LEARNING TO SPEAK.
No human being remembers how he learned his mother-tongue in early
youth, and the whole human race has forgotten the origin of its
articulate speech as well as of its gestures; but every individual
passes perceptibly through the stage of learning to speak, so that a
patient observer recognizes much as conformable to law.
The acquisition of speech belongs to those physiological problems which
can not be solved by the most important means possessed by physiology,
vivisection. And the speechless condition in which every human being is
born can not be regarded as a disease that may be healed by instruction,
as is the case with certain forms of acquired aphasia. A set of other
accomplishments, such as swimming, riding, fencing, piano-playing, the
acquirement of which is physiological, are learned like articulate
speech, and nobody calls the person that can not swim an anomaly on that
account. The _inability to appropriate_ to one's self these and other
co-ordinated muscular movements, this alone is abnormal. But we can not
tell in advance in the case of any new-born child whether he will learn
to speak or not, just as in the case of one who has suffered an
obstruction of speech or has entirely lost speech, it is not certain
whether he will ever recover it.
In this the normal child that does _not yet_ speak perfectly,
resembles the diseased adult who, for any cause, _no longer_ has
command of language. And to compare these two with each other is the
more important, as at present no other empirical way is open to us for
investigating the nature of the process of learning to speak; but this
way conducts us, fortunately, through pathology, to solid, important
physiological conclusions.
1. Disturbances of Speech in Adults.
The command of language comprises, on the one hand, the understanding of
what is spoken; on the other hand, the utterance of what is thought. It
is at the height of its performance in free, intelligible, connected
speech. Everything that disturbs the _understanding of words heard_ must
be designated disturbance of speech equally with everything that
disturbs _the production of words_ and sentences.
By means of excellent investigations made by many persons, especially by
Broca, Wernicke, Kussmaul, it has become possible to make a topical
division of most of the observed disturbances of speech of both kinds.
In the first class, which comprises the _impressive_ processes, we have
to consider every functional disturbance of the peripheral ear, of the
auditory nerve and of the central ends of the auditory nerve; in the
second class, viz., the _expressive_ processes, we consider every
functional disturbance of the apparatus required for articulation,
including the nerves belonging to this in their whole extent, in
particular the hypoglossus, as motor nerve of the tongue, and certain
parts of the cerebral hemispheres from which the nerves of speech are
excited and to which the sense-impressions from without are so conducted
by connecting fibers that they themselves or their memory-images can
call forth expressive, i. e., motor processes. The diagram, Fig. 1,
illustrates the matter.
[Illustration: FIG. 1.]
The peripheral ear _o_, with the terminations of the auditory nerve, is
by means of sensory fibers _a_, that are connected with the auditory
nerve, in connection with the storehouse of sound-impressions, K. This
is connected by means of the intercentral paths _v_ with the motor
speech-center M. From it go out special fibers of communication, _h_, to
the motor nerves of speech which terminate in the external instruments
of articulation, _z_.
The impressive nerve-path, _o_ _a_ K, is centripetal; the expressive,
M _h_ _z_, centrifugal; _v_, intercentral.
When the normal child learns to speak, _o_ receives the
sound-impressions; by _a_ the acoustic-nerve excitations are passed
along to K, and are here stored up, every distinctly heard sound (a
tone, a syllable, a word) leaving an impression behind in K. It is
very remarkable here that, among the many sounds and noises that
impress themselves upon the portions of the brain directly connected
with the auditory nerve, a selection is made in the sound-field of
speech, K, since all those impressions that can be reproduced, among
them all the acoustic images necessary for speech, are preserved, but
many others are not, e. g., thunder, crackling. Memory is indistinct
with regard to these. From K, when the sound-images or
sound-impressions have become sufficiently strong and numerous, the
nerve-excitement goes farther through the connecting paths _v_ to M,
where it liberates motor impulses, and through _h_ sets in activity
the peripheral apparatus of speech, _z_.
Now, speech is disturbed when at any point the path _o_ _z_ is
interrupted, or the excitation conducted along the nerve-fibers and
ganglionic cells upon the hearing of something spoken or upon the
speaking of something represented in idea (heard inwardly) is arrested,
a thing which may be effected without a total interruption of the
conduction, e. g., by means of poison and through anatomical lesions.
On the basis of these physiological relations, about which there is no
doubt, I divide, then, all pure disturbances of speech, or
_lalopathies_, into three classes:
(1) Periphero-Impressive or Perceptive Disturbances.
The organ of hearing is injured _at its peripheral extremity_, or else
the acusticus in its course; then occurs _difficulty of hearing_ or
_deafness_. What is spoken is not correctly heard or not heard at all:
the utterance is correct only in case the lesion happened late. If it
is inborn, then this lack of speech, alalia, is called _deaf-mutism_,
although the so-called deaf and dumb are not in reality dumb, but only
deaf. If words spoken are incorrectly heard on account of acquired
defects of the peripheral ear, the patient mis-hears, and the abnormal
condition is called paracusis.
(2) Central Disturbances.
_a._ The higher impressive central paths are disturbed: _centro-sensory
dysphasia and aphasia_, or _word-deafness_. Words are heard but not
understood. The hearing is acute. "Patients may have perfectly correct
ideas, but they lack the correct expression for them; not the thoughts
but the words are confused. They would understand the ideas of others
also if they only understood the words. They are in the position of
persons suddenly transported into the midst of a people using the same
sounds but different words, which strike upon their ear like an
unintelligible noise." (Kussmaul.) Their articulation is without defect,
but what they say is unintelligible because the words are mutilated and
used wrongly. C. Wernicke discovered this form, and has separated it
sharply from other disturbances of speech. He designated it sensory
aphasia. Kussmaul later named this abnormal condition word-deafness
(surditas verbalis).
_b._ The connections between the impressive sound-centers and the motor
speech-center are injured. Then we have intercentral conductive
dysphasia and aphasia. What is spoken is heard and understood correctly
even when _v_ is completely interrupted. The articulation is not
disturbed, and yet the patient utters no word of himself. He can,
however, read aloud what is written. (Kussmaul.) The word that has just
been read aloud by the patient can not be repeated by him, neither can
the word that has been pronounced to him; and, notwithstanding this, he
reads aloud with perfect correctness. In this case, then, it is
impossible for the patient of his own motion, even if the memory of the
words heard were not lost, to set in activity the expressive mechanism
of speech, although it might remain uninjured.
_c._ The motor speech-center is injured. Then we have centro-motor
dysphasia and aphasia. If the center is completely and exclusively
disturbed, then it is a case of pure ataxic aphasia. Spontaneous
speaking, saying over of words said by another, and reading aloud of
writing, are impossible. (Kussmaul.) On the other hand, words heard are
understood, although the concepts belonging with them can not be
expressed aloud. The verbal memory remains; and the patient can still
express his thoughts in writing and can copy in writing what he reads or
what is dictated to him.
(3) Periphero-Expressive or Articulatory Disturbances.
The centrifugal paths from the motor speech-center to the motor nerves
of speech and to their extremities, or else these nerves themselves,
are injured. Then occurs _dysarthria_, and, if the path is totally
impassable at any place, _anarthria_. The hearing and understanding of
words are not hindered, but speaking, repeating the words of others,
and reading aloud are, as in the last case (2, _c_), impossible. In
general this form can not be distinguished from the foregoing when
both are developed in an extreme degree, except in cases of peripheral
dysarthria, i. e., dyslalia, since, as may be easily understood, it
makes no difference in the resulting phenomena whether the motor
center itself is extirpated or its connections with the motor outlet
are absolutely cut off just where the latter begins; but if this
latter is injured nearer to the periphery, e. g., if the hypoglossus
is paralyzed, then the phenomena are different (paralalia, mogilalia).
Here belongs all so-called mechanical dyslalia, caused by defects of
the peripheral speech-apparatus.
Of these five forms each occurs generally only in connection with
another; for this reason the topical diagnosis also is often
extraordinarily difficult. But enough cases have been accurately
observed and collected to put it almost beyond a doubt that each form
may also appear for a short time purely by itself. To be sure, the
anatomical localization of the impressive and expressive paths is not
yet ascertained, so that for the present the centripetal roads from
the acusticus to the motor speech-center, and the intercentral fibers
that run to the higher centers, are as much unknown as the centrifugal
paths leading from them to the nuclei of the hypoglossus; but that the
speech-center discovered by Broca is situated in the posterior portion
of the third frontal convolution (in right-handed men on the left, in
left-handed on the right) is universally acknowledged.
Further, it results from the abundance of clinical material, that the
acoustic-center K must be divided into a sound-center L, a
syllable-center S, a word-center W, each of which may be in itself
defective, for cases have been observed in which sounds were still
recognized and reproduced, but not syllables and words, also cases in
which sounds and syllables could be dealt with but no words; and,
finally, cases in which all these were wanting. The original diagram
is thereby considerably complicated, as the simple path of connection
between K and M has added to it the arcs L S M and L S W M (Fig. 2).
[Illustration: FIG. 2.]
The surest test of the perfect condition of all the segments is afforded
by the repetition of sounds, syllables, and words pronounced by others.
Syllables and sounds, but no words, can be pronounced if W is missing
or the path S W or W M is interrupted; no syllables if S is missing or
L S or S M is interrupted. If L is missing, then nothing can be
repeated from hearing. If L M is interrupted, then syllables and words
are more easily repeated than simple sounds, so far as the latter are
not syllables. If L S is interrupted, then simple sounds only can be
repeated. All these abnormal states have been actually observed. The
proofs are to be found in Kussmaul's classic work on the disturbances
of speech (1877). Even the strange case appears in which, L M being
impracticable, syllables are more easily repeated than simple sounds.
If _a_ is interrupted before the acquirement of speech, and thus chronic
deafness is present in very early childhood, articulation may still be
learned through visual and tactile impressions; but in this case the
sound-center L is not developed. Another, a sound-touch-center, comes in
its place in deaf-mutes when they are instructed, chiefly through the
tactile sensations of the tongue; and, when they are instructed in
reading (and writing), a sound-sight-(or letter) center. This last is,
on the contrary, wanting to those born blind; and both are wanting to
those born blind and deaf. Instead is formed in them through careful
instruction, by means of the tactile sensations of the finger-tips, a
center for signs of sound that are known by touch (as with the printed
text for the blind).
Accordingly, the eye and ear are not absolutely indispensable to the
acquirement of a verbal language; but for the thorough learning of the
verbal language in its entire significance both are by all means
indispensable. For, the person born blind does not get the significance
of words pertaining to light and color. For him, therefore, a large
class of conceptions, an extensive portion of the vocabulary of his
language, remains empty sound. To the one born deaf there is likewise an
extensive district of conceptions closed, inasmuch as all words
pertaining to tone and noise remain unintelligible to him.
Moreover, those born blind and deaf, or those born blind and becoming
deaf very early, or those born deaf and becoming blind very early,
though they may possess ever so good intelligence, and perhaps even
learn to write letters, as did the famous Laura Bridgman, will
invariably understand only a small part of the vocabulary of their
language, and will not articulate correctly.
