THE ETHICS OF CHRISTENDOM.

_The Temporal Benefits of Christianity exemplified in its

Influence on the Social, Intellectual, Civil, and Political

Condition of Mankind, from its first Promulgation to the present

Day._ By ROBERT BLAKEY. London. 1849.

_Small Books on Great Subjects._ Edited by a few Well-Wishers to

Knowledge. No. 19. _On the State of Man subsequent to the

Promulgation of Christianity._ London. 1851.

_The Connection of Morality with Religion; a Sermon, preached in

the Cathedral of St. Patrick, at an Ordination held by the Lord

Archbishop of Dublin, Sunday, September 21, 1851._ By WILLIAM

FITZGERALD, A.M., Vicar of St. Ann's, and Professor of Moral

Philosophy in the University of Dublin. London. 1851.

Of these works, the third treats theoretically, the others practically,

of the relation of Christianity to human nature. The preacher seeks in

the natural conscience for the moral ground and receptacle of

revelation; while the historians trace its moral operation in society

and life. Were both tasks perfectly performed, we should be furnished

with a complete image of the religion at once in its idea and its

expression; should be able definitely to compare its promise with its

achievements and to submit it, as a whole, to philosophical

appreciation. But the two halves of the subject are exhibited with very

unequal success. It is much easier to show the intended than the actual

influence of the Christian faith upon the character of its

disciples,--to determine by _a priori_ methods what it _must be_, than

by an _a posteriori_ induction to estimate what it _has been_, and is.

Mr. Fitzgerald, as becomes a professor of ethical science, has well

contended that the religion which he recommends from the pulpit is

neither indifferent nor supercilious towards the morals which he teaches

from the University chair,--but assumes their obligation, appeals to

their authority, and, in its mode of reconciling the human will with the

Divine, raises them into eternal sanctities. It addresses itself to man

as a being already conscious of responsibility; and simply proposes to

restore reason and conscience to that supremacy _in fact_ which _of

right_ they can never lose. How far has this aim been visibly realized?

Are the traces of a Divine renovation clear upon the face of

Christendom? Is there the difference between ancient Greece and modern

England, or between the empire and the papacy of Rome, which might be

expected between an unregenerate world and a regenerate? The historical

answer to these questions is attempted by Mr. Blakey, with perhaps

adequate resources of knowledge, but with so imperfect an apprehension

of the requisites of his argument, that his book, though often

instructive in detail, is altogether ineffective as a whole. He is

content to select and enumerate the most salient and favorable points in

the transition from ancient to modern civilization, and to set them down

to the credit of Christianity; without care to disengage the action of

concurrent causes, or to balance the account by reference to more

questionable effects. A much finer analysis is needed, in order to draw

from history its real testimony on this great matter; and nothing can

well be more arbitrary, than to stroll through some fifteen centuries,

and, gathering up none but the most picturesque and beneficent

phenomena, weave them into a glory to crown the faith with which they

co-exist. In Christendom, all the great and good things that are done at

all will of course be done by Christians, and will contain such share of

the religious element as may belong to the character of the actor or the

age; but before you can avail yourself of them in Christian

Apologetics, it must be shown that, under any other faith, no social

causes would have remained adequate either to produce them or to provide

any worthy equivalent. Because Charlemagne, after baptizing the Saxons

in their own blood, displayed a better zeal by establishing cathedral

and conventual schools, _therefore_ to put the horn-book of the liberal

arts into the hand of his religion, while leaving the wet sword to stain

his own; because chivalry blended in its vow "_fear of God_" with "love

of the ladies," _therefore_ to trace all loyalty and courtesy to the

doctrine of the Church; because the mediæval schoolmen imported into

every science the canons of Divinity, and decided between Realism and

Nominalism on eucharistic principles, _therefore_ to give the priesthood

all the honors of modern philosophy and intellectual liberty,--is, to

say the least, very vulnerable logic and very superficial history. Of a

far superior order is the little book "On the State of Man subsequent to

the Promulgation of Christianity." In a previous treatise, "On the State

of Man _before_ the Promulgation of Christianity," the author had passed

under rapid review the ancient systems of civilization,--stationary,

progressive, aggressive; and having seized on their characteristic

features, he now brings with him determinate points of comparison into

his survey of the post-Apostolic times. The view which he spreads

beneath your eye of the world, as it lay ready to afford a channel for

the Christian faith, is remarkable for breadth and truth. Conducting

you, with the wide picture in your mind, to the pure head-spring in

Galilee, and keeping close to the stream as it descends and opens from

these sequestered heights, he enables you to see, reach by reach, where

it fertilizes and where it destroys; the new fields of life it enters,

the old landmarks of habit it overwhelms. The author is not more

familiar with the Christian Apologists and Fathers, than with the later

Latin and revived Greek literature from Trajan to Aurelian; and by

skilfully noting the moments when Pagan and Christian life not only

stood in silent co-presence, but came into active contact, he brings out

into clear relief the new type of character which formed itself within

the communities of disciples. That type is so strikingly original, its

features so conspicuously express an order of passions and ideas strange

alike to the Hellenic and the Italian races, as to betray the creative

action of some vast moral power unborrowed from the established

civilization. When the free Roman breaks the bread of communion with

slaves,--when the slippery Syrian forswears lying and theft,--when the

heedless Greek changes his eagerness of the moment into a living for

eternity,--when a people ignorant of Stoic maxims display a contempt of

torture and death sublimer than the ideal of the Porch,--an influence is

plainly at work which has penetrated to hitherto unawakened depths of

the human soul. The phenomenon is the more impressive, when regard is

had to the materials from which the early Christian communities were

gathered. It cannot be imagined that they were composed of elements

particularly choice; and, indeed, amid the universal corruption of

morals and exhaustion of wholesome life, it is difficult to conceive

how, if the Christian doctrine had enforced a rigorous selection,

instead of indiscriminately inviting innocence and guilt, any decent

elements could have been collected. Without adopting Gibbon's

contemptuous estimate of the body of primitive believers, we cannot

doubt that it comprised very mixed ingredients; we know that it

contained great numbers of the servile class, and very few whose station

and culture gave them access to the higher ideas familiar to the schools

of philosophy: yet from these unpromising sources arose a society,

which, in severity of morals, in intensity of affection, in heroism of

endurance, reversed the habits of the world to which they belonged. It

seems to us an idle question for sceptical criticism to raise, whether

the religion of Christ comprised in its teachings any ethical element

absolutely new. If genius had conceived it all before, life had not

produced it till now; and the more you affirm the philosophers'

