Now that there is more than one kind of Justice, and that there is one
which is distinct from and besides that which is co-extensive with,
Virtue, is plain: we must next ascertain what it is, and what are its
characteristics.
Well, the Unjust has been divided into the unlawful and the unequal,
and the Just accordingly into the lawful and the equal: the
aforementioned Injustice is in the way of the unlawful. And as the
unequal and the more[7] are not the same, but differing as part to
whole (because all more is unequal, but not all unequal more), so the
Unjust and the Injustice we are now in search of are not the same with,
but other than, those before mentioned, the one being the parts, the
other the wholes; for this particular Injustice is a part of the
Injustice co-extensive with Vice, and likewise this Justice of the
Justice co-extensive with Virtue. So that what we have now to speak of
is the particular Justice and Injustice, and likewise the particular
Just and Unjust.
Here then let us dismiss any further consideration of the Justice
ranking as co-extensive with Virtue (being the practice of Virtue in
all its bearings towards others), and of the co-relative Injustice
(being similarly the practice of Vice). It is clear too, that we must
separate off the Just and the Unjust involved in these: because one may
pretty well say that most lawful things are those which naturally
result in action from Virtue in its fullest sense, because the law
enjoins the living in accordance with each Virtue and forbids living in
accordance with each Vice. And the producing causes of Virtue in all
its bearings are those enactments which have been made respecting
education for society.
By the way, as to individual education, in respect of which a man is
simply good without reference to others, whether it is the province of
πολιτικὴ or some other science we must determine at a future time: for
it may be it is not the same thing to be a good man and a good citizen
in every case.[8]