_MUNITIONS._
A brief history of the work of the Shell Committee, its organization,
and the part played by the Nova Scotia Steel and Coal Company in
producing munitions during the first two and a half years of the War.
On September 8, 1915, Col. Alex Bertram, Thomas Cantley, and George W.
Watts were summoned by the Federal Minister of Militia, Sir Sam Hughes,
to Valcartier. On meeting the Minister he stated that the British
Secretary of State for War had advised the Canadian Government that the
War Office were desirous of having shrapnel shells made in Canada, that
the Canadian Government had decided to entrust the matter to a Committee
of Manufacturers, and had so advised the War Office. It was understood
that the advice of the Minister had been accepted, and that the names of
the three gentlemen above referred to had been approved by the War
Office as a Committee to carry on the work on their behalf. The men
above named were then asked to serve as such Committee, without
remuneration, which they agreed to do, and were requested to select one
of their number as Chairman. On the suggestion of Thos. Cantley, Colonel
Bertram was appointed Chairman, the Minister confirming the appointment
of the Committee by a memorandum initialed “For Action.”
Later, Mr. E. Carnegie, of Welland, was added to the Committee, and at
their request the Minister agreed that Colonel Benson, Master General of
Ordnance; Colonel Lafferty, Superintendent of the Dominion Arsenal; and
Colonel Greville Harston, Inspector of Arms and Ammunition, should be
added as Technical Members.
The first meeting was held the same evening (September 8th) at the
Chateau Frontenac, Quebec. The second meeting was held the following day
at the office of the Superintendent of the Dominion Arsenal. The
Committee were accorded the privilege of dissecting the manufacturing
costs of the various operations involved in making shells of this type
at the Dominion Arsenal, which at that time had an out-turn of about 200
per day.
From the data there available and their experience as manufacturers the
Committee advised the War Office that 200,000 shrapnel shells could be
produced by the Committee and supplied to the War Office at a price of
$8.30 for the 15–pounder, and $8.55 each for the 18–pounder. On this
information being cabled to London the Committee were at once instructed
to proceed with the order.
[Illustration:
COL. THOMAS CANTLEY.]
After the order was in process of execution a contract was presented by
a representative of the War Office to the four civilian members, viz.,
Messrs. Bertram, Cantley, Watt and Carnegie, under which contract they
were obligated to supply the War Office with these shells at the prices
stated. This contract was duly executed, the Honorable Minister of
Militia signing on behalf of and representing, the War Office, the
civilian members signing on their own behalf.
While the first order was for 200,000 shells, additional orders were
placed by the War Office with the Committee at various times between
September, 1914, and November, 1915, aggregating in all $345,222,870.24.
The contract prices were in most cases named by the War Office. In some
cases the prices were the result of compromise arranged by cable between
the Committee and the War Office. In other cases the prices were those
suggested by the Committee and were accepted by the War Office.
As already stated, every order was covered by a contract between the War
Office on the one hand and the four civilian members of the Committee on
the other, for the carrying out of which the civilian members were
collectively and individually responsible. When they resigned office a
statement, which was prepared and duly audited showing the total cost,
together with the surplus based on prices agreed upon and covered by
contracts between the War Office and the four civilian members, showed
that the contracts entered into amounted in all to $345,222,874.34.
Approximately 87½ per cent. of these orders were then completed, and the
surplus—the difference between the contract price and the cost of
production—was $42,097,584.57, less overhead charges, cost of
inspection, guages, etc., of $737,400.31. If 12½ per cent. be added to
this overhead charge to meet similar expenses incidental to the
completion of the contracts, $92,175.03 would require to be added,
making the total overhead expenditure $829,575.34, or a total net
surplus to the credit of the Committee on November 30, 1915, of
$41,268,009.23. The total overhead cost, covering inspection, cost of
guages, accounting, and office expense of the Committee, worked out
at .17, or less than one-fifth of one per cent. of contract prices.
In this connection it may be stated that the prices paid by the War
Office to American makers in many cases were considerably higher than
those paid in Canada for shells and other material. In other cases,
where the prices were approximately the same, the volume of orders
entrusted to the United States makers were very much greater than the
corresponding orders placed with the Canadian Shell Committee, and the
American prices should have been considerably lower. Further, the orders
placed in the United States were entrusted to an agent, who is reported
to have received a handsome commission, whereas the services of the
Canadian Shell Committee were freely given.
