The courts were nearly as bad as the laws. There were royal courts,

feudal courts, church courts, courts of finance, and military courts;

and it was a wise offender who knew before which court he might be

tried. Extremely important cases might be carried on appeal to the

highest courts of the realm--the Parlements--of which there were

thirteen, headed in honor by that of Paris.

[Sidenote: Prevalence of Injustice]

Although courts were so plenteous, justice was seldom to be found.

Persons wrongfully accused of crime were tortured until they confessed

deeds they had never committed. The public was not admitted to trials,

so no one knew on what grounds the sentence was passed, and the judge

gave no reason for his verdict. Civil lawsuits were appealed from court

to court and might drag on for years until the parties had spent all

their money. Lawyers were more anxious to extract large fees from their

clients than to secure justice for them.

[Sidenote: "Noblesse de la Robe"]

Confused laws and conflicting jurisdictions were often made worse by

the character of the judges who presided over royal courts. Many of

them were rich bourgeois who had purchased their appointment from the

king. For a large price it was possible to buy a judgeship or seat in a

Parlement, not only for a lifetime but as an hereditary possession. It

has been estimated that 50,000 bourgeois families possessed such

judicial offices: they formed a sort of lower nobility, exempted from

certain taxes and very proud of their honors. Naturally envious were

his neighbors when the "councilor" appeared in his grand wig and his

enormous robe of silk and velvet, attended by a page who kept the robe

from trailing in the dust. No wonder these bourgeois judges were called

"the nobility of the robe."

In some way or other the "noble of the robe" had to compensate himself

for the price of his office and the cost of his robe. One bought an

office for profit as well as for honor. For to the judge were paid the

court fees and fines; and no shrewd judge would let a case pass him

without exacting some kind of a fee. Even more profitable were the

indirect gains. If Monsieur A had gained his case in court, it was

quite to be expected that in his joy Monsieur A would make a handsome

present to the judge who had given the decision. At least, that is the

way the judge would have put it. As a plain matter of fact the judges

were bribed, and justice was too often bought and sold like judgeships.

[Sidenote: Abuses in the Army]

Corruption and abuses were not confined to the civil government and the

courts of law; the army, too, was infected. In the ranks were to be

found hired foreigners, unwilling peasants dragged from their farms,

and the scum of the city slums. Thousands deserted every year. Had the

discontented troops been well commanded, they might still have answered

the purpose. But such was not the case. There were certainly enough

officers--an average of one general for every 157 privates. But what

officers they were! Dissolute and dandified generals drawing their pay

and never visiting their troops, lieutenants reveling in vice, instead

of drilling and caring for their commands. Noble blood, not ability,

was the qualification of a commander. Counts, who had never seen a

battlefield, were given military offices, and the seven-year-old Duc de

Frousac was a colonel.

[Sidenote: Confusion in Finance]

Confused administration, antiquated laws, corrupt magistrates, and a

disorganized army showed the weakness of the French monarchy; but

financial disorders threatened its very existence,--for a government

out of money is as helpless as a fish out of water.

The destructive wars, costly armies, luxurious palaces, and extravagant

court of Louis XIV had left to the successors of the Grand Monarch many

debts, an empty treasury, and an overtaxed people. If ever there was

need of care and thrift, it was in the French monarchy in the

eighteenth century.

Yet the king's ministers did not even trouble themselves to keep

orderly accounts. Bills and receipts were carelessly laid away; no one

knew how much was owed or how much was to be expected by the treasury;

and even the king himself could not have told how much he would run

into debt during the year. While it lasted, money was spent freely.

[Sidenote: Royal Revenue]

The amount of money required by the king would have made taxes very

heavy anyway, but bad methods of assessment and collection added to the

burden. The royal revenue was derived chiefly from three sources: the

royal domains, the direct taxes, and the indirect taxes. From the royal

domains, the lands of which the king was landlord as well as sovereign,

a considerable but ever-diminishing income was derived.

[Sidenote: Direct Taxes]

[Sidenote: The Income Tax]

[Sidenote: The Poll Tax]

The direct taxes were the prop of the treasury, for they could be

increased to meet the demand, at least as long as the people would pay.

There were three direct taxes--the _taille_, the _capitation_, and the

_vingtième_. The _vingtième_, or "twentieth," was a tax on incomes—5

per cent [Footnote: Five per cent in theory; in practice in the reign

of Louis XVI it was 11 per cent] on the salary of the judge, on the

rents of the noble, on the earning of the artisan, on the produce of

the peasant. The clergy were entirely exempted from this tax; the more

influential nobles and bourgeois contrived to have their incomes

underestimated, and the burden fell heaviest on the poorer classes.

_Capitation_ was a general poll or head tax, varying in amount

according to whichever of twenty-two classes claimed the individual

taxpayer. Maid-servants, for example, paid annually three _livres_ and

twelve _sous_. [Footnote: A _livre_ was worth about a _franc_ (20

cents) and a _sou_ was equivalent to one cent.]

[Sidenote: The Taille or Land Tax]

The most important and hated direct tax was the _taille_ or land

tax,--practically a tax on peasants alone. The total amount to be

raised was apportioned among the intendants by the Royal Council, and

by the intendants among the villages of their respective districts. At

the village assembly collectors were elected, who were thereby

authorized to demand from each villager a share of the tax, according

to his ability to pay. As a result of this method, each villager tried

to appear poor so as to be taxed lightly; whole villages looked run-

down in order to be held for only a small share; and influential

politicians often obtained alleviation for parts of the country.

[Sidenote: Indirect Taxes]

[Sidenote: "Tax Farming"]

The indirect taxes were not so heavy, but they were bitterly detested.

There were taxes on alcohol, metal-ware, cards, paper, and starch, but

most disliked of all was that on salt (the _gabelle_). Every

person above seven years of age was supposed annually to buy from the

government salt-works seven pounds of salt at about ten times its real

value. [Footnote: It should be understood, of course, that the

_gabelle_ was higher and more burdensome in some provinces than in

others.] Only government agents could legally sell salt, and smugglers

were fined heavily or sent to the galleys. These indirect taxes were

usually "farmed out," that is, in return for a lump sum the government

would grant to a company of speculators the right to collect what they

could. These speculators were called "farmers-general,"--France could

be called their farm [Footnote: Etymologically, the French word for

farm (_ferme_) was not necessarily connected with agriculture, but

signified a fixed sum (_firma_) paid for a certain privilege, such

as that of collecting a tax.] and money its produce. And they farmed

well. After paying the government, the "farmers" still had millions of

francs to distribute as bribes or as presents to great personages or to

retain for themselves. Thus, millions were lost to the treasury.

[Sidenote: The Burden of Taxation]

Taxes could not always be raised to cover emergencies, nor collected so

wastefully. The peasants of France were crushed by feudal dues, tithes,

and royal taxes. The bourgeoisie were angered by the income tax, by the

indirect taxes, by the tolls and internal customs, and by the

monopolistic privileges which the king sold to his favorites. How long

the unprivileged classes would bear the burden of taxation, while the

nobles and clergy were almost free, no one could tell; but signs of

discontent were too patent to be ignored.

Louis XIV (1643-1715) at the end of his long reign perceived the

danger. As the aged monarch lay on his deathbed, flushed with fever, he

called his five-year-old great-grandson and heir, the future Louis XV,

to the bedside and said: "My child, you will soon be sovereign of a

great kingdom. Do not forget your obligations to God; remember that it

is to Him that you owe all that you are. Endeavor to live at peace with

your neighbors; do not imitate me in my fondness for war, nor in the

exorbitant expenditure which I have incurred. Take counsel in all your

actions. Endeavor to _relieve the people at the earliest possible

moment_, and thus to accomplish what, unfortunately, I am unable to

do myself."

[Sidenote: Louis XV, 1715-1774]

It was good advice. But Louis XV was only a boy, a plaything in the

hands of his ministers. In an earlier chapter [Footnote: See above, pp.

255 f.] we have seen how under the duke of Orleans, who was prince

regent from 1715 to 1723, France entered into war with Spain, and how

finance was upset by speculation; and how under Cardinal Fleury, who

was minister from 1726 to 1743, the War of the Polish Election (1733-

1738) was fought and the War of the Austrian Succession (1740-1748)

begun.

When in 1743 the ninety-year-old Cardinal Fleury died, Louis XV

announced that he would be his own minister. But he was not a Frederick

the Great. At the council table poor Louis "opened his mouth, said

little, and thought not at all." State business seemed terribly dull,

and the king left most of it to others.

But of one thing, Louis XV could not have enough--and that was

pleasure. He much preferred pretty girls to pompous ministers of state,

and spent most of his time with the ladies and the rest of the time

either hunting or gambling. In spite of the fact that he was married,

Louis very easily fell in love with a charming face; at one time he was

infatuated by the duchess of Châteauroux, then by Madame de Pompadour,

and later by Madame du Barry. Upon his mistresses he was willing to

lavish princely presents,--he gave them estates and titles, had them

live at Versailles, and criminally allowed them to interfere in

politics; for their sake he was willing to let his country go to ruin.

The character of the king was reflected in his court. It became

fashionable to neglect one's wife, to gamble all night, to laugh at

virtue, to be wasteful and extravagant. Versailles was gay; the ladies

painted their cheeks more brightly than ever, and the lords spent their

fortunes more recklessly.

But Versailles was not France. France was ruined with wars and taxes.

Louis XIV had said, "Live at peace with your neighbors"; but since his

death four wars had been waged, culminating in the disastrous Seven

Years' War (1756-1763), by which French commerce had been destroyed and

the French colonies had been lost. [Footnote: The formal annexation of

Lorraine in 1766 and of Corsica in 1768 afforded some crumbs of comfort

for Louis XV.] Debts were multiplied and taxes increased. What with

war, extravagance, and poor management, Louis XV left France a bankrupt

state.

[Sidenote: Growing complaints against the French Monarchy under Louis

XV]

Complaints were loud and remonstrances bitter, and Louis XV could not

silence them, try as he might. Authors who criticized the government

were thrown into prison: radical writings were confiscated or burned;

but criticism persisted. Enemies of the government were imprisoned

without trial in the Bastille by _lettres de cachet_, which were

orders for arrest signed in blank by the king, who sometimes gave or

sold them to his favorites, so that they, too, might have their enemies

jailed. Yet the opposition to the court ever increased. Resistance to

taxation centered in the Parlement of Paris. It refused to register the

king's decrees, and remained defiant even after Louis XV had angrily

announced that he would not tolerate interference with his

prerogatives. The quarrel grew so bitter that all the thirteen

Parlements of France were suppressed (1771), and in their stead new

royal courts were established.

