[Illustration: U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR · March 3, 1849]
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
Stewart L. Udall, _Secretary_
NATIONAL PARK SERVICE
Conrad L. Wirth, _Director_
_HISTORICAL HANDBOOK NUMBER THIRTY-THREE_
This publication is one of a series of handbooks describing the
historical and archeological areas in the National Park System
administered by the National Park Service of the United States
Department of the Interior. It is printed by the Government Printing
Office and may be purchased from the Superintendent of Documents,
Washington 25, D.C. Price 25 cents.
RICHMOND
National Battlefield Park
Virginia
[Illustration: {Sniper}]
_by Joseph P. Cullen_
NATIONAL PARK SERVICE HISTORICAL HANDBOOK SERIES NO. 33
Washington, D.C., 1961
[Illustration: _The National Park System, of which Richmond National
Battlefield Park is a unit, is dedicated to conserving the scenic,
scientific, and historic heritage of the United States for the
benefit and inspiration of its people._]
_Contents_
_Page_
Richmond 1
The Army of the Potomac 2
Part One
THE PENINSULA CAMPAIGN, SUMMER 1862
On to Richmond 3
Up the Peninsula 4
Drewry’s Bluff 5
Seven Pines (Fair Oaks) 6
Lee Takes Command 9
The Seven Days Begin 12
Beaver Dam Creek (Ellerson’s Mill) 13
Gaines’ Mill 16
Savage Station 18
Glendale (Frayser’s Farm) 21
Malvern Hill 22
End of Campaign 24
The Years Between 27
Part Two
THE FINAL STRUGGLE FOR RICHMOND, 1864-65
Lincoln’s New Commander 28
Cold Harbor 29
Fort Harrison 37
Richmond Falls 40
The Park 46
Administration 46
[Illustration: _Richmond, 1858._ From a contemporary sketch.]
[Illustration: ]
The American Civil War _was unique in many respects. One of the great
turning points in American history, it was a national tragedy of
international significance. Simultaneously, it was the last of the old
wars and the first of the new. Although it began in a blaze of glamor,
romance, and chivalry, it ended in the ashes of misery, destruction, and
death. It was, as Walt Whitman said, “a strange, sad war.”_
Richmond National Battlefield Park preserves the scenes of some of the
great battles that took place in the vicinity of the Confederate
Capital. When we visit these now quiet, peaceful woods and fields, we
feel an association with our past that is impossible to achieve with the
written or spoken word. Here we are not reminded of the Blue or the Gray
as such, only of the heroic struggle of men—men with two different
beliefs and philosophies, welded together by the blood of battle, to
give us our America of today.
_Richmond_
In session at Montgomery, Ala., in May 1861, the Confederate Congress
voted to remove the Capital of the Confederate States to Richmond, Va.
This decision, in effect, made Richmond a beleaguered city for 4 years.
Essentially, the move was dictated by political and military
considerations. The prestige of Virginia, richest and most populous
State in the South, was considered necessary for the success of the
Confederacy. For political reasons it was believed that the Capital
should be near the border States and the heavy fighting expected there.
Second only to New Orleans, Richmond was the largest city in the
Confederacy, having a population of about 38,000. It was also the center
of iron manufacturing in the South. The Tredegar Iron Works, main source
of cannon supply for the Southern armies, influenced the choice of
Richmond as the Confederate Capital and demanded its defense. During the
course of the war, Tredegar made over 1,100 cannon, in addition to
mines, torpedoes, propeller shafts, and other war machinery. It expanded
to include rolling mills, forges, sawmills, and machine shops. The
Richmond Laboratory made over 72 million cartridges, along with
grenades, gun carriages, field artillery, and canteens, while the
Richmond Armory had a capacity for manufacturing 5,000 small arms a
month.
[Illustration: _Tredegar Iron Works._ Courtesy, Library of
Congress.]
Thus Richmond became the political, military, and manufacturing center
of the South, and the symbol of secession to the North.
Situated near the head of the navigable waters of the James River, and
within 110 miles of the National Capital at Washington, Richmond was the
key to the military planning of both sides. For 4 years the city
remained the primary military objective of the Union armies in the east.
As one southern newspaper stated: “To lose Richmond is to lose Virginia,
and to lose Virginia is to lose the key to the Southern Confederacy.”
_The Army of the Potomac_
In July 1861 the untrained Union Army of the Potomac suffered disaster
at Manassas (Bull Run) in the first attempt to drive into Virginia and
capture Richmond. President Abraham Lincoln then appointed Gen. George
B. McClellan the new commander of the demoralized army. McClellan
reported: “I found no army to command * * * just a mere collection of
regiments cowering on the banks of the Potomac.”
To this chaotic situation he brought order and discipline. During the
long winter months, the raw recruits were marshalled and drilled into an
efficient fighting machine of over 100,000 men—the largest army ever
commanded by one man in the history of the western hemisphere. By the
spring of 1862 this army was ready for the supreme test—the goal was
Richmond.
Part One
THE PENINSULA CAMPAIGN, SUMMER, 1862
_On To Richmond_
Instead of marching overland, McClellan decided to take advantage of
Union control of the inland waters and transport his army, with its vast
supplies and materiel, down the Potomac River and across Chesapeake Bay
to the tip of the peninsula between the York and James Rivers. Then with
his supply ships steaming up the York, he planned to march northwestward
up the peninsula, join another force under Gen. Irvin McDowell marching
overland from Washington, and together, converge on Richmond.
[Illustration: _McClellan’s plan of attack._ Painting by Sidney
King.]