competency to think it, the more do you convict them of inability to

realize it. But in morals scarcely _can_ there be clear intellectual

conception of principles not yet embodied in living character. As in the

highest works of art, the thing seen is far other than the thing

imagined and described; not doctrines, but persons, are here the only

expression of the truth; and till they appear, ethical forms are but as

the human clay without the vital fire. In the _statement_ of thought,

the early Christians, not excepting the Scripture writers, are rude and

unskilled; and a taste formed from the study of Plato and Seneca may be

offended by the rusticity of Mark, and the abruptness of Paul. But

whoever can rise above the level of a merely intellectual critique, and

embrace, with our anonymous author, the _whole_ phenomenon of the first

centuries of our era, will see a glow of self-denying faith, and a deep

movement of conscience, affording manifest announcement of a new edition

of human nature.

That edition has now been extant for many centuries; and is variously

legible in the literature, the institutions, the private manners of

Christendom. The Christian ideal of human life lies as an open book

before us; yet as a book so various in its versions, and so overlaid

with comments, that the fresh flavor of its language, and even the finer

essence of its thought, are in danger of being lost. The actual

Christianity of each successive age, and each contemporary nation, is

the express result, not only in its dogma, but in its life, of two

component terms,--a given _matter_, and a given _faculty_ of faith.

However full and constant the former may be in itself, the latter is

perpetually variable with the knowledge and passions of the time, and

the special genius of individual leaders; nor can this variation of

insight in the mind fail to neutralize some portion of truth, and to

give disproportionate magnitude to others. The data supplied by

inspiration itself form no exception to this rule. Delivered into the

charge of the human soul, they fall into the moulds of its recipient

nature, take their immediate form from the laws of its life, and are

reacted on from its independent activity. The _immutable_ custody of

anything by a finite thinking subject, involves the most evident

contradiction; the very contact with human intelligence reduces

universal truth to partial, the permanent to the variable, the secure to

the contingent. It is only in the essential Unity of Reason and

Conscience in every age, that we find the means of correcting the

aberrations and verifying the insight of all particular men. Not that we

are to conceive of the human race collectively as one large person, of

which individual minds are vital organs, and which has a necessary

growth and development, entitling each century to boast of advance

beyond its predecessors. We know of no spiritual units, of no

personalities, except each single and separate will; nor do we find

anything in their mutual relation which necessarily determines them to

uninterrupted improvement, and excludes the encroachment of degeneracy

and falsehood. Indeed, no sorrier product is there of human conceit and

ignorance than the cant of "progress," which assumes that every newest

phase of thought is wisest. But if all men are endowed with radically

the same faculties, however various in their intensities and

proportions, there is a court of appeal in permanent sitting, where the

normal laws of intellectual and moral apprehension are administered

against all provincial prejudices and transient verdicts of error. In

the long run, the healthy perceptions of good eyes will outvote the

discoloring effects of all ophthalmic epidemics, how obstinate and wide

soever they may be. And the moral vision of mankind will no less

vindicate its natural rights, by returning again and again into clear

discernments, and settled admirations, and discharging the illusory

forms and false tints of each separate age. To deny the ethical

competency of the mind for this office,--to say that there is no power

given for deciding what, among the claimants on reverence, is really

noble, true, and good,--is, with all its pietistic pretences, an act of

the profoundest scepticism, washing away, as a quicksand, the only rock

on which any faith can be built. It is to treat the durable source of

truth as evanescent and uncertain, and shut out the possibility of all

religion. On the other hand, to set up and idolize the life and thought

of any one time as an unquestionable rule for all times, and stereotype

it for unmodified reproduction, is to treat the evanescent as the

durable, and build on whatever stands above the water, heedless whether

it be the quicksand or the rock. Yet, strange to say, this particular

superstition, and that general unbelief,--an apparent antithesis of

error,--usually meet in the same mind, and constitute together the chief

theology of most visible churches. Having deposed and insulted the

eternal sanctities, they coax and flatter the letter of Scripture to

accept the vacant throne, and exchange the holy modesty of its

administration for a universal empire of pretence. They drain off the

springs of inspiration at their fountain-head, and turn all history into

a plain of sand, that they may magnify their Hebrew reservoir as the

world's sole supply; forgetting that, when cut off from the running

waters, the choicest store loses its fresh virtues, and the fairest

lake, shut up without exit, turns into a Dead Sea. In contradiction of

both errors, we shall assume that transitory elements cannot fail to mix

themselves with the expression of the purest inspiration,--the horizon

of human relations and expressible things around even the divinest soul

being limited; and that, as the inspiration tries itself upon age after

age, bringing into distinct consciousness now one side of truth and now

another, it becomes more and more possible to find its essence and

eliminate its accidents, to save its catholic beauties apart from its

sectional distortions. The Christian ideal of life is not to be looked

for in what is special to the Crusader or the Quaker,--to Puritan or

Cavalier,--to Platonists of the second century or Aristotelians of the

twelfth,--to Aquinas or Luther,--to John or Paul; but in such sentiment

as was common to them all, and attached to them as citizens of

Christendom. When this element is disengaged from all that encumbers it,

it will be found pervading and animating still whatever is noblest in

our modern life; while all that is narrow, and weak, and unworthy in the

moral doctrine of our age, springs from a forced attempt to perpetuate

the accidental modes of the Apostolic period.