Opposition was only temporarily crushed; and Louis XV knew that graver

trouble was brewing. He grew afraid to ride openly among the

discontented crowds of Paris; the peasants saluted him sullenly; the

treasury was empty; the monarchy was tottering. Yet Louis XV felt

neither responsibility nor care. "It will surely last as long as I," he

cynically affirmed; "my successor may take care of himself."

[Sidenote: Louis XVI, 1774-1792]

His successor was his grandson, Louis XVI (1774-1792), a weak-kneed

prince of twenty years, very virtuous and well-meaning, but lacking in

intelligence and will-power. He was too awkward and shy to preside with

dignity over the ceremonious court; he was too stupid and lazy to

dominate the ministry. He liked to shoot deer from out the palace

window, or to play at lock-making in his royal carpentry shop.

Government he left to his ministers.

[Sidenote: Turgot]

At first, hopes ran high, for Turgot, friend of Voltaire and

contributor to the _Encyclopedia_, was minister of finance (1774-

1776), and reform was in the air. Industry and commerce were to be

unshackled; _laisser-faire_ was to be the order of the day;

finances were to be reformed, and taxes lowered. The clergy and nobles

were no longer to escape taxation; taxes on food were to be abolished;

the peasants were to be freed from forced labor on the roads. But

Turgot only stirred up opposition. The nobles and clergy were not

anxious to be taxed; courtiers resented any reduction of their

pensions; tax-farmers feared the reforming minister; owners of

industrial monopolies were frightened; the peasants misunderstood his

intentions; and riots broke out. Everybody seemed to be relieved when,

in 1776, Turgot was dismissed.

[Sidenote: Necker]

Turgot had been a theorist; his successor was a businessman. Jacques

Necker was well known in Paris as a hard-headed Swiss banker, and

Madame Necker's receptions were attended by the chief personages of the

bourgeois society of Paris. During his five years in office (1776-1781)

Necker applied business methods to the royal finances. He borrowed

400,000,000 francs from his banker friends, reformed the collection of

taxes, reduced expenditures, and carefully audited the accounts. In

1781 he issued a report or "Account Rendered of the Financial

Condition." The bankers were delighted; the secrets of the royal

treasury were at last common property; [Footnote: _The Compte

Rendu_, as it was called in France, was really not accurate; Necker,

in order to secure credit for his financial administration, made

matters appear better than they actually were.] and Necker was praised

to the skies.

[Sidenote: Marie Antoinette]

While Necker's Parisian friends rejoiced, his enemies at court prepared

his downfall. Now the most powerful enemy of Necker's reforms and

economies was the queen, Marie Antoinette. She was an Austrian

princess, the daughter of Maria Theresa, and in the eyes of the French

people she always remained a hated foreigner--"the Austrian," they

called her--the living symbol of the ruinous alliance between Habsburgs

and Bourbons which had been arranged by a Madame de Pompadour and which

had contributed to the disasters and disgrace of the Seven Years' War

[Footnote: See above, pp. 358 ff]. While grave ministers of finance

were puzzling their heads over the deficit, gay Marie Antoinette was

buying new dresses and jewelry, making presents to her friends, giving

private theatricals, attending horse-races and masked balls. The light-

hearted girl-queen had little serious interest in politics, but when

her friends complained of Necker's miserliness, she at once demanded

his dismissal.

Her demand was granted, for the kind-hearted, well-intentioned Louis

XVI could not bear to deprive his pretty, irresponsible Marie

Antoinette and her charming friends,--gallant nobles of France,--of

their pleasures. Their pleasures were very costly; and fresh loans

could be secured by the obsequious new finance-minister, Calonne, only

at high rates of interest.

From the standpoint of France, the greatest folly of Louis XVI's reign

was the ruinous intervention in the War of American Independence (1778-

1783). The United States became free; Great Britain was humbled;

Frenchmen proved that their valor was equal to their chivalry; but when

the impulsive Marquis de Lafayette returned from assisting the

Americans to win their liberty, he found a ruined France. The treasury

was on the verge of collapse. From the conclusion of the war in 1783 to

the outbreak of the French Revolution in 1789, every possible financial

expedient was tried--in vain.

[Sidenote: The Problem of Taxation]

To tax the so-called privileged classes--the clergy and the nobles--

might have helped; and successive finance ministers so counseled the

king. But it was absolutely against the spirit of the "old régime."

What was the good of being a clergyman or a noble, if one had no

privileges and was obliged to pay taxes like the rest? To tax all alike

would be in itself a revolution, and the tottering divine-right

monarchy sought reform, not revolution.

[Sidenote: The Assembly of Notables, 1787]

Yet in 1786 the interest-bearing debt had mounted to $600,000,000, the

government was running in debt at least $25,000,000 a year, and the

treasury-officials were experiencing the utmost difficulty in

negotiating new loans. Something had to be done. As a last resort, the

king convened (1787) an Assembly of Notables--145 of the chief nobles,

bishops, and magistrates--in the vain hope that they would consent to

the taxation of the privileged and unprivileged alike. The Notables

were not so self-sacrificing, however, and contented themselves with

abolishing compulsory labor on the roads, voting to have provincial

assemblies established, and demanding the dismissal of Calonne, the

minister of finance. The question of taxation, they said, should be

referred to the Estates-General. All this helped the treasury in no

material way.

[Sidenote: Convocation of the Estates-General]

A new minister of finance, who succeeded Calonne,--Archbishop Loménie

de Brienne,--politely thanked the Notables and sent them home. He made

so many fine promises that hope temporarily revived, and a new loan was

raised. But the Parlement of Paris, which together with the other

Parlements had been restored early in the reign of Louis XVI, soon saw

through the artifices of the suave minister, and positively refused to

register further loans or taxes. Encouraged by popular approval, the

Parlement went on to draw up a declaration of rights, and to assert

that subsidies could constitutionally be granted only by the nation's

representatives--the ancient Estates-General. This sounded to the

government like revolution, and the Parlements were again abolished.

The abolition of the Parlements raised a great cry of indignation;

excited crowds assembled in Paris and other cities; and the soldiers

refused to arrest the judges. Here was real revolution, and Louis XVI,

frightened and anxious, yielded to the popular demand for the Estates-

General.

In spite of the fact that every one talked so glibly about the Estates-

General and of the great things that body would do, few knew just what

the Estates-General was. Most people had heard that once upon a time

France had had a representative body of clergy, nobility, and

commoners, somewhat like the British Parliament. But no such assembly

had been convoked for almost two centuries, and only scholars and

lawyers knew what the old Estates-General had been. Nevertheless, it

was believed that nothing else could save France from ruin; and in

August, 1788, Louis XVI, after consulting the learned men, issued a

summons for the election of the Estates-General, to meet in May of the

following year.

[Sidenote: Failure of Absolutism in France]

The convocation of the Estates-General was the death-warrant of divine-

right monarchy in France. It meant that absolutism had failed. The king

was bankrupt. No half-way reforms or pitiful economies would do now.

The Revolution was at hand.

ADDITIONAL READING

THE BRITISH MONARCHY, 1760-1800. General accounts: A. L. Cross,

_History of England and Greater Britain_ (1914), ch. xlv, a brief

résumé; _Cambridge Modern History_, Vol. VI (1909), ch. xiii; A. D.

Innes, _History of England and the British Empire_, Vol. III (1914),

ch. vii-ix, xi; C. G. Robertson, _England under the Hanoverians_

(1911); J. F. Bright, _History of England_, Vol. III, _Constitutional

Monarchy_, 1689-1837; William Hunt, _Political History of England,

1760-1801_ (1905), Tory in sympathy; and W. E. H. Lecky, _A History of

England in the Eighteenth Century_, London ed., 7 vols. (1907), and _A

History of Ireland in the Eighteenth Century_, 5 vols. (1893), the most

complete general histories of the century. Special studies: E. and A.

G. Porritt, _The Unreformed House of Commons_, new ed., 2 vols. (1909),

a careful description of the undemocratic character of the

parliamentary system; J. R. Fisher, _The End of the Irish Parliament_

(1911); W. L. Mathieson, _The Awakening of Scotland, 1747-1797_ (1910);

_Correspondence of George III with Lord North, 1768-1783_, ed. by W. B.

Donne, 2 vols. (1867), excellent for illustrating the king's system of

personal government; Horace Walpole, _Letters_, ed. by Mrs. P. Toynbee,

16 vols. (1903-1905), a valuable contemporary source as "Walpole is the

acknowledged prince of letter writers"; G. S. Veitch, _The Genesis of

Parliamentary Reform_ (1913), a clear and useful account of the

agitation in the time of Pitt and Fox; W. P. Hall, _British Radicalism,

1791-1797_ (1912), an admirable and entertaining survey of the movement

for political and social reform in England; J. H. Rose, _William Pitt

and National Revival_ (1911), dealing with the years 1781-1791. There

are biographies of _William Pitt_ (the Younger) by Lord Rosebery (1891)

and by W. D. Green (1901); and _The Early Life of Charles James Fox_ by

Sir G. 0. Trevelyan (1880) affords a delightful picture of the life of

the time. Also see books listed under ENGLISH SOCIETY IN THE EIGHTEENTH

CENTURY, pp. 427 f., above.

THE BENEVOLENT DESPOTS. Brief general accounts: H. E. Bourne, _The

Revolutionary Period in Europe, 1763-1815_ (1914), ch. ii, iv, v; J.

H. Robinson and C. A. Beard, _The Development of Modern Europe_,

Vol. I (1907), ch. x, xi; H. M. Stephens, _Revolutionary Europe,

1789-1815_ (1893), ch. i; _Cambridge Modern History_, Vol. VI

(1909), ch. xii, xviii-xx, xxii, xvi; E. F. Henderson, _A Short

History of Germany_, Vol. II (1902), ch. v, excellent on Frederick

the Great. With special reference to the career of Charles III of

Spain: Joseph Addison, _Charles III of Spain_ (1900); M. A. S.

Hume, _Spain, its Greatness and Decay, 1479-1788_ (1898), ch. xiv,

xv; François Rousseau, _Règne de Charles III d'Espagne, 1759-

1788,_ 2 vols. (1907), the best and most exhaustive work on the

subject; Gustav Diercks, _Geschichte Spaniens von der fruhesten

Zeiten bis auf die Gegenwart_, 2 vols. (1895-1896), a good general

history of Spain by a German scholar. On Gustavus III of Sweden: R. N.