Those born deaf are precisely the ones that show plainly how necessary
hearing is for the acquirement of perfectly articulate speech. One who
is deaf from birth does not even learn to speak half a dozen sounds
correctly without assistance, and the loss of speech that regularly
follows deafness coming on in children who have already learned to
speak, shows how inseparably the learning and the development of perfect
articulation are bound up with the hearing. Even the deafness that comes
on in maturer years injures essentially the agreeable tone, often also
the intelligibility, of the utterance.
2. The Organic Conditions of Learning to Speak.
How is it, now, with the normal child, who is learning to speak? How is
it as to the existence and practicability of the nervous conduction, and
the genesis of the centers?
In order to decide these questions, a further extension of the diagram
is necessary (Fig. 3).
[Illustration: FIG. 3.]
For the last diagram deals only with the hearing and pronouncing of
sounds, syllables, and single words, not with the grammatical formation
and syntactical grouping of these; there must further be a center of
higher rank, the _dictorium_, or center of diction (Kussmaul), brought
into connection with the centers L S and W. And, on the one hand, the
word-image acquired (by hearing) must be at the disposition of the
diction-center, an excitation, therefore, passing from W to D (through
_m_); on the other hand, an impulse must go out from the diction-center
to pronounce the word that is formed and placed so as to correspond to
the sense (through _n_). The same is true for syllables and sounds,
whose paths to and from are indicated by _k_ and _l_, as well as by _g_
and _i_. These paths of connection must be of twofold sort. The
excitement can not pass off to the diction-center D on the same
anatomical path as the return impulse from D, because not a single case
is known of a nerve-fiber that in natural relations conducts both
centrifugally _and_ centripetally, although this possibility of double
conduction does occur under artificial circumstances. Apart, then, from
pathological experience, which seems to be in favor of it, the
separation of the two directions of the excitement seems to be justified
anatomically also. On the contrary, it is questionable whether the
impulse proceeding from D does not arrive directly at the motor
speech-center, instead of passing through W, S, or L. The diagram then
represents it as follows (Fig. 4). Here the paths of direct connection
_i_, _l_, and _n_ from D to M represent that which was just now
represented by _i_ L _d_ and _l_ S _e_ and _n_ W _f_, respectively; in
Fig. 4, _i_ conducts only sound-excitations coming from L, _l_ only
excitations coming from S, and _n_ only those coming from W, as impulses
for M. For the present, I see no way of deciding between the two
possibilities. They may even exist both together. All the following
statements concerning the localization of the disturbances of speech and
the parallel imperfections of child-speech apply indifferently to either
figure; it should be borne in mind that the nerve-excitement always goes
_only_ in the direction of the arrows, never in the opposite direction,
through the nervous path corresponding to them. Such a parallel is not
only presented, as I have found, and as I will show in what follows, by
the most superficial exhibition of the manifold deviations of
child-speech from the later perfect speech, but is, above all, necessary
for the answering of the question: what is the condition of things in
learning to speak?
[Illustration: FIG. 4.]
3. Parallel between the Disturbances of Speech in Adults and the
Imperfections of Speech in the Child.
In undertaking to draw such a parallel, I must first of all state that
in regard to the pathology of the subject, I have not much experience of
my own, and therefore I rely here upon Kussmaul's comprehensive work on
speech-disturbances, from which are taken most of the data that serve to
characterize the individual deviations from the rule. In that work also
may be found the explanations, or precise definitions, of almost all the
names--with the exception of the following, added here for the sake of
brevity--skoliophasia, skoliophrasia, and palimphrasia. On the other
hand, the statements concerning the speech of the child rest on my own
observations of children--especially of my own son--and readers who give
their attention to little children may verify them all; most of them,
indeed, with ease. Only the examples added for explaining mogilalia and
paralalia are taken in part from Sigismund, a few others from Vierordt.
They show more plainly (at least concerning rhotacism) than my own
notes, some imperfections of articulation of the child in the second
year, which occur, however, only in single individuals. In general the
defects of child-speech are found to be very unequally distributed among
different ages and individuals, so that we can hardly expect to find all
the speech-disturbances of adults manifested in typical fashion in one
and the same child. But with very careful observation it may be done,
notwithstanding; and when several children are compared with one another
in this respect, the analogies fairly force themselves upon the
observer, and there is no break anywhere.
The whole group into which I have tried to bring in organic connection
all the kinds of disturbances and defects of speech in systematic form
falls into three divisions:
1. Imperfections not occasioned by disturbance of the intelligence--pure
speech-disturbances or _lalopathies_.
2. Imperfections occasioned solely by disturbances of the
intelligence--disturbances of continuous speech or discourse
(Rede)--_dysphrasies_.
3. Imperfections of the language of gesture and feature--_dysmimies_.
I. LALOPATHY.
A. THE IMPRESSIVE PERIPHERAL PROCESSES DISTURBED.
_Deafness._--Persons able to speak but who have become deaf do not
understand what is spoken simply because they can _no longer_ hear. The
newly born do not understand what is spoken because they can _not yet_
hear. The paths _o_ and _a_ are not yet practicable. All those just born
are deaf and dumb.
_Difficulty of Hearing._--Persons who have become hard of hearing do not
understand what is spoken, or they misunderstand, because they _no
longer_ hear distinctly. Such individuals easily hear wrong (paracusis).
Very young infants do not understand what is spoken, for the reason that
they do _not yet_ hear distinctly; _o_ and _a_ are still difficult for
the acoustic nerve-excitement to traverse. Little children very easily
hear wrong on this account.
B. THE CENTRAL PROCESSES DISTURBED.
_Dysphasia._--In the child that can use only a small number of words,
the cerebral and psychical act through which he connects these with his
ideas and gives them grammatical form and syntactical construction in
order to express the movement of his thought is _not yet_ complete.
(1) The Sensory Processes centrally disturbed.
_Sensory Aphasia_ (Wernicke), _Word-Deafness_ (Kussmaul).--The child, in
spite of good hearing and sufficiently developed intelligence, can _not
yet_ understand spoken words because the path _m_ is not yet formed and
the storehouse of word images W is still empty or is just in the stage
of origination.
_Amnesia, Amnesic Dysphasia and Aphasia, Partial and Total Word-Amnesia,
Memory-Aphasia._--The child has as yet no word-memory, or only a weak
one, utters meaningless sounds and sound-combinations. He can _not yet_
use words because he does not yet have them at his disposal as acoustic
sound-combinations. In this stage, however, much that is said to him can
be repeated correctly in case W is passable, though empty or imperfectly
developed.
(2) The Sensori-motor Processes of Diction disturbed.
_Acataphasia_ (Steinthal).--The child that has already a considerable
number of words at his disposal is _not yet_ in condition to arrange
them in a sentence syntactically. He can _not yet_ frame correct
sentences to express the movement of his thought, because his
diction-center D is still imperfectly developed. He expresses a whole
sentence by a word; e. g., _hot!_ means as much as "The milk is too hot
for me to drink," and then again it may mean "The stove is too hot!"
_Man!_ means "A strange man has come!"
_Dysgrammatism_ (Kussmaul) _and Agrammatism_ (Steinthal).--Children can
_not yet_ put words into correct grammatical form, decline, or
conjugate. They like to use the indefinite noun-substantive and the
infinitive, likewise to some extent the past participle. They prefer the
weak inflection, ignore and confound the articles, conjunctions,
auxiliaries, prepositions, and pronouns. In place of "I" they say their
own names, also _tint_ (for "Kind"--child or "baby"). Instead of "Du,
er, Sie" (thou, he, you), they use proper names, or man, papa, mamma.
Sometimes, too, the adjectives are placed after the nouns, and the
meaning of words is indicated by their position with reference to
others, by the intonation, by looks and gestures. Agrammatism in
child-language always appears in company with acataphasia, often also in
insane persons. When the imbecile Tony says, "Tony flowers taken,
attendant come, Tony whipped" (Tony Blumen genommen, Waerterin gekommen,
Tony gehaut), she speaks exactly like a child (Kussmaul), without
articles, pronouns, or auxiliary verbs, and, like the child, uses the
weak inflection. The connection _m_ of the word-image-center W with the
diction-center D, i. e., of the word-memory with grammar, and the
centers themselves, are as yet very imperfectly developed, unused.
_Bradyphasia._--Children that can already frame sentences take a
surprising amount of time in speaking on account of the slowness of
their diction. In D and W _m_ in the cerebral cortex the hindrances are
still great because of too slight practice.
(3) The Motor Processes centrally disturbed.
_a. Centro-motor Dysphasia and Aphasia, Aphemia, Asymbolia,
Asemia._--Children have not yet learned, or have hardly learned, the use
of language, although their intelligence is already sufficient. There is
no longer any deficiency in the development of the external organs of
speech, no muscular weakness, no imperfection of the nervous structures
that effect the articulation of the separate sounds, for intelligence
shows itself in the child's actions; he forms the separate sounds
correctly, unintentionally; his hearing is good and the sensory
word-memory is present, since the child already obeys. His _not yet_
speaking at this period (commonly as late as the second year) must
accordingly be essentially of centro-motor character.
In the various forms of this condition there is injury or lack of
sufficient relative development either in the centro-motorium M or in
the paths that lead into it, _d_, _e_, _f_ as well as _i_, _l_, _n_.
_[alpha]. Central Dysarthria and Anarthria._--In the child at the stage
of development just indicated articulation is _not yet_ perfect,
inasmuch as while he often unintentionally pronounces correctly sounds,
syllables, and single words, yet he can not form these intentionally,
although he hears and understands them aright. He makes use of gestures.
_Ataxic Aphasia (Verbal Anarthria)._--The child that already understands
several words as sound-combinations and retains them (since he obeys),
can not yet use these in speech because he has not yet the requisite
centro-motor impulses. He forms correctly the few syllables he has
already learned of his future language, i. e., those he has at the time
in memory as sound-combinations (sensory), but can _not yet_ group them
into new words; e. g., he says _bi_ and _te_ correctly, learns also to
say "_bitte_," but not yet at this period "tibe," "tebi." He lacks still
the motor co-ordination of words.
At this period the gesture-language and modulation of voice of the child
are generally easy to understand, as in case of pure ataxic aphasia (the
verbal asemia or asymbolia of Finkelnburg) are the looks and gestures
of aphasic adults. Chiefly _n_, _f_, and M are as yet imperfectly
developed.
_Central Stammering and Lisping (Literal Dysarthria)._--Children just
beginning to form sentences stammer, not uttering the sounds correctly.
They also, as a rule, lisp for a considerable time, so that the words
spoken by them are still indistinct and are intelligible only to the
persons most intimately associated with them.
The paths _d_ and _i_, and consequently the centro-motorium M, come
chiefly into consideration here; but L also is concerned, so far as from
it comes the motor impulse to make a sound audible through M.
The babbling of the infant is not to be confounded with this. That
imports merely the unintentional production of single disconnected
articulate sounds with non-cooerdinated movements of the tongue on
account of uncontrolled excitement of the nerves of the tongue.