Every one is sensible of a change in the whole climate of thought and

feeling, the moment he crosses any part of the boundary which divides

Christian civilization from Heathendom; yet of nothing is it more

difficult to render any compendious account. It is easy to enumerate in

detail the phenomena which are modified or disappear; just as on

entering a new physical region the travelling naturalist may register

the new species of plants and animals, that, one after another, present

themselves to his research. But these do not paint the scene before even

the learned eye; they are the separate out-comings of a great

life-thrill, into whose current their roots penetrate; the landscape, as

a whole, speaks differently to the mind, and the whole heaven and earth

seem pregnant with a thought unfelt before. To read off that thought,

requires an apprehension the converse of the analytic vision of science.

The same difficulty occurs when we endeavor to seize the latent

principle of a natural realm of history. Such principle, however, there

must be. Beneath all the moving tides of Christian thought there lie

still depths that supply them all, and a centre of equilibrium around

which they sweep. We believe that the fundamental idea of Christendom

may be described to be _the ascent through Conscience into communion

with God_. Other religions have lent their sanctions to morality, and

announced the Divine commands to the human will; but only as the laws of

an outward monarch within whose sovereignty we lie, and who, ruling in

virtue of his almightiness, has a right to obedience, ordain as he will.

Other religions, again, have aimed at a union with God. But the

conditions of this union, dictated by misleading conceptions of the

Divine nature, have missed on every side the true level of human dignity

and peace. Manichæism, deifying the antithesis of matter, takes the path

of ascetic suppression of the body. The Indian Pantheist, imagining the

Divine Abyss as the realm of night and infinite negation, strives to

hold in the breath and sink into self-annulment. Plato, seeing in God

the essence of thought, demands science and beauty, not less than

goodness, as the needful notes of harmony with him, and appoints the

approach to heaven by academic ways. The modern Quietists, worshipping a

Being too much the reflection of their own tenderness, have lost

themselves in soft affections, relaxing to the nerves of duty, and

unseemly in the face of eternal law. Christianity alone has neither

crushed the soul by mere submission, like Mohammedanism; nor melted it

away in the tides of infinite being, like Pantheistic faiths; but has

saved the good of both, by establishing the union with God through a

free act of the individual soul. Assigning to him a transcendent moral

nature, sensitive to the same distinctions, conservative of the same

solemnities, which awe and kindle us, it singles out the conscience as

the field where we are to meet him,--where the bridge will be found of

transit between the human and the divine. No fear or servility remains

with an obedience consisting, not in mystic acts and artificial habits,

but in the free play of natural goodness; and rendered, not in homage to

a Supreme Autocrat, but in sympathy with a Mind itself the infinite

impersonation of all the sanctities. Nor are any dizzy and perilous

flights incurred by a devotion which meets its great Inspirer in no

foreign heaven, but in the higher walks of this home life, and misses

him only in what is mean and low. The place assigned in Christianity to

the _moral_ sentiments and affections has no parallel in any other

religion. The whole faith is as an unutterable sigh after an ideal

perfection. Holiness eternal in heaven, incarnate on earth, and to be

realized in men,--this is the circle of conceptions in which it moves.

Its very name for the Inspiration which mediates all its work, expresses

the same thing. It is not simply an ενθουσιασμος,--not μανια,--not

βακχεια,--but the πνευμα ἁγιον. The Dæmon of Socrates--the least

heathenish of heathen men--was but an intellectual guide, and checked

his erring judgment; the Holy Spirit guards the vigils of duty, and

succors the disciple's tempted will. This profound sense of interior

amity with God through faithfulness to our highest possibility, appears

in the Christian Scriptures under two forms,--the positive and the

negative,--each the complement of the other. In the Gospel, Jesus

himself, as befits the saintly mind lifted above the strife of passion,

describes the _aspiration after goodness_ as the native guidance of the

soul to her source and refuge. In the Epistles, Paul, pouring forth the

confessions of a fiery nature, proclaims the _sense of sin_ to be the

contracted hinderance that bars the ascent, and against which the wings

of the struggling will beat only to grow faint. These representations

are evidently but the two sides of the same doctrine seen from the

heavenly and from the earthly position. Whether we are told what the

good heart will find, or what the guilty must lose, the lesson equally

recognizes the Divine authority of conscience. The benediction and the

curse are but the bright and the dark hemisphere of one perfect truth.

The Apostle, standing in the shadow of the world's night, and regarding

its averted face, dwells on the gloom of alienation,--the "foolish heart

that is darkened,"--the "reprobate mind" from which God is hid. Christ,

conscious of the holy light, and knowing how it penetrates the folds of

willing natures, and wakes what else would sleep, speaks rather of the

glory that is not denied, and utters that deepest of blessings,--"The

pure in heart shall see God." To this bright side also the Pauline view

in the end comes round. For though in him we miss that recognition of a

natural human goodness which gives such grace and sweetness to many of

the parables; though in his scheme the human will has not only betrayed

its trust, but hopelessly crippled its powers; yet he does not leave it

in the collapse of paralysis, with the hard saying that it can in no

wise lift up itself, but points to a hope that bends over it from above.

The soul that is too far gone to act, may still be capable of love; if

unable to trust itself, it may trust another; if it cannot command its

volitions, it may surrender its affections; can reverence, can aspire,

can yield its hand, like a child, to an angel of deliverance. Beyond the

precincts of this world is an Image of divine excellence and

beauty,--one recently withdrawn from human history, and soon to have a

more august return. It is but to turn the eye and give the heart to that

ideal and immortal perfection, and in the light of so pure a love, the

clouds will clear from the conscience, and lift themselves as a

nightmare away; the lame will, forgetting its infirmities, will spring

up and walk; and the restoration, impossible by flight from deformity

and ill, will come through the attraction of a Divine sanctity and

goodness. Thus does the Apostle snatch the disciple at last into the

right perceptions which Christ assumes to be possible at first; and in

both its primitive developments the Christian religion implies the

communion of man with God through purity of heart.