In the early stages the executive work of the Committee was carried on
by General Bertram, whose time was largely taken up in co-ordinating the
machining of parts, and the placing of orders for components among
Canadian manufacturers, while Thomas Cantley undertook to carry out
experiments, both chemical and physical, looking to the production of
open hearth basic steel to meet the specifications and tests called for
by the War Office. Experiments were also carried out later in regard to
steel discs, base plates, nose plugs, alloy steel armor plating, etc.
Later Colonel Bertram, Thos. Cantley and G. W. Watts collaborated in
fixing prices for component parts and machining and assembling of the
different size shells. Later they devised a complete system of records,
inspection sheets, transfer and shipping forms, store and stock forms,
and a complete system of accounting was worked out and inaugurated by
them.
Late in September the Minister of Militia, on the suggestion of the
Committee, approved the appointment of David Carnegie as Ordnance
Adviser to the Committee, in view of the fact that he had had
considerable experience in munition work at Woolwich Arsenal.
When the War Office first appealed to Canada for assistance in supplying
munitions, little was known of shell manufacturing in Canada. This being
the case the Canadian Government decided that a Committee of
Manufacturers could better serve the War Office than could the
Government through any of the Departments; and then followed the
formation of the Shell Committee as originally outlined. The Committee
had before them three problems: First, that of securing steel of the
requisite character; secondly, the forging of the steel into shell
bodies, together with the supply of other component parts, comprising
brass, copper, tin, zinc and antimony; and thirdly, the machining and
assembling of these various component parts.
Up to the time that the request came from the War Office practically no
men in Canada, with the exception of those employed at the Dominion
Arsenal, knew anything about the manufacture of shells, or the material
required for same. The steel hitherto used at the Dominion Arsenal had
been supplied by the Crucible Steel Co. of America, and the War Office
had stipulated that only Acid Open Hearth Siemens-Martin steel could be
employed in shell forgings. As no Siemens-Martin steel was produced in
Canada, and if the War Office adhered to their stipulation in that
respect the entire steel supply would have to be obtained in the United
States, the American makers, feeling sure that this would be done,
promptly advanced their prices approximately forty per cent.
At this juncture the Minister of Militia appealed to Thomas Cantley,
then President and General Manager of the Nova Scotia Steel and Coal
Co., as to whether the Scotia plant could not produce steel which would
meet not only the chemical but physical requirements of the War Office
shell specifications. He at once expressed the belief that they could do
so, and immediately proceeded to carry out exhaustive experiments, both
chemical and physical, which proved conclusively that the Scotia Company
could produce steel as called for by the War Office, and offered to
supply it at a price as low as the original price asked by the American
works, and indeed below the American price. Within a few days of receipt
of the first order by the Shell Committee from the War Office, the
Scotia Company supplied the Committee with steel for 200,000 shrapnel
shells. The difference in price paid to the Scotia Company and the price
asked by the American Co. for the steel supplied on this small order
amounted to over $40,000.
As regards forging of shells, the cost of producing the various
component parts, the labor involved in finishing and assembling
these—the Committee were supplied with the cost of these various
operations as carried on at the Dominion Arsenal, but the difficulty
involved was that the work, having been done there by a class of machine
not in general use in Canada, and with the comparatively small order in
hand, manufacturers could not be found who would purchase and install
plant for this work and turn out shells within a reasonable time and
price.
Manufacturers throughout the country were invited to visit the Dominion
Arsenal at Quebec, where they would be shown the various operations
involved, and given all information _re_ cost, methods employed, etc.
Quite a number responded to this invitation. Some offered to undertake
the work; others declined to undertake it on any basis whatever.
Colonel Bertram volunteered that the John Bertram & Sons Co. would do a
certain amount of machining and assembling, and Thos. Cantley, through
his Company, the Nova Scotia Steel and Coal Co., undertook to supply the
steel and forgings, while Mr. Watt, of the Canadian General Electric
Company, agreed to make some of the component parts. Sir Thomas
Shaughnessy, on being appealed to by the Committee for assistance,
instructed the Superintendent of the Angus Shops to take on some of the
work, and generously promised that the Angus Shops would take up their
share of the enterprise.
With the start made by these firms to encourage them, a few other
manufacturers were induced to take up a share of the work, and thus the
supply of components parts and machining of same for the first 200,000
shells was finally placed, and this initial order was shipped complete
and to the entire satisfaction of the War Office some considerable time
before the contract date.
