Nothing appears in history similar to the enthusiasm roused by Kossuth
in nations foreign to him, except perhaps the kindling for the First
Crusade by the voice of Peter the Hermit. Then bishops, princes, and
people alike understood the danger which overshadowed Europe from the
Mohammedan powers; and by soundly directed, though fanatical instinct,
all Christendom rushed eastward, till the chivalry of the Seljuk Turks
was crippled on the fields of Palestine. Now also the multitudes of
Europe, uncorrupted by ambition, envy, or filthy lucre, forebode the
deadly struggle impending over us all from the conspiracy of crowned
heads. Seeing the apathy of their own rulers, and knowing, perhaps by
dim report, the deeds of Kossuth, they look to him as the Great Prophet
and Leader, by whom Policy is at length to be moulded into Justice; and
are ready to catch his inspiration before he has uttered a word. Kossuth
undoubtedly is a mighty Orator; but no one is better aware than he, that
the cogency of his arguments is due to the atrocity of our common
enemies, and the enthusiasm which he kindles to the preparations of the
people's heart.
His orations are a tropical forest, full of strength and majesty,
tangled in luxuriance, a wilderness of self-repetition. Utterly
unsuited to form a book without immense abridgment, they contain
materials adapted equally for immediate political service and for
permanence as a work of wisdom and of genius. To prepare them for the
press is an arduous and responsible duty: the best excuse which I can
give for having assumed it, is, that it has been to me a labour of love.
My task I have felt to be that of a judicious reporter, who cuts short
what is of temporary interest, condenses what is too amplified for his
limits and for written style, severely prunes down the repetitions which
are inevitable where numerous[*] audiences are addressed by the same man
on the same subject, yet amid all these necessary liberties retains not
only the true sentiments and arguments of the speaker, but his forms of
thought and all that is characteristic of his genius. Such an operation,
rightly performed, may, like a diminishing mirror, concentrate the
brilliancy of diffuse orations, and assist their efficacy on minds which
would faint under the effort of grasping the original.
[Footnote *: The number of speeches, great and small, spoken in his
American half-year, is reckoned to be above 500.]
It is true, the exuberance of Kossuth is often too Asiatic for English
taste, and that excision of words, which needful abridgment suggests,
will often seem to us a gain. Moreover, remembering that he is a
foreigner, and though marvellous in his mastery of our language, still
naturally often unable to seize the word, or select the construction
which he desired, I have not thought I should show honour to him by
retaining anything verbally unskilful. To a certain cautious extent, I
account myself to be a _translator_, as well as a _reporter_,
and in undertaking so delicate a duty, I am happy to announce that I
have received Kossuth's written approval and thanks. Mere quaintness of
expression I have by no means desired entirely to remove, where it
involved nothing grotesque, obscure, or monotonous. In several passages
where I imperfectly understood the thought, I have had the advantage of
Kossuth's personal explanations, which have enabled me to clear up the
defective report, or real obscurities of his words.
Nevertheless I have to confess my conviction, that nothing can wholly
compensate for the want of systematic revision by the author himself;
which his great occupations have made impossible. The mistakes in the
reports of the speeches are sometimes rather subtle, and have not roused
my suspicion. Of this I have been, made disagreeably sensible, by
several errata communicated to me by Kossuth in the first great speech
at New York, here marked as No. VII. (which have been corrected in this
edition.)
Nearly all the points on which attempts have been made to misrepresent
in England the cause of Hungary are cleared up in these speeches. On two
subjects only does it seem needful here to make any remark:
_first_, on the Republicanism of Kossuth; _secondly_, on the
Hungarian levies against Italy in the year 1848.
1. Kossuth is attacked by his countrymen on opposite grounds: Szemerè
despises him for not becoming a republican early enough, Count Casimir
Bathyanyi reproves him for becoming a republican at all. The facts are
these. Kossuth, like all English statesmen, was a historical royalist,
not a doctrinaire. When the existing reign had become treacherous and
lawless, he was willing to change the line of succession, and make the
Archduke Stephen king. When the dynasty had become universally detested
and actually expelled, he approved most heartily[*] the deposition of
the Hapsburgs; but still held himself in suspense as to the future of
the constitution. By his influence instructions were sent to his
representative in England, which were equivalent to soliciting a dynasty
from the British government. Meanwhile Szemerè, his Home Secretary, took
on himself to avow in the Diet that the government was REPUBLICAN, and
no voice of protest was raised in either house. Indeed, Mr. Vucovics,
who was Minister of Justice under Kossuth, states (see Appendix I.) that
the government and both houses responded unanimously to the republican
avowal, and that the government removed the symbol of the Crown from the
public arms and seal. The press of all shades assented. After this, it
was clear (I presume) to Kossuth, or at least it soon became so, that
all sympathy with royal power was gone out of the nation's heart.