_Stuttering (Syllabic Dysarthria)._--Stutterers articulate each separate
sound correctly, but connect the consonants, especially the explosive
sounds, with the succeeding vowels badly, with effort as if an obstacle
were to be overcome. The paths _i_ and _l_ are affected, and hence M is
not properly excited. S, too, comes under consideration in the case of
stuttering, so far as impulses go out from it for the pronunciation of
the syllables.
Children who can not yet speak of themselves but can repeat what is said
for them, exert themselves unnecessarily, making a strong expiratory
effort (with the help of abdominal pressure) to repeat a syllable still
unfamiliar, and they pause between the doubled or tripled consonant and
vowel. This peculiarity, which soon passes away and is to be traced
often to the lack of practice and to embarrassment (in case of threats),
and which may be observed _occasionally_ in every child, is stuttering
proper, although it appears more seldom than in stutterers. Example: The
child of two years is to say "Tischdecke," and he begins with an
unnecessary expiratory effort, _T-t-itt-t_, and does not finish.
Stuttering is by no means a physiological transition-stage through which
every child learning to speak must necessarily pass. But it is easily
acquired, in learning to speak, by imitation of stutterers, in frequent
intercourse with them. Hence, stutterers have sometimes stuttering
children.
_[beta]. Stumbling at Syllables._--Children that already articulate
correctly separate sounds, and do so intentionally, very often put
together syllables out of the sounds incorrectly, and frame words
incorrectly from the syllables, where we can not assume deficient
development of the external organs of speech; this is solely because the
co-ordination is still imperfect. The child accordingly says _beti_
before he can say _bitte_; so too _grefessen_ instead of _gefressen_.
The tracts _l_ and _n_ are still incompletely developed; also S and W,
so far as impulses come thence to utter syllables by means of M.
_b. Paraphasia._--Children have learned some expressions in their future
language, and use them independently but wrongly; they put in the place
of the appropriate word an incorrect one, confounding words because they
can _not yet_ correctly combine their ideas with the word-images. They
say, e. g., _Kind_ instead of "Kinn," and _Sand_ instead of "Salz"; also
_Netz_ for "Nest" and _Billard_ for "Billet," _Matrone_ for "Patrone."
The connection of D with M through _n_ is still imperfect, and perhaps
also M is not sufficiently developed.
_Making Mistakes in Speaking (Skoliophasia)._--In this kind of
paraphasia in adults the cause is a lack of attention; therefore purely
central concentration is wanting, or one fails to "collect himself";
there is distraction, hence the unintentional, frequently unconscious,
confounding of words similar in sound or connected merely by remote,
often dim, reminiscences. This kind of mis-speaking through carelessness
is distinguished from skoliophrasia (see below) by the fact that there
is no disturbance of the intelligence, and the correction easily
follows.
Skoliophasia occurs regularly with children in the second and third
years (and later). The child in general has not yet the ability to
concentrate his attention upon that which is to be spoken. He _wills_ to
do it but _can_ not yet. Hence, even in spite of the greatest effort,
occur often erroneous repetitions of words pronounced for him (aside
from difficulties of articulation, and also when these are wanting);
hence confounding (of words), wrong forms of address, e. g., _Mama_ or
_Helene_ instead of "Papa," and _Papa_ instead of "Marie."
_c. Taciturnity (Dumbness)._--Individual human beings of sound physical
condition who can speak very well are dumb, or speak only two or three
words in all for several years, because they no longer _will_ to speak
(e. g., in the belief that silence prevents them from doing wrong).
This taciturnity is not to be confounded with the paranoic aphrasia in
certain insane persons--e. g., in catatonia, where the will is
paralyzed.
It also occurs--seldom, however--that children who have already learned
to speak pretty well are dumb, or speak only a few words--among these
the word _no_--during several months, or speak only with certain
persons, because they _will not_ speak (out of obstinacy, or
embarrassment). Here an organic obstacle in the motor speech-center is
probable. For voluntary dumbness requires great strength of will, which
is hardly to be attributed to the child. The unwillingness to speak that
is prompted by _fun_ never lasts long.
C. THE EXPRESSIVE PERIPHERAL PROCESSES DISTURBED.
(1) Dyslalia and Alalia (Peripheral Dysarthria and Anarthria).
The infant can _not yet_ articulate correctly, or at all, on account of
the still deficient development, and afterward the lack of control, of
the nerves of speech and the external organs of speech. The complete
inability to articulate is called alalia. The newly born is alalic.
Dyslalia continues with many children a long time even after the
learning of the mother-tongue. This is always a case simply of
imperfections in _h_ and _z_.
_a. Bulbo-nuclear Stammering (Literal Bulbo-nuclear Dysarthria and
Anarthria)._--Patients who have lost control over the muscles of speech
through bulbo-nuclear paralysis, stammer before they become speechless,
and along with paralysis and atrophy of the tongue occur regularly
fibrillar contractions of the muscles of the tongue. The tongue is _no
longer_ regulated by the will.
The child that has not yet gained control over his vocal muscles
stammers before he can speak correctly, and, according to my
observations, regularly shows fibrillar contractions of the muscles of
the tongue along with an extraordinary mobility of the tongue. The
tongue is _not yet_ regulated by the will. Its movements are aimless.
_b. Mogilalia._--Children, on account of the as yet deficient control of
the external organs of speech, especially of the tongue, can _not yet_
form some sounds, and therefore omit them. They say, e. g., _in_ for
"hin," _aetz_ for "Herz," _eitun_ for "Zeitung," _ere_ for "Schere."
_Gammacism._--Children find difficulties in the voluntary utterance of K
and Ks (_x_), and indeed of G, and therefore often omit these sounds
without substituting others; they say, e. g., _atsen_ for "Klatschen,"
_atten_ for "Garten," _asse_ for "Gasse," _all_ for "Karl," _ete_ for
"Grete" (in the second year), _wesen_ for "gewesen," _opf_ for "Kopf."
_Sigmatism._--All children are late in learning to pronounce correctly
S, and generally still later with Sch, and therefore omit both, or in a
lisping fashion put S in place of Sch; more rarely Sch in place of S.
They say, e. g., _saf._ in place of "Schaf," _int_ for "singt," _anz_
for "Salz," _lafen_ and _slafen_ for "schlafen," _iss_ for "Hirsch,"
_pitte_ for "Splitter," _tul_ for "Stuhl," _wein_ for "Schwein,"
_Tuttav_ for "Gustav," _torch_ for "Storch" (second year), _emele_ for
"Schemel," _webenau_ for "Fledermaus," but also _Kusch_ for "Kuss." But
in no case have I myself heard a child regularly put "sch" in place of
_s_, as _Joschef_ for "Josef." This form, perhaps, occurs in Jewish
families; but I have no further observations concerning it as yet.
_Rhotacism._--Many children do not form R at all for a long time and put
nothing in place of it. They say _duch_ for "durch," _bot_ for "Brot,"
_unte_ for "herunter," _tautech_ for "traurig," _ule_ for "Ruhe,"
_taenen_ for "Thraenen," _ukka_ for "Zucker." On the contrary, some form
early the R lingual, guttural, and labial, but all confound now and then
the first two with each other.
_Lambdacism._--Many children are late in learning to utter L, and often
omit it. They say, e. g., _icht_ for "Licht," _voge_ for "Vogel,"
_atenne_ for "Laterne," _batn_ for "Blatt," _mante_ for "Mantel."
(2) Literal Pararthria or Paralalia.
Children who are beginning to repeat intentionally what is said, often
put another sound in place of the well-known correct (no doubt intended)
one; this on account of deficient control of the tongue or other
peripheral organs of speech. E. g., they say _t_ in place of _p_, or _b_
for _w_ (_basse_ for "Wasser" and for "Flasche"), _e_ for _i_ and _o_
for _u_, as in _bete_ for "bitte," and _Ohr_ for "Uhr."
_Paragammacism._--Children supply the place of the insuperably difficult
sounds G, K, X by others, especially D and T, also N, saying, e. g.,
_itte_ for "Rike," _finne_ for "Finger," _tein_ for "Klein," _toss_ for
"gross," _atitte_ for "Karnickel," _otute_ for "Kuk," _attall_ for
"Axel," _wodal_ for "Vogel," _tut_ for "gut," _tatze_ for "Katze."
_Parasigmatism._--Children are late in learning to utter S and Sch
correctly. They often supply the place of them, before acquiring them,
by other sounds, saying, e. g., _tule_ for "Schule," _ade_ for "Hase,"
_webbe_ for "Wasser," _beb_ for "boes," _bebe_ for "Besen," _gigod_ for
"Schildkroete," _baubee_ for "Schwalbe."
_Pararhotacism._--Most children, if not all, even when they have very
early formed R correctly (involuntarily), introduce other sounds in
place of it in speaking--e. g., they say _moigjen_ for "morgen," _matta_
for "Martha," _annold_ for "Arnold," _jeiben_ for "reiben," _amum_ for
"warum," _welfen_ for "werfen."
_Paralambdacism._--Many children who do not learn until late to utter L
put in its place other sounds; saying, e. g., _bind_ for "Bild," _bampe_
for "Lampe," _tinne_ for "stille," _degen_ for "legen," _wewe_ for
"Loewe," _ewebau_ for "Elephant."
(3) Bradylalia or Bradyarthria.
Children reciting for the first time something learned by heart
speak not always indistinctly, but, on account of the incomplete
practicability of the motor-paths, slowly, monotonously, without
modulation. Sounds and syllables do _not yet_ follow one another
quickly, although they are already formed correctly. The syllables
belonging to a word are often separated by pauses like the words
themselves--a sort of dysphasia-of-conduction on account of the more
difficult and prolonged conduction of the motor-impulse. I knew a boy
(feeble-minded, to be sure) who took from three to eight seconds for
answering even the simplest question; then came a regular explosion of
utterance. Yet he did not stutter or stammer. When he had only _yes_ or
_no_ to answer, the interval between question and answer was shorter.
Here belong in part also the imperfections of speech that are occasioned
by too large a tongue (macroglossia). When a child is born with too
large a tongue, he may remain long alalic, without the loss of
intellectual development, as was observed to be the case by Paster and
O. von Heusinger (1882).
II. DYSPHRASIA (DYSLOGICAL DISTURBANCES OF SPEECH).
The child that can already speak pretty correctly deforms his speech
after the manner of insane persons, being moved by strange caprices,
because his understanding is not yet sufficiently developed.
_Logorrhoea_ (_Loquaciousness_).--It is a regular occurrence with
children that their pleasure in articulation and in vocal sound often
induces them to hold long monologues, sometimes in articulate sounds and
syllables, sometimes not. This chattering is kept up till the grown
people present are weary, and that by children who can not yet talk; and
their screaming is often interrupted only by hoarseness, just as in the
case of the polyphrasia of the insane.
_Dysphrasia of the Melancholy._--Children exert themselves perceptibly
in their first attempts to speak, answer indolently or not at all, or
frequently with embarrassment, always slowly, often with drawl and
monotone, very frequently coming to a stop. They also sometimes begin to
speak, and then lose at once the inclination to go on.