To this sentiment, conveyed with living realization in the person of

Jesus Christ, may be referred whatever is distinctively great in

Christian ethics. Proposing, as an end within their reach, the ascent of

the soul to a divine life, and as the means, a simple surrender to its

own highest intimations, they have melted away the interval between

earthly and heavenly natures,--not by humanizing God, but by

consecrating man. In treating the lower desires of sense and self as the

steams that intercept, the tender reverences as the clear air that

transmits, the light of lights, they have struck the deepest truth of

human consciousness. Hence the temper of aspiration,--the earnest

ideality,--the sense of infinite want, with faith in infinite

possibilities,--the sorrowful unrest in the present, with irrepressible

struggle for a better future,--which are impressed on the poetry, the

art, the social life of Christendom. Unlike the expression of the

Hellenic mind, they are rather a prayer for what might be, than a joy in

what is. Hence, too, the predominance of the psychological and

subjective element in the philosophy of modern times, and the conversion

of the ancient "metaphysics" into the form of "mental science." Man

would never have ceased to be merged in nature, and registered merely as

a part of its contents; his self-knowledge would not have vindicated its

independent rights; his mind would not have been recognized as the court

of record for the moral legislation of the universe,--had not his

religion taken him deep into himself, and from a new point shown him his

relation to all else; kindling his own consciousness to a point of

intense brilliancy, in correspondence with a divine centre, which must

be sought on the same axis of being,--like the two determining foci of

an infinite curve, that find each other out, while the realm of

determined nature lies around, as the configured area, or the bounding

curve. Of the external world, indeed, _too_ little account has been made

in the faith of Christians. They have not cared to recognize it as the

shrine of immanent Deity;--have stood in uneasy relations to it; often

inimical to it; sometimes trying to get rid of it as an illusion;

usually regarding it as a foreign object, like a great statue on the

stage of being, with only stony eyes and ears for the real play of

passions that whirl around. Existence, in its essence, has been felt as

an interview between man and God, at which space and nature have been

collaterally present, but in which it was not apparent what they had to

do. Physical science and the plastic arts may have reason to complain of

the depressing influence of this imperfect view, and of the hard

necessity under which it places them of pursuing their ends with only

scanty and grudging recognition from religion. But, for the philosophic

knowledge of human nature, and the practical regulation of human

society, this isolation of the soul within its own consciousness,--this

concentrated personality,--this vivid interchange of life with God

without diffusion through benumbing media,--must be held eminently

ennobling.