Bain, _Scandinavia, a Political History of Denmark, Norway, and

Sweden, from 1513 to 1900_ (1905). On the Dutch Netherlands in the

eighteenth century: H. W. Van Loon, _The Fall of the Dutch

Republic_ (1913). On Joseph II: A. H. Johnson, _The Age of the

Enlightened Despot, 1660-1789_ (1910), ch. x, an admirable brief

introduction to the subject; _Cambridge Modern History_, Vol. VIII

(1904), ch. xi, on Joseph's foreign policy; William Coxe (1747-1828),

_History of the House of Austria_, Vol. III, an excellent account

though somewhat antiquated; Franz Krones, _Handbuch der Geschichte

Oesterreichs_, Vol. IV (1878), Books XIX, XX, a standard work; Karl

Ritter, _Kaiser Joseph II und seine kirchlichen Reformen_; G.

Holzknecht, _Ursprung und Herkunft der reformideen Kaiser Josefs II

auf kirchlichem Gebiete_ (1914). For further details of the projects

and achievements of Frederick the Great and Maria Theresa, see

bibliographies accompanying Chapter XI, above; and for those of

Catherine II of Russia, see bibliography of Chapter XII, above.

THE FRENCH MONARCHY, 1743-1789. Brief general accounts: Shailer

Mathews, _The French Revolution_ (reprint 1912), ch. vi-viii; A. J.

Grant, _The French Monarchy, 1483-1789_, Vol. II (1900), ch. xix-xxi;

G. W. Kitchin, _A History of France_, Vol. III (4th ed., 1899), Book

VI, ch. iii-vii; _Cambridge Modern History_, Vol. VIII (1904), ch. ii-

iv; E. J. Lowell, _The Eve of the French Revolution_ (1892), an able

survey; Sophia H. MacLehose, _The Last Days of the French Monarchy_

(1901), a popular narrative. More detailed studies: J. B. Perkins,

_France under Louis XV_, 2 vols. (1897), an admirable treatment; Ernest

Lavisse (editor), _Histoire de France_, Vol. VIII, Part II, _Règne de

Louis XV, 1715-1774_ (1909), and Vol. IX, Part I, _Règne de Louis XVI,

1774-1789_ (1910), the latest and most authoritative treatment in

French; Felix Rocquain, _The Revolutionary Spirit Preceding the French

Revolution_, condensed Eng. trans. by J. D. Hunting (1891), a

suggestive account of various disorders immediately preceding 1789;

Leon Say, _Turgot_, a famous little biography translated from the

French by M. B. Anderson (1888); W. W. Stephens, _Life and Writings of

Turgot_ (1895), containing extracts from important decrees of Turgot;

Alphonse Jobez, _La France sous Louis XV_, 6 vols. (1864-1873), and,

by the same author, _La France sous Louis XVI_, 3 vols. (1877-1893),

exhaustive works, still useful for particular details but in general

now largely superseded by the _Histoire de France_ of Ernest Lavisse;

Charles Gomel, _Les causes financières de la révolution française: les

derniers contrôleurs généraux_, 2 vols. (1892-1893), scholarly and

especially valuable for the public career of Turgot, Necker, Calonne,

and Loménie de Brienne; Rene Stourm, _Les finances de l'ancien régime

et de la révolution_, 2 vols. (1885); Aimé Cherest, _La chute de

l'ancien regime_, 1787-1789, 3 vols. (1884-1886), a very detailed study

of the three critical years immediately preceding the Revolution; F. C.

von Mercy-Argenteau, _Correspondance secrète avec l'impératrice Marie-

Thérèse, avec les lettres de Marie-Thérèse et de Marie-Antoinette_, 3

vols. (1875); and _Correspondance secrète avec l'empereur Joseph II et

le prince de Kaunitz_, 2 vols. (1889-1891), editions of original

letters and other information which Mercy-Argenteau transmitted to

Vienna from 1766 to 1790, very valuable for the contemporary pictures

of court-life at Versailles (selections have been translated and

published in English). Also see books listed under FRENCH SOCIETY ON

THE EVE OF THE REVOLUTION, p. 427, above.

CHAPTER XV

THE FRENCH REVOLUTION INTRODUCTORY

The governments and other political institutions which flourished in

the first half of the eighteenth century owed their origins to much

earlier times. They had undergone only such alterations as were

absolutely necessary to adapt them to various places and changing

circumstances. Likewise, the same social classes existed as had always

characterized western Europe; and these classes--the court, the nobles,

the clergy, the bourgeoisie, the artisans, the peasants--continued to

bear relations to each other which a hoary antiquity had sanctioned.

Every individual was born into his class, or, as the popular phrase

went, to "a station to which God had called him," and to question the

fundamental divine nature of class distinctions seemed silly if not

downright blasphemous.

[Sidenote: Dislocation of Society in Eighteenth Century]

Such ideas were practical so long as society was comparatively static

and fixed, but they were endangered as soon as the human world was

conceived of as dynamic and progressive. The development of trade and

industry, as has been emphasized, rapidly increased the numbers,

wealth, and influence of the bourgeoisie, or middle class, and quite

naturally threw the social machine out of gear. The merchants, the

lawyers, the doctors, the professors, the literary men, began to envy

the nobles and clergy, and in turn were envied by the poor townsfolk

and by the downtrodden peasants. With the progress of learning and

study, thoughtful persons of all classes began to doubt whether the old

order of politics and society was best suited to the new conditions and

new relations. The "old régime" was for old needs; did it satisfy new

requirements?

[Sidenote: Influence of Philosophy]

To this question the philosophers of the eighteenth century responded

unequivocally in the negative. Scientists, of whom the period was full,

had done much to exalt the notions that the universe is run in

accordance with immutable laws of nature and that man must forever

utilize his reasoning faculties. It was not long before the

philosophers were applying the scientists' notions to social

conditions. "Is this reasonable?" they asked, or, "Is that rational?"

Montesquieu insisted that divine-right monarchy is unreasonable.

Voltaire poked fun at the Church and the clergy for being irrational.

Rousseau claimed that class inequalities have no basis in reason.

Beccaria taught that arbitrary or cruel interference with personal

liberty is not in accordance with dictates of nature or reason.

Philosophy did not directly effect a change; it was merely an

expression of a growing belief in the advisability of change. It

reflected a conviction, deep in many minds, that the old political

institutions and social distinctions had served their purpose and

should now be radically adapted to the new order. Every country in

greater or less degree heard the radical philosophy, but it was in

France that it was first heeded.

[Sidenote: The Revolution]

In France, between the years 1789 and 1799, occurred a series of

events, by which the doctrine of democracy supplanted that of divine-

right monarchy, and the theory of class distinctions gave way to that

of social equality. These events, taken together, constitute what we

term the French Revolution, and, inasmuch as they have profoundly

affected all political thought and social action throughout the

nineteenth and twentieth centuries, they are styled, by way of

eminence, the Revolution.

[Sidenote: The Revolution French]

Why the Revolution started in France may be suggested by reference to

certain points which have already been mentioned in the history of that

country. France was the country which, above any other, had perfected

the theory and practice of divine-right monarchy. In France had

developed the sharpest contrasts between the various social classes. It

was likewise in France that the relatively high level of education and

enlightenment had given great vogue to a peculiarly destructive

criticism of political and social conditions. Louis XIV had erected his

absolutism and had won for it foreign glory and prestige only by

placing the severest burdens upon the French people. The exploitation

of the state by the selfish, immoral Louis XV had served not to lighten

those burdens but rather to set forth in boldest relief the inherent

weaknesses of the "old régime." And Louis XVI, despite all manner of

pious wishes and good intentions, had been unable to square conditions

as they were with the operation of antique institutions. One royal

minister after another discovered to his chagrin that mere "reform" was

worse than useless. A "revolution" would be required to sweep away the

mass of abuses that in the course of centuries had adhered to the body

politic.

[Sidenote: Differences between the French and English Revolutions]

At the outset, any idea of likening the French Revolution to the

English Revolution of the preceding century must be dismissed. Of

course the English had put one king to death and had expelled another,

and had clearly limited the powers of the crown; they had "established

parliamentary government." But the English Revolution did not set up

genuine representative government, much less did it recognize the

theory of democracy. Voting remained a special privilege, conferred on

certain persons, not a natural right to be freely exercised by all. Nor

was the English Revolution accompanied by a great social upheaval: it

was in the first instance political, in the second instance religious

and ecclesiastical; it was never distinctly social. To all intents and

purposes, the same social classes existed in the England of the

eighteenth century as in the England of the sixteenth century, and,

with the exception of the merchants, in much the same relation to one

another.

[Sidenote: The French Revolution in Two Periods]

How radical and far-reaching was the French Revolution in contrast to

that of England will become apparent as we review the course of events

in France during the decade 1789-1799. A brief summary at the close of

this chapter will aim to explain the significance of the Revolution.

Meanwhile, we shall devote our attention to a narrative of the main

events.

The story falls naturally into two parts: First, 1789-1791, the

comparatively peaceful transformation of the absolute, divine-right

monarchy into a limited monarchy, accompanied by a definition of the

rights of the individual and a profound change in the social order;

second, 1792-1799, the transformation of the limited monarchy into a

republic, attended by the first genuine trial of democracy, and

attended likewise by foreign war and internal tumult. The story, in

either of its parts, is not an easy one, for the reason that important

rôles are played simultaneously by five distinct groups of interested

persons.

[Sidenote: Rôle of the Court and the Privileged]

In the first place, the people who benefit by the political and social

arrangements of the "old régime" will oppose its destruction. Among

these friends of the "old régime" may be included the royal court,

headed by the queen, Marie Antoinette, and by the king's brothers, the

count of Provence and the count of Artois, and likewise the bulk of the

higher clergy and the nobles--the privileged classes, generally. These

persons cannot be expected to surrender their privileges without a

struggle, especially since they have been long taught that such

privileges are of divine sanction. Only dire necessity compels them to

acquiesce in the convocation of the Estates-General and only the

mildest measures of reform can be palatable to them. They hate and

dread revolution or the thought of revolution. Yet at their expense the

Revolution will be achieved.

[Sidenote: Rôle of the Bourgeoisie]

In the second place, the bourgeoisie, who have the most to lose if the

"old régime" is continued and the most to gain if reforms are obtained,

will constitute the majority in all the legislative bodies which will

assemble in France between 1789 and 1799. Their legislative decrees

will in large measure reflect their class interests, and on one hand

will terrify the court party and on the other will not fully satisfy

the lower classes. The real achievements of the Revolution, however,

will be those of the bourgeois assemblies.