Hungarians may settle that amongst themselves: but as for
Englishmen,--when for seven or eight months together the English
ministry and English peerage would not stir, or speak, or whisper, to
save constitutional royalty and ancient peerage for Hungary and for
Europe while it was yet possible; with what face, with what decency, can
Englishmen censure Kossuth for despairing of a cause, which was
abandoned to ruin by ourselves, the greatest power interested to
maintain it,--which the monarchs have waded through blood and perjury to
destroy,-and which the millions of Hungary will not (in his belief)
peril life and fortune to restore?
[Footnote *: How unanimous was the whole country, is clear by the facts
stated. How spontaneous was the movement, and free from all government
intrigue, see in Appendix I. This is entirely confirmed by our envoy,
Mr. Blackwell: Blue Book, March--Ap. 1848.]
2. The ministry of Louis Bathyanyi and Kossuth have been attacked on
opposite grounds,--because they _did_, and because they did
_not_, attempt to subdue the Italians by force of arms. The facts
are rather complicated, but deserve here to be stated concisely.
When the ministry was appointed, there were _already_ Hungarians in
Italy with Radetzki, and Austrian soldiers in Hungary. The Viennese
ministry promised to exchange them, as fast as could be done without
encountering great expense or dislocating the regiments and making them
inefficient. With this promise the Hungarian ministry was forced to
content itself at the time. At a later period, when it discovered that
the Austrian commanders in Hungary had secret orders not to fight
against the Serbian marauders, and that the Austrian troops could not be
trusted, the Hungarian ministry _desired_ to get back their men
from Italy for their own defence; which desire proved ineffectual, yet
has been severely blamed by some of our monarchists. But meanwhile the
Viennese ministry, as early as June, 1848, endeavoured to buy of the
Hungarian ministry an increased grant of troops against Italy, by
conceding a most energetic "King's Speech" against the Serbs, with which
the Archduke Palatine was to open, and did open, the Diet on July 2d. A
part of this speech is quoted in Appendix II., and indeed it is a
loathsome exhibition of Austrian treachery. The Hungarian ministry were
pressed by the arguments, that since Austria was attacked in Italy by
the King of Sardinia, the war was not merely against the Lombards; and
that the Pragmatic Sanction bound Hungary to defend the empire if
assailed from without. This led them to acknowledge the
_principle_, that they were bound to assist, if able; but they
replied that Hungary itself must first be secured against marauders, and
no troops could be spared until the Serbs were subdued. At the same
time orders were sent to Radetzki from Vienna to offer independence to
the Lombards, and constitutional nationality under the Austrian crown to
the Venetians: hence the Hungarian ministry for a time fancied that they
would not be fighting against the Italians, as they expected the terms
to be accepted by them. When it was farther represented that the
Italians had rejected them,--(for Radetzki, acting probably by secret
orders, suppressed the despatches, and never offered independence to
Lombardy, though the Austrian ministers made diplomatic capital of their
liberality,)--then the Hungarian ministry began to think the Italians
unreasonable; yet they did not go beyond their abstract principle, that
Hungary ought to grant troops for Austrian defence in Italy, provided,
1st, that rebellion in Hungary itself were repressed; 2d, that the
troops should not act against the Italians, unless the Italians had
rejected the offer of national liberties and a constitution coordinate
to those of Hungary, under the Austrian crown.
The protocol on this subject was drawn on July 5th; the public speech of
Kossuth concerning it was not until July 22d; and in this short interval
the treachery of the dynasty had been so displayed, that Kossuth could
no longer speak in the same tone as a few weeks earlier. For a fuller
development of this, I refer the reader to Appendix III. The real object
of the Austrian ministry, was, to ruin the popularity of Bathyanyi and
Kossuth, if they could induce them to sacrifice Italian freedom; or
else, to accuse them to all the European diplomatists as conspirators
against the integrity of the Austrian empire, if they refused to oppress
the liberties of Italy.
Finally, the reader has even here proof enough how false is the
statement which has been current in English newspapers, that Kossuth's
visit to America was "a failure." This was an attempt to practise on our
prevalent disgraceful tendency to judge of a cause by its success.
However, the end is not yet seen: America has still to act decisively,
if she would win the lasting glory which we have despised, of rescuing
Law and Right from lawless force, and establishing the future of Europe.