If, from the fundamental Christian sentiment, we descend to the scheme

of _Applied Morals_ which it organized and inspired, the principle

still vindicates itself in its results. The great problems of life are

supplied from two sources,--the _Persons_ that may engage our

affections, and the _Pursuits_ that may invite our will. The light in

which the _personal_ relations are presented before the eye of

Christendom is undeniably benign and true. It has never been obscured

without the social spread of injustice and discontent; nor ever

cleared again, but as the precursor of reformation. That every human

soul has its sacred concerns and its divine communion, is the simplest

of thoughts; but so deep and moving, that, where it is received and

acknowledged, it calls up angelic virtues; where it is insulted and

denied, it lets slip avenging fiends. Wherever it is sincerely held,

it secures that reverential feeling towards others, beneath whose

spell the selfish passions sleep, and without which the precept of

courtesy and the definition of rights are an ineffectual form. Power

loses its insolence, and dependence its sting, where their mutual

relation does not carry the whole individuality with it, but stops

with the limits of social and political convenience, and lies under

the restraining protection of a supreme equality before God. The

"Fraternity" that is the offspring of political theories, and aims to

neutralize by fellow-citizenship the diversities and antipathies of

nature, is often the watchword of envy and egotism, shouted by the

voice of hatred, and announcing the deed of violence. It is for want

of faith in that highest brotherhood of worship and responsibility

which Christianity assumes, that impatient schemes are formed for

artificially equalizing the weak and the strong, and abolishing the

relations of necessary dependence. Nor, where that faith is absent,

can they ever be answered so as to satisfy the _feeling_ from which

they spring. They may be shown to be impracticable, and crushed by the

relentless argument of fact; but the fact will be protested against as

unnatural, and the impossibility will seem a cruelty. How differently

is this topic handled by the logic of science and the sentiment of

religion! How much less justly does the former draw the line between

natural subordination among men and tyrannous oppression, than the

latter! Aristotle undertakes the defence of slavery on grounds both of

philosophy and of experience. Nature, he contends, pursuing a definite

end in every act of creation, assigns to some things, from their very

origin, a destiny to rule, while imposing on others a necessity of

being ruled. Wherever a plurality of parts concur to form a general

whole, dominant and subordinate elements present themselves. Even

within the inanimate realm this is apparent, as in the case of harmony

in music. But it is chiefly conspicuous in the sphere of animal

existence; the body being, by nature, servitor, of which the soul is

lord. In the highest stage of animate being, the constitution of

well-organized men, this law comes into the clearest light; for here

the soul sways the body with absolute command, while reason exercises

over the passions the prerogatives of a royal and constitutional

power; and were equality to be substituted for these modes of

subjection, mischief would ensue on all sides. Not less evidently does

Nature announce the dependence of inferior on superior in the rank

allotted to the brutes in relation to man; and again, in the case of

the two sexes, of which the male, as the more distinguished, is

rendered dominant. The same necessary law adjusts the positions of

mankind _inter se_. All those who are as intrinsically inferior to

their neighbors as the body to the soul, or the brute to the

man,--(and this is precisely the case of the mere manual

laborer,)--are slaves by nature; and for them, as for the body and the

brutes, it is better to be servile than to be free. Any man who can be

made property of by another, and who is competent to understand a

master's intelligence without a spontaneous stock of his own, is

naturally a slave. Such a one performs functions in the world not

essentially distinguished from those of the domestic animals; the

destiny of both is to contribute their corporeal energies to the

service of society; and creatures fit for this alone are brought into

the slave-market by Nature herself. Consistently with this conception

of the laborer as a _living tool_ (δουλος εμψυχον οργανον), Aristotle

lays it down that the relation of master and slave admits no rights,

and excludes friendship. To our modern worshippers of strength, this

will appear commendable doctrine, very much because they have

themselves relapsed into the old Hellenic way of studying the problems

of the universe; descending, in the Pantheistic method, from the whole

upon the parts; fetching rules from the wider sphere (therefore the

lower) to import into the narrower; entering the human world from the

physical,--the οικουμενη from the κοσμος; approaching society as a

specialty superinduced on a groundwork of nomadic barbarism; and

determining the functions of the individual as member of the vital

organism of the state. So long as this logical strategy is allowed,

the Titans will always conquer the gods; the ground-forces of the

lowest nature will propagate themselves, pulse after pulse, from the

abysses to the skies; and right will exist only on sufferance from

might. But there is a heaven, after all, which the most trenchant

giant cannot storm, and where justice and sanctity reserve a quiet

throne. Without disputing the inequality of gifts and consequent law

of natural ranks, religion qualifies it by an addition which

overarches and absorbs it. Were man only the choicest, most

intelligent, most gregarious of the mammalia,--were the theory of his

affairs a mere extension of natural history,--we might reasonably

discuss, in Aristotle's way, the conditions under which he may fitly

be put in harness. But there is in him an element that takes him

beyond the range of a Pliny or a Cuvier, that lifts him out of the

kingdom of nature and gives him kindred with the preternatural and

divine. He is not simply an instrument for achieving a given fraction

of a universal end, but has a sacred trust which, on its own account,

he is empowered and commissioned to discharge. He is watched by the

eyes of infinite Pity and Affection, braced for his faithful work,

succored in his fierce temptations. The conditions of dutiful, loving,

noble life must be preserved to him. Let his task, indeed, be suited

to his powers; and if he cannot rule, by all means let him serve; but

still with a margin and play of spiritual freedom secure from

encroachment and contempt. Those on whom Heaven lays the burden of

duty no power on earth may strip of rights. The conscience with which

the Highest can commune, the spirit which is not too mean for His

abode, can be no object of slight and scorn from men. By law and usage

you may have the disposal of another's lot and labor; but in the

reality of things the lord of a province may be less than the

conqueror of a temptation. You may be Greek, and he barbarian; but in

the heraldry of the universe, the blood of Agamemnon is less noble

than the spirit of a saint. In thus snatching the individual, as

bearer of a holy trust, from the crush of nature and the world,

Christianity became the first _human_ religion,--that absolutely took

no notice of race and sex and class. It created a new order of

inalienable rights, neither the heritage of birth, nor the franchise

of a state, but inherent in the moral capabilities of a man. The free

opening of sanctity and immortality to every willing heart could not

fail to exercise an intense influence on the better portion of a

world, like the declining empire of Rome, sickened with corruption and

confused with unmanageable oppressions. That it did so, is proved by

the whole tenor of the early Christian literature; and the effect is

well described and accounted for by the writer "On the State of Man

subsequent to the Promulgation of Christianity."

"The mockery of adoring as gods the licentious tyrants who had

occupied the imperial throne, seems to have put an end to everything

like religious feeling among the nations under the sway of Rome. The

free satire of Lucianus shows how completely it had faded away, for it

introduces the gods of Olympus complaining that they were starving for

lack of offerings; not altogether because Christian or philosophic

doctrines prevailed widely, but rather on account of the total

indifference of the people to their ancient mythology; for even if it

ever had symbolized the truth, its meaning was now forgotten; and,

even so far back as the time of Cicero, had become totally

unintelligible to the learned, as well as to the multitude. It was

useless, therefore, and wanted but a slight impulse from without to

overthrow it. But to the philosopher who was in earnest in his pursuit

of this truth, buried under the rubbish of time, the doctrine of

Christ afforded it; there he found all that the master minds whom he

honored had taught and hoped; but he found it simplified, purified,

and confirmed by sanctions such as Plato had wished for, but scarcely

dared to expect;--to the Roman patrician, if any there were who still

looked back with fond memory to the purer morals and stern courage of

his forefathers, the Christian simplicity of manners and firm

endurance of torture and death was the realization of what he had

heard of and admired, but scarcely seen till then;--to the slave,

sighing under oppression and condemned to homeless bondage, the

doctrine of the Gospel gave all that was valuable in life; the

Christian slave was the friend of his Christian master, partook of the

same holy feast, shared the same painful but glorious martyrdom; he

was raised at once to all his intellectual rank, found freedom beyond

the grave, and lived already in a happy immortality;--to the woman,

degraded in her own eyes no less than in those of the tyrant to whose

lusts she was the slave, it offered a restoration to all that is most

dear to the human race; it offered intellectual dignity, equality

before God, purity, holiness. The Christian woman could die; she could

not, therefore, unless consenting to it, be again enslaved to the vile

passions of men; before God she was free, and with Him she trusted to

find shelter when the hard world left her none. Can we wonder, then,

that Christianity found votaries wherever a mind existed that sighed

after better things? for the preacher of Nazareth had at last

expressed the thought which had been brooding in the minds of so many,

who had found themselves unable to give it utterance."--p. 55.

Nor was it merely within the pale of the Christian fraternity that

relations of mutual reverence and tenderness attested the power of an

ennobling faith. Intensity of internal combination is often balanced,

in religious brotherhoods, by vehemence of external repugnance; and

were we to accept the fiery declamation of Tertullian as fairly

expressing the spirit of his fellow-believers, we could ill defend

them from the charge of fierce antipathy to the persons as well as the

creed of their Pagan neighbors. But many silent mercies appear which

contradict this loud intolerance. When the Decian persecution and its

attendant tumultuary movements had filled Alexandria with such

slaughter as to breed pestilence from the bodies of the dead, the

Christians, instead of sullenly permitting the physical calamity to

avenge their cause, assumed the duties of public nurses, and performed

the loathsome tasks from which priests and magistrates had fled.