_Dysphrasia of the Delirious_ (_Wahnsinnigen_).--Children that have begun
to speak often make new words for themselves. They have already invented
signs before this; they are also unintelligible often-times because they
use the words they have learned in a different sense.
_Dysphrasia of the Insane_ (_Verrueckten_).--The child is not yet
prepared to speak. He possesses only non-co-ordinated sounds and
isolated rudiments of words, primitive syllables, roots, as the
primitive raw material of the future speech.
In many insane persons only the disconnected remains or ruins of their
stock of words are left, so that their speech resembles that of the
child at a certain stage.
_Dysphrasia of the Feeble-minded._--The child at first reacts only upon
strong impressions, and that often indolently and clumsily and with
outcry; later, upon impressions of ordinary strength, without
understanding--laughing, crowing, uttering disconnected syllables.
So the patient reacts either upon strong impressions only, and that
indolently, bluntly, with gestures that express little and with rude
words, or he still reacts upon impressions of ordinary strength, but in
flat, silly, disconnected utterances.
_Dysphrasia of Idiots._--Children have command at the beginning of no
articulate sounds; then they learn these and syllables; after this also
words of one syllable; then they speak short words of more than one
syllable and sentences, but frequently babble forth words they have
heard without understanding their meaning, like parrots.
Imbeciles also frequently command only short words and sentences or
monosyllabic words and sounds, or, finally, they lack all articulate
sound. Many microcephalous idiots babble words without understanding
their meaning, like little children.
_Echo-speech or Echolalia_ (_Imitative Reflex Speech_).--Children not
yet able to frame a sentence correctly like to repeat the last word of a
sentence they have heard; and this, according to my observations and
researches, is so general that I am forced to call this echolalia a
physiological transition stage. Of long words said to them, the children
usually repeat only the last two syllables or the last syllable only.
The feeble-minded also repeat monotonously the words and sentences said
by a person in their neighborhood without showing an awakened attention,
and in general without connecting any idea with what they say.
(Romberg.)
_Interjectional Speech._--Children sometimes have a fancy for speaking
in interjections. They express vague ideas by single vowels (like _ae_),
syllables (e. g., _na_, _da_), and combinations of syllables, and
frequently call out aloud through the house meaningless sounds and
syllables. D and W are as yet undeveloped.
Often, too, children imitate the interjections used by members of the
family--_hop!_ _patsch_, _bauz!_ an interjectional echolalia. Many
deranged persons express their feelings in like manner, in sounds,
especially vowels, syllables, or sound-combinations resembling words,
which are void of meaning or are associated merely with obscure ideas
(Martini). Then D is connected with M only through L and S, and so
through _i_ and _e_.
_Embolophrasia._--Many children, long after they have overcome
acataphasia and agrammatism, delight in inserting between words sounds,
syllables, and words that do not belong there; e. g., they double the
last syllable of every word and put an _eff_ to it: _ich-ich-eff_, _bin
in-eff_, etc., or they make a kind of bleat between the words
(Kussmaul); and, in telling a story, put extra syllables into their
utterance while they are thinking.
Many adults likewise have the disagreeable habit of introducing certain
words or meaningless syllables into their speech, where these do not at
all belong; or they tack on diminutive endings to their words. The
syllables are often mere sounds, like _eh_, _uh_; in many cases they
sound like _eng_, _ang_ (angophrasia--Kussmaul).
_Palimphrasia._--Insane persons often repeat single sounds, syllables,
or sentences, over and over without meaning; e. g., "I am-am-am-am."
"The phenomenon in many cases reminds us of children, who say or sing
some word or phrase, a rhyme or little verse, so long continuously, like
automata, that the by-standers can endure it no longer. It is often the
ring of the words, often the sense, often both, by which the children
are impressed. The child repeats them because they seem to him strange
or very sonorous." (Kussmaul.)
_Bradyphrasia._--The speech of people that are sad or sleepy, and of
others whose mental processes are indolent, often drags along with
tedious slowness; is also liable to be broken off abruptly. The speaker
comes to a standstill. This is not to be confounded with bradyphasia or
with bradyarthria or bradylalia (see above).
In children likewise the forming of the sentence takes a long time on
account of the as yet slow rise and combination of ideas, and a simple
narrative is only slowly completed or not finished at all, because the
intellectual processes in the brain are too fatiguing.
_Paraphrasia._--Under the same circumstances as in the case of
bradyphrasia the (slow) speech may be marred and may become
unintelligible because the train of thought is confused--e. g., in
persons "drunk" with sleep--so that words are uttered that do not
correspond to the original ideas.
In the case of children who want to tell something, and who begin right,
the story may be interrupted easily by a recollection, a fresh train of
thought, and still they go on; e. g., they mix up two fairy tales,
attaching to the beginning of one the end of another.
_Skoliophrasia._--Distracted and timid feeble-minded persons easily make
mistakes in speaking, because they can not direct their attention to
what they are saying and to the way in which they are saying it, but
they wander, allowing themselves to be turned aside from the thing to be
said by all sorts of ideas and external impressions; and, moreover, they
do not notice afterward that they have been making mistakes (cf. p. 53).
Children frequently put a wrong word in place of a right one well known
to them, without noticing it. They allow themselves to be turned aside
very easily from the main point by external impressions and all sorts of
fancies, and often, in fact, say the opposite of what they mean without
noticing it.
III. DYSMIMIA.
Disturbances of Gesture-Language (Pantomime).
_Perceptive Asemia._--Patients have lost the ability to _understand_
looks and gestures (Steinthal).
Children can not yet understand the looks and gestures of persons about
them.
_Amnesic Amimia._--Aphasic persons can sometimes imitate gestures, but
can not execute them when bid, but only when the gestures are made for
them to imitate. Children that do not yet speak can imitate gestures if
these are made for them to see, but it is often a long time before they
can make them at the word of command.
_Ataxic Dysmimia and Amimia_ (_Mimetic Asemia_).--Patients can _no
longer_ execute significative looks and gestures, on account of
defective co-ordination.
Children can not express their states of desire, etc., because they do
_not yet_ control the requisite co-ordination for the corresponding
looks and gestures.
_Paramimia_ (_Paramimetic Asemia_).--Many patients can make use of looks
and gestures, but confound them.
Children have not yet firmly impressed upon them the significance of
looks and gestures; this is shown in their interchanging of these; e. g.,
the head is shaken in the way of denial when they are affirming
something.
_Emotive Language_ (_Affectsprache_) _in Aphrasia._--In Aphrasia it
happens that smiling, laughing, and weeping are _no longer_ controlled,
and that they break out on the least occasion with the greatest
violence, like the spinal reflexes in decapitated animals.
(Hughlings-Jackson.)
Emotive language may continue when the language of ideas
(Begriffssprache) is completely extinguished, and idiotic children
without speech can even sing.
In children, far slighter occasions suffice normally to call forth
smiles, laughter, and tears, than in adults. These emotional utterances
are _not yet_ often voluntarily inhibited by the child that can not yet
speak; on the contrary, they are unnecessarily repeated.
_Apraxia._--Many patients are _no longer_ in condition, on account of
disturbed intellect, to make right use of ordinary objects, the use of
which they knew well formerly; e. g., they can no longer find the way to
the mouth; or they bite into the soap.
Children are _not yet_ in condition, on account of deficient practice,
to use the common utensils rightly; e. g., they will eat soup with a
fork, and will put the fork against the cheek instead of into the mouth.
4. Development of Speech in the Child.
We may now take up the main question as to the condition of the
child that is learning to speak, in regard to the development and
practicability of the nerve-paths and of the centers required for
speech. For the comparison of the disturbances of speech in adults
with the deficiencies of speech in the child, on the one hand, and
the chronological observation of the child, on the other hand,
disclose to us what parts of the apparatus of speech come by
degrees into operation. First to be considered are the _impressive_
and _expressive_ paths in general.
All new-born human beings are deaf or hard of hearing, as has already
been demonstrated. Since the hearing but slowly grows more acute during
the first days, no utterances of sound at this period can be regarded as
responses to any sound-impressions whatever. The first cry is purely
reflexive, like the croaking of the decapitated frog when the skin of
his back is stroked (Vol. I, p. 214). The cry is not heard by the
newly-born himself and has not the least value as language. It is on a
par with the squeaking of the pig just born, the bleating of the
new-born lamb, and the peeping of the chick that is breaking its shell.
Upon this first, short season of physiological deaf-mutism follows the
period during which crying expresses bodily conditions, feelings such as
pain, hunger, cold. Here, again, there exists as yet no connection of
the expressive phenomena with acoustic impressions, but there is already
the employment of the voice with stronger expiration in case of strong
and disagreeable excitations of other sensory nerves than those of
general sensation and of the skin. For the child now cries at a dazzling
light also, and at a bitter taste, as if the unpleasant feeling were
diminished by the strong motor discharge. In any case the child cries
because this loud, augmented expiration lessens for him the previously
existing unpleasant feelings, without exactly inducing thereby a
comfortable condition.
Not until later does a sudden sound-impression, which at first called
forth only a start and then a quivering of the eyelids, cause also
crying. But this loud sign of fright may be purely reflexive, just like
the silent starting and throwing up of the arms at a sudden noise, and
has at most the significance of an expression of discomfort, like
screaming at a painful blow.
It is otherwise with the first loud response to an acoustic impression
_recognized_ as new. The indefinable sounds of satisfaction made by the
child that hears music for the first time are no longer reflexive, and
are not symptoms of displeasure. I see in this reaction, which may be
compared with the howling of the dog that for the first time in his life
hears music--I see in this reaction of the apparatus of voice and of
future speech, _the first sign of the connection now just established
between impressive_ (acoustic) and _expressive_ (having the character of
emotive language) _paths_. The impressive, separately, were long since
open, as the children under observation after the first week allowed
themselves to be quieted by the singing of cradle-songs, and the
expressive, separately, must likewise have been open, since various
conditions were announced by various sorts of crying.
Everything now depends on a well-established _intercentral
communication_ between the two. This is next to be discussed.
The primitive connection is already an advance upon that of a reflex
arc. The sound-excitations arriving from the ear at the central endings
of the auditory nerve are not directly transformed into motor
excitations for the laryngeal nerves, so that the glottis contracts to
utter vocal sound. When the child (as early as the sixth to the eighth
week) takes pleasure in music and laughs aloud, his voice can not in
this case (as at birth) have been educed by reflex action, for without a
cerebrum he would not laugh or utter joyous sounds, whereas even without
that he cries.
From this, however, by no means follows the existence of a speech-center
in the infant. The fact that he produces sounds easily articulated,
although without choice, like _tahu_ and _amma_, proves merely the
functional capacity of the peripheral apparatus of articulation (in the
seventh week) at a period long before it is intentionally used for
articulation. The unintentionally uttered syllables that make their
appearance are, to be sure, simple, at least in the first half-year. It
is vowels almost exclusively that appear in the first month, and these
predominate for a long time yet. Of the consonants in the third month
_m_ alone is generally to be noted as frequent. This letter comes at a
later period also, from the raising and dropping of the lower jaw in
expiration, an operation that is besides soon easy for the infant with
less outlay of will than the letter _b_, which necessitates a firmer
closing of the lips.