[Sidenote: Rôle of the Urban Proletariat]

In the third place, the artisans and poverty-stricken populace of the

cities, notably of Paris, will through bitter years lack for bread.

They will expect great things from the assemblies and will revile the

efforts of the court to impede the Revolution. They will shed blood at

first to defend the freedom of the assemblies from the court,

subsequently to bring the assemblies under their own domination.

Without their cooperation the Revolution will not be achieved.

[Sidenote: Rôle of the Peasantry]

In the fourth place, the dull, heavy peasants, in whom no one has

hitherto suspected brains or passions, long dumb under oppression, will

now find speech and opinions and an unwonted strength. They will rise

against their noble oppressors and burn castles and perhaps do murder.

They will force the astonished bourgeoisie and upper classes to take

notice of them and indirectly they will impress a significant social

character upon the achievements of the Revolution.

[Sidenote: Rôle of the Foreign Powers]

Finally, the foreign monarchs must be watched, for they will be

intensely interested in the story as it unfolds. If the French people

be permitted with impunity to destroy the very basis of divine-right

monarchy and to overturn the whole social fabric of the "old régime,"

how long, pray, will it be before Prussians, or Austrians, or Russians

shall be doing likewise? With some thought for Louis XVI and a good

deal of thought for themselves, the monarchs will call each other

"brother" and will by and by send combined armies against the

revolutionaries in France. At that very time the success of the

Revolution will be achieved, for all classes, save only the handful of

the privileged, will unite in the cause of France, which incidentally

becomes the cause of humanity. Bourgeoisie, townsfolk, peasants, will

go to the front and revolutionary France will then be found in her

armies. Thereby not only will the Revolution be saved in France, but in

the end it will be communicated to the uttermost parts of Europe.

THE END OF ABSOLUTISM IN FRANCE, 1789

[Sidenote: France on the Eve of the Revolution]

When the story opens, France is still the absolute, divine-right

monarchy which Louis XIV had perfected and Louis XV had exploited. The

social classes are still in the time-honored position which has been

described in Chapter XIII. But all is not well with the "old régime."

In the country districts the taxes are distressingly burdensome. In the

cities there is scarcity of food side by side with starvation wages.

Among the bourgeoisie are envy of the upper classes, an appreciation of

the critical philosophy of the day, and a sincere admiration of what

seem to be happier political and social conditions across the Channel

in Great Britain. The public debt of France is enormous, and a large

part of the national income must, therefore, be applied to the payment

of interest: even the courtiers of Louis XVI find their pensions and

favors and sinecures somewhat reduced. When the privileged classes

begin to feel the pinch of hard times, it is certain that the finances

are in sore straits.

[Sidenote: Financial Embarrassment]

In fact, all the great general causes of the French Revolution, which

may be inferred from the two preceding chapters, may be narrowed down

to the financial embarrassment of the government of Louis XVI. The king

and his ministers had already had recourse to every expedient

consistent with the maintenance of the "old regime" save one, and that

one--the convocation of the Estates-General--was now to be tried. It

might be that the representatives of the three chief classes of the

realm would be able to offer suggestions to the court, whereby the

finances could be improved and at the same time the divine-right

monarchy and the divinely ordained social distinctions would be

unimpaired.

[Sidenote: Convocation of the Estates-General]

With this idea of simple reform in mind, Louis XVI in 1788 summoned the

Estates-General to meet at Versailles the following May. The Estates-

General were certainly not a revolutionary body. Though for a hundred

and seventy-five years the French monarchs had been able to do without

them, they were in theory still a legitimate part of the old-time

government. Summoned by King Philip the Fair in 1302, they had been

thenceforth convoked at irregular intervals until 1614. Their

organization had been in three separate bodies, representing by

election the three estates of the realm--clergy, nobility, and

commoners (Third Estate). Each estate voted as a unit, and two out of

the three estates were sufficient to carry a measure. It usually

happened that the clergy and nobility joined forces to outvote the

commoners. The powers of the Estates-General had always been advisory

rather than legislative, and the kings had frequently ignored or

violated the enactments of the assembly. In its powers as well as in

its organization, the Estates-General differed essentially from the

Parliament of England. By the Estates-General the ultimate supremacy of

the royal authority had never been seriously questioned.

[Sidenote: Election of the Estates-General]

The elections to the Estates-General were held in accordance with

ancient usage throughout France in the winter of 1788-1789. Also, in

accordance with custom, the electors were invited by the king to

prepare reports on the condition of the locality with which they were

familiar and to indicate what abuses, if any, existed, and what

remedies, in their opinion, were advisable.

[Sidenote: The Cahiers]

By the time the elections were complete, it was apparent that the

majority of the French people desired and expected a greater measure of

reform than their sovereign had anticipated. The reports and lists of

grievances that had been drafted in every part of the country were

astounding. To be sure, these documents, called _cahiers_, were

not revolutionary in wording: with wonderful uniformity they expressed

loyalty to the monarchy and fidelity to the king: in not a single one

out of the thousand _cahiers_ was there a threat of violent

change. But in spirit the _cahiers_ were eloquent. All of them

reflected the idea which philosophy had made popular that reason

demanded fundamental, thoroughgoing reforms in government and society.

Those of the Third Estate were particularly insistent upon the social

inequalities and abuses long associated with the "old régime." It was

clear that if the elected representatives of the Third Estate carried

out the instructions of their constituents, the voting of additional

taxes to the government would be delayed until a thorough investigation

had been made and many grievances had been redressed.

[Sidenote: The Third Estate]

On the whole, it was probable that the elected representatives of the

Third Estate would heed the _cahiers_. They were educated and

brainy men. Two-thirds of them were lawyers or judges; many, also, were

scholars; only ten could possibly be considered as belonging to the

lower classes. A goodly number admired the governmental system of Great

Britain, in which the royal power had been reduced; the class interests

of all of them were directly opposed to the prevailing policies of the

French monarchy. The Third Estate was too intelligent to follow blindly

or unhesitatingly the dictates of the court.

In the earliest history of the Estates-General, the Third Estate had

been of comparatively slight importance either in society or in

politics, and Philip the Fair had proclaimed that the duty of its

members was "to hear, receive, approve, and perform what should be

commanded of them by the king." But between the fourteenth and

eighteenth centuries the relative social importance of the bourgeoisie

had enormously increased. The class was more numerous, wealthier, more

enlightened, and more experienced in the conduct of business. It became

clearer with the lapse of time that it, more than nobility or clergy,

deserved the right of representing the bulk of the nation. This right

Louis XVI had seemed in part to recognize by providing that the number

of elected representatives of the Third Estate should equal the

combined numbers of those of the First and Second Estates. The

commoners naturally drew the deduction from the royal concession that

they were to exercise paramount political influence in the Estates-

General of 1789.

The Third Estate, as elected in the winter of 1788-1789, was fortunate

in possessing two very capable leaders, Mirabeau and Sieyès, both of

whom belonged by office or birth to the upper classes, but who had

gladly accepted election as deputies of the unprivileged classes. With

two such leaders, it was extremely doubtful whether the Third Estate

would tamely submit to playing an inferior role in future.

[Sidenote: Mirabeau]

Mirabeau (1749-1791) was the son of a bluff but good-hearted old

marquis who was not very successful in bringing up his family. Young

Mirabeau had been so immoral and unruly that his father had repeatedly

obtained _lettres de cachet_ from the king in order that prison

bars might keep him out of mischief. Released many times only to fall

into new excesses, Mirabeau found at last in the French Revolution an

opportunity for expressing his sincere belief in constitutional

government and an outlet for his almost superhuman energy. From the

convocation of the Estates-General to his death in 1791, he was one of

the most prominent men in France. His gigantic physique, half-broken by

disease and imprisonment, his shaggy eyebrows, his heavy head, gave him

an impressive, though sinister, appearance. And for quickness in

perceiving at once a problem and its solution, as well as for gifts of

reverberating oratory, he was unsurpassed.

[Sidenote: Sieyès]

Of less force but greater tact was the priest, Sieyès (1748-1836),

whose lack of devotion to Christianity and the clerical calling was

matched by a zealous regard for the skeptical and critical philosophy

of the day and for the practical arts of politics and diplomacy. It was

a pamphlet of Sieyès that, on the eve of the assembling of the Estates-

General, furnished the Third Estate with its platform and program.

"What is the Third Estate?" asks Sieyès. "It is everything," he

replies. "What has it been hitherto in the political order? Nothing!

What does it desire? To be something!"

[Sidenote: Meeting of the Estates-General (May, 1789)]

[Sidenote: Constitutional Question Involved in the Organization of the

Estates-General]

The position of the Third Estate was still officially undefined when

the Estates-General assembled at Versailles in May, 1789. The king

received his advisers with pompous ceremony and a colorless speech, but

it was soon obvious that he and the court intended that their business

should be purely financial and that their organization should be in

accordance with ancient usage; the three estates would thus vote "by

order," that is, as three distinct bodies, so that the doubled

membership of the Third Estate would have but one vote to the

privileged orders' two. With this view the great majority of the nobles

and a large part of the clergy, especially the higher clergy, were in

full sympathy. On their side the commoners began to argue that the

Estates-General should organize itself as a single body, in which each

member should have one vote, such voting "by head" marking the

establishment of true representation in France, and that the assembly

should forthwith concern itself with a general reformation of the

entire government. With the commoners' argument a few of the liberal

nobles, headed by Lafayette, and a considerable group of the clergy,

particularly the curates, agreed; and it was backed up by the undoubted

sentiment of the nation. Bad harvests in 1788 had been followed by an

unusually severe winter. The peasantry was in an extremely wretched

plight, and the cities, notably Paris, suffered from a shortage of

food. The increase of popular distress, like a black cloud before a

storm, gave menacing support to the demands of the commoners.

[Sidenote: The King Defied by the Third Estate]

[Sidenote: The "Oath of the Tennis Court," 20 June, 1789]

Over the constitutional question, fraught as it was with the most

significant consequences to politics and society, the parties wrangled

for a month. The king, unwilling to offend any one, shilly-shallied.