Referring to this occasion, the author just cited says:--

"The plague made its appearance with tremendous violence, and

desolated the city, so that, as Dionysius, the Christian bishop,

writes, there were not so many inhabitants left of all ages, as

heretofore could be numbered between forty and seventy. In this

emergency the persecuted Christians forgot all but their Lord's

precept, and were unwearied in their attendance on the sick; many

perishing in the performance of this duty by taking the infection. 'In

this way,' says the bishop, with touching simplicity, 'the best of the

brethren departed this life; some ministers, and some deacons,' the

heathens having abandoned their friends and relations to the care of

the very persons whom they had been accustomed to call 'Men-haters.' A

like noble self-devotion was shown at Carthage when the pestilence

which had desolated Alexandria made its appearance in that city, and,

I quote the words of a contemporary, 'All fled in horror from the

contagion, abandoning their relations and friends as if they thought

that by avoiding the plague any one might also exclude death

altogether. Meanwhile the city was strewed with the bodies, or rather

carcasses of the dead, which seemed to call for pity from the

passers-by, who might themselves so soon share the same fate; but no

one cared for anything but miserable pelf; no one trembled at the

consideration of what might so soon befall him in his turn; no one did

for another what he would have wished others to do for him. The bishop

hereupon called together his flock, and setting before them the

example and teaching of their Lord, called on them to act up to it. He

said, that if they took care only of their own people, they did but

what the commonest feeling would dictate; the servant of Christ must

do more; he must love his enemies, and pray for his persecutors; for

God made his sun to rise and his rain to fall on all alike, and he who

would be the child of God must imitate his Father.' The people

responded to his appeal; they formed themselves into classes, and

those whose poverty prevented them from doing more gave their personal

attendance, while those who had property aided yet further. No one

quitted his post but with his life."--p. 162.

This self-devotion in times of distress, strangely contrasting with

habits and temper apparently unsocial, has too steadily reappeared in

every earnest church not to be accepted as a Christian characteristic.

During the fatal famine and epidemic which desolated Antioch in the

third century, the Pagan governor, when urged by the inhabitants to

make authoritative arrangements for relieving the sufferings of a

perishing populace, replied that "The gods hated the poor"; while the

Christians, prevailingly poor themselves, plunged into the centre of

the danger, and carried into the recesses of fever and despair the

quiet presence of help and hope. If disciples have thus freely

rendered to "those without" services which Pagans refused to one

another, it is not simply in stiff obedience to a precept of love to

their enemies, but from a heart-felt sentiment of honor for human

nature and consequent tenderness of human life. There was no man who,

though he might be a persecutor to-day, might not be a comrade

to-morrow; he had a soul susceptible of consecration; and day and

night the gates of the Church were ready to fly open to the touch of

penitence; and whether he throws off the mask of delusion or not, he

must be treated as a brother in disguise. Only by reference to this

conception of all men as possible subjects of sanctifying change, can

the fact be explained, that even where the creed has opened an

infinite gulf between believer and unbeliever, the active charities

have detained in lingering embrace the persons whom the theoretic

fancy has flung into the ultimate horrors. A religion that is superior

to the external distinctions of lineage and class, and draws its lines

only by the invisible coloring of souls, must ever be a religion open

to hope, and therefore apt to love. Even where the severest doctrine

of exclusion has prevailed, the fundamental sentiment of Christian

faith has saved the heart from the most withering of all

passions,--the blight of _scorn_. Human nature may appear beneath the

eye of an austere believer in an _awful_, but never in a

_contemptible_ light. The very crisis in which it is suspended can

belong to no mean existence. What it has lost is too great a glory,

what it has incurred is too deep a terror, to be conceivable except of

a being on a grand scale. _He_ is no worm for whom the eternal abysses

are built as a dungeon and the lightnings are brandished as a scourge.

Accordingly, the very alienations of intolerance itself have acquired

a higher and more respectful character than in ancient faiths. The

sort of feeling with which the Jew spurned "the Gentile dog" is

sanctioned by piety no more. The Oriental curl of the lip is scarcely

traceable on the features of Christendom; and is replaced by an

expression of tragic sorrow and earnestness, where lights of admiring

pity flash through the darkest clouds.

It seems, then, that the essential sentiment of all Christian faith--the

communion through conscience with God--carries with it, not only noble

personal aspirations, but also, towards others, affections of singular

generosity and depth; affections which demand for every man a position

in which he may work out the moral problem of life, which dignify every

lot where this is possible, and which soften even actual alienations

with possible reverence and hope. The sphere of action which these

feelings may shape for themselves, the particular enterprises they may

undertake, the external pursuits they may assume, will necessarily

depend on many foreign and accidental conditions. The work which it

would fall to the hands of the same faithful man to do, if he lived on

through the changes of the world, would greatly vary from age to age.

The work which contemporary men, of equal and similar fidelity, will set

themselves to accomplish, will vary with their several positions. The

same act, or even habit, which is innocent (though possibly not

innocuous) in one place, may assume quite an altered significance in

another. It would be absurd, for instance, to set down the double

marriages of patriarchal times in the same moral rank with modern cases

of bigamy. And the doctrine of Plato's Republic respecting marriage,

startling as a comment on the manners of his age, by no means expresses

the odious state of mind which would be implied in its substitution now

for the sanctities of private life. The devotion to studious and

peaceful acts which may usually be either blameless or laudable, may

become a guilt like treason in an hour when the interests of public

liberty claim every citizen for the council or the field. Indeed, the

conduct in such contrasted instances is in no proper sense _the same_;