But in spite of the simplicity of all the vocal utterances and of the
defectiveness of the articulatory apparatus, the child is able (often
long before the seventh month) to respond to address, questions,
chiding, either with inarticulate sounds or with vowels or by means of
simple syllables, like _pa_, _ta_, _ma_, _na_, _da_, _mae_, _moe_, _goe_,
_roe_ [_a_ as in _father_; ae as in _fate_; oe like _i_ in _bird_.] Since
these responses are entirely, or almost entirely, lacking in
microcephali and in children born deaf, they are not purely reflexive,
like sneezing, e. g.; therefore there must be in the case of these a
cerebral operation also, simple indeed, but indubitably intellectual,
interposed between sound-perception and vocal utterance, especially as
the infant behaves differently according to what he hears, and he
discriminates very well the stern command from the caress, forbidding
from allowing, in the voice of the person speaking to him. Yet it is
much more the _timbre_, the accent, the pitch, the intensity of the
voice and the sounds, the variation of which excites attention, than it
is the spoken word. In the first half-year the child hears the vowels
much better than he does the consonants, and will imperfectly
understand or divine the sense of a few sounds only--e. g., when his
name is uttered in a threatening tone he will hear merely the accented
vowel, for at the first performance taught him, purposely postponed to a
very late period (in his thirteenth month), it made no difference to my
child whether we asked without changing a feature, "Wie gross?" (how
tall?) or "ooss?" or "oo?" In all three cases he answered with the same
movement of the hand.
Now, although all infants in normal condition, before they can repeat
anything after others or can understand any word whatever, _express_
their feelings by various sounds, even by syllables, and _distinguish_
vowels and many consonants in the words spoken to them, yet this does
not raise them above the intelligent animal. The response to friendly
address and loud chiding by appropriate sounds is scarcely to be
distinguished as to its psychical value from the joyous barking and
whining of the poodle.
The pointer-dog's understanding of the few spoken utterances that are
impressed upon him in his training is also quite as certain at least
as the babe's understanding of the jargon of the nurse. The correctly
executed movements or arrests of movement following the
sound-impressions "Setz dich! Pfui! Zurueck! Vorwaerts! Allez! Fass!
Apporte! Such! Verloren! Pst! Lass! Hierher! Brav! Leid's nicht!
Ruhig! Wahr Dich! Hab Acht! Was ist das! Pfui Vogel! Pfui Hase! Halt!"
prove that the bird-dog understands the meaning of the sounds and
syllables and words heard as far as he needs to understand them. The
training in the English language accomplishes the same result with
"Down! Down charge! Steady! Toho! Fetch! Hold up!" as the training in
the French language, with yet other words--so that we can by no means
assume any hereditary connection whatever between the quality of the
sound heard and the movement or arrest of movement to be executed,
such as may perhaps exist in the case of the chick just hatched which
follows the clucking of the hen. Rather does the dog learn afresh in
every case the meaning of the words required for hunting, just as the
speechless child comprehends the meaning of the first words of its
future language without being able to repeat them himself--e. g.,
"Give! Come! Hand! Sh! Quiet!" Long before the child's mechanism of
articulation is so far developed that these expressions can be
produced by him, the child manifests his understanding of them
unequivocally by corresponding movements, by gestures and looks, by
obedience.
No doubt this behavior varies in individual cases, inasmuch as in some
few the imitative articulation may be to some extent earlier developed
than the understanding. There are many children who even in their first
year have a monkey-like knack at imitation and repeat all sorts of
things like parrots without guessing the sense of them. Here, however,
it is to be borne in mind that such an echo-speech appears only after
the _first_ understanding of some spoken word can be demonstrated; in no
case before the fourth month. Lindner relates that when he one day
observed that his child of eighteen weeks was gazing at the swinging
pendulum of the house-clock, he went with him to it, saying,
"Tick-tack," in time with the pendulum; and when he afterward called
out to the child, who was no longer looking at the clock, "Tick-tack!"
this call was answered, at first with delay, a little later immediately,
by a turning of the look toward the clock. This proved that there was
understanding long before the first imitation of words. Progress now
became pretty rapid, so that at the end of the seventh month the
questions, "Where is your eye? ear? head? mouth? nose? the table? chair?
sofa?" were answered correctly by movements of hand and eyes. In the
tenth month this child for the first time himself used a word as a means
of effecting an understanding, viz., _mama_ (soon afterward, indeed, he
called both parents _papa_). The child's inability to repeat distinctly
syllables spoken for him is not to be attributed, shortly before the
time at which he succeeds in doing it, to a purely psychical adynamy
(impotence), not, as many suppose, to "being stupid," or to a weakness
of will without organic imperfections determined by the cerebral
development, for the efforts, the attention, and the ability to repeat
incorrectly, show that the will is not wanting. Since also the
peripheral impressive acoustic and expressive phonetic paths are intact
and developed, as is proved by the acuteness of the hearing and the
spontaneous formation of the very syllables desired, the cause of the
inability to repeat correctly must be solely organic-centro-motor. The
connecting paths between the sound-center and the syllable-center, and
of both these with the speech motorium, are not yet or not easily
passable; but the imitation of a single sound, be it only _a_, can not
take place without the mediation of the cerebral cortex. Thus in the
very first attempt to repeat something heard there exists an
unquestionable advance in brain development; and the first successful
attempt of this kind proves not merely the augmented functional ability
of the articulatory apparatus and of the sound-center, and the
practicability of the impressive paths that lead from the ear to the
sound-center--it proves, above all, the establishment of intercentral
routes that lead from the sound-center and the syllable-center to the
motorium.
In fact, the correct _repeating_ of a sound heard, of a syllable, and,
finally, of a word pronounced by another person, is the surest proof of
the establishment and practicability of the entire impressive, central,
and expressive path. It, however, proves nothing as to the
_understanding_ of the sound or word heard and faultlessly repeated.
As the term "understanding" or "understand" is ambiguous, in so far
as it may relate to the ideal content (the meaning), and at the same
time to the mere perception of the word spoken (or written or
touched)--e. g., when any one speaks indistinctly so that we do not
"understand" him--it is advisable to restrict the use of this
expression. _Understand_ shall in future apply only to the _meaning_
of the word; _hear_--since it is simply the perceiving of a word
through the hearing that we have in view--will relate to the sensuous
impression. It is clear, then, that all children who can hear but can
not yet speak, repeat many words without understanding them, and
understand many words without being able to repeat them, as Kussmaul
has already observed. But I must add that the repeating of what is
not understood begins only after some word (even one that can not be
repeated) has been understood.
Now it is certain that the majority, if not all, of the children
that have good hearing develop the understanding more at first,
since the impressive side is practiced more and sooner than the
expressive-articulatory. Probably those that imitate early and
skillfully are the children that can speak earliest, and whose
cerebrum grows fastest but also soonest ceases to grow; whereas those
that imitate later and more sparingly, generally learn to speak later,
and will generally be the more intelligent. For with the higher sort
of activity goes the greater growth of brain. While the other children
cultivate more the centro-motor portion, the sensory, the
intellectual, is neglected. In animals, likewise, a brief, rapid
development of the brain is wont to go along with inferior
intelligence. The intelligence gets a better development when the
child, instead of repeating all sorts of things without any meaning,
tries to guess the meaning of what he hears. Precisely the epoch at
which this takes place belongs to the most interesting in intellectual
development. Like a pantomimist, the child, by means of his looks and
gestures, and further by cries and by movements of all sorts, gives
abundant evidence of his understanding and his desires, without
himself speaking a single word. As the adult, after having half
learned a foreign language from books, can not speak (imitate) it, and
can not easily understand it when he hears it spoken fluently by one
that is a perfect master of it, but yet makes out _single_ expressions
and understands them, and divines the meaning of the whole, so the
child at this stage can distinctly hear single words, can grasp the
purport of them, and divine correctly a whole sentence from the looks
and gestures of the speaker, although the child himself makes audible
no articulate utterance except his own, for the most part meaningless,
variable babble of sounds and syllables and outcries.
The causes of the slowness of the progress in expressing in articulate
words what is understood and desired, on the part of normal children, is
not, however, to be attributed, as it has often been, to a slower
development of the expressive motor mechanism, but must be looked for in
the difficulty of establishing the connection of the various central
storehouses of sense-impressions with the intercentral path of
connection between the acoustic speech-centers and the speech-motorium.
For the purely peripheral articulatory acts are long since perfect,
although as yet a simple "_a_" or "_pa_" can not be repeated after
another person; for these and other sounds and syllables are already
uttered correctly by the child himself.
The order of succession in which these separate sounds appear, without
instruction, is very different in individual cases. With my boy, who
learned to speak rather late, and was not occupied with learning by
heart, the following was the order of the perfectly pure sounds heard by
me:
On the left are the sounds or syllables indicated by one letter; on the
right, the same indicated by more than one letter; and it is to be borne
in mind that the child needs to pronounce only fourteen of the nineteen
so-called consonants of the German alphabet in order to master the
remaining five also; for
c = ts and k
v = f and w
x = ks and gs
q = ku and kw
z = ts and ds
and of the fourteen four require no new articulation, because
p is a toneless b
t is a toneless d
f is a toneless w
k is a toneless g
Of the ten positions of the mouth required for all the consonants of the
alphabet, nine are taken by the child within the first six months:*
Months.
1. Indefinite
vowels; ae u, uae.
2. a, oe, o; m,
g, r, t; h, am, ma, ta, hu, oer, roe, ar, ra, goe.
3. i; b, l, n, ua, oa, ao, ai, [(ei], oae, aeo, aea, aeoe; oem, in, ab,
om; la, ho, moe, nae, na, ha, bu; ng, mb, gr.
4. e, [(aeu], a-u, aoe, ea; an; na, toe, la, me; nt.
5. ue (y); k, ag, eg, ek, ge, koe.
6. j; the oi ([(eu], [(aeu]), io, oee, eu (French); ij, aj,
lingual-labial oeg, ich; ja, jae; rg, br, ch.
sound,
7. d, p, aee, ui; mae.
8. eoe, ae, ou, [(au]; up; hoe, mi, te.
9. ap, ach, aem; pa, ga, cha.
10. el, ab, at, aet; dae, ba, ta, tae; nd.
11. ad, al, ak, er, ej, oed; da, gae, bae, ka, ke, je,
he, ne; pr, tr.
12. w, aen, op, ew, aer; de, wae; nj, ld.
13. s (ss), en; hi; dn.
14. mu; kn, gn, kt.
15. z, ooe, oea, is, iss, es, ass, th (English),
ith (Engl.), it; hae, di, wa, sse.
16. f (v), ok, on; do, go; bw, fp.
17. ib, oet, an; bi.
18. aei, iae; aep, im; tu, pae; ft.
19. oen, et, es; sa, be; st, tth (Engl.), s-ch, sj.