But the uncompromising attitude of the privileged orders and the

indecision of the leaders of the court at length forced the issue. On

17 June, 1789, the Third Estate solemnly proclaimed itself a National

Assembly. Three days later, when the deputies of the Third Estate came

to the hall which had been set apart in the palace of Versailles for

their use, they found its doors shut and guarded by troops and a notice

to the effect that it was undergoing repairs. Apparently the king was

at last preparing to intervene in the contest himself. Then the

commoners precipitated a veritable revolution. Led by Mirabeau and

Sieyès, they proceeded to a great public building in the vicinity,

which was variously used as a riding-hall or a tennis court. There,

amidst intense excitement, with upstretched hands, they took an oath as

members of the "National Assembly" that they would not separate until

they had drawn up a constitution for France. The "Oath of the Tennis

Court" was the true beginning of the French Revolution. Without royal

sanction, in fact against the express commands of the king, the ancient

feudal Estates-General had been transformed, by simple proclamation of

the nation's representatives, into a National Assembly, charged with

the duty of establishing constitutional government in France. The "Oath

of the Tennis Court" was the declaration of the end of absolute divine-

right monarchy and of the beginning of a limited monarchy based on the

popular will.

What would the king do under these circumstances? He might overwhelm

the rebellious commoners by force of arms. But that would not solve his

financial problems, nor could he expect the French nation to endure it.

It would likely lead to a ruinous civil war. The only recourse left

open to him was a game of bluff. He ignored the "Oath of the Tennis

Court," and with majestic mien commanded the estates to sit separately

and vote "by order." But the commoners were not to be bluffed. Now

joined by a large number of clergy and a few nobles, they openly defied

the royal authority. In the ringing words of Mirabeau, they expressed

their rebellion: "We are here by the will of the people and we will not

leave our places except at the point of the bayonet." The weak-kneed,

well-intentioned Louis XVI promptly acquiesced. Exactly one week after

the scene in the tennis court, he reversed his earlier decrees and

directed the estates to sit together and vote "by head."

[Sidenote: Transformation of the Estates-General into the National

Constituent Assembly]

By 1 July, 1789, the first stage in the Revolution was completed. The

nobles and clergy were meeting with the commoners. The Estates-General

had become the National Constituent Assembly. As yet, however, two

important questions remained unanswered. In the first place, how would

the Assembly be assured of National freedom from the intrigues and

armed force of the court? In the second place, what direction would the

reforms of the Assembly take?

[Sidenote: The Court Prepares to Use Force against the Assembly]

The answer to the first question was speedily evoked by the court

itself. As early as 1 July, a gradual movement of royal troops from the

garrisons along the eastern frontier toward Paris and Versailles made

it apparent that the king contemplated awing the National Assembly into

a more deferential mood. The Assembly, in dignified tone, requested the

removal of the troops. The king responded by a peremptory refusal and

by the dismissal of Necker [Footnote: Necker had been restored to his

office as director-general of finances in 1788] the popular finance-

minister. Then it was that Paris came to the rescue of the Assembly.

[Sidenote: Popular Uprising at Paris in Behalf of the Assembly]

[Sidenote: The Destruction of the Bastille, 14 July, 1789]

The Parisian populace, goaded by real want, felt instinctively that its

own cause and that of the National Assembly were identical. Fired by an

eloquent harangue of a brilliant journalist, Camille Desmoulins (1760-

1794) by name, they rushed to arms. For three days there was wild

disorder in the city. Shops were looted, royal officers were expelled,

business was at a standstill. On the third day--14 July, 1789--the mob

surged out to the east end of Paris, where stood the frowning royal

fortress and prison of the Bastille. Although since the accession of

Louis XVI the Bastille no longer harbored political offenders,

nevertheless it was still regarded as a symbol of Bourbon despotism, a

grim threat against the liberties of Paris. The people would now take

it and would appropriate its arms and ammunition for use in defense of

the National Assembly. The garrison of the Bastille was small and

disheartened, provisions were short, and the royal governor was

irresolute. Within a few hours the mob was in possession of the

Bastille, and some of the Swiss mercenaries who constituted its

garrison had been slaughtered.

[Sidenote: Revolution in the Government of Paris: the Commune]

The fall of the Bastille was the first serious act of violence in the

course of the Revolution. It was an unmistakable sign that the people

were with the Assembly rather than with the king. It put force behind

the Assembly's decrees. Not only that, but it rendered Paris

practically independent of royal control, for, during the period of

disorder, prominent citizens had taken it upon themselves to organize

their own government and their own army. The new local government--the

"commune," as it was called--was made up of those elected

representatives of the various sections or wards of Paris who had

chosen the city's delegates to the Estates-General. It was itself a

revolution in city government: it substituted popularly elected

officials in place of royal agents and representatives of the outworn

gilds. And the authority of the commune was sustained by a popularly

enrolled militia, styled the National Guard, which soon numbered 48,000

champions of the new cause.

[Sidenote: Temporary Acquiescence of the King]

The fall of the Bastille was such a clear sign that even Louis XVI did

not fail to perceive its meaning. He instantly withdrew the royal

troops and recalled Necker. He recognized the new government of Paris

and confirmed the appointment of the liberal Lafayette to command the

National Guard. He visited Paris in person, praised what he could not

prevent, and put on a red-white-and-blue cockade--combining the red and

blue of the capital city with the white of the Bourbons--the new

national tricolor of France. Frenchmen still celebrate the fourteenth

of July, the anniversary of the fall of the Bastille, as the

independence day of the French nation.

[Sidenote: Renewed Intrigues of the Royal Family against the Assembly]

For a while it seemed as though reform might now go forward without

further interruption. The freedom of the Assembly had been affirmed and

upheld. Paris had settled down once more into comparative repose. The

king had apparently learned his lesson. But the victory of the

reformers had been gained too easily. Louis XVI might take solemn oaths

and wear strange cockades, but he remained in character essentially

weak. His very virtues--good intentions, love of wife, loyalty to

friends--were continually abused. The queen was bitterly opposed to the

reforming policies of the National Assembly and actively resented any

diminution of royal authority. Her clique of court friends and

favorites disliked the decrease of pensions and amusements to which

they had long been accustomed. Court and queen made common cause in

appealing to the good qualities of Louis XVI. What was the weak king to

do under the circumstances? He was to fall completely under the

domination of his entourage.

[Sidenote: Demonstrations of the Parisian Women at Versailles, October,

1789]

The result was renewed intrigues to employ force against the

obstreperous deputies and their allies, the populace of Paris. This

time it was planned to bring royal troops from the garrisons in

Flanders. And on the night of 1 October, 1789, a supper was given by

the officers of the bodyguard at Versailles in honor of the arriving

soldiers. Toasts were drunk liberally and royalist songs were sung.

News of the "orgy," as it was termed, spread like wildfire in Paris,

where hunger and suffering were more prevalent than ever. That city was

starving while Versailles was feasting. The presence of additional

troops at Versailles, it was believed, would not only put an end to the

independence of the Assembly but would continue the starvation of

Paris. More excited grew the Parisians.

On 5 October was presented a strange and uncouth spectacle. A long line

of the poorest women of Paris, including some men dressed as women,

riotous with fear and hunger and rage, armed with sticks and clubs,

screaming "Bread! bread! bread!" were straggling along the twelve miles

of highway from Paris to Versailles. They were going to demand bread of

the king. Lafayette and his National Guardsmen, who had been unable or

unwilling to allay the excitement in Paris, marched at a respectful

distance behind the women out to Versailles.

By the time Lafayette reached the royal palace, the women were

surrounding it, howling and cursing, and demanding bread or blood; only

the fixed bayonets of the troops from Flanders had prevented them from

invading the building, and even these regular soldiers were weakening.

Lafayette at once became the man of the hour. He sent the soldiers back

to the barracks and with his own force undertook the difficult task of

guarding the property and lives of the royal family and of feeding and

housing the women for the night. Despite his precautions, it was a wild

night. There was continued tumult in the streets and, at one time,

shortly before dawn, a gang of rioters actually broke into the palace

and groped about in search of the queen's apartments. Just in the nick

of time the hated Marie Antoinette hurried to safer quarters, although

several of her personal bodyguard were killed in the mêlée.

When the morning of 6 October had come, Lafayette addressed the crowd,

promising them that they should be provided for, and, at the critical

moment, there appeared at his side on the balcony of the palace the

royal family--the king, the little prince, the little princess, and the

queen--all wearing red-white-and-blue cockades. A hush fell upon the

mob. The respected general leaned over and gallantly kissed the hand of

Marie Antoinette. A great shout of joy went up. Apparently even the

queen had joined the Revolution. The Parisians were happy, and

arrangements were made for the return journey.

[Sidenote: Forcible Removal of the Court and Assembly from Versailles

to Paris]

The procession of 6 October from Versailles to Paris was more curious

and more significant than that of the preceding day in the opposite

direction. There were still the women and the National Guardsmen and

Lafayette on his white horse and a host of people of the slums, but

this time in the midst of the throng was a great lumbering coach, in

which rode Louis and his wife and children, for Paris now insisted that

the court should no longer possess the freedom of Versailles in which

to plot unwatched against the rights of the French people. All along

the procession reechoed the shout, "We have the baker and the baker's

wife and the little cook-boy--now we shall have bread." And so the

court of Louis XVI left forever the proud, imposing palace of

Versailles, and came to humbler lodgings [Footnote: In the palace of

the Tuileries.] in the city of Paris.

Paris had again saved the National Assembly from royal intimidation,

and the Assembly promptly acknowledged the debt by following the king

to that city. After October, 1789, not reactionary Versailles but

radical Paris was at once the scene and the impulse of the Revolution.

The "Fall of the Bastille" and the "March of the Women to Versailles"

were the two picturesque events which assured the independence of the

National Assembly from the armed force and intrigue of the court.

Meanwhile, the answer to the other question which we propounded above,

"What direction would the reforms of the Assembly take?" had been

supplied by the people at large.

[Sidenote: Disintegration of the Old Régime throughout France]

[Sidenote: Peasant Reprisals against the Nobility]

Ever since the assembling of the Estates-General, ordinary

administration of the country had been at a standstill. The people,

expecting great changes, refused to pay the customary taxes and

imposts, and the king, for fear of the National Assembly and of a

popular uprising, hesitated to compel tax collection by force of arms.

