I. Why manufacturers charge high prices—Cost of experimental
work—Building of trial machines.
A decidedly interesting question is that of the cost of aeroplanes. It
represents a consideration, also, which is of practical importance from
the military point of view.
So far, the price of any aeroplane of a well-known make has been high.
An ordinary-type biplane, for example, fitted with a "Gnome" engine, has
been selling for approximately £1000. A monoplane of established repute,
built to carry a pilot alone, has been listed at £900.
A military-type biplane, capable of carrying three men, has been selling
at something like £1200, and a reconnoitring monoplane, for two
occupants, has been priced at a figure in excess of£1000. There has, as
a matter of fact, been good reason for manufacturers to demand high
prices for their machines.
The expenses of a builder of aeroplanes are extremely heavy. His
business is not at all like any ordinary commercial undertaking. He does
not merely build a machine, and then sell it. He has costly researches
to undertake, and wearisome and expensive experimental work to carry
out.
Let us take a typical example. A prominent manufacturer in France
designed a monoplane, which embodied improvements upon existing
practice. Having the facilities of a well-equipped workshop, he speedily
put his ideas to a practical test, and commenced the building of a
machine.
This occupied some weeks, during which time, of course, the builder had
the wages of his engineers to pay. Then, when the machine was ready for
tests, he had to hand it over to his professional aviator—another
well-paid employee. The monoplane was taken to the private flying ground
which the manufacturer found it necessary to rent; and here, for a week
or so, first experiments were carried out, the wages of the aviator
being augmented by those of a regular staff of mechanics.
The result of the trials was that, after securing useful data, the
monoplane was irretrievably wrecked, in landing after a flight.
Whereupon, the manufacturer had to face the expense of building a second
machine, embodying further improvements suggested—and going through the
whole routine again.
This he did, devoting several weeks of his men’s time to constructing
the new machine. Once more, when it was finished, the professional
aviator took it in hand. This time, after an even shorter career than
the first machine, the monoplane was broken up. Again, however,
improvements suggested themselves; and so the maker embarked, patiently,
upon the construction of a third model.
To cut a long story short, this process of evolution went on until six
monoplanes had been built, each one more reliable in action than its
predecessor. It was only, in fact, when a seventh machine stood ready,
that the manufacturer considered he had a flying machine he could offer
to prospective purchasers, as a safe and improved type.
In fixing the price that he should ask for this new model, the
manufacturer was guided, naturally, by the outlay that had been
necessary in perfecting it. It would have been unreasonable, under such
circumstances, for the purchaser to expect to buy the machine at a
figure which represented a small profit for its builder, over and above
the actual cost of production of that one model. Having spent thousands
of pounds upon his experiments, the manufacturer was obliged to recoup
himself, by charging a high price for his goods.
Another factor would also govern price in such circumstances as these.
The manufacturer would have no guarantee as to selling any fixed number
of machines. In the case of a new motor-car, for instance, the machine
is standardised; and, if it is a good one, a large number are sold.
This, naturally, reduces the price per machine.
But, in the case of this new monoplane, even if it is the best produced
at the moment, the question of the number to be sold is an
unsatisfactorily vague quantity. After only two or three have been
disposed of, for instance, another machine may be put upon the market
which is a few miles an hour faster; whereupon, the aviators who are
intent upon winning speed prizes quickly devote their attention to the
new machine.
As may be imagined, therefore, what with enormously-heavy first costs,
and a doubtful sale even when a good machine is produced, the
manufacturer of aeroplanes has no alternative but to charge a high price
for the machines he does succeed in disposing of.
Let us consider, for a moment, the experience of such a famous
manufacturer as M. Louis Blériot. It was in 1906 that he began
experimenting with monoplanes, entirety at his own expense; and he was
spending money lavishly on new machines, and devoting a vast amount of
time to the problem, until the summer of 1909. Apart from the money he
spent, and the aircraft he broke up, he risked his life, on many
occasions, in attempting to fly on machines which were entirely
experimental.
It was estimated, indeed, that—before this famous airman and constructer
flew the Channel, in July, 1909—he had expended a fortune upon aerial
research work. It was perfectly legitimate, therefore, that he should
endeavour to recoup himself, for all his time and expense, when a sale
did spring up for his machines.
It has not been a case, since then, of producing machines of a standard
type. Directly he had perfected the simple, low-powered monoplane upon
which he crossed from France to England, M. Blériot began experimenting
with a more powerful machine; and so he has been engaged ever since.
In his works in Paris, for example, M. Blériot employs a skilled staff
of draughtsmen, who are busy every day upon designs for new machines. He
must keep pace with his rivals, and he must meet the growing demands of
the military service. Faster and more reliable machines are demanded
every day, and strenuous efforts must be made to fulfil these demands.