20. ub, ot, id, od, oj, uf, aet; bo, ro, jo; dj,
dth (Engl.).
21. oep; fe; rl, dl, nk, pt.
22. ol; lo; ps, pt, tl, sch, tsch, pth (Engl.).
23. q, uo; id, op, um, em, us, un, ow, ed, uk, ig, il;
joe, ju, po, mo, wo, fa, fo, fi, we, ku (qu),
li, ti; tn, pf, gch, gj, tj, schg.
24. ut, esch; pu, wi, schi, pi.
25. oe, ul, il, och, iw, ip, ur; lt, rb, rt.
26. nl, ds, mp, rm, fl, kl, nch, ml, dr.
27. x, kch, cht, lch, ls, sw, sl.
_____________________________________________________________________
* Pronounce the letters in the tabular view as in German.
Every such chronological view of the sequence of sounds is uncertain,
because we can not observe the child uninterruptedly, and hence the
first appearance of a new sound easily escapes notice. The above
synopsis has a chronological value only so far as this, that it
announces, concerning every single sound, that such sound was heard in
its purity by me at least as early as the given month. The sound may,
however, have been uttered considerably earlier without my hearing it. I
know from personal experience that in other children many sounds appear
much earlier; in my child, e. g., _ngae_ was observed too late, and I
have no doubt that the first utterance of _f_ and _w_ was unobserved,
although I was on the lookout for them. When it is maintained, on the
contrary, that _m_ is not heard from a normal child until the tenth
month, then the _am_ and _moe_ which appear universally in the first
half-year have escaped notice. Earlier tabular views of this sort, which
have even served as a foundation for instruction of deaf-mutes in
speaking, do not rest exclusively on observation. Besides, in this
matter, even two children hardly agree. According to my observations, I
am compelled in spite of this disagreement to lay down the proposition
as valid for all healthy children, that the greatly _preponderating
majority of the sounds the child makes use of after learning verbal
language, and many other sounds besides these, are correctly formed by
him within the first eight months_, not intentionally, but just as much
at random as any other utterance of sound not to be used later in
speech, not appearing in any civilized language. I will only mention as
an example the labio-lingual explosive sound, in which the tip of the
tongue comes between the lips and, with an expiration, bursting from its
confinement is drawn back swiftly (with or without tone). All children
seem to like to form this sound, a sound between _p_, _b_, and _t_, _d_;
but it exists in few languages.
Among the innumerable superfluous, unintentional, random, muscular
movements of the infant, the movements of the muscles of the larynx,
mouth, and tongue take a conspicuous place, because they ally
themselves readily with acoustic effects and the child takes delight
in them. It is not surprising, therefore, that precisely those
vibrations of the vocal cords, precisely those shapings of the cavity
of the mouth, and those positions of the lips, often occur which we
observe in the utterance of our vowels, and that among the
child-noises produced unconsciously and in play are found almost all
our consonants and, besides, many that are used in foreign languages.
The plasticity of the apparatus of speech in youth permits the
production of a greater abundance of sounds and sound-combinations
than is employed later, and not a single child has been observed who
has, in accordance with the principle of the least effort (_principe
du moindre effort_) applied by French authors to this province,
advanced in regular sequence from the sounds articulated easily--i. e.,
with less activity of will--to the physiologically difficult;
rather does it hold good for all the children I have observed, and
probably for all children that learn to speak, that many of the sounds
uttered by them at the beginning, in the speechless season of infancy,
without effort and then forgotten, have to be learned afresh at a
later period, have to be painstakingly acquired by means of imitation.
Mobility and perfection in the _technique_ of sound-formation are not
speech. They come into consideration in the process of learning to speak
as facilitating the process, because the muscles are perfected by
previous practice; but the very first attempts to imitate voluntarily a
sound heard show how slight this advantage is. Even those primitive
syllables which the child of himself often pronounces to weariness, like
_da_, he can not at the beginning (in the tenth month in my case) as yet
say after any one, although he makes manifest by his effort--a regular
strain--by his attention, and his unsuccessful attempts, that he would
like to say them, as I have already mentioned. The reason is to be
looked for in the still incomplete development of the sensori-motor
central paths. In place of _tatta_ is sounded _tae_ or _ata_; in place of
_papa_ even _tai_, and this not once only, but after a great many trials
repeated again and again with the utmost patience. That the sound-image
has been correctly apprehended is evident from the certainty with which
the child responds correctly in various cases by gestures to words of
similar sound unpronounceable by him. Thus, he points by mistake once
only to the mouth (Mund) instead of the moon (Mond), and points
correctly to the ear (Ohr) and the clock (Uhr) when asked where these
objects are. The acuteness of hearing indispensable for repeating the
sounds is therefore present before the ability to repeat.
On the whole, the infant or the young child already weaned must be
placed higher at this stage of his mental development than a very
intelligent animal, but not on account of his knowledge of language, for
the dog also understands very well single words in the speech of his
master, in addition to hunting-terms. He divines, from the master's
looks and gestures, the meaning of whole sentences, and, although he has
not been brought to the point of producing articulate sounds, yet much
superior in this respect is the performance of the cockatoo, which
learns all articulate sounds. A child who shows by looks and gestures
and actions that he understands single words, and who already pronounces
correctly many words by imitation without understanding them, does not
on this account stand higher intellectually than a sagaciously
calculating yet speechless elephant or an Arabian horse, but because he
already forms many more and far more complex concepts.
The animal phase of intellect lasts, in the sound, vigorous, and not
neglected child, to the end of the first year of life at the farthest;
and long before the close of this he has, by means of the _feelings_ of
pleasure and of discomfort, very definitely distinguishable by him even
in the first days of life, but for which he does not get the verbal
expressions till the second and third year, formed for himself at least
in one province, viz., that of food, _ideas_ more or less well defined.
Romanes also rightly remarks that the _concept_ of food arises in us
through the feeling of hunger quite independently of language. Probably
this concept is the very first that is formed by the quite young infant,
only he would not name it "food," if indeed he named it at all, but
would understand by it everything that puts an end to the feeling of
hunger. It is of great importance to hold firmly to this fact of the
origination of ideas, and that not of sensuous percepts only but of
concepts, without language, because it runs contrary to prevailing
assumptions.
He who has conscientiously observed the mental development of infants
must come to the conclusion that _the formation of ideas is not bound
up with the learning of words, but is a necessary prerequisite for
the understanding of the words to be learned first, and therefore for
learning to speak_. Long before the child understands even a single
word, before he uses a single syllable consistently with a definite
meaning, he already has a number of ideas which are expressed by
looks and gestures and cries. To these belong especially ideas gained
through touch and sight. Associations of objects touched and seen
with impressions of taste are probably the first generators of
concepts. The child, still speechless and toothless, takes a lively
interest in bottles; sees, e. g., a bottle that is filled with a
white opaque liquid (Goulard water), and he stretches out his arms
with desire toward it, screaming a long time, in the belief that it
is a milk-bottle (observed by me in the case of my child in the
thirty-first week). The bottle when empty or when filled with water
is not so long attractive to him, so that the idea of food (or of
something to drink, something to suck, something sweet) must arise
from the sight of a bottle with certain contents without the
understanding or even utterance of any words. The formation of
concepts without words is actually demonstrated by this; for the
speechless child not only perceived the points of identity of the
various bottles of wine, water, oil, the nursing-bottle and others,
the sight of which excited him, but he united in one notion the
contents of the different sorts of bottles when what was in them was
white--i. e., he had separated the concept of food from that of the
bottle. Ideas are thus independent of words.
Certain as this proposition is, it is not, however, supported by the
reasons given for it by Kussmaul, viz., that one and the same object
is variously expressed in various languages, and that a new animal or
a new machine is known before it is named; for no one desires to
maintain that certain ideas are _necessarily_ connected with certain
words, without the knowledge of which they could not arise--it is
maintained only that ideas do not exist without words. Now, any object
has some appellation in each language, were it only the appellation
"object," and a new animal, a new machine, is already called "animal,"
"machine," before it receives its special name. Hence from this
quarter the proof can not be derived. On the other hand, the
speechless infant certainly furnishes the proof, which is confirmed by
some observations on microcephalous persons several years old or of
adult age. The lack of the power of abstraction apparent in these
persons and in idiots is not so great that they have not developed the
notion "food" or "taking of food."
Indeed, it is not impossible that the formation of ideas may continue
after the total loss of word-memory, as in the remarkable and
much-talked-of case of Lordat. Yet this case does not by any means
prove that the formation of concepts of the _higher_ order is possible
without previous mastery of verbal language; rather is it certain that
concepts rising above the lowest abstractions can be formed only by
him who has thoroughly learned to speak: for intelligent children
without speech are acquainted, indeed, with more numerous and more
complex ideas than are very sagacious animals, but not with many more
abstractions of a higher sort, and where the vocabulary is small the
power of abstraction is wont to be as weak in adults as in children.
The latter, to be sure, acquire the words for the abstract with more
difficulty and later than those for the concrete, but have them
stamped more firmly on the mind (for, when the word-memory fails,
proper names and nouns denoting concrete objects are, as a rule, first
forgotten). But it would not be admissible, as I showed above, to
conclude from this that no abstraction at all takes place without
words. To me, indeed, it is probable that in the most intense thought
the most abstract conceptions are effected most rapidly without the
disturbing images of the sounds of words, and are only supplementarily
clothed in words. In any case the intelligent child forms many
concepts of a lower sort without any knowledge of words at all, and he
therefore performs abstraction without words.
When Sigismund showed to his son, not yet a year old and not able to
speak a word, a stuffed woodcock, and, pointing to it, said, "Bird,"
the child directly afterward looked toward another side of the room
where there stood upon the stove a stuffed white owl, represented as
in flight, which he must certainly have observed before. Here, then,
the concept had already arisen; but how little specialized are the
first concepts connected with words that do not relate to food is
shown by the fact that in the case of Lindner's child (in the tenth
month) _up_ signified also _down_, _warm_ signified also _cold_. Just
so my child used _too much_ also for _too little_; another child used
_no_ also for _yes_; a third used _I_ for _you_. If these by no means
isolated phenomena rest upon a lack of differentiation of the
concepts, "then the child already has a presentiment that opposites
are merely the extreme terms of the same series of conceptions"
(Lindner), and this before he can command more than a few words.