To accomplish this, McClellan undertook the largest amphibious operation
ever attempted in the western world. Over 400 steam vessels, brigs,
schooners, sloops, ferry boats, and barges assembled on the Potomac
River. In March 1862 these vessels ferried the Army of the Potomac, with
its 3,600 wagons, 700 ambulances, 300 pieces of artillery, 2,500 head of
cattle, and over 25,000 horses and mules, to the southeast coast of
Virginia. As Q. M. Gen. Rufus Ingalls reported: “Operations so extensive
and important as the rapid and successful embarkation of such an army,
with all its vast equipment, its transfer to the peninsula, and its
supply while there, had scarcely any parallel in history.”
_Up The Peninsula_
After landing at Fortress Monroe the Federal troops pushed aside the
thinly held Confederate defenses at Yorktown and Williamsburg and
proceeded up the peninsula according to plan. But progress was slow.
Every day 500 tons of forage and subsistence were required to keep the
army in the field. Early in May it rained and kept raining, day after
dreary day. Federal soldiers had a saying: “Virginia used to be in the
Union—now it’s in the mud.” Dirt roads turned into bottomless
muck—creeks and gullies became swift flowing streams—fields were swamps.
Roads and bridges had to be built and rebuilt, and still the thousands
of wagons, horses, and mules continually stuck in the mud.
[Illustration: _Sumner’s troops crossing Grapevine Bridge to
reinforce Coach at Seven Pines._ From a contemporary sketch.]
Realizing that an effective overland pursuit of the retreating
Confederate forces under Gen. Joseph E. Johnston was out of the question
because of the weather and the condition of the roads, McClellan on May
6 sent Gen. William B. Franklin’s division up the York River by
transport to West Point, terminus of the Richmond and York River
Railroad, in an attempt to cut off the Confederate wagon train. Johnston
anticipated the move, however, and on May 7 ordered Gen. W. H. C.
Whiting’s troops to attack Franklin in the battle of West Point, or
Eltham’s Landing.
The attack was repulsed, but, even so, the wagon train managed to
continue safely to Richmond. McClellan, however, had cleared the way to
his next objective—the landing at White House on the Pamunkey River, a
tributary of the York. Here the railroad crossed the Pamunkey on its way
to West Point. This would be the Union base of supply for the
contemplated attack on Richmond. This battle also cleared the way for
the right wing of the Union army, which would have to stay north and
east of Richmond in order to hook up with McDowell’s anticipated
overland march from Washington.
General Johnston, falling back steadily in front of McClellan’s slow
advance, was the target of severe criticism from Richmond newspapers for
not making a determined stand. But he wrote to Gen. Robert E. Lee: “We
are engaged in a species of warfare at which we can never win. It is
plain that Gen. McClellan will adhere to the system adopted by him last
summer, and depend for success upon artillery and engineering. We can
compete with him in neither.”
_Drewry’s Bluff_
After the fall of Norfolk on May 10 to the Union forces under Gen. John
Wool, the crew of the _Virginia_ (_Merrimack_) scuttled their ship.
River pilots had advised that the iron-clad vessel could not navigate
the treacherous channel up the James River to Richmond. Loss of the
_Virginia_ opened the river to Federal gunboats, and McClellan
immediately telegraphed the War Department: “I would now most earnestly
urge that our gunboats and the iron-clad boats be sent as far as
possible up the James river without delay. Instructions have been given
so that the Navy will receive prompt support wherever and whenever
required.”
Five Union gunboats, including the famous _Monitor_, started up the
James under Comdr. John Rogers in the _Galena_. By May 15 they reached
Drewry’s Bluff, just 7 miles below Richmond. Here, at a sharp bend, the
Confederates had effectively obstructed the river and erected powerful
batteries on a 90-foot bluff.
[Illustration: _Battle of Drewry’s Bluff._ Diorama, Richmond
National Battlefield Park Visitor Center.]
At 7 that morning the Federal gunboats opened fire on Fort Darling. The
battle raged for 4 hours while the fate of Richmond hung in the balance,
and near panic spread through the city. However, the accurate fire of
the heavy guns on the bluff, combined with effective sharpshooting along
the riverbanks, finally proved too much for the gunboats, and the
Federal fleet retreated down the river. One Confederate officer
observed: “* * * had Commander Rogers been supported by a few brigades,
landed at City Point or above on the south side, Richmond would have
been evacuated.”
Although the Secretary of the Navy requested “a cooperating land force”
to help the gunboats pass Fort Darling and take Richmond, McClellan,
despite his earlier promise of cooperation, wired the War Department:
“Am not yet ready to cooperate with them.” He neglected to say when he
would be ready. Richmond was never again seriously threatened by water.
_Seven Pines_ (_Fair Oaks_)
Slowed by the heavy rains and the bad condition of the roads, where
“teams cannot haul over half a load, and often empty wagons are
stalled,” McClellan finally established his base of supply at White
House on May 15. Five days later his advance crossed the Chickahominy
River at Bottoms Bridge. By the 24th the five Federal corps were
established on a front partly encircling Richmond on the north and east,
and less than 6 miles away. Three corps lined the north bank of the
Chickahominy, while the two corps under Generals E. D. Keyes and Samuel
P. Heintzelman were south of the river, astride the York River Railroad
and the roads down the peninsula.
[Illustration: _Gen. George B. McClellan._ Courtesy, Library of
Congress.]
With his army thus split by the Chickahominy, McClellan realized his
position was precarious, but his orders were explicit: “General McDowell
has been ordered to march upon Richmond by the shortest route. He is
ordered * * * so to operate as to place his left wing in communication
with your right wing, and you are instructed to cooperate, by extending
your right wing to the north of Richmond * * *.”