So soon as the work involved in the first trial order had been accepted
by the manufacturers referred to, the Committee took up the organization
necessary for the co-ordinating of the work on a larger scale; and as
large orders were received in rapid succession from the War Office,
contracts were made with different manufacturers for component parts,
which were bought outright by the Committee. A full set of component
parts for each shell was supplied by the assembly contractors, by whom
these were finished and returned as completed shells, they being paid a
fixed price on the shells which were completed, and which passed all the
tests demanded by the War Office, and were certified as such by the
Government Inspection Bureau. The component parts before being accepted
by the Committee and delivered to the finishing contractors were
inspected and certified by the Committee’s inspectors. Any component
parts spoiled by the assembly manufacturers had to be paid for by them
at the actual cost of same.
The first experiences of the forging and finishing contractors alike
were disappointing. It was an entirely new business to everybody engaged
in the work, and the usual initial difficulties were met and overcome
with varying success.
It is safe to say that as far as the first order of 200,000 shells was
concerned, the companies engaged, either as makers of component parts or
as assembly contractors, received little, if any, profit for their work.
They had only the usual reward that comes to pioneers in any new work.
When the new and larger orders came in, both the material and the work
were thrown open to competition. The Dominion Steel Corporation, the
Steel Company of Canada, and other smaller steel producers were asked to
supply steel and forgings. The same thing applied to manufacturing
establishments, which were in a position to supply other component parts
or to take on the work of machining and assembling. By the early part of
1915 the work was distributed throughout the entire Dominion.
Those who had done the pioneering work, and who won their position
through dearly-bought experience, and by venturing in where others
lacked courage to do so, came under criticism from others who had not
hitherto undertaken any of the work. To overcome this difficulty and to
assure hearty co-operation in the production of the largest amount of
munitions possible, the Committee adopted the principle of naming a flat
price for each component part, as well as for the machining and
assembling of each size shell.
All the orders placed thereafter, from time to time, were placed at a
uniform price, both for the component parts and for the finishing of the
shells. The instant effect of this was that the accumulated experience
of the pioneering firms was placed at the disposal of the other
manufacturers. Both forging and finishing shops were thrown open, their
methods of working and costs were fully explained, and shown to other
manufacturers. The newcomers thus saved the heavy cost of experimental
work.
New methods, improvements of great value in connection with the
execution of the work, the outcome of the initiative adaptability of
Canadians, wrought a revolution in the methods of production. All these
improvements were in every case put within the reach of other
manufacturers. Many of these have been adopted, not only by Canadian
shell makers, but by shell makers in the United States and Great
Britain.
During the organization period from September, 1914, to April, 1915,
more than one member of the Committee worked from ten to seventeen hours
per day, Sundays and holidays not excepted, and none of the members then
appointed received one dollar by way of remuneration.
The part played by the New Glasgow works of the Nova Scotia Steel and
Coal Company in the Great War is an interesting one. At the beginning of
hostilities in August, 1914, there were only two Steel Companies in the
United States who had either the plant or experience to produce either
shells or armor plates, while none of the Canadian steel plants had any
experience whatever.
The first production of munition material, by way of shells and shell
steel, was undertaken in Canada by the Shell Committee, and the story of
the experiments carried on in the early days of September, 1914, which
resulted in convincing the British War Office that basic steel, as made
in Canada, would meet all the requirements of both shrapnel and high
explosive shells, and which resulted in very large orders for munitions
coming to Canada, is well known to all Nova Scotians, and has become a
matter of history.
Between October, 1914, when the Scotia plants produced 22,000 shell
forgings, and the signing of the Armistice, November 11, 1918, the New
Glasgow plant had made more than 15,000,000 shells—these ranging in size
from the 15–pounder shrapnel to 12–inch high explosive, the local plant
being the only one in Canada which made the latter size. The total
tonnage of forged shells produced at New Glasgow amounted in round
figures to 180,000 tons. In addition to this a very considerable tonnage
of shell and other munition steel was shipped to be worked up in other
shell forging establishments in Canada and Great Britain. A further
considerable tonnage was worked up into marine forgings. British
shipyards about this time experienced great difficulty in obtaining
heavy marine forgings to meet Lloyd’s specification and tests. The
Scotia forges had long been on Lloyd’s list as approved makers of Marine
Forgings. The British shipbuilders’ difficulty was now met by Scotia,
which supplied to various yards on the Clyde, the East Coast, and other
yards complete sets of marine forgings of all classes for both
mercantile and other vessels of large tonnage. The total quantity of
marine forgings supplied Great Britain since the outbreak of war
amounted to 9,000 tons.
Most Nova Scotians are probably entirely ignorant of the considerable
amount of what might be called “research” and experimental work carried
out at the New Glasgow plant for the Government, and while this did not
produce the tangible results brought about in connection with the
manufacture of shells, not a little of the data and knowledge
accumulated, contributed in a very considerable degree to the successful
development of both the offensive and the defensive equipment of the
Allied forces.
