Chapter VII.

And the remaining one is the Corrective, which arises in voluntary as

well as involuntary transactions. Now this just has a different form

from the aforementioned; for that which is concerned in distribution of

common property is always according to the aforementioned proportion: I

mean that, if the division is made out of common property, the shares

will bear the same proportion to one another as the original

contributions did: and the Unjust which is opposite to this Just is

that which violates the proportionate.

But the Just which arises in transactions between men is an equal in a

certain sense, and the Unjust an unequal, only not in the way of that

proportion but of arithmetical.[12] Because it makes no difference

whether a robbery, for instance, is committed by a good man on a bad or

by a bad man on a good, nor whether a good or a bad man has committed

adultery: the law looks only to the difference created by the injury

and treats the men as previously equal, where the one does and the

other suffers injury, or the one has done and the other suffered harm.

And so this Unjust, being unequal, the judge endeavours to reduce to

equality again, because really when the one party has been wounded and

the other has struck him, or the one kills and the other dies, the

suffering and the doing are divided into unequal shares; well, the

judge tries to restore equality by penalty, thereby taking from the

gain.

For these terms gain and loss are applied to these cases, though

perhaps the term in some particular instance may not be strictly

proper, as gain, for instance, to the man who has given a blow, and

loss to him who has received it: still, when the suffering has been

estimated, the one is called loss and the other gain.

And so the equal is a mean between the more and the less, which

represent gain and loss in contrary ways (I mean, that the more of good

and the less of evil is gain, the less of good and the more of evil is

loss): between which the equal was stated to be a mean, which equal we

say is Just: and so the Corrective Just must be the mean between loss

and gain. And this is the reason why, upon a dispute arising, men have

recourse to the judge: going to the judge is in fact going to the Just,

for the judge is meant to be the personification of the Just.[13] And

men seek a judge as one in the mean, which is expressed in a name given

by some to judges (μεσίδιοι, or middle-men) under the notion that if

they can hit on the mean they shall hit on the Just. The Just is then

surely a mean since the judge is also.

So it is the office of a judge to make things equal, and the line, as

it were, having been unequally divided, he takes from the greater part

that by which it exceeds the half, and adds this on to the less. And

when the whole is divided into two exactly equal portions then men say

they have their own, when they have gotten the equal; and the equal is

a mean between the greater and the less according to arithmetical

equality.

This, by the way, accounts for the etymology of the term by which we in

Greek express the ideas of Just and Judge; (δίκαιον quasi δίχαιον, that

is in two parts, and δικάστης quasi διχάστης, he who divides into two

parts). For when from one of two equal magnitudes somewhat has been

taken and added to the other, this latter exceeds the former by twice

that portion: if it had been merely taken from the former and not added

to the latter, then the latter would have exceeded the former only by

that one portion; but in the other case, the greater exceeds the mean

by one, and the mean exceeds also by one that magnitude from which the

portion was taken. By this illustration, then, we obtain a rule to

determine what one ought to take from him who has the greater, and what

to add to him who has the less. The excess of the mean over the less

must be added to the less, and the excess of the greater over the mean

be taken from the greater.

Thus let there be three straight lines equal to one another. From one

of them cut off a portion, and add as much to another of them. The

whole line thus made will exceed the remainder of the first-named line,

by twice the portion added, and will exceed the untouched line by that

portion.[14] And these terms loss and gain are derived from voluntary

exchange: that is to say, the having more than what was one’s own is

called gaining, and the having less than one’s original stock is called

losing; for instance, in buying or selling, or any other transactions

which are guaranteed by law: but when the result is neither more nor

less, but exactly the same as there was originally,[15] people say they

have their own, and neither lose nor gain.

So then the Just we have been speaking of is a mean between loss and

gain arising in involuntary transactions; that is, it is the having the

same after the transaction as one had before it took place.

The Nicomachean ethics of Aristotle · 第 7 / 19 章