But to return to the condition of the normal child, as yet entirely
speechless. It is clear that, being filled with desire to give
expression in every way to his feelings, especially to his needs, he
will use his voice, too, for this purpose. The adult likewise cries
out with pain, although the "Oh!" has no direct connection with the
pain, and there is no intention of making, by means of the outcry,
communication to others. Now, before the newly-born is in condition to
seek that which excites pleasure, to avoid what excites displeasure,
he cries out in like fashion, partly without moving the tongue, partly
with the sound _ae_ dominant, repeated over and over monotonously till
some change of external conditions takes place. After this the manner
of crying begins to vary according to the condition of the infant;
then come sounds clearly distinguishable as indications of pleasure or
displeasure; then syllables, at first to some extent spontaneously
articulated without meaning, afterward such as express desire,
pleasure, etc.; not until much later imitated sounds, and often the
imperfect imitation of the voices of animals, of inorganic noises, and
of spoken words. The mutilation of his words makes it seem as if the
child were already inventing new designations which are soon
forgotten; and as the child, like the lunatic, uses familiar words in
a new sense after he has begun to learn to talk, his style of
expression gets an original character, that of "baby-talk." Here it is
characteristic that the feelings and ideas do not now first _arise_,
though they are now first articulately expressed; but they were in
part present long since and did not become articulate, but were
expressed by means of looks and gestures. In the adult ideas generate
new words, and the formation of new words does not cease so long as
thinking continues; but in the child without speech new feelings and
new ideas generate at first only new cries and movements of the
muscles of the face and limbs, and, the further we look back into
child-development proper, the greater do we find the number of the
conditions expressed by one and the same cry. The organism as yet has
too few means at its disposal. In many cases of aphasia every mental
state is expressed by one and the same word (often a word without
meaning). Upon closer examination it is found, however, that for the
orator also, who is complete master of speech, all the resources of
language are insufficient. No one, e. g., can name all the colors that
may be perceived, or describe pain, or describe even a cloud, so that
several hearers gain the same idea of its form that the speaker has.
The words come short, but the idea is clear. If words sufficed to
express clearly clear conceptions, then the greater part of our
philosophical and theological literature would not exist. This
literature has its basis essentially in the inevitable fact that
different persons do not associate the same concept with the same
word, and so one word is used to indicate different concepts (as is
the case with the child). If a concept is exceptionally difficult--i. e.,
exceptionally hard to express clearly in words--then it is wont to
receive many names, e. g., "die," and the confusion and strife are
increased; but words alone render it possible to form and to make
clear concepts of a higher sort. They favor the formation of new
ideas, and without them the intellect in man remains in a lower stage
of development just because they are the most trustworthy and the most
delicate means of expression for ideas. If ideas are not expressed at
all, or not intelligibly, their possessor can not use them, can not
correct or make them effective. Those ideas only are of value, as a
general thing, which continue to exist after being communicated to
others. Communication takes place with accuracy (among human beings)
only by means of words. It is therefore important to know how the
child learns to speak words, and then to use them.
I have above designated, as the chief difficulty for the child in the
formation of words, the establishment of a connection between the
central storehouse for sense-impressions--i. e., the sensory centers
of higher rank--with the intercentral path of connection between the
center-for-sounds and the speech-motorium. After the establishment of
these connections, and long after ideas have been formed, the
sound-image of the word spoken by the mother, when it emerges in the
center-for-sounds directly after the rise of a clear idea, is now
repeated by the child accurately, or, in case it offers insurmountable
difficulties of articulation for pronunciation, inaccurately. This
fact of _sound-imitation_ is fundamental. Beyond it we can not go.
Especially must be noted here as essential that it appears to be an
entirely indifferent matter what syllables and words are employed for
the first designation of the child's ideas. Were one disposed to
provide the child with false designations, he could easily do it. The
child would still connect them logically. If taught further on that
two times three are five, he would merely give the _name_ five to what
is six, and would soon adopt the usual form of expression. In making a
beginning of the association of ideas with articulate syllables, such
syllables are, as a rule, employed (probably in all languages) as have
already been often uttered by the child spontaneously without meaning,
because these offered no difficulties of articulation; but only the
child's family put meaning into them. Such syllables are _pa_, _ma_,
with their doubled form _papa_, _mama_, for "father" and "mother," in
connection with which it is to be observed that the meaning of them is
different in different languages and even in the dialects of a
language. For _maman_, _mama_, _mama_, _mamme_, _mammeli_, _moemme_,
_mam_, _mamma_, _mammeken_, _memme_, _memmeken_, _mamm[)e]l[)e]_,
_mammi_, are at the same time child-words and designations for
"mother" in various districts of Germany, whereas these and very
similar expressions signify also the mother's breast, milk, pap,
drink, nursing-bottle; nay, even in some languages the father is
designated by _Ma_-sounds, the mother by _Ba_-and _Pa_-sounds.
It is very much the same with other primitive syllables of the babe's
utterance, e. g., _atta_. Where this does not denote the parents or
grandparents it is frequently used (_tata_, _tatta_, _tata_, also in
England and Germany) in the sense of "gone" ("fort") and "goodby."
These primitive syllables, _pa-pa_, _ma-ma_, _tata_ and _apa_, _ama_,
_ata_, originate of themselves when in the expiration of breath the
passage is stopped either by the lips (_p_, _m_) or by the tongue (_d_,
_t_); but after they have been already uttered many times with ease,
without meaning, at random, the mothers of all nations make use of them
to designate previously existing ideas of the child, and designate by
them what is most familiar. Hence occurs the apparent confounding of
"milk" and "breast" and "mother" and "(wet-) nurse" or "nurse" and
"bottle," all of which the child learns to call _mam_, _amma_, etc.
But just at this period appears a genuine echolalia, the child,
unobserved, repeating correctly and like a machine, often in a
whisper, all sorts of syllables, when he hears them at the end of a
sentence. The normal child, before he can speak, repeats sounds,
syllables, words, if they are short, "mechanically," without
understanding, as he imitates movements of the hands and the head that
are made in his sight. Speaking is a movement-making that invites
imitation the more because it can be strictly regulated by means of
the ear. Anything more than regulation is not at first given by the
sense of hearing, for those born deaf also learn to speak. They can
even, like normal children, speak quite early in dreams (according to
Gerard van Asch). Those born deaf, as well as normal children, when
one turns quietly toward them, often observe attentively the lips (and
also touch them sometimes) and the tongue of the person speaking; and
this visual image, even without an auditory image, provokes imitation,
which is made perfect by the combination of the two. This combination
is lacking in the child born blind, pure echolalia prevailing in this
case; in the one born deaf, the combination is likewise wanting, the
reading-off of the syllables from the mouth coming in as a substitute.
With the deaf infant the study of the mouth-movements is, as is well
known, the only means of understanding words spoken aloud, and it is
sight that serves almost exclusively for this, very rarely touch; and
the child born deaf often repeats the visible movements of lips and
tongue better than the hearing child that can not yet talk. It is to
be observed, in general, that the hearing child makes less use, on the
whole, of the means of reading-off from the mouth than we assume, but
depends chiefly on the ear. I have always found, too, that the child
has the greatest difficulty in imitating a position of the mouth, in
case the sound belonging to it is not made, whereas he easily achieves
the same position of the mouth when the acoustic effect goes along
with it.
Accordingly, the connection between the ear and the speech-center must
be shorter or more practicable in advance (hereditarily) than that
between the eye and the speech-center. With regard to both associations,
however, the gradually progressive shortening or consolidating is to be
distinguished in space and time. With the child that does not yet speak,
but is beginning to repeat syllables correctly and to associate them
with primitive ideas, the act of imitation takes longer than with the
normal adult, but the paths in the brain that he makes use of are
shorter, absolutely and relatively--absolutely, because the whole brain
is smaller; relatively, because the higher centers, which at a later
period perform their functions with consciousness and accessory ideas,
are still lacking. Notwithstanding this, the time is longer than at a
later period--often amounting to several seconds--because the working up
of what has been heard, and even the arrangement of it in the center for
sound-images, and of what has been seen in the center for sight-images,
takes more time apart from a somewhat less swift propagation of the
nerve-excitement in the peripheral paths. The child's imitation can not
be called fully conscious or deliberate. It resembles the half-conscious
or unconscious imitation attained by the adult through frequent
repetition--i. e., through manifold practice--and which, as a sort of
reminiscence of conscious or an abbreviation of deliberate imitation,
results from frequent continuous use of the same paths. Only, the
child's imitations last longer, and especially the reading-off from the
mouth. The child can not distinguish the positions of the mouth that
belong to a syllable, but can produce them himself very correctly. He is
like the patients that Kussmaul calls "word-blind," who can not, in
spite of good sight, read the written words they see, but can express
them in speech and writing. For the same word, e. g., _atta_, which the
child does not read off from the mouth and does not repeat, he uses
himself when he wants to be taken out; thus the inability is not
expressive-motor, but central or intercentral. For the child can
already see very well the movement of mouth and tongue; the impressive
sight-path has been long established.
Herein this sort of word-blindness agrees fully with the physiological
word-deafness of the normal child without speech, whose hearing is good.
For he understands wrongly what he hears, when, e. g., in response to
the order, "No! no!" he makes the affirmative movement of the head,
although he can make the right movement very well. Here too, then, it is
not centrifugal and centripetal peripheral lines, but intercentral paths
or centers, that are not yet sufficiently developed--in the case of my
child, in the fourteenth month. The path leading from the word-center to
the dictorium, and the word-center itself, must have been as yet too
little used.
From all this it results, in relation to the question, how the child
comes to learn and to use words, that in the first place he has ideas;
secondly, he imitates sounds, syllables, and words spoken for him;
and, thirdly, he associates the ideas with these. E. g., the idea
"white+wet+sweet+warm" having arisen out of frequent seeing, feeling,
and tasting of milk, it depends upon what primitive syllable is
selected for questioning the hungry infant, for talking to him, or
quieting him, whether he expresses his desire for food by _moem_,
_mimi_, _nana_, _ning_, or _maman_, or _maem_, or _mem_, or _mima_, or
yet other syllables. The oftener he has the idea of food (i. e.,
something that banishes hunger or the unpleasant feeling of it), and
at the same time the sound-impression "milk," so much the more will
the latter be associated with the former, and in consideration of the
great advantages it offers, in being understood by all, will finally
be adopted. Thus the child learns his first words. But in each
individual case the first words acquired in this manner have a wider
range of meaning than the later ones.
By means of pure echolalia, without associating ideas with the word
babbled in imitation, the child learns, to be sure, to articulate words
likewise; but he does not learn to understand them or to use them
properly unless coincidences, intentional or accidental, show him this
or that result when this or that word is uttered by him. If the child,
e. g., hearing the new word "Schnee," says, as an echo, _nee_, and then
some one shows him actual snow, the meaningless _nee_ becomes associated
with a sense-intuition; and later, also, nothing can take the place of
the intuition--i. e., the direct, sensuous perception--as a means of
instruction. This way of learning the use of words is exactly the
opposite of that just discussed, and is less common because more
laborious. For, in the first case, the idea is first present, and only
needs to be expressed (through hearing the appropriate word). In the
second case, the word comes first, and the idea has to be brought in
artificially. Later, the word, not understood, awakens curiosity, and
thereby generates ideas. But this requires greater maturity.
