It was after a seven years’ study of military aviation, as Commandant of
the British Government Balloon School, that Colonel J. E. Capper
declared emphatically: "The necessity has arisen for every warlike
nation to have a sufficient aerial fleet, armed and equipped for
offensive warfare."
His advice, however, was not adopted—at any rate, not by the War Office.
No steps have yet been taken to estimate the value of an aeroplane as a
destructive instrument, despite the fact that France and Germany are
keenly alive to the possibilities of a large number of weight-carrying
machines.
In Germany, at the present time, secret tests and experiments are being
made, and the construction of special machines undertaken. Meanwhile, we
fumble along. If a war broke out to-morrow, it is true that destructive
work by aeroplanes, on anything like a large scale, would not be
undertaken.
But what about the day after to-morrow—or rather next year? Every day,
the general efficiency of the aeroplane is being improved, and its
radius of action increased. Practically every day, also, foreign nations
are adding to their air-fleets. Already the art of employing aircraft in
fairly large numbers has been learned. Machines for destructive work can
now be built—and are being built; and yet we are content, as yet, to do
nothing.
Sufficient warning has been given. Colonel Templer, an officer
identified with the first Government aeronautical work undertaken in
England, has declared: "It is conclusively proved that the aeroplane is
a machine for carrying out attacks in warfare. We must, therefore, be
prepared not only for defence against bomb-dropping aeroplanes; we must
be prepared, if necessary, to use them."
Another military expert of high repute, speaking of the havoc that a
hostile air-fleet might work, by an attack upon the Thames Valley
between Hammersmith and Gravesend, has observed: "This whole fifty miles
of concentrated essence of Empire lies at the absolute mercy of an
aerial machine, which could plant a dozen incendiary missiles in certain
pre-selected spots."
The point to be considered, in this connection, is this: such an aerial
attack is no longer a vague possibility. It was only the other day,
while discussing the destructive capabilities of modern-type aeroplanes,
that a famous constructer showed how—if a large fleet of machines was
marshalled together—it would be possible for an enemy to drop a couple
of hundred tons of explosive matter upon London, suddenly appearing from
across the Channel by air, and as flying quickly back again.
[Illustration: TRANSPORT OF WAR AEROPLANES
Photo, M. Roe.
In the manner depicted above—and also by means of motor lorries—were
military aeroplanes transported from point to point during the French
manœuvres.]
What such an aerial attack as this would mean has been pictured by Lord
Montagu of Beaulieu. Suppose London was thus assailed, from the air, at
the beginning of a war, he says: What would the result be? Imagine the
Stock Exchange, the chief banks, the great railway stations, and our
means of communication destroyed. "Such a blow at the very heart of the
Empire," declares Lord Montagu, "would be like paralysing the nerves of
a strong man, with a soporific, before he had to fight for his life: the
muscular force would remain, but the brains would be powerless to
direct."
When delivering an attack upon a city, a squadron of aeroplanes engaged
in such work would, declare military experts who have specially studied
the problem, probably sweep over the principal buildings in a long line,
dropping bombs as they flew. Then they would wheel round, and return
over the same area, again releasing a certain number of missiles. The
disastrous effect of such an aerial bombardment, carried out
systematically by a large number of machines, may readily be imagined.
Although, as has been mentioned, German experimental work, regarding the
value of aeroplanes for punitive work, has been kept very secret, the
result of one interesting test, at least, has become known. In this
case, a squadron of dragoons was specially employed to give realism to
the experiment.
The squadron was directed to move a certain distance away from one of
the German air-stations, and then camp for the night. This was done.
Then two army airmen, flying biplanes, set off to deliver a night attack
upon the encampment. Beneath their machines, they carried a
bomb-dropping apparatus such as has already been described.
Locating the bivouac by its fires, the two airmen stopped their engines,
and planed down silently from a considerable altitude. Neither of the
aeroplanes was seen, by the dragoons, until it was right over them. Then
the attacking airmen released a stream of dummy bombs, which fell all
about the camp-fires. Immediately they had done so, and before the
dragoons had recovered from their surprise, the pilots started their
engines, and disappeared again into the darkness.
Seeing that it was purely experimental, and that neither officer-airmen
was skilled in such work, the result of this mock attack was surprising.
Had actual war conditions prevailed, and had the bombs been real ones,
death would have been scattered through the bivouac, the horses would
probably have stampeded, and a general scene of confusion would have
ensued.
And this is a most important point: so swift and unexpected was the
night attack that the machines only came into view just at the moment
they were releasing their bombs. This would probably have meant that, in
warfare, they would have escaped without an effective shot being fired
at them.
By such tests as these, regarding which, as a general rule, nothing
becomes public, the German military authorities are obtaining data that
is invaluable concerning the destructive potentialities of the war
aeroplane. Apart from the actual damage done by such a night attack as
has been described, there is its moral effect to be considered—and this
point is regarded as an important one by foreign experts.
Nothing, they think, could be more harassing or wearying for troops,
during a hard campaign, than to be attacked, night after night, by
squadrons of aeroplanes. Incessant watchfulness, and consequent loss of
rest, would be involved, and a general feeling of uneasiness would be
occasioned.
It is now considered feasible to carry a light machine-gun upon an
aeroplane, and to use it effectively. With such guns, skilfully handled,
it is considered that attacks could be delivered upon reserve troops,
upon artillery trains, upon the horses of guns in action, and upon
troops when on the march.
Considerable experience, in handling a machine-gun on an aeroplane will,
probably, be necessary before accuracy can be obtained; but military
men, who are most competent to speak, see no difficulty in equipping an
aeroplane with such a gun, and in obtaining satisfactory results.
In conclusion, it may be taken that the offensive possibilities of the
aeroplane grow, from day to day. Machines are built to fly faster, and
to carry heavier weights. In future, so far as the question of this
destructive work of machines is concerned, it will be necessary to
reckon air-fleets not in hundreds, but in thousands.
At the moment, as has been said, the reconnoitring machine is engaging
most attention; but an aeroplane for destructive use is being kept well
in mind, none the less. Its appearance, as a weapon of war, is merely a
matter of time.
What may be accomplished, by a fleet of aeroplanes bent upon
destruction, has only been hinted at in this section; but it should
serve its purpose—which is to show that no country can afford to ignore
what the future promises in this respect.