The local officials did not know whether they were to obey the Assembly

or the king. In fact, the Assembly was for a time so busy with

constitutional questions that it neglected to provide for local

government, and the king was always timorous. So, during the summer of

1789, the institutions of the "old régime" disappeared throughout

France, one after another, because there was no popular desire to

maintain them and no competent authority to enforce them. The

insurrection in Paris and the fall of the Bastille was the signal in

July for similar action elsewhere: other cities and towns substituted

new elective officers for the ancient royal or gild agents and

organized National Guards of their own. At the same time the direct

action of the people spread to the country districts. In most provinces

the oppressed peasants formed bands which stormed and burned the

châteaux of the hated nobles, taking particular pains to destroy feudal

or servile title-deeds. Monasteries were often ransacked and pillaged.

A few of the unlucky lords were murdered, and many others were driven

into the towns or across the frontier. Amid the universal confusion,

the old system of local government completely collapsed. The intendants

and governors quitted their posts. The ancient courts of justice,

whether feudal or royal, ceased to act. The summer of 1789 really ended

French absolutism, and the transfer of the central government from

Versailles to Paris in October merely confirmed an accomplished fact.

[Sidenote: The Revolution Social as well as Political]

Whatever had been hitherto the reforming policies of the National

Assembly, the deputies henceforth faced facts rather than theories.

Radical social readjustments were now to be effected along with purely

governmental and administrative changes. The Revolution was to be

social as well as political.

THE END OF THE OLD RÉGIME: THE NATIONAL CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY, 1789-1791

[Sidenote: Achievements of the National Assembly, 1789-1791]

By the transformation of the Estates-General into the National

Constituent Assembly, France had become to all intents and purposes a

limited monarchy, in which supreme authority was vested in the nation's

elected representatives. From October, 1789, to September, 1791, this

Assembly was in session in Paris, endeavoring to bring order out of

chaos and to fashion a new France out of the old that was dying of

exhaustion and decrepitude. Enormous was the task, but even greater

were the achievements. Although the work of the Assembly during the

period was influenced in no slight degree by the Parisian populace,

nevertheless it was attended by comparative peace and security. And the

work done was by far the most vital and most lasting of the whole

revolutionary era.

Leaving out of consideration for the time the frightened royal family,

the startled noblemen and clergy, the determined peasantry, and the

excited townsfolk, and not adhering too closely to chronological order,

let us center our attention upon the National Assembly and review its

major acts during those momentous years, 1789-1791.

[Sidenote: 1. Legal Destruction of Feudalism and Serfdom]

The first great work of the Assembly was the legal destruction of

feudalism and serfdom--a long step in the direction of social equality.

We have already noticed how in July while the Assembly was still at

Versailles, the royal officers in the country districts had ceased to

rule and how the peasants had destroyed many _châteaux_ amid

scenes of unexpected violence. News of the rioting and disorder came to

the Assembly from every province and filled its members with the

liveliest apprehension. A long report, submitted by a special

investigating committee on 4 August, 1789, gave such harrowing details

of the popular uprising that every one was convinced that something

should be done at once.

[Sidenote: "The August Days"]

While the Assembly was debating a declaration which might calm revolt,

one of the nobles--a relative of Lafayette--arose in his place and

stated that if the peasants had attacked the property and privileges of

the upper classes, it was because such property and privileges

represented unjust inequality, that the fault lay there, and that the

remedy was not to repress the peasants but to suppress inequality. It

was immediately moved and carried that the Assembly should proclaim

equality of taxation for all classes and the suppression of feudal and

servile dues. Then followed a scene almost unprecedented in history.

Noble vied with noble, and clergyman with clergyman, in renouncing the

vested rights of the "old régime." The game laws were repudiated. The

manorial courts were suppressed. Serfdom was abolished. Tithes and all

sorts of ecclesiastical privilege were sacrificed. The sale of offices

was discontinued. In fact, all special privileges, whether of classes,

of cities, or of provinces, were swept away in one consuming burst of

enthusiasm. The holocaust lasted throughout the night of the fourth of

August. Within a week the various independent measures had been

consolidated into an impressive decree "abolishing the feudal system,"

and this decree received in November the royal assent. What many

reforming ministers had vainly labored for years partially to

accomplish was now done, at least in theory, by the National Assembly

in a few days. The so-called "August Days" promised to dissolve the

ancient society of France.

It has been customary to refer these vast social changes to the

enthusiasm, magnanimity, and self-sacrifice of the privileged orders.

That there was enthusiasm is unquestionable. But it may be doubted

whether the nobles and clergy were so much magnanimous as terrorized.

For the first time, they were genuinely frightened by the peasants, and

it is possible that the true measure of their "magnanimity" was their

alarm. Then, too, if one is to sacrifice, he must have something to

sacrifice. At most, the nobles had only legal claims to surrender, for

the peasants had already taken forcible possession of nearly everything

which the decree accorded them. In fact the decree of the Assembly

constituted merely a legal and uniform recognition of accomplished

facts.

The nobles may have thought, moreover, that liberal acquiescence in the

first demands of the peasantry would save themselves from further

demands. At any rate, they zealously set to work in the Assembly to

modify what had been done, to secure financial or other indemnity,

[Footnote: The general effect of the series of decrees of the Assembly

from 5 to 11 August, 1789, was to impose some kind of financial

redemption for many of the feudal dues. It was only in July, 1793,

almost four years after the "August Days," that _all_ feudal dues

and rights were legally abolished without redemption or compensation.]

and to prevent the enactment of additional social legislation. Outside

the Assembly few nobles took kindly to the loss of privilege and

property: the overwhelming majority protested and tried to stir up

civil war, and, when such attempts failed, they left France and

enrolled themselves among their country's enemies.

It is not necessary for us to know precisely who were responsible for

the "August Days." The fact remains that the "decree abolishing the

feudal system" represented the most important achievement of the whole

French Revolution. Henceforth, those who profited by the decree were

loyal friends of the Revolution, while the losers were its bitter

opponents.

[Sidenote: 2. The Declaration of the Rights of Man]

The second great work of the Assembly was the guarantee of individual

rights and liberties. The old society and government of France were

disappearing. On what basis should the new be erected? Great Britain

had its _Magna Carta_ and its Bill of Rights; America had its

Declaration of Independence. France was now given a "Declaration of the

Rights of Man and of the Citizen." This document, which reflected the

spirit of Rousseau's philosophy and incorporated some of the British

and American provisions, became the platform of the French Revolution

and tremendously influenced political thought in the nineteenth and

twentieth centuries. A few of its most striking sentences are as

follows: "Men are born and remain free and equal in rights." The rights

of man are "liberty, property, security, and resistance to oppression."

"Law is the expression of the general will. Every citizen has a right

to participate personally, or through his representative, in its

formation. It must be the same for all." "No person shall be accused,

arrested, or imprisoned except in the cases and according to the forms

prescribed by law." Religious toleration, freedom of speech, and

liberty of the press are affirmed. The people are to control the

finances, and to the people all officials of the state are responsible.

Finally, the influence of the propertied classes, which were

overwhelmingly represented in the Assembly, showed itself in the

concluding section of the Declaration: "Since private property is an

inviolable and sacred right, no one shall be deprived thereof except

where public necessity, legally determined, shall clearly demand it,

and then only on condition that the owner shall have been previously

and equitably indemnified."

[Sidenote: 3. Reform of Local Administration]

The next great undertaking of the National Assembly was the

establishment of a new and uniform administrative system in France. The

ancient and confusing "provinces," "governments," "intendancies,"

"_pays d'état_" "_pays d'élection_" "parlements," and

"bailliages" were swept away. The country was divided anew into eighty-

three departments, approximately uniform in size and population, and

named after natural features, such as rivers or mountains. Each

department was subdivided into districts, cantons. and communes,--

divisions which have endured in France to the present time. The heads

of the local government were no longer to be appointed by the crown but

elected by the people, and extensive powers were granted to elective

local councils. Provision was made for a new system of law courts

throughout the country, and the judges, like the administrative

officials, were to be elected by popular vote. Projects were likewise

put forward to unify and simplify the great variety and mass of laws

which prevailed in different parts of France, but this work was not

brought to completion until the time of Napoleon Bonaparte.

[Sidenote: 4. Financial Regulation. 5. Secularization of Church

Property, the Assignats]

Another grave matter which concerned the National Assembly was the

regulation of the public finances. It will be recalled that financial

confusion was the royal reason for summoning the Estates-General. And

in the early days of the Assembly, the confusion became chaos: it was

impossible to enforce the payment of direct taxes; indirect taxes were

destroyed by legislative decree; and bankers could not be induced to

make new loans. Therefore, it was to heroic measures that the Assembly

resorted to save the state from bankruptcy. To provide funds, a heavy

blow was struck at one of the chief props of the "old régime"--the

Catholic Church. The Church, as we have seen, owned at least a fifth of

the soil of France, and it was now resolved to seize these rich church

lands, and to utilize them as security for the issue of paper money--

the _assignats_. As partial indemnity for the wholesale

confiscation, the state was to undertake the payment of fixed salaries

to the clergy. Thus by a single stroke the financial pressure was

relieved, the Church was deprived of an important source of its

strength, and the clergy were made dependent on the new order. Of

course, as often happens in similar cases, the issue of paper money was

so increased that in time it exceeded the security and brought fresh

troubles to the state, but for the moment the worst dangers were tided

over.

[Sidenote: 6. Other Legislation against the Catholic Church]

The ecclesiastical policies and acts of the National Assembly were

perhaps the least efficacious and the most fateful achievements of the

Revolution. Yet it would be difficult to perceive how they could have

been less radical than they were. The Church appeared to be

indissolubly linked with the fortunes of old absolutist France; the

clergy comprised a particularly privileged class; and the leaders and

great majority of the Assembly were filled with the skeptical, Deistic,

and anti-Christian philosophy of the time. In November, 1789, the

church property was confiscated. In February, 1790, the monasteries and

other religious houses were suppressed. In April, absolute religious

toleration was proclaimed. In August, 1790, the "Civil Constitution of

the Clergy" was promulgated, by which the bishops and priests, reduced

in numbers, were made a civil body: they were to be elected by the

people, paid by the state, and separated from the sovereign control of

the pope. In December, the Assembly forced the reluctant king to sign a

decree compelling all the clergy to take a solemn oath of allegiance to

the "Civil Constitution."

[Sidenote: Catholic Opposition to the Revolution]

The pope, who had already protested against the seizure of church

property and the expulsion of the monks, now condemned the "Civil

Constitution" and forbade Catholics to take the oath of allegiance.