Then, because of Gen. Thomas J. (“Stonewall”) Jackson’s brilliant
operations in the Shenandoah Valley threatening Washington, Lincoln
telegraphed McClellan on May 24: “I have been compelled to suspend
McDowell’s movements to join you.” McDowell wrote disgustedly: “If the
enemy can succeed so readily in disconcerting all our plans by alarming
us first at one point then at another, he will paralyze a large force
with a very small one.” That is exactly what Jackson succeeded in doing.
This fear for the safety of Washington—the skeleton that haunted
Lincoln’s closet—was the dominating factor in the military planning in
the east throughout the war.
Lincoln’s order only suspended McDowell’s instructions to join
McClellan; it did not revoke them. McClellan was still obliged to keep
his right wing across the swollen Chickahominy.
Learning of McDowell’s withdrawal, Johnston decided to attack the two
Federal corps south of the river, drive them back and destroy the
Richmond and York River Railroad to White House. Early in the morning on
May 31, after a violent rainstorm that threatened to wash all the
Federal bridges into the river, Johnston fell upon Keyes and Heintzelman
with 23 of his 27 brigades at Seven Pines.
The initial attack was sudden and vicious. Confederate Gen. James
Longstreet threw Gen. D. H. Hill’s troops against Gen. Silas Casey’s
division of Keyes’ corps, stationed about three-quarters of a mile west
of Seven Pines. Longstreet overwhelmed the Federal division, forcing
Casey to retreat a mile east of Seven Pines. Keyes then put Gen. D. N.
Couch’s division on a line from Seven Pines to Fair Oaks, with Gen.
Philip Kearney’s division on his left flank. Not until 4 that afternoon,
however, did Confederate Gen. G. W. Smith send Whiting’s division
against Couch’s right flank at Fair Oaks. The delay was fatal. Although
Couch was forced back slowly, he drew up a new line of battle facing
south towards Fair Oaks, with his back to the Chickahominy River. Here
he held until Gen. Edwin V. Sumner, by heroic effort, succeeded in
getting Gen. John Sedgwick’s division and part of Gen. I. B.
Richardson’s across the tottering Grapevine Bridge to support him. Led
by Sumner himself, Sedgwick’s troops repulsed Smith’s attack and drove
the Confederates back with heavy losses.
The battle plan had been sound, but the attack was badly bungled.
Directed by vague, verbal orders instead of explicit, written ones,
whole brigades got lost, took the wrong roads, and generally got in each
other’s way. Nine of the 23 attacking brigades never actually got into
the fight at all. Towards nightfall Johnston was severely wounded in the
chest and borne from the field. The command then fell to G. W. Smith.
Fighting ceased with darkness.
Early next morning, June 1, Smith renewed the attack. His plan called
for Whiting on the left flank to hold defensively, while Longstreet on
the right swung counterclockwise in a pivot movement to hit Richardson’s
division, which was facing south with its right near Fair Oaks. The
Federal troops repulsed the assault, however, and when Heintzelman sent
Gen. Joseph Hooker’s division on the Federal left on the offensive, the
Confederates withdrew and the battle was over before noon.
That afternoon President Jefferson Davis appointed his chief military
advisor, Gen. Robert E. Lee, as commander of the Southern forces. Lee
promptly named his new command the Army of Northern Virginia—a name
destined for fame in the annals of the Civil War.
[Illustration: _McClellan’s troops repairing Grapevine Bridge._
Courtesy, Library of Congress.]
Although the battle itself was indecisive, the casualties were heavy on
both sides. The Confederates lost 6,184 in killed, wounded, and missing;
the Federals, 5,031. Undoubtedly the most important result of the fight
was the wounding of Johnston and the resultant appointment of Lee as
field commander.
_Lee Takes Command_
Lee immediately began to reorganize the demoralized Southern forces, and
put them to work digging the elaborate system of entrenchments that
would eventually encircle Richmond completely. For this the troops
derisively named him the “King of Spades.” But Lee was planning more
than a static defense. When the time came these fortifications could be
held by a relatively small number of troops, while he massed the bulk of
his forces for a counteroffensive. He was familiar with and believed in
Napoleon’s maxim: “* * * to manoeuver incessantly, without submitting to
be driven back on the capital which it is meant to defend * * *.”
On June 12 Lee sent his cavalry commander, Gen. J. E. B. (“Jeb”) Stuart,
with 1,200 men, to reconnoiter McClellan’s right flank north of the
Chickahominy, and to learn the strength of his line of communication and
supply to White House. Stuart obtained the information, but instead of
retiring from White House the way he had gone, he rode around the Union
army and returned to Richmond on June 15 by way of the James River,
losing only one man in the process.
[Illustration: _Gen. Robert E. Lee._ Courtesy, National Archives.]
[Illustration: _Lee’s fortifications east of Mechanicsville
Turnpike._ From a contemporary sketch.]
[Illustration: _Chickahominy swamps._ Courtesy, National Archives.]
It was a bold feat, and Stuart assured his chief that there was nothing
to prevent his turning the Federal right flank. But the daring ride
probably helped McClellan more than Lee. Alerted to the exposed position
of his right flank and base of supply, McClellan withdrew his whole army
south of the Chickahominy, with the exception of Gen. Fitz-John Porter’s
corps, which stretched from Grapevine Bridge to the Meadow Bridge west
of Mechanicsville. On June 18 he started the transfer of his enormous
accumulation of supplies with the shipment of 800,000 rations from White
House to Harrison’s Landing on the James River. After Jackson’s success
in the Shenandoah Valley at Cross Keys and Port Republic, it was
becoming apparent even to McClellan that McDowell probably never would
join him, in which case he wanted his base of operations to be the James
rather than the York River.