it has only an external identity; it is a physical self-repetition,

with a moral contrariety; and unless, in speaking of a human _action_,

we mean to shut out the soul which makes it human, and to denote only

the muscular flourish and spasm of limb, the sameness is but a semblance

with a reality of difference. The moral values of actions, taken in this

narrowest sense, are inevitably variable; and any code that should

present a list of them as obligatory in perpetuity, without regard to

the changes of their meaning to the mind, would mistake the very nature

of human duty. Not that we deny the existence of permanent grounds for

the adoption of some habits and the avoidance of others. There are

reasons, unchangeable as the corporeal frame of man, why opium should

not be taken as an article of food, and why cousins should not

intermarry. But the grounds of prohibition in these cases are

_rational_, not _moral_; they are found in the outward effects, not in

the inward sources, of conduct; and only when its outward effects are

_known_ to the agent, so as to enter among its inward sources and modify

its meaning, does he pass from _unwise_ to _immoral_. External action,

in short, stands as an _indifferent_ phenomenon, between the mind that

issues it and the world into which it goes. The thought and affection

whence it springs in the former give its _moral_, the results to which

it tends in the latter its _rational_ value. Whoever makes a correct

estimate of the several affections and impulses which stir the will, and

throughout their scale reveres the better and disapproves the worse,

possesses _moral_ truth. Whoever perceives and computes the real

consequences of voluntary conduct, possesses _rational_ discernment in

human affairs. The former--an interpretation of the conscience and its

sacred contents--is the permanent essence of ethical and root of

religious wisdom. The latter--an apprehension of physical laws and

historical tendencies--is conditioned by the progress of science and the

facilities for social vaticination. Errors in _this_ are inevitable to

the limitations of human intellect. Perfection in _that_ is possible

only to the highest divine insight in the soul. The fallible judgment

respecting outward relations affects only the accidents of morals,

though the essence of scientific truth. Where the inner apprehension is

deep and true, the outward judgment contains a principle of

self-correction; the miscalculation of one age is checked by that of a

succeeding; opposite errors cancel each other; and the spirit of a pure

faith, like a just feeling of beauty and greatness in art, works itself

clear of the false data of usage amid which its inspiration arose, and

transmigrates into ever-improving forms. If, however, the reverence due

to the inspiration should become a traditional affair, losing its living

eye and spiritual tact, it will extend itself as a moping idolatry to

the imperfect media and rude materials through which the new glory first

gleamed; an incapable era of _renaissance_ will appear; the very works

which were given as the spring of ever-fresh creation will be used to

stifle it; in servile imitation of an original period, its whole

character will be lost, and the moment of exactest reproduction will be

that of intensest contrast.

This is precisely the way in which the spiritual life of the primitive

Christians has been dealt with. The thought and meaning that lay at its

heart are little apprehended; its applied morals, in which these are

mixed up with the errors incident to their point of view, are distorted

into a rigid code of obligation, in which the original idea is often

entirely reversed. If it be really true that the Apostolic age was

impressed with the belief of a speedy end of the world, such an outlook

must undeniably have affected the disciples' whole estimate of the value

of human pursuits. The plan of life commendable in a passage-ship may be

questionable in a settled home; and the proceedings of an army on the

eve of battle are not like the habits of the same people tilling their

fields and sitting at their hearths. To apply to a permanently

constituted planet the rules promulgated to preserve discipline amid a

general breaking-up, is surely an eccentric kind of legislation. Yet by

just such a process have modern churches derived a number of ethical

extravagances offensive to the eye of chastened conscience, and

condemned by their impracticability to the insincere existence of

perpetual talk. The manner in which English divines conduct themselves

towards this error of the first century appears to us not simple and

ingenuous. Some still affect to deny it, and to treat its reiterated

assertion as a mere perverseness and impudence of heresy; yet they leave

the statement without serious refutation, though well aware that the

weight of critical authority is altogether in its favor, and though

avowing their own theory of revelation absolutely to require that it be

false. Others incidentally and grudgingly admit it, and then pass on as

if nothing had happened; immediately relapsing into the same

authoritative appeal to Scripture, the same direct and mechanical use of

its precepts, the same assumption of it as an instrument yielding on

interpretation nothing but truth, which had been habitual with them

before their eyes were opened. Now, if anything be certain on such a

matter, it is that to suppose one's self in the world's last year,--the

admission paid to the panorama of judgment and the spectacle only

waiting to begin,--is no small and sleepy idea, which might

ineffectually turn up now and then, and sink back below the surface

without further trace. A man who could live in presence of such a

vision, and not carry its crimsoned light upon every object that fixed

his eye, could be no apostle of truth or preacher of earnestness; nor do

we know that anything more contemptuous could be said of him than that,

no doubt, he held such an expectation, but it was of no consequence. To

convert the author of the Pauline Epistles into a dilettante believer of

the pattern of the nineteenth century, and say of his most tremendous

gleams of thought that they were but transitory fireworks which meant

nothing, is no less an offence against his character than a

misunderstanding of his writings; and we conceive that, in affirming the

deep penetration of his mistaken world-view into the substance of his

monitory teaching, we shall be vindicating the fundamental veracity and

noble clearness of his soul.

To exhibit the Christology of the Apostles with the fulness necessary

for tracing pseudo-Christian morality to its origin, would require a

volume. We can only advert to one or two points, indicating the

direction which such an inquiry would take. It is admitted on all

hands, that a second advent of Christ is announced in almost every book

of the New Testament; that, if we except the Gospel of John, it is

spoken of invariably as a real, personal return, an objective and scenic

event, to be seen, heard, and felt; and cannot be explained away into a

spiritual access to the world, or a subjective drama in the soul of

disciples. It is further admitted, that with this advent are integrally

connected many incidents which, however difficult to group into a

complete picture, constitute, under every variety of possible

arrangement, a final consummation of human affairs. Indeed, the article

in the Creed which declares that Christ "shall come to judge the quick

and the dead, and at his coming all men shall rise again with their

bodies and shall give account for their own works," shows how the Church

understands the doctrine, and conjoins the end of the world with the

advent. The _nature_ of the event being so far undisputed, the question

which separates the mass of scientific interpreters from the popular

expounder, refers only to its _date_. The Apostle Paul, it is urged by

the critics, writes to his Thessalonian converts, in answer to a

distressing doubt which could have no existence but in minds on the

watch for the return of Christ; and his answer, far from checking this

outlook, raised it to such intensity that, to soothe their excitement,

he wrote to them again to remove the event from the immediate foreground

of their imagination; yet even then detained it quite within the limits

of their natural lives, and, simply interposing one or two signals of

its approach that had not yet appeared, counselled them not to lose

their composure, but maintain a "patient waiting for Christ." The

original doubt which had disturbed them seems to have been one

instructively characteristic of the early theocratic faith. Some member

of the community had died; his friends, in addition to their natural

sorrow, were apparently taken by surprise, that, after enrolment among

the citizens of the approaching kingdom, he was taken from their side,

and would not be with them when they hailed the arrival of Christ. What

would become of him? They thought he would have to remain in his sleep

till Messiah should exercise his function of raising the dead, which was

not to be at first; and so, during the great crisis, and for an

uncertain continuance beyond, he would linger behind the privilege which

they enjoyed. This seems, at first sight, a strange subject of distress.