Thus, the issue was squarely joined. Such as took the oath were

excommunicated by the pope, such as refused compliance were deprived of

their salaries and threatened with imprisonment. Up to this time, the

bulk of the lower clergy, poor themselves and in immediate contact with

the suffering of the peasants, had undoubtedly sympathized with the

course of the Revolution, but henceforth their convictions and their

consciences came into conflict with devotion to their country. They

followed their conscience and either incited the peasants, over whom

they exercised considerable influence, to oppose further revolution, or

emigrated [Footnote: The clergy who would not take the oath were called

the "non-juring" clergy. Those who left France, together with the noble

emigrants, were called "émigrés."] from France to swell the number of

those who, dissatisfied with the course of events in their own country,

would seek the first opportunity to undo the work of the Assembly. The

Catholic Church, as well as the hereditary nobility, became an

unwearied opponent of the French Revolution.

[Sidenote: 7. The Constitution of 1791]

Amid all these sweeping reforms and changes, the National Constituent

Assembly was making steady progress in drafting a written constitution

which would clearly define the agencies of government, and their

respective powers, the new limited monarchy. This constitution was

completed in 1791 and signed by the king--he could do nothing else--and

at once went into full effect. It was the first written constitution of

any importance that any European country had had, and was preceded only

slightly in point of time by that of the United States. [Footnote: The

present American constitution was drafted in 1787 and went into effect

in 1789, the year that the Estates-General assembled.]

The Constitution of 1791, as it was called, provided, like the American

constitution, for the "separation of powers," that is, that the law-

making, law-enforcing, and law-interpreting functions of government

should be kept quite distinct as the legislative, executive, and

judicial departments, and should each spring, in last analysis, from

the will of the people. This idea had been elaborated by Montesquieu,

and deeply affected the constitution-making of the eighteenth century

both in France and in the United States.

[Sidenote: Legislative Provisions]

The legislative authority was vested in one chamber, styled the

"Legislative Assembly," the members of which were chosen by means of a

complicated system of indirect election. [Footnote: That is to say, the

people would vote for electors, and the electors for the members of the

Assembly.] The distrust with which the bourgeois framers of the

constitution regarded the lower classes was shown not only in this

check upon direct election but also in the requirements that the

privilege of voting should be exercised exclusively by "active"

citizens, that is, by citizens who paid taxes, and that the right to

hold office should be restricted to property-holders.

[Sidenote: Weakness of the King under the Constitution]

Nominally the executive authority resided in the hereditary king. In

this respect, most of the French reformers thought they were imitating

the British government, but as a matter of fact they made the kingship

not even ornamental. True, they accorded to the king the right to

postpone for a time the execution of an act of the legislature--the so-

called "suspensive veto"--but they deprived him of all control over

local government, over the army and navy, and over the clergy. Even his

ministers were not to sit in the Assembly. Tremendous had been the

decline of royal power in France during those two years, 1789-1791.

[Sidenote: Summary of the Work of the National Assembly]

This may conclude our brief summary of the work of the National

Constituent Assembly. If we review it as a whole, we are impressed by

the immense destruction which it effected. No other body of legislators

has ever demolished so much in the same brief period. The old form of

government, the old territorial divisions, the old financial system,

the old judicial and legal regulations, the old ecclesiastical

arrangements, and, most significant of all, the old condition of

holding land--serfdom and feudalism--all were shattered. Yet all this

destruction was not a mad whim of the moment. It had been preparing

slowly and painfully for many generations. It was foreshadowed by the

mass of well-considered complaints in the _cahiers_. It was

achieved not only by the decrees of the Assembly, but by the forceful

expression of the popular will.

THE LIMITED MONARCHY IN OPERATION: THE LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY (1791-1792)

AND THE OUTBREAK OF FOREIGN WAR

[Sidenote: Brief Duration of Limited Monarchy in France, 1791-1792]

Great public rejoicing welcomed the formal inauguration of the limited

monarchy in 1791. Many believed that a new era of Peace and prosperity

was dawning for France. Yet the extravagant hopes which were widely

entertained for the success of the new régime were doomed to speedy and

bitter disappointment. The new government encountered all manner of

difficulties, the country rapidly grew more radical in sentiment and

action, and within a single year the limited monarchy gave way to a

republic. The establishment of the republic was the second great phase

of the Revolution. Why it was possible and even inevitable may be

gathered from a survey of political conditions in France during 1792,--

at once the year of trial for limited monarchy and the year of

transition to the republic.

[Sidenote: Sources of Opposition to the Limited Monarchy]

By no means did all Frenchmen accept cheerfully and contentedly the

work of the National Constituent Assembly. Of the numerous dissenters,

some thought it went too far and some thought it did not go far enough.

The former may be styled "reactionaries" and the latter "radicals."

[Sidenote: Reactionaries]

[Sidenote: 1. The Émigrés]

The reactionaries embraced the bulk of the formerly privileged nobility

and the non-juring clergy. The nobles had left France in large numbers

as soon as the first signs of violence appeared--about the time of the

fall of the Bastille and the peasant uprisings in the provinces. Many

of the clergy had similarly departed from their homes when the

anticlerical measures of the Assembly rendered it no longer possible

for them to follow the dictates of conscience. These reactionary

exiles, or émigrés as they were termed, collected in force along the

northern and eastern frontier, especially at Coblenz on the Rhine. They

possessed an influential leader in the king's own brother, the count of

Artois, and they maintained a perpetual agitation, by means of

newspapers, pamphlets, and intrigues, against the new régime. They were

anxious to regain their privileges and property, and to restore

everything, as far as possible, to precisely the same position it had

occupied prior to 1789.

[Sidenote: 2. The Court]

[Sidenote: The Flight to Varennes]

Nor were the reactionaries devoid of support within France. It was

believed that the royal family, now carefully watched in Paris,

sympathized with their efforts. So long as Mirabeau, the ablest leader

in the National Assembly, was alive, he had never ceased urging the

king to accept the reforms of the Revolution and to give no countenance

to agitation beyond the frontiers. In case the king should find his

position in Paris intolerable, he had been advised by Mirabeau to

withdraw into western or southern France and gather the loyal nation

about him. But unfortunately, Mirabeau, worn out by dissipation and

cares, died prematurely in April, 1791. Only two months later the royal

family attempted to follow the course against which they had been

warned. Louis XVI and Marie Antoinette, in an effort to rid themselves

of the spying vigilance of the Parisians, disguised themselves, fled

from the capital, and made straight for the eastern frontier,

apparently to join the émigrés. At Varennes, near the border, the royal

fugitives were recognized and turned back to Paris, which henceforth

became for them rather a prison than a capital. Although Louis

subsequently swore a solemn oath to uphold the constitution, his

personal popularity vanished with his ill-starred flight, and his wife

--the hated "Austrian woman"--was suspected with good reason of being

in secret correspondence with the émigrés as well as with foreign

governments. Marie Antoinette was more detested than ever. The king's

oldest brother, the count of Provence, was more successful than the

king in the flight of June, 1791: he eluded detection and joined the

count of Artois at Coblenz.

[Sidenote: 3. Conservative and Catholic Peasants.]

Had the reactionaries been restricted entirely to émigrés and the royal

family, it is hardly possible that they would have been so troublesome

as they were. They were able, however, to secure considerable popular

support in France. A small group in the Assembly shared their views and

proposed the most extravagant measures in order to embarrass the work

of that body. Conservative clubs existed among the upper and well-to-do

classes in the larger cities. And in certain districts of western

France, especially in Brittany, Poitou (La Vendée), and Anjou, the

peasants developed hostility to the course of the Revolution: their

extraordinary devotion to Catholicism placed them under the influence

of the non-juring clergy, and their class feeling against townspeople

induced them to believe that the Revolution, carried forward by the

bourgeoisie, was essentially in the interests of the bourgeoisie. Riots

occurred in La Vendée throughout 1791 and 1792 with increasing

frequency until at length the district blazed into open rebellion

against the radicals.

[Sidenote: Radicals]

[Sidenote: 1. The Bourgeois Leaders]

[Sidenote: 2. The Proletarians]

More dangerous to the political settlement of 1791 than the opposition

of the reactionaries was that of the radicals--those Frenchmen who

thought that the Revolution had not gone far enough. The real

explanation of the radical movement lies in the conflict of interest

between the poor working people of the towns and the middle class, or

bourgeoisie. The latter, as has been repeatedly emphasized, possessed

the brains, the money, and the education: it was they who had been

overwhelmingly represented in the National Assembly. The former were

degraded, poverty-stricken, and ignorant, but they constituted the bulk

of the population in the cities, notably in Paris, and they were both

conscious of their sorry condition and desperately determined to

improve it. These so-called "proletarians," though hardly directly

represented in the Assembly, nevertheless fondly expected the greatest

benefits from the work of that body. For a while the bourgeoisie and

the proletariat coöperated: the former carried reforms through the

Assembly, the latter defended by armed violence the freedom of the

Assembly; both participated in the capture of the Bastille, in the

establishment of the commune, and in the transfer of the seat of

government from Versailles to Paris. So long as they faced a serious

common danger from the court and privileged orders, they worked in

harmony.

[Sidenote: Conflict of Interests Between Bourgeoisie and Proletariat]

But as soon as the Revolution had run its first stage and had succeeded

in reducing the royal power and in abolishing many special privileges

of the nobles and clergy, a sharp cleavage became evident between the

former allies--between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. The

bourgeoisie, to whom was due the enactment of the reforms of the

National Constituent Assembly, profited by those reforms far more than

any other class in the community. Their trade and industry were

stimulated by the removal of the ancient royal and feudal restrictions.

Their increased wealth enabled them to buy up the estates of the

outlawed émigrés and the confiscated lands of the Church. They secured

an effective control of all branches of government, local and central.

Of course, the peasantry also benefited to no slight extent, but their

benefits were certainly less impressive than those of the bourgeoisie.

Of all classes in France, the urban proletariat seemed to have gained

the least: to be sure they were guaranteed by paper documents certain

theoretical "rights and liberties," but what had been done for their

material well-being? They had obtained no property. They had

experienced no greater ease in earning their daily bread. And in 1791

they seemed as far from realizing their hopes of betterment as they had

been in 1789, for the bourgeois constitution-makers had provided that

only taxpayers could vote and only property-owners could hold office.

The proletariat, thereby cut off from all direct share in the conduct

of government, could not fail to be convinced that in the first phase

of the Revolution they had merely exchanged one set of masters for

another, that at the expense of the nobles and clergy they had exalted

the bourgeoisie, and that they themselves were still downtrodden and

oppressed. Radical changes in the constitution and radical social

legislation in their own behalf became the policies of the proletariat;

violence would be used as a means to an end, if other means failed.