Meanwhile, pressure from Washington for an offensive movement against
Richmond was mounting. But because of the wettest June in anyone’s
memory, McClellan was having trouble bringing up his heavy siege guns,
corduroying roads, and throwing bridges across the flooded Chickahominy
swamps. As one bedraggled soldier wrote: “It would have pleased us much
to have seen those ‘On-to-Richmond’ people put over a 5 mile course in
the Virginia mud, loaded with a 40-pound knapsack, 60 rounds of
cartridges, and haversacks filled with 4 days rations.”
Also, McClellan believed erroneously that the Confederates had twice as
many available troops as he had. Consequently, his plan of action, as he
wrote his wife, was to “make the first battle mainly an artillery
combat. As soon as I gain possession of the ‘Old Tavern’ I will push
them in upon Richmond and behind their works; then I will bring up my
heavy guns, shell the city, and carry it by assault.”
_The Seven Days Begins_
[Illustration: _Lee’s plan of attack._ Painting by Sidney King.]
McClellan’s plan probably would have succeeded had Lee been willing to
stand still for it. But the Confederate commander did not intend to let
McClellan fight that type of warfare. As he wrote to Jackson: “Unless
McClellan can be driven out of his entrenchments he will move by
positions under cover of his heavy guns within shelling distance of
Richmond.” It was almost as if Lee had read McClellan’s letter to his
wife.
Lee’s plan to drive McClellan away from Richmond was bold and daring,
and strategically brilliant. He would bring Jackson’s forces down from
the valley quickly and secretly to turn McClellan’s right flank at
Mechanicsville. At the same time Gen. A. P. Hill’s division would cross
the Chickahominy at Meadow Bridge, turn east and clear the Federal
forces from Mechanicsville, thereby opening the Mechanicsville Turnpike
bridge for D. H. Hill and Longstreet’s troops to cross. Then, in
echelon, the four divisions would sweep down the north side of the
Chickahominy, annihilate Porter’s corps, capture the supply base at
White House, then turn and destroy the rest of the Union army. With
Jackson’s forces and other reinforcements from farther south, Lee would
have about 90,000 men, the largest army he would ever command in the
field.
To protect Richmond, he planned to leave about one-third of his army,
under Generals John B. Magruder and Benjamin Huger, in the entrenchments
around the city to hold back the main part of McClellan’s force, about
70,000 men, from marching into the Confederate Capital. If this force
started to withdraw, then Magruder and Huger would attack.
Lee apparently believed that McClellan would try to retreat to his base
at White House, or failing that, would retire back down the peninsula.
He assured Jefferson Davis that “any advance of the enemy toward
Richmond will be prevented by vigorously following his rear and
crippling and arresting his progress.” The strategy was just about
perfect, but, unfortunately for Lee, the tactics were not.
On the morning of June 25 the Seven Days began with the advance of
Hooker’s division along the Williamsburg road at Oak Grove, preparatory
to a general advance McClellan planned for the next day. But Hooker ran
into strong opposition from Huger’s troops, and when McClellan received
intelligence of Jackson’s approach, Hooker was ordered back. McClellan
wired Washington: “I incline to think that Jackson will attack my right
and rear.” He had delayed too long—the next day Lee wrested the
initiative from him.
_Beaver Dam Creek_ (_Ellerson’s Mill_)
According to Lee’s plan, Jackson was to march from Ashland on June 25
and encamp that night just west of the Central Railroad. At 3 a.m. on
the 26th he was to advance and envelop Porter’s right flank at Beaver
Dam Creek. Then, wrote Lee, “A. P. Hill was to cross the Chickahominy at
Meadow Bridge when Jackson’s advance beyond that point should be known
and move directly upon Mechanicsville.”
[Illustration: _Confederate attack at Beaver Dam Creek._ From a
contemporary sketch.]
But from the beginning, unforeseen circumstances upset the operation and
timing of this plan. McClellan suspected Jackson’s approach, so the
element of surprise was lacking. And when the action of the Union
pickets in destroying bridges and felling trees in Jackson’s path, as
well as the fatigue of his weary troops, combined to delay him, the
all-important time element was lost.
As the day wore on with no word from Jackson, A. P. Hill became
impatient and fearful for the success of Lee’s plan. He decided to
attack regardless. At 3 that afternoon he crossed the Chickahominy and
swept the Union outposts from Mechanicsville, thus clearing the way for
D. H. Hill and Longstreet’s troops to cross. Porter withdrew to a
prepared position behind Beaver Dam Creek, a mile east of
Mechanicsville. This naturally strong position was further fortified by
felled trees and the banks of a millrace. Here, atop the high banks of
the stream, he placed Gen. George McCall’s division, extending from near
the Chickahominy on the south, across Old Church road (now U.S. 360) on
the north. Gen. Truman Seymour’s brigade held the left and Gen. John
Reynold’s the right, with Gen. George G. Meade’s brigade in reserve. The
only approaches to the position were across open fields, commanded by
the Federal artillery, and down the steep banks of the stream, covered
by the soldiers’ muskets.
Hill recklessly hurled his brigades forward in a hopeless frontal
assault. The gray-clad infantry charged bravely down the steep banks and
up to the stream before the murderous fire of artillery and musketry
from the surrounding slopes forced a bloody withdrawal. Casualties in
killed and wounded were: Confederate 1,485; Union, 258.
Despite the successful defense, when Jackson’s forces finally appeared
on his right flank later that night, Porter’s position became untenable
and McClellan ordered him to withdraw to a previously prepared position
behind Boatswain Swamp, near Gaines’ Mill. At the same time he ordered
his quartermaster general at White House to reship all the supplies he
possibly could to Harrison’s Landing on the James, and send all the beef
cattle to the vicinity of Savage Station. Early next morning, June 27,
the herd of 2,500 head of cattle started on its drive from White House.
[Illustration: _Battle of Gaines’ Mill._ From _Battles and Leaders
of the Civil War_.]
