and Father, is not
identical with, but similar to, these; because there is no possibility
of injustice towards those things which are absolutely one’s own; and a
slave or child (so long as this last is of a certain age and not
separated into an independent being), is, as it were, part of a man’s
self, and no man chooses to hurt himself, for which reason there cannot
be injustice towards one’s own self: therefore neither is there the
social Unjust or Just, which was stated to be in accordance with law
and to exist between those among whom law naturally exists, and these
were said to be they to whom belongs equality of ruling and being
ruled.
Hence also there is Just rather between a man and his wife than between
a man and his children or slaves; this is in fact the Just arising in
domestic relations: and this too is different from the Social Just.
Further, this last-mentioned Just is of two kinds, natural and
conventional; the former being that which has everywhere the same force
and does not depend upon being received or not; the latter being that
which originally may be this way or that indifferently but not after
enactment: for instance, the price of ransom being fixed at a mina, or
the sacrificing a goat instead of two sheep; and again, all cases of
special enactment, as the sacrificing to Brasidas as a hero; in short,
all matters of special decree.
But there are some men who think that all the Justs are of this latter
kind, and on this ground: whatever exists by nature, they say, is
unchangeable and has everywhere the same force; fire, for instance,
burns not here only but in Persia as well, but the Justs they see
changed in various places.
Now this is not really so, and yet it is in a way (though among the
gods perhaps by no means): still even amongst ourselves there is
somewhat existing by nature: allowing that everything is subject to
change, still there is that which does exist by nature, and that which
does not.[23]
Nay, we may go further, and say that it is practically plain what among
things which can be otherwise does exist by nature, and what does not
but is dependent upon enactment and conventional, even granting that
both are alike subject to be changed: and the same distinctive
illustration will apply to this and other cases; the right hand is
naturally the stronger, still some men may become equally strong in
both.
A parallel may be drawn between the Justs which depend upon convention
and expedience, and measures; for wine and corn measures are not equal
in all places, but where men buy they are large, and where these same
sell again they are smaller: well, in like manner the Justs which are
not natural, but of human invention, are not everywhere the same, for
not even the forms of government are, and yet there is one only which
by nature would be best in all places.