We said that the violator of Law is Unjust, and the keeper of the Law
Just: further, it is plain that all Lawful things are in a manner Just,
because by Lawful we understand what have been defined by the
legislative power and each of these we say is Just. The Laws too give
directions on all points, aiming either at the common good of all, or
that of the best, or that of those in power (taking for the standard
real goodness or adopting some other estimate); in one way we mean by
Just, those things which are apt to produce and preserve happiness and
its ingredients for the social community.
Further, the Law commands the doing the deeds not only of the brave man
(as not leaving the ranks, nor flying, nor throwing away one’s arms),
but those also of the perfectly self-mastering man, as abstinence from
adultery and wantonness; and those of the meek man, as refraining from
striking others or using abusive language: and in like manner in
respect of the other virtues and vices commanding some things and
forbidding others, rightly if it is a good law, in a way somewhat
inferior if it is one extemporised.
Now this Justice is in fact perfect Virtue, yet not simply so but as
exercised towards one’s neighbour: and for this reason Justice is
thought oftentimes to be the best of the Virtues, and
“neither Hesper nor the Morning-star
So worthy of our admiration:”
and in a proverbial saying we express the same;
“All virtue is in Justice comprehended.”
And it is in a special sense perfect Virtue because it is the practice
of perfect Virtue. And perfect it is because he that has it is able to
practise his virtue towards his neighbour and not merely on himself; I
mean, there are many who can practise virtue in the regulation of their
own personal conduct who are wholly unable to do it in transactions
with their neighbour. And for this reason that saying of Bias is
thought to be a good one,
“Rule will show what a man is;”
for he who bears Rule is necessarily in contact with others, i.e. in a
community. And for this same reason Justice alone of all the Virtues is
thought to be a good to others, because it has immediate relation to
some other person, inasmuch as the Just man does what is advantageous
to another, either to his ruler or fellow-subject. Now he is the basest
of men who practises vice not only in his own person,[5] but towards
his friends also; but he the best who practises virtue not merely in
his own person but towards his neighbour, for this is a matter of some
difficulty.
However, Justice in this sense is not a part of Virtue but is
co-extensive with Virtue; nor is the Injustice which answers to it a
part of Vice but co-extensive with Vice. Now wherein Justice in this
sense differs from Virtue appears from what has been said: it is the
same really, but the point of view is not the same: in so far as it has
respect to one’s neighbour it is Justice, in so far as it is such and
such a moral state it is simply Virtue.