OLD COLD HARBOR
Gaines’s MILL
NEW COLD HARBOR
_CONFEDERATE_
Lee’s Headq’rs
D. H. HILL
JACKSON
EWELL
A. P. HILL
WHITING
LONGSTREET
_UNION_
SYKES
McGehee
BUCHANAN
WARREN
LOVELL
MORELL
Porter’s Headq’rs
GRIFFIN
MARTINDALE
BUTTERFIELD
McCALL
REYNOLDS
SEYMOUR
MEADE
J. Martin
W. F. SMITH
SLOCUM _ARRIVING 4 O’CLOCK_
NEWTON
TAYLOR
BARTLETT
FRENCH & MEACHER _ARRIVING TO COVER RETREAT about 6.30 p.m._
[Illustration: _McClellan’s change of base._ Painting by Sidney
King.]
WHITE HOUSE
MECHANICSVILLE
GAINES MILL
Pomunkey
SAVAGE STATION
Chickahominy
GLENDALE
MALVERN HILL
HARRISON’S LANDING
_Gaines’ Mill_
The tactical situation was now extremely critical for both Lee and
McClellan. Because of the repulse at Beaver Dam, Lee had not yet
achieved his first objective, which, according to his battle order, was
to “drive the enemy from his position above New Bridge,” about 4 miles
east of Mechanicsville. Lee’s whole plan for the defense of Richmond, in
the event McClellan should elect to march on the city with his main
force south of the Chickahominy, hinged on his ability to cross the
river quickly and attack the Federal rear. Lacking control of New Bridge
this would be impossible. Although the Union position behind Boatswain
Swamp was actually east of New Bridge, the approaches to the bridge
could be covered by Porter’s artillery.
The situation was equally serious for McClellan. With Jackson enveloping
his right flank and rear, and believing he “had to deal with at least
double” his numbers, White House would have to be abandoned. Having made
the decision to change his base to the James, he desperately needed time
to perfect the arrangements and to get the thousands of wagons and the
herd of cattle safely started. His order to Porter was explicit, “hold
our position at any cost until night * * *.”
Porter’s corps now occupied a semicircular line of battle along the
crest of the partially wooded plateau behind Boatswain Swamp, with both
extremes resting on the Chickahominy River. It was another naturally
strong position further strengthened by felling trees and digging rifle
pits. The approaches to the position were over an open plain and across
a sharp ravine. Gen. George Morell’s division held the left and Gen.
George Sykes’ right, with McCall’s weary troops in reserve. Gen. Philip
St. George Cooke’s cavalry was on Porter’s extreme left, in the lowlands
bordering the Chickahominy. During the course of the impending battle of
Gaines’ Mill, Porter would be reinforced by Gen. Willard Slocum’s
division, giving him a total strength of about 35,000, as opposed to
about 60,000 for Lee.
On the Confederate side, Longstreet was on Lee’s right opposite Morell,
A. P. Hill in the center, and Jackson and D. H. Hill on the left. Lee
was convinced that the greater part of the Federal army was in his
front, and he still thought McClellan would try to protect his base and
retreat toward White House. On these erroneous assumptions he made his
plans.
A. P. Hill would attack the center while Longstreet made a feint on the
Union left. Then when Jackson appeared on the Union right, Lee believed
Porter would shift part of his troops to meet Jackson’s threat in order
to keep him from getting between the Union army and its base at White
House. As soon as Porter did this, Longstreet would turn the feint into
a full assault, and together with Hill drive the Union forces into
Jackson and D. H. Hill, waiting on Lee’s left.
About 2:30 p.m. Hill attacked the center of the Federal line, but under
a devastating fire of artillery and musketry, “where men fell like
leaves in an autumn wind,” his troops were hurled back with heavy
losses. Longstreet, realizing a feint now would not help Hill, ordered a
full-scale attack, but he too suffered a bloody repulse. Jackson,
sensing that “Porter didn’t drive worth two cents,” as he quaintly put
it, threw D. H. Hill against Sykes on Porter’s right.
By now A. P. Hill’s division was badly cut up, and on Lee’s request
Jackson sent Whiting’s division, consisting of Gen. E. M. Law’s and John
B. Hood’s brigades, over to support him. Porter then threw in Slocum’s
division of Franklin’s corps, to protect threatened points along the
line. The vicious battle waged furiously for 4 hours. “The noise of the
musketry,” said one veteran, “was not rattling, as ordinarily, but one
intense metallic din.”
Finally, just as darkness covered the bloody field, Hood’s Texas
brigade, along with Gen. George Pickett’s brigade on Longstreet’s left,
penetrated the right of Morell’s line in a courageous bayonet charge
that broke the morale of the Federal troops. They went streaming back
across the plateau to the safety of the Chickahominy River. In a last
desperate attempt to stem the tide, General Cooke (“Jeb” Stuart’s
father-in-law) sent his cavalry in a wild charge against the pressing
Confederates. But the retreating Union infantry and artillery obstructed
the cavalry and broke its attack. The only result was the loss of
several more artillery pieces in the confusion.
With darkness closing in and the Confederate troops disorganized after
the breakthrough, Lee did not attempt to pursue the Federals farther.
Porter withdrew the remnants of his corps across the river and rejoined
the main Union army. Total casualties in this crucial battle, the most
costly and vicious of the Seven Days, were: Union, 6,837; Confederate,
8,751.
In a sense, both sides had achieved their immediate objectives. Porter
had held until night, so McClellan could get his army safely started for
Harrison’s Landing. Lee had cleared the north side of the Chickahominy
of all Federal forces, broken their supply line to White House,
controlled strategic New Bridge, and had turned back McClellan’s advance
on Richmond.