The third way in which the first words are learned is this: The idea and
the word appear almost simultaneously, as in onomatopoetic designations
and interjections. Absolutely original onomatopoetic words are very rare
with children, and have not been observed by me except after the
children already knew some words. The names of animals, _bow-wow_,
_moo-moo_, _peep-peep_ (bird), _hotto_ (horse), from the expression of
the carter, "hott-ho" ("_tt_," instead of _Haut_ (the skin), i. e.,
"left," in contrast with "aarr"--_Haar_, _Maehne_ (the mane)--i. e.,
"right"), are spoken for the child by the members of his family. Some
names of animals, like _kukuk_ (cuckoo), also _kikeriki_ (cock) and
_kuak_ (duck, frog), are probably formed often without having been heard
from others, only more indistinctly, by German, English (American), and
French children. _Ticktack_ (_tick-tick_) has also been repeated by a
boy of two years for a watch. On the other hand, _weo-weo-weo_ (German,
_[)u]io_) for the noise of winding a watch (observed by Holden in a boy
of two years) is original. _Huet_, as an unsuccessful imitation of the
locomotive-whistle by my boy of two and a half years, seems also
noteworthy as an onomatope independently invented, because it was used
daily for months in the same way merely to designate the whistle. The
voice of the hen, of the redstart, the creaking of a wheel, were
imitated by my child of his own accord long before he could speak a
word. But this did not go so far as the framing of syllables. It is not
easy in this to trace so clearly the framing of a concept as attaching
itself directly to onomatopoetic forms as it is in a case communicated
by Romanes. A child that was beginning to talk, saw and heard a duck on
the water, and said _quack_. Thereafter the child called, on the one
hand, all birds and insects, on the other hand, all liquids, _quack_.
Finally, it called all coins also _quack_, after having seen an eagle
on a French sou. Thus the child came, by gradual generalization, to the
point of designating a fly, wine, and a piece of money by the same
onomatopoetic word, although only the first perception contained the
characteristic that gave the name.
Another case is reported by Eduard Schulte: A boy of a year and three
quarters applied the joyous outcry _ei_ (which may be an imitated
interjection), modifying it first into _eiz_, into _aze_, and then into
_ass_, to his wooden goat on wheels, and covered with rough hide; _eiz_,
then, became exclusively a cry of joy; _ass_, the name for everything
that moved along--e. g., for animals and his own sister and the wagon;
also for everything that moved at all; finally, for everything that had
a rough surface. Now, as this child already called all coverings of the
head and covers of cans _huta_, when he saw, for the first time, a fur
cap, he at once christened it _ass-huta_. Here took place a decided
subordination of one concept to another, and therewith a new formation
of a word. How broad the comprehensiveness of the concept designated
_huta_ was, is perceived especially in this, that it was used to express
the wish to have objects at which the child pointed. He liked to put all
sorts of things that pleased him upon his head, calling them _huta_. Out
of the _huta_, for "I should like to have that as a hat" grew, then,
after frequent repetition, "I should like that." There was in this case
an extension of the narrower concept, after it had itself experienced
previously a differentiation, and so a limitation, by means of the
suffix _ass_. These examples show how independent of words the formation
of concepts is. With the smallest stock of words the concepts are yet
manifold, and are designated by the same word when there is a lack of
words for the composition of new words, and so for fresh
word-formation.
The formation of words out of interjections without imitation has not
been observed. Here belongs the _rollu_, _rollolo_, uttered by my boy,
of his own accord, on seeing rolling balls or wheels; and (in the
twentieth month) _rodi_, _otto_, _rojo_, where the rotation perceived by
the child occasions at once the one or the other exclamation containing
_l_ or _r_. In the case of Steinthal, it was _lu-lulu_; in the case of a
boy a year and a half old, observed by Kussmaul, it was _golloh_. In
these cases the first interjection is always occasioned by a _noise_,
not simply by the sight of things rolling without noise. The
interjection must accordingly be styled imitative. A combination of the
original--i. e., inborn--interjectional sounds into syllables and groups
of syllables, without the assistance of members of the family, and
without imitation, for the purpose of communicating an idea, is not
proved to exist.
On the whole, the way in which the child learns to speak not merely
resembles the way in which he learns at a later period to write, but is
essentially completely in accord with it. Here, too, he makes no new
inventions. First are drawn strokes and blurs without meaning; then
certain strokes are imitated; then signs of sounds. These can not be at
once combined into syllables, and even after the combination has been
achieved and the written word can be made from the syllables it is not
yet understood. Yet the child could see, even before the first
instruction in writing or the first attempt at scribbling, every
individual letter in the dimensions in which he writes it later. So,
too, the speechless child hears every sound before he understands
syllables and words, and he understands them before he can speak them.
The child commonly learns reading before writing, and so understands the
sign he is to write before he can write it. Yet the sign written by
himself is often just as unintelligible to him as the word he himself
speaks. The analogy is perfect.
If the first germs of words, after ideas have begun to become clear by
means of keener perception, are once formed, then the child fashions
them of his own effort, and this often with surprising distinctness; but
in the majority of cases the words are mutilated. In the first category
belongs the comparative _hocher_ for _hoeher_ in the sentence _hocher
bauen_ (build higher)! (in the third year uttered as a request when
playing with building-stones). The understanding of the comparative is
plainly manifest in this. When, therefore, the same child in his fifth
year, to the improper question, "Whom do you like better, papa or
mamma?" answers, "Papa and mamma," we should not infer a lack of that
understanding, as many do (e. g., Heyfelder); but the decision is
impossible to the child. Just so in the case of the question, "Would you
rather have the apple or the pear?"
Other inventions of my child were the verb _messen_ for "mit dem
Messer schneiden" (to cut with the knife); _schiffern_, i. e., "das
Schiff bewegen" (move the ship), for "rudern," (row). And the
preference of the weak inflection on the part of all children is a
proof that _after_ the appropriation of a small number of words
through imitation, independent--always logical--changes of formation
are undertaken. _Gegebt_, _gegeht_, _getrinkt_ (gived, goed, drinked),
have never been heard by the child; but "gewebt, geweht, gewinkt" (as
in English, waved, wafted, beckoned), have been known to him as models
(or other formations corresponding to these). Yet this is by no means
to say that every mutilation or transformation the child proposes is a
copy after an erroneously selected model; rather the child's
imagination has a wide field here and acts in manifold fashion,
especially by combinations. "My teeth-roof pains me," said a boy who
did not yet know the word "palate." Another in his fourth year called
the road (Weg) the "go" (Gehe). A child of three years used the
expression, "Just grow me" (_wachs mich einmal_) for "Just see how I
have grown" (Sieh einmal wie ich gewachsen bin) (Lindner). Such
creations of the childish faculty of combination, arising partly
through blending, partly through transference, are collected in a neat
pamphlet, "Zur Philosophie der Kindersprache," by Agathon Keber, 1868.
The most of them, however, are from a later time of life than that
here treated of. So it is with the two "heretical" utterances
communicated by Roesch. A child said _unterblatte_ (under-leaf) for
"Oblate," because he saw the wafer (Oblate) slipped under the leaf of
paper (Blatt); and he called the "American chair,"
"Herr-Decaner-chair," because somebody who was called "Herr Decan"
used to sit in it. Here may be seen the endeavor to put into the
acoustic impression not understood a meaning. These expressions are
not inventions, but they are evidence of intellect. They can not, of
course, appear in younger children without knowledge of words, because
they are transformations of words.
On the other hand it is of the greatest importance for the understanding
of the first stage of the use of words in their real significance, after
the acquirement of them has once begun, to observe how many different
ideas the child announces by one and the same verbal expression. Here
are some examples: _Tuhl_ (for Stuhl, chair) signifies--1. "My chair is
gone"; 2. "The chair is broken"; 3. "I want to be lifted into the
chair"; 4. "Here is a chair." The child (Steinthal's) says (in the
twenty-second month), when he sees or hears a barking dog, _bellt_
(barks), and thinks he has by that word designated the whole complex
phenomenon, the sight-perception of the dog and of a particular dog, and
the sound-perception; but he says _bellt_ also when he merely hears the
dog. No doubt the memory-image of the dog he has seen is then revived
for him.
Through this manifold significance of a word, which is a substitute for
a whole sentence, is exhibited a much higher activity of the intellect
than appears in the mutilation and new formation of words having but one
meaning to designate a sense-impression, for, although in the latter is
manifested the union of impressions into perceptions and also of
qualities into concepts, wherein an unconscious judgment is involved,
yet a _clear_ judgment is not necessarily connected with them. The union
of concepts into conscious clear judgments is recognized rather in the
formation of a sentence, no matter whether this is expressed by one word
or by several words.
In connection with this an error must be corrected that is wide-spread.
It consists in the assumption that all children begin to speak with
nouns, and that these are followed by verbs. This is by no means the
case. The child daily observed by me used an adjective for the first
time in the twenty-third month in order to express a judgment, the
first one expressed in the language of those about him. He said "hot"
for "The milk is too hot." In general, the appropriation and employment
of words for the first formation of sentences depends, in the first
instance, upon the action of the adults in the company of the child. A
good example of this is furnished by an observation of Lindner, whose
daughter in her fourteenth month first begged with her hands for a piece
of apple, upon which the word "apple" was distinctly pronounced to her.
After she had eaten the apple she repeated the request, re-enforcing her
gesture this time by the imitated sound _appn_, and her request was
again granted. Evidently encouraged by her success, the child from that
time on used _appn_ for "eat, I want to eat," as a sign of her desire to
eat in general, because those about her "accepted this signification and
took the word stamped by her upon this concept for current coin, else it
would very likely have been lost." This also confirms my statement (p.
85) that a child easily learns to speak with logical correctness with
wrong words. He also speaks like the deaf-mute with logical correctness
with quite a different arrangement of words from that of his speech of a
later period. Thus the child just mentioned, in whom "the inclination to
form sentences was manifest from the twenty-second month," said, "hat
die Olga getrinkt," when she had drunk!
But every child learns at first not only the language of those in whose
immediate daily companionship he grows up, but also at first the
peculiarities of these persons. He imitates the accent, intonation,
dialect, as well as the word, so that a Thuringian child may be surely
distinguished from a Mecklenburg child even in the second and third
year, and, at the same time, we may recognize the peculiarities of the
speech of its mother or nurse, with whom it has most intercourse. This
phenomenon, the persistence of dialects and of peculiarities of speech
in single families, gives the impression, on a superficial observation,
of being something inherited; whereas, in fact, nothing is inherited
beyond the voice through inheritance of the organic peculiarities of the
mechanism of phonation. For everything else completely disappears when a
child learns to speak from his birth in a foreign community.
Hereditary we may, indeed, call the characteristic of humanity, speech;
hereditary, also, is articulation in man, and the faculty of acquiring
any articulate language is innate. But beyond this the tribal influence
does not reach. If the possibility of learning to speak words
phonetically is wanting because ear or tongue refuses, then another
language comes in as a substitute--that of looks, gestures, writing,
tactile images--then not Broca's center, but another one is generated.
So that the question whether a speech-center already exists in the
alalic child must be answered in the negative; the center is formed only
when the child hears speech, and, if he does not hear speech, no center
is developed. In this case the ganglionic cells of the posterior third
of the third frontal convolution are otherwise employed, or they suffer
atrophy. In learning to speak, on the contrary, there is a continuous
development, first of the sound-center, then of the syllable-center,
then of the word-center and the dictorium. The brain grows through its
own activity.