Not all of the bourgeoisie were thoroughly devoted to the settlement of

1791. Most of them doubtless were. But a thoughtful and conspicuous

minority allied themselves with the proletariat. Probably in many

instances it was for the selfish motive of personal ambition that this

or that middle-class individual prated much about his love for "the

people" and shed tears over their wretchedness and made all manner of

election promises to them. But, on the other hand, there were sincere

and altruistic bourgeois who had been converted to the extreme

democratic doctrines of Rousseau and who were deeply touched by the

misery of the lowest classes. It was under the leadership of such men

that the proletariat grew ever more radical until they sought by force

to establish democracy in France.

[Sidenote: Center of Radicalism in Paris]

The radical movement centered in Paris, where now lived the royal

family and where the legislature met. With the object of intimidating

the former and controlling the latter, the agitation made rapid headway

during 1791 and 1792. It was conducted by means of inflammatory

newspapers, coarse pamphlets, and bitter speeches. It appealed to both

the popular reason and the popular emotions. It was backed up and

rendered efficient by the organization of revolutionary "clubs."

[Sidenote: The Clubs]

[Sidenote: Cordeliers and Jacobins]

These clubs were interesting centers of political and social agitation.

Their origin was traceable to the "eating clubs" which had been formed

at Versailles by various deputies who desired to take their meals

together, but the idea progressed so far that by 1791 nearly every café

in Paris aspired to be a meeting place for politicians and "patriots."

Although some of the clubs were strictly constitutional, and even, in a

few instances, professedly reactionary, nevertheless the greater number

and the most influential were radical. Such were the Cordelier and

Jacobin clubs. The former, organized as a "society of the friends of

the rights of man and of the citizen," was very radical from its

inception and enrolled in its membership the foremost revolutionaries

of Paris. The latter, starting out as a "society of the friends of the

constitution," counted among its early members such men as Mirabeau,

Sieyès, and Lafayette, but subsequently under the leadership of

Robespierre, transformed itself into an organization quite as radical

as the Cordeliers. It is an interesting tact that both these radical

clubs derived their popular names from monasteries, in whose

confiscated buildings they customarily met.

[Sidenote: Radical Propaganda]

From Paris the radical movement radiated in all directions. Pamphlets

and newspapers were spread broadcast. The Jacobin club established a

regular correspondence with branch clubs or kindred societies which

sprang up in other French towns. The radicals were everywhere inspired

by the same zeal and aided by a splendid organization.

[Sidenote: Radical Leaders]

Of the chief radical leaders, it may be convenient at this point to

introduce three--Marat, Danton, and Robespierre. All belonged to the

bourgeoisie by birth and training, but by conviction they became the

mouthpieces of the proletariat. All played important rôles in

subsequent scenes of the Revolution.

[Sidenote: Marat]

Marat (_c_. 1742-1793), had he never become interested in politics

and conspicuous in the Revolution, might have been remembered in

history as a scientist and a man of letters. He had been a physician,

and for skill in his profession, as well as for contributions to the

science of physics, he had received an honorary degree from St. Andrews

University in Scotland, and for a time he was in the service of the

count of Artois. The convocation of the Estates-General turned his

attention to public affairs. In repeated and vigorous pamphlets he

combated the idea then prevalent in France that his countrymen should

adopt a constitution similar to that of Great Britain. During several

years' sojourn in Great Britain he had observed that that country was

being ruled by an oligarchy which, while using the forms of liberty and

pretending to represent the country, was in reality using its power for

the promotion of its own narrow class interests. He made up his mind

that real reform must benefit all the people alike and that it could be

secured only by direct popular action. This was the simple message that

filled the pages of the _Ami du peuple_--the _Friend of the

People_--a newspaper which he edited from 1789 to 1792. With fierce

invective he assailed the court, the clergy, the nobles, even the

bourgeois Assembly. Attached to no party and with no detailed policies,

he sacrificed almost everything to his single mission. No poverty,

misery, or persecution could keep him quiet. Forced even to hide in

cellars and sewers, where he contracted a loathsome skin disease, he

persevered in his frenzied appeals to the Parisian populace to take

matters into their own hands. By 1792 Marat was a man feared and hated

by the authorities but loved and venerated by the masses of the

capital. [Footnote: Marat was assassinated on 13 July, 1793, by

Charlotte Corday, a young woman who was fanatically attached to the

Girondist faction.]

[Sidenote: Danton]

No less radical but far more statesmanlike was Danton (1759-1794), who

has been called "a sort of middle-class Mirabeau." The son of a farmer,

he had studied law, had purchased a position as advocate of the Royal

Council, and, before the outbreak of the Revolution, had acquired a

reputation not only as a brilliant young lawyer, but also as a man of

liberal tastes, fond of books, and happy in his domestic life. Like

Mirabeau, he was a person of powerful physique and of stentorian voice,

a skilled debater and a convincing orator; unlike Mirabeau, he himself

remained calm and self-possessed while arousing his audiences to the

highest pitch of enthusiasm. Like Mirabeau, too, he was not so

primarily interested in the welfare of his own social class as in that

of the class below him: what the nobleman Mirabeau was to the

bourgeoisie, the bourgeois Danton was to the Parisian proletariat.

Brought to the fore, through the favor of Mirabeau, in the early days

of the Revolution, Danton at once showed himself a strong advocate of

real democracy. In 1790, in conjunction with Marat and Camille

Desmoulins, he founded the Cordelier Club, the activities of which he

directed throughout 1791 and 1792 against the royal family and the

whole cause of monarchy. An influential member of the commune of Paris,

he was largely instrumental in crystallizing public opinion in favor of

republicanism, Danton was rough and courageous, but neither venal nor

bloodthirsty.

[Sidenote: Robespierre]

Less practical than Danton and further removed from the proletariat

than Marat, Maximilien Robespierre (1758-1794) nevertheless combined

such qualities as made him the most prominent exponent of democracy and

republicanism. Descended from a middle-class family of Irish

extraction, Robespierre had been a classmate of Camille Desmoulins in

the law school of the University of Paris, and had practiced law with

some success in his native town of Arras. He was appointed a criminal

judge, but soon resigned that post because he could not endure to

inflict the death penalty. In his immediate circle he acquired a

reputation as a writer, speaker, and something of a dandy. Elected to

the Third Estate in 1789, he took his place with the extreme radicals

in that body--the "thirty voices," as Mirabeau contemptuously called

them. Robespierre had read Rousseau from cover to cover and believed in

the philosopher's doctrines with all his heart so that he would have

gone to death for them. In the belief that they eventually would

succeed and regenerate France and all mankind, he was ready to work

with unwearied patience. The paucity of his followers in the National

Assembly and the overpowering personality of Mirabeau prevented him

from exercising much influence in framing the new constitution, and he

gradually turned for support to the people of Paris. He was already a

member of the Jacobin Club, which, by the withdrawal of its more

conservative members in 1791, came then under his leadership.

Thenceforth the Jacobin Club was a most effective instrument for

establishing social democracy (although it was not committed to

republicanism until August, 1792), and Robespierre was its oracle.

Robespierre was never a demagogue in the present sense of the word: he

was always emphatically a gentleman and a man of culture, sincere and

truthful. Although he labored strenuously for the "rights" of the

proletariat, he never catered to their tastes; to the last day of his

life he retained the knee-breeches and silk stockings of the old

society and wore his hair powdered.

We are now in a position to understand why the constitutional monarchy

floundered. It had no great leaders to strengthen it and to conduct it

through the narrow strait. It was bound to strike the rocks of reaction

on one side or those of radicalism on the other. Against such fearless

and determined assailants as Robespierre, Danton, and Marat, it was

helpless.

[Sidenote: Difficulties Confronting the Legislative Assembly, 1791]

The new government came into being with the first meeting of the

Legislative Assembly on 1 October, 1791. Immediately its troubles

began. The members of the Legislative Assembly were wholly

inexperienced in parliamentary procedure, for an unfortunate self-

denying ordinance [Footnote: Proposed by Robespierre.] of the retiring

Constituent Assembly had prohibited any of its members from accepting

election to the new body. The Legislative Assembly contained deputies

of fundamentally diverse views who quarreled long though eloquently

among themselves. Moreover, it speedily came into conflict with the

king, who vainly endeavored to use his constitutional right of

suspensive veto in order to check its activities. Combined with these

problems was the popular agitation and excitement: a peasant revolt in

La Vendée, the angry threats of émigré nobles and non-juring clergy

across the eastern frontier, the loud tumults of the proletariat of

Paris and of other large cities as well.

[Sidenote: Foreign Hostility to the French Revolution]

The difficulties of the limited monarchy were further complicated by an

embarrassing foreign situation. It will be borne in mind that all

important European states still adhered rigidly to the social

institutions of the "old régime" and, with the exception of Great

Britain, to divine-right monarchy. Outside of France there appeared as

yet no such thing as "public opinion," certainly no sign among the

lower classes of any opinion favorable to revolution. In Great Britain

alone was there a constitutional monarchy, and in the early days of the

French Revolution, so long as British statesmen could flatter

themselves that their neighbors across the Channel were striving to

imitate their political system, these same public men sympathized with

the course of events. But when it became evident that the Revolution

was going further, that it aimed at a great social leveling, that it

was a movement of the masses in behalf of the lowest classes in the

community, then even British criticism assailed it. At the close of

1790 Edmund Burke published his _Reflections on the Revolution in

France_, a bitter arraignment of the newer tendencies and a

rhetorical panegyric of conservatism. Although Burke's sensational work

was speedily and logically answered by several forceful thinkers,

including the brilliant Thomas Paine, nevertheless it long held its

place as the classical expression of official Britain's horror of

social equality and of "mob violence." The book was likewise received

with such approval by the monarchs of continental Europe, who

interpreted it as a telling defense of their position, that Catherine

of Russia personally complimented the author and the puppet king of

Poland sent him a flamboyant glorification and a gold medal.

Thenceforth the monarchs, as well as the nobles and clergy, of Europe

saw in the French Revolution only a menace to their political and

social privileges: were it communicated to the lower classes, the

Revolution might work the same havoc throughout the length and breadth

of Europe that it was working in France. The "benevolent despots" had

sincere desires to labor for the welfare of the people; they shuddered

at the thought of what the people themselves would do in laboring for

their own welfare.

[Sidenote: The Holy Roman Emperor the Champion of Opposition to the

Revolution]

A Political and Social History of Modern Europe V.1. · 第 10 / 12 章