_Savage Station_
[Illustration: _Battle of Savage Station._ From _Battles and Leaders
of the Civil War_.]
MAGRUDER’S HEADQUARTERS ON BRIDGE OVER RAILROAD
TOOMB’S BRIGADE
BARKSDALE’S BRIGADE
COBB’S BRIGADE
HART’S BATTERY
RAILROAD BATTERY
KERSHAW’S BRIGADE
SEMMES’S BRIG.
KEMPER’S BATTERY
17^TH. & 21^ST. MISS. OF BARKESDALE’S BRIG.
RICHARDSON’S DIVISION
SUMNER’S CORPS
MEAGHER
CALDWELL
FRENCH
FIELD HOSPITAL
SEDGWICK’S DIVISION
BURN’S BRIG.
GORMAN
1ST-MINN. GORMAN’S BRIG.
DANA
PETTIT, HAZZARD AND OSBORN
SUMNER & FRANKLIN _HEADQUARTERS IN THE FIELD_
HANCOCK’S BRIGADE, SMITH’S DIVISION, FRANKLIN’S CORPS
CENTER’S BATTERY
BROOKS’S BRIG., SMITH’S DIV., FRANKLIN’S CORPS
DAVIDSON’S BRIGADE
McClellan was now engaged in the most difficult move an army can be
called upon to make in the face of an aggressive enemy—a flanking
movement to effect a change of base. There was no thought given to any
offensive movement. President Lincoln telegraphed: “Save your army at
all events.” This was now McClellan’s only objective.
That McClellan had not tried to fall back on White House surprised Lee,
as he had believed he was facing the main part of the Federal army at
Gaines’ Mill. The next day, June 28, he spent burying the dead,
reorganizing for another offensive movement, and attempting to divine
McClellan’s plans. Lee reported to Jefferson Davis that “the bridges
over the Chickahominy in rear of the enemy were destroyed, and their
reconstruction impracticable in the presence of his whole army and
powerful batteries. We were therefore compelled to wait until his
purpose should be developed.” By nightfall, however, he realized that
McClellan was headed for the James River, and made his plans
accordingly.
Early next morning, June 29, Longstreet and A. P. Hill were to cross the
Chickahominy at New Bridge and take the Darbytown road to where it met
the Long Bridge road. Huger and Magruder, already on the south side of
the river in front of Richmond, were ordered in pursuit of the Federal
forces—Huger by Charles City road and Magruder by the Williamsburg road.
In the meantime, Jackson would cross Grapevine Bridge and sweep down the
south side of the river to get in McClellan’s rear.
Again, Lee’s strategy was brilliant. The Charles City road met the Long
Bridge road at a place called Glendale or Frayser’s Farm. Lee planned to
have all his divisions converge there at about the time the middle of
McClellan’s long column should be passing. The impact of the expected
blow would undoubtedly split the Union army, and with Jackson’s corps in
the rear of one half, the other half could be cut off and annihilated.
Once again, however, the staff work and tactics were pitiful.
McClellan’s rearguard was posted about Savage Station on the Richmond
and York River Railroad, facing west. Richardson’s division, of Sumner’s
corps, was in an open field north of the railroad tracks in back of the
station. Sedgwick’s division held the center in another open field south
of the tracks, with its left resting on the Williamsburg road. Gen.
William F. (“Baldy”) Smith’s division, of Franklin’s corps, took
position in the woods south of the Williamsburg road.
Magruder reached the vicinity of Savage Station about noon, June 29, but
did not attack as he realized his four brigades were badly outnumbered.
He halted and waited for Jackson, who was supposed to turn the Federal
right flank along the Chickahominy and get in their rear. But Jackson
“was delayed by the necessity of reconstructing Grapevine Bridge.”
Magruder then mistakenly reported McClellan advancing and sent for two
brigades from Huger to support him. Lee cancelled the order when he
realized that what Magruder had hit was only the rearguard covering the
Federal army’s passage across White Oak swamp. What Lee did not realize,
however, was that Jackson was not in position and would not reach Savage
Station until 3 the following morning. Finally, about 5 that afternoon,
Magruder attacked with his four brigades and two regiments, but it was
too late with too little. The Federals withdrew hastily but safely. In
their haste they were forced to leave 2,500 sick and wounded men in the
field hospital at Savage Station and to abandon or destroy a vast amount
of supplies and equipment.
[Illustration: _Battle of Savage Station._ From a contemporary
sketch.]
[Illustration: _Battle of Glendale._ From _Battles and Leaders of
the Civil War_.]
_CONFEDERATE_
JACKSON’S CORPS & D. H. HILL
HUGER
LONGSTREET
A. P. HILL
_UNION_
SMITH
RICHARDSON
1 REG^T., 1 GUN
SLOCUM
KEARNY
McCALL
SEDGWICK
HOOKER
_Glendale (Frayser’s Farm)_
Lee now ordered Magruder to follow Longstreet and A. P. Hill down the
Darbytown road. The next day, June 30, Longstreet and Hill came upon the
Union troops of McCall and Kearney across the Long Bridge road about a
mile west of the Charles City road intersection at Glendale. Hooker held
the left or south flank, with Slocum on the right guarding the Charles
City road approach. Sedgwick was in the rear in reserve. Longstreet and
Hill halted and waited for Huger, coming down the Charles City road, and
Jackson, supposedly coming on the Federal rear from White Oak Swamp.
Meanwhile, Gen. T. H. Holmes, who had come from the south side of the
James River with part of his division and Gen. Henry A. Wise’s brigade,
had been sent by Lee down the River, or New Market road in an attempt to
get between McClellan and the James River. McClellan anticipated the
move, however, and Warren of Sykes’ division stopped Holmes south of
Malvern Hill. Lee then ordered Magruder on the Darbytown road to
reinforce him, but Magruder’s forces did not get there in time to help.