That the second advent should take place in the presence of the living

only, and should leave the dead without part or lot in the matter, is so

completely at variance with the picture which has become fixed in the

common Christian imagination, that scruples may readily be felt about

attributing so mutilated a conception to the Thessalonian church. The

commonly received picture, however, is made up of elements incongruously

brought together from several Scripture writers, to whom the expected

event presented itself under different aspects; and nowhere can they be

found combined into such a whole as the ecclesiastical faith represents.

To understand and account for the Thessalonian state of mind, we have

only to read over the 24th and 25th chapters of St. Matthew, and to

surrender ourselves to the images there presented, without adding

anything of our own. These chapters contain the fullest description of

the advent, the last judgment, and the end of the world, that can be

found in Scripture; yet _the dead are not brought upon the scene at all,

nor is any resurrection found among its elements_. The whole idea is

evidently of a return of the Son of Man, within the limits of a

generation, to take account, in his theocratic capacity, of the very

persons who had known him in his Galilean humiliation and disguise,--of

those who, having joined him in his days of trial, had been intrusted by

him with the administration in the interval of his heavenly

absence,--and of those who, after rejecting him personally, had hardened

themselves no less against the preaching and overtures of his subsequent

ambassadors. The nations gathered before him are furnished from the

surviving population of the earth; and the ground of their admittance or

rejection is the reception they have given to Messiah in the persons of

his missionaries and representatives. In supposing the dead to have lost

their chance of participating in this scene, the Thessalonians did but

paint it to themselves as Christ, according to the first Gospel, had

described it to his hearers. Their misgiving plainly assumes that the

advent was sure for the living and was lost for the dead. The Apostle

answers by denying the distinction, and putting both classes into the

same condition ere the great hour strikes: but _what_ condition? Does he

say that the living will die first? No; but that the dead will live

first: so that the departed companion will come back at the right moment

for mingling with the troop of friends that shall go "to meet the Lord

in the air." The same order of events is given in the sublime, but

little understood, chapter on the resurrection in the First Epistle to

the Corinthians, where the Apostle places _himself_, at the advent, not

among "the dead" that "shall be raised incorruptible," but among the

survivors that "shall be changed" into immortals without ever quitting

life. It is a topic of praise to the disciples at Corinth that they are

"waiting for the coming of Our Lord Jesus Christ, who shall also confirm

you unto the end, that ye may be blameless in the day of our Lord Jesus

Christ." He assures his Philippian friends that "the Lord is at hand,"

and prays that they may "be sincere and without offence till the day of

Christ." Having come out safe from his examination and hearing at Rome,

he avows his persuasion that he will be similarly delivered "from every

evil work," and preserved unto Christ's heavenly kingdom. Though amid

his toils and weariness he earnestly desired to be endowed with his

immortal frame,--to be invested, as he expresses it, with his house from

above; yet he was unwilling to put off the corruptible, till he could

put on the incorruptible; he would have his mortality "swallowed up of

life"; he did not wish the great hour to find him naked, but clothed,

not, that is, a disembodied spirit, but a living man. He stands at the

era on which "the end of the world has come"; and begs his

correspondents to let certain existing disputes lie over, and to "judge

nothing before the time until the Lord come." Not less explicit evidence

is afforded in the writings of other Apostles. James says, "The coming

of the Lord draweth nigh; ... behold, the Judge standeth before the

door." Peter, "The end of all things is at hand." John, "Children, it is

the last time; and as ye have heard that Antichrist shall come, even now

are there many Antichrists; whereby we know that it is the last time."

If the author of Christianity did not himself entertain the same

expectation of an early return to assume his Messianic prerogatives, he

has been greatly misrepresented by his biographers. For though one of

them represents him as disclaiming a knowledge of the specific "_day_

and _hour_" appointed for his "coming in the clouds with great power and

glory," the disclaimer follows immediately on his announcement, that at

all events it will take place within the existing generation. Does any

reader doubt whether this "coming in the clouds" really describes the

judgment? or whether "this generation" denotes the natural term of human

life? Both questions are answered at once in Matthew's report of a

single sentence, which simultaneously defines the event and its date:

"For the Son of Man shall come in the glory of his Father, with his

angels; and _then he shall reward every man according to his works_.

Verily I say unto you, there be _some standing here which shall not

taste of death_, till they see the Son of Man coming in his kingdom." It

is certainly possible enough that the discourses in which these

expressions occur may be incorrectly reported, and have acquired from

the writer's state of mind a definiteness not belonging to the original

production. But, at any rate, they reveal the historian's conception of

what was in Jesus's thought; and the false coloring of expectation which

they threw over his prophecies could not fail to extend in their reports

to his preceptive discourses, and thus to have almost the same influence

on the recorded Christian ethics, as if the error were his as well as

theirs.

The evidence on this point is so positive and overwhelming, that

critics such as Olshausen, whose testimony is undoubtedly reluctant,

no longer think of resisting it. Nothing, indeed, can be opposed to it

but a kind of interpretation which is the opprobrium of English

theology; and whose problem is, not simply to gather an author's

thought from his words, but from among all _true_ thoughts to find

the one that will sit the least uneasily under his words. Thus "the

end of all things" is explained away into the founding of the

Christian Church; the "coming of the Son of Man on the clouds of

heaven," into the Jewish war under Titus; the last judgment, which

"rewards every man according to his works," into the escape of the

Christians and the slaughter of the Jewish zealots at the destruction

of Jerusalem. No doubt, many good and well-instructed men have

persuaded themselves that by such exegetical sleight of hand they

could save Apostolic and other infallibility. We can only say, that

when piety supplies the motive, and learning the means, for

bewildering veracity of apprehension, two rich and noble endowments

are spent in corrupting a nobler, which is the life of them both.

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