Therefore, the expense of running an aeroplane factory is exceptionally
high.
These facts are interesting, as they explain why "a few bits of stick
and canvas, and an engine," as an aeroplane has been described, should
cost as much as £1000. It is not so much the wood, and the canvas, and
the engine that the purchaser is paying for, as the months, and perhaps
years, of patient toil and ceaseless expense, which have gone to the
production of a practical machine.
High prices are charged for aeroplane engines. Here, again, the same
causes are at work. Most costly are the preliminary expenses connected
with the production of a new petrol engine. In the case of the famous
"Gnome," for instance, many thousands of pounds were spent upon a series
of experimental engines, before a reliable model could be obtained.
II. Economy of a large military order for machines—The incidental
expenses.
The idea has been conveyed, by the previous notes, that the aeroplane is
an expensive machine. So it is, at present, so far as the private
purchaser is concerned—although its champions are already prone to point
out that a first-class flying machine does not cost more than a
high-powered, luxurious motor-car.
When the aeroplane is regarded as a weapon of war, however, it should
not be considered expensive. It is, in fact, remarkably cheap,
particularly when compared with the cost of other forms of armament.
The prices, previously quoted, as representing the cost of the best
makes of aeroplane, have been for individual machines; and this
introduces a point which is greatly in favour of any War Department,
when it seeks to equip itself with a number of aeroplanes. Through
placing orders for a batch of machines, instead of buying one here and
there, any Government should be able materially to reduce the price of
any make.
Grant, for the sake of argument, that a country decides to provide
itself with a fleet of a hundred war aeroplanes. The policy, in such a
case, would be to look round, at the beginning of any flying season, and
make a selection, say, of the three types of machine best suited for the
tasks arising in military work.
It would certainly not be wise to buy a hundred machines all of one
type, although, by so doing, the price for each machine could be more
reduced than in the case of splitting up an order between several
manufacturers. But such a policy of having "all one’s eggs in one
basket" would not be judicious—or fair to the industry as a whole.
Government policy, in this regard, should be to support as many
manufacturers as is reasonably possible, and thus ensure the industry
maintaining a healthy position.
Orders placed with a number of makers would be necessary, in fact. But,
even with such a distribution as this, a considerable saving of expense
could be made. Expert estimates have been given as to the cost, per
machine, of a hundred war aeroplanes, all ordered at the same time; and
a reasonably exact figure places the average price, for each machine, at
£600.
This represents a very definite reduction upon the price of a single
machine; and it also indicates that, in the future, when aeroplanes are
bought in even larger numbers, for war purposes, the cost of each
machine will become an almost insignificant item—insignificant, that is
to say, when compared with the cost of other forms of armament. When a
thousand machines can be ordered, and built at one time, for example,
the cost per machine will be enormously reduced.
There should be no outcry, indeed, as to the cost of war aeroplanes. The
Admiralty embarks, without question, upon the construction of a great
battleship, although it knows that each huge craft will speedily become
obsolete. This money is not grudged; it is for the defence of the
country.
The same attitude should be taken up as regards the creation of a fleet
of war aeroplanes. They, too, have become essential weapons.
War aeroplanes are, in their own sphere, quite as important as
battleships. And the contrast between the two weapons, in the matter of
price, is extraordinary. For the price of one Dreadnought it is, indeed,
estimated that a fleet of a couple of thousand aeroplanes could be
created.
An enthusiastic advocate of the war aeroplane puts this matter of cost
very forcibly. "It is as nothing," he declares. "A vote of a few hundred
thousand pounds would place the whole air service on a sound basis, so
far as England is concerned. The net cost of each aeroplane, in a
squadron, is an absolutely insignificant item of expense, when we reckon
what we are spending, in other ways, on our Army and Navy. One aircraft
represents only about twice the amount spent in making one of the great
shells fired by our biggest naval guns. It is this astonishing cheapness
of the aeroplane, having regard to its revolutionary work, which is the
surprising factor of the situation. It will mean, of course, that flying
machines will be used, eventually, in huge fleets."
Naturally, the purchase of a hundred machines does not represent the
total outlay, in connection with the establishment of a well-equipped
air-corps. An organisation must be built up round these machines, and
there must be men not only to fly them, but to keep them in a state of
efficiency; and there is the need, also, of housing the air-fleet.
The question of providing sheds for a fleet of machines is an important
one. Aeroplanes must be well housed, or their depreciation is rapid.
Whatever sheds are provided must, apart from being strong and
weather-proof, be portable as well.
Under the same heading, also, should come the workshops—some of them
portable—necessary to cope with repairs and renewals in connection with
machines. This, too, is an important item, as first-class repair work is
an essential feature in the organisation of any air service.