Huger was delayed by obstructions, mostly felled trees, with which the
Federals had blocked his path. Instead of going around the obstructions,
Huger continually halted to clear the road. Thus it resolved itself into
a question of whether Huger could clear the trees as fast as the Union
soldiers cut them down. In this so-called “battle of the axes” Huger
lost, and did not get to Glendale in time to participate in the
engagement.
About 4 that afternoon, however, Longstreet heard artillery firing from
Huger’s direction which “was supposed to indicate his approach,” and
expecting Jackson’s appearance momentarily, he opened with one of his
batteries and thus brought on the battle. Jackson never did show up,
being held north of White Oak Swamp by the artillery of Richardson and
Smith, and did not get to Glendale until the next day. The fight was
particularly vicious with many pockets of hand-to-hand combat, but,
without the expected support of Huger and Jackson, Longstreet could not
break the Union lines in time to inflict any serious damage or to
interrupt the withdrawal. Lee stated in his report: “Could the other
commands have cooperated in the action the result would have proved most
disastrous to the enemy.” Gone was Lee’s last chance to cut McClellan’s
army in two.
_Malvern Hill_
McClellan had already selected another naturally strong position, this
time on Malvern Hill, for the last stand before reaching the James
River. On the morning of July 1, Morell and Sykes’ divisions of Porter’s
corps were drawn up on the crest of the hill west of the Quaker road.
East of the road Couch’s division of Keyes’ corps held the front, with
Kearney and Hooker of Heintzelman’s corps flanked to the right and rear.
Sumner’s troops were in the rear in reserve. The position was flanked on
either side by creeks in deep ravines less than a mile apart, and across
this narrow front, Porter placed his batteries with the guns almost hub
to hub. In front, the ground was open, sloping down to woods, marshes,
and swamps, through which the Confederate forces had to form for attack
within range of the Federal artillery.
Lee had Jackson on his left facing Kearney, Hooker, and Couch’s right.
D. H. Hill was in the center opposite Couch’s left and Morell’s right.
Lee then ordered Magruder to the right of Hill, but Magruder was delayed
by taking the wrong road; so instead two brigades of Huger’s were placed
on Hill’s right. Longstreet and A. P. Hill, their ranks decimated from
the actions at Gaines’ Mill and Glendale, were held in reserve. The
terrain rendered it almost impossible for effective use of Confederate
artillery, and the few batteries that did get into position were quickly
cut to pieces by the massed Union guns.
[Illustration: _Battle of Malvern Hill._ From _Battles and Leaders
of the Civil War_.]
_Confederate Forces_
LONGSTREET’S DIVISIONS
FIELD OF A. P. HILL
THOMAS OF A. P. HILL
BRANCH OF A. P. HILL
COBB OF MAGRUDER
G. T. ANDERSON OF MAGRUDER
RANSOM OF HUGER
JONES OF JACKSON
WINDER OF JACKSON
LAWTON
EARLY OF EWELL
MAHONE OF HUGER
SEMMES OF MAGRUDER
KERSHAW OF MAGRUDER
BARKDALE OF MAGRUDER
TOOMBS OF MAGRUDER
TAYLOR OF EWELL
HAMPTON OF JACKSON
LAW OF WHITING
TRIMBLE OF EWELL
WRIGHT OF HUGER
ARMISTEAD OF HUGER
GORDON OF HUGER
OF D. H. HILL:
E. B. ANDERSON
RIPLEY
GARLAND
COLQUITT
HOOD OF WHITING
HOLMES’ DIVISION
_Union Forces_
BERDAN’S SHARPSHOOTERS
MEAGHER _after dark_
QUAKER
PALMER
ABERCROMBIE
HOWE
J. W. Binford
GRIFFIN
McQUADE
MORELL
Crew
West
CALDWELL
NICKLES OF HOOKER
KEARNY
HOOKER
HEINTZELMAN’S CORPS
FRANKLIN
SUMNER’S CORPS
Binford
BUCHANAN
MARTINDALE
BUTTERFIELD
LOVELL
SYKES
HOLMES’ DIVISION
RESERVE BATTERIES
WARREN OF SYKES
Malvern House _HEADQUARTERS OF GEN. PORTER_
SEYMOUR OF McCALL
Greenwood _(HOSPITAL)_
GUN-BOAT FIRE FROM JAMES RIVER
“Owing to ignorance of the country, the dense forests impeding necessary
communications, and the extreme difficulty of the ground,” Lee reported,
“the whole line was not formed until a late hour in the afternoon.” The
first real assault did not take place until after 5, and then it was
uncoordinated and confused. The signal for the attack was to be a yell
from one of Huger’s brigades, after the Confederate artillery had
blasted a hole in the Union lines. This put the responsibility of where
and when to begin the attack on a mere brigade commander.
The artillery was unable to put concentrated fire in any one spot, but
Huger attacked regardless and was beaten back with heavy losses. Then D.
H. Hill attacked, only to suffer the same fate. Magruder finally sent
his troops in a gallant charge across the open fields right up to the
cannons’ muzzles, only to be mowed down like wheat at harvest time. Late
in the battle Jackson sent his own division to Magruder’s and Hill’s
support, but in the heavily wooded and swampy ground they got lost and
did not arrive in time to help. Darkness finally put an end to these
hopeless attacks. As D. H. Hill declared bitterly, “It was not war—it
was murder.”
_End of Campaign_
[Illustration: _McClellan’s withdrawal._ From a contemporary
sketch.]