While this work was being done secrecy was essential, nothing was said
and but little known of the work carried on along these lines. Now that
the War is over the necessity for secrecy appears to be past.
In February, 1919, the firm of William Beardmore and Co., of Glasgow,
Scotland, in their works magazine, told the story of the evolution and
development by them of bullet-proof material for the protection of
armored cars, trench shields, armor-plate for the celebrated “tanks,”
and other work of a like character. The story, as told by the Beardmore
people, in many important particulars runs on all fours with the
experiments and results obtained at New Glasgow during the latter weeks
of 1914 and the early part of 1915, when a series of exhaustive
experiments were carried out at New Glasgow, first in connection with
the production and testing of bullet-resisting steel plate.
This matter was first brought to the attention of the writer by General
Sir Sam Hughes in connection with the shield shovel, of which a good
deal was heard during 1915 and 1916. This spade, as supplied by the
American makers, was formed with a sharp cutting edge, and a loophole
for a rifle, but had no handle. When deliveries began to be made by the
American manufacturers, a certain quantity was collected at random and
turned over to the writer for testing. This was carried out at the rifle
range, of the Fifth Royal Highlanders in the basement of the Bleury
Street Armory, Montreal. It was then found that while practically all
would stand Mark Six British Service Ammunition, they failed to
withstand the much greater impact of Mark Seven Ammunition. Mark Six had
a muzzle velocity of about 1,800 feet per second. Further investigation
showed that the difference in bullet resisting power in the plates
submitted was due to lack of uniformity.
No handles had been supplied with the shovels, and no apparent effort
had been made by the manufacturers to supply one which was suitable.
Scotia’s engineers were asked to meet the difficulty, which they did,
and finally offered one which was adopted, weighed eight ounces, and was
secured by a single rivet passing through a square slotted hole in the
body of the shovel below the base of the tang.
At this time the question of supplying our army with armored machine-gun
automobile trucks had become a pressing matter. The question had been
turned over to a Toronto Committee. Great delay was experienced in
securing sufficient suitable bullet-resisting plate, and serious
confusion resulted. The experiments in connection with the shovel had
thrown great doubt on the efficiency of the steel being supplied by the
Americans, and again the Scotia Company were asked to carry out tests
and advise as to the matter.
From hints which had filtered through from the army in France and
Flanders it was known that the German Spitzer bullet was much more
effective than the British new Mark Seven, and while the armor-plating
contracted to be supplied by the Americans for these cars was guaranteed
to withstand Mark Seven British Ammunition at 300 yards, the rumors in
regard to the penetrating powers of the German Spitzer ammunition were
most disquieting, and could not be ignored.
At that time the United States were neutral, but were making ammunition
for the Allies and others. By methods, which it is not necessary here to
refer to, or explain, the General Manager of the Scotia Company was able
to obtain a German Mauser Service Rifle, and by an expenditure out of
all proportion to the real value, 1,000 rounds of German Mauser Spitzer
service ammunition was also secured. An improvised range was set up on
the ice on the East River, Nova Scotia, at a point where, protected by
steep banks, firing tests could be carried out, when it was demonstrated
that .311 Spitzer German ammunition, which, carefully chronographed,
gave a muzzle velocity of 2,915 feet per second, easily penetrated the
armor plate which resisted Mark Seven British Ammunition fired from
either the Lee-Enfield or Ross Rifle.
The effect, of course, was to call a halt to the manufacture of these
plates, and at the same time to push forward experiments then under way
in the production by the Scotia Company of bullet-resisting alloy armor
plates. Within a short time New Glasgow was able to offer the Department
of Militia alloy steel, heat-treated plates, not exceeding 3–16th of an
inch thick, which successfully withstood point-blank impact at one yard
from Mark 7 ammunition fired from the latest model Ross rifle. In one
case two shots had struck the plate within less than one-half inch of
each other, and they neither penetrated nor cracked the plate.
Plates somewhat thicker were later supplied which withstood German
Mauser ammunition at point blank range, and the result given by these
plates when tested at the Proving Station in Toronto were so
satisfactory that the Artillery Proving Officers, after the tests,
placed them on exhibition outside the Camp, and later reported that the
men felt the utmost confidence with the protection afforded them by this
plating, which later was supplied and fitted to a proportion of the
machine-gun trucks then being equipped. Later the British Government
asked the Scotia Company to tender for similar protective plating for
armored trucks.