An estimate of the money that should be expended upon sheds and
repair-shops—for a fleet of a hundred aeroplanes—places the amount at
£20,000. Money should not be stinted in this direction; good sheds, and
efficient repairs, should both tell their tale, when the aeroplane is
used in a campaign.
[Illustration: PILOT AND "OBSERVER."
Photo, M. Roe.
The above photograph shows a military-type Breguet biplane, as used in
the French manœuvres, with pilot and observer in their places.]
Now it is necessary to touch upon the question of military flying
grounds, and the expense incurred in keeping them in proper order; also
the sum of money necessary to provide a sufficient number of motor
transport lorries for the air-fleet. As has been explained, the plan
generally adopted is for an aeroplane to be transported from point to
point on a lorry, and followed by a repair-car.
In regard to the English trials of war aeroplanes, a point is made—in
connection with the size of the packing-cases for machines—of the
possibility of transporting aircraft by railway in time of war.
Undoubtedly, under favourable circumstances, this would provide a rapid
method of bringing up machines from a distance.
Under the headings of the expenditure upon flying grounds, and the
provision of motor-lorries to follow aeroplanes, and act as transport
waggons, a reasonable estimate of the sum to be expended—in connection
with a fleet of a hundred machines—is £20,000.
The sum of £100,000 should be sufficient, not only to purchase a hundred
war aeroplanes, but to equip the corps with sheds and repair-shops, and
also to maintain flying grounds, and provide an adequate number of
motor-lorries.
This amount allocated for machines and incidentals, a Government would
find itself face to face with the question of providing officers and men
for the air-corps. Pay for this corps should, it is considered, be
represented by an annual sum of approximately £60,000.
III. Question of renewals—General cheapness of an air-corps, as compared
with other forms of armament.
A point of considerable importance, in regard to an air-corps, concerns
the money which should be put aside, each year, for the provision of new
machines. One eminently practical authority, Colonel J. E. Capper,
reckons that, in connection with a fleet of a hundred aeroplanes, an
allowance should be made for the purchase of forty new machines each
year.
Upon this question of renewals there is, however, diversity of opinion.
The contention is made, for example, that a Government should be
prepared, at the commencement of the flying season, to relegate all its
previous year’s machines to the schools, for the use of pupils, and
purchase a new fleet of up-to-date craft for use in war-time.
Such a drastic step, however, should not be necessary. It would be
advisable, of course, to weed out a number of machines, from time to
time, for the reason that they become obsolete; and such machines
should, as suggested, find a place at the schools for the use of
beginners.
The exact number of new aeroplanes which it should be advisable to buy,
in any one year, must be governed, very largely, by the process of
perfection which goes on. For the next year or so, it is probable that
an allowance for renewals will need to be a heavy one. Afterwards, as
the rate of improvement becomes slower, the purchase of new machines
will represent a lighter item.
A good reconnoitring biplane, say of the flying season of 1911, is not
likely to become obsolete in 1912. A new machine will probably fly
farther and faster, and carry more weight; but the 1911 biplane will
still be capable of useful work, and need not be relegated to the
scrap-heap. It will behove a Government, of course, to equip itself with
as many new-type machines as possible; and an estimate of forty new
machines a year, in connection with a fleet of a hundred, is by no means
unreasonable.
This, of course, presupposes a logical process of development, with an
improved type of machine appearing from year to year. Should a
revolutionary discovery be made, the plans of all nations would be
altered. It might then become necessary, in the interests of national
safety, to "scrap" a whole fleet of aeroplanes, in order to make way for
the type which had made them obsolete.
But the unexpected production of an aeroplane, immeasurably superior to
existing models, is not anticipated. Already, it is true, the way can be
seen to make many improvements upon present-type aeroplanes; but, in
regard to such a difficult problem as that of aviation, the testing and
perfecting of any new device, however simple, cannot be hastily carried
out.
One other consideration, in regard to the running costs of a fleet of
machines, now presents itself. This concerns the allowance to be made
for the general upkeep of the aeroplanes, and for such items as the
provision of petrol and oil. Here an expert computation places the
figure—for an air service of a hundred machines—at a sum of £16,000.
It is possible to arrive at a summary of the cost of the purchase and
upkeep of a fleet of a hundred machines. First would come the
expenditure of £100,000 upon the aeroplanes themselves, and incidentals;
and then the Government would need to be ready to spend another £100,000
a year upon the upkeep of the corps.
Such estimates as this go to reveal the inadequacy of the grant made by
the British Government for the year 1911-12. As has been previously
mentioned, the actual sum devoted to aeroplaning, dirigible ballooning,
and the upkeep of the Air Battalion, has been £85,000. Owing to the
costliness of airships, only a small portion of this sum has been
devoted to aeroplanes. There is no chance—with such a grant as this—of
mapping out an adequate programme for aeroplane work.