During the night McClellan continued his withdrawal, and the next day
found the Army of the Potomac safe at Harrison’s Landing under the
protection of the Federal gunboats on the James. The Seven Days were
over. Total casualties: Army of Northern Virginia, 20,614; Army of the
Potomac, 15,849.
[Illustration: _Army of the Potomac at Harrison’s Landing._ From a
contemporary sketch.]
In his official report of the campaign Lee stated: “Under ordinary
circumstances the Federal Army should have been destroyed. Its escape
was due to * * * the want of correct and timely information. This fact,
attributable chiefly to the character of the country, enabled Gen.
McClellan skillfully to conceal his retreat and to add much to the
obstructions with which nature had beset the way of our pursuing columns
* * *.” But his other objective had been achieved—Richmond was safe, at
least for the time being.
While McClellan had successfully changed his base of operations from the
York to the James River and saved his army in the process, he had failed
in his first objective of capturing Richmond and possibly ending the
war. The decision to remove the army from the peninsula, rather than
reinforce it for another attempt on Richmond, was made in Washington
over McClellan’s strong objections. He wrote to Gen. Henry W. Halleck:
“It is here on the banks of the James, that the fate of the Union should
be decided.”
[Illustration: _McClellan’s cartographers._ Courtesy, Library of
Congress.]
Although McClellan wisely realized the advantages of another assault on
Richmond on the line of the James, it was his own mistaken view of Lee’s
strength that was the major reason for the withdrawal. As Halleck
explained to him:
You and your officers at one interview estimated the enemy’s forces in
and around Richmond at 200,000 men. Since then you and others report
that they have received and are receiving large re-enforcements from
the South. General Pope’s army covering Washington is only about
40,000. Your effective force is only about 90,000. You are 30 miles
from Richmond, and General Pope 80 or 90, with the enemy directly
between you, ready to fall with his superior numbers upon one or the
other, as he may elect. Neither can re-enforce the other in case of
such an attack. If General Pope’s army be diminished to re-enforce
you, Washington, Maryland, and Pennsylvania would be left uncovered
and exposed. If your force be reduced to strengthen Pope, you would be
too weak to even hold the position you now occupy should the enemy
turn around and attack you in full force. In other words, the old Army
of the Potomac is split into two parts * * * and I wish to unite them.
In August the Army of the Potomac was transported by water back to
Washington to support Pope’s campaign in Northern Virginia. McClellan’s
failure to capture the Confederate Capital, combined with Lee’s failure
to destroy the Union Army, assured the nation a long, bitter war that
became one of the great turning points in American history.
_The Years Between_
[Illustration: _Richmond, summer of 1862._ From a contemporary
sketch.]
In August 1862 Lee wrote to Jefferson Davis: “If we are able to change
the theater of the war from the James River to the north of the
Rappahannock we shall be able to consume provisions and forage now being
used in supporting the enemy.” So Lee moved into Northern Virginia to
meet Pope’s threatened overland campaign against Richmond. At Second
Manassas (Bull Run) the Union army was defeated again and withdrew into
the fortifications around Washington.
Lee took advantage of this opportunity and made his first invasion north
into Maryland, only to be defeated by McClellan at Antietam (Sharpsburg)
in September. Lee then withdrew into Virginia, and at Fredericksburg in
December he severely repulsed Gen. Ambrose Burnside’s move on Richmond.
In the spring of 1863 the Union army, now under Hooker, attempted to
flank Lee’s left and rear to cut him off from Richmond, but it was
decisively defeated at Chancellorsville and driven back across the
Rapidan. Lee then made his second thrust north, penetrating into
Pennsylvania, but was beaten back by Meade at Gettysburg in the summer
of 1863 and, once again, retired into Virginia.
These gallant armies fought each other across the fields of
Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Virginia before they clashed again in the
outskirts of Richmond 2 years later.
Part Two
THE FINAL STRUGGLE FOR RICHMOND, 1864-65
_Lincoln’s New Commander_
In March 1864 President Lincoln appointed Gen. Ulysses S. Grant as
commanding general of all the Union armies. Said Grant: “In the east the
opposing forces stood in substantially the same relations toward each
other as three years before, or when the war began; they were both
between the Federal and Confederate Capitals. Battles had been fought of
as great severity as had ever been known in war * * * from the James
River to Gettysburg, with indecisive results.” He hoped to change this
situation by putting pressure on all Confederate armies at the same
time, something that had never been done before.
Grant’s plan called for Gen. Benjamin F. Butler to march up the south
side of the James and attack Petersburg or Richmond or both; Gen. Franz
Sigel to push down the Shenandoah Valley driving Gen. Jubal Early before
him, thereby protecting Washington; Gen. Nathaniel Banks in New Orleans
to march on Mobile; Gen. William T. Sherman to cut across Georgia
driving Johnston before him, take Atlanta, and if necessary swing north
to Richmond; Meade’s Army of the Potomac, with Grant in command, to push
Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia and capture Richmond. As Grant stated:
“Lee, with the Capital of the Confederacy, was the main end to which all
were working.”
Lee’s objective now was to stop Grant and protect Richmond. Said Lee:
“We must destroy this army of Grant’s before he gets to the James River.
If he gets there it will become a siege, and then it will be a mere
question of time.”
The campaign started in the spring of 1864 when the Army of the Potomac
crossed the Rapidan River and the Army of Northern Virginia blocked its
path at the Wilderness. After a particularly vicious and costly battle,
Grant instead of retreating to lick his wounds as other Federal
commanders had done, executed a left flank movement, still heading south
and trying to get between Lee and Richmond. A few days later the two
armies clashed again at Spotsylvania in a series of grim battles, but
still indecisive as far as major objectives were concerned. Although
Grant’s losses were staggering, he was slowly but methodically
destroying Lee’s ability to wage offensive war.