“They certainly had _no sort of claim_ to a repayment of all
they had lost.”[27]
So far as this instance is an example to us, it is only an incentive
to a kindly policy, which, after prudent inquiry, and full knowledge
of the extent of these claims, shall make such reasonable allowance as
humanity and patriotism may require. There must be an inquiry not only
into this individual case, but into all possible cases that may spring
into being, so that, when we act, it may be on the whole subject.
* * * * *
From the beginning of our national life Congress has been called to
deal with claims for losses by war. Though new in form, the present
case belongs to a long list, whose beginning is hidden in Revolutionary
history. The folio volume of State Papers, now before me, entitled
“Claims,” attests the number and variety. Even amid the struggles of
the war, as early as 1779, the Rev. Dr. Witherspoon was allowed $19,040
for repairs of the college at Princeton damaged by the troops.[28]
There was afterward a similar allowance to the academy at Wilmington,
in Delaware, and also to the college in Rhode Island. These latter
were recommended by Mr. Hamilton, while Secretary of the Treasury, as
“affecting the interests of literature.”[29] On this account they were
treated as exceptional. It will also be observed that they concerned
claimants within our own jurisdiction. But on a claim for compensation
for a house burnt at Charlestown for the purpose of dislodging the
enemy, by order of the American commander at that point during the
Siege of Boston, a Committee of Congress in 1797 reported, that, “as
Government has not adopted a general rule to compensate individuals
who have suffered in a similar manner, the Committee are of opinion
that the prayer of this petition cannot be granted.”[30] At a later
day, however, after successive favorable reports, the claim was finally
in 1833 allowed, and compensation made to the extent of the estimated
value of the property destroyed.[31]
In 1815 a claimant received compensation for a house at the end of the
Potomac bridge, which was blown up to prevent certain public stores
from falling into the hands of the enemy;[32] and other claimants at
Baltimore received compensation for rope-walks burnt in the defence of
the city.[33] The report of a committee in another case says that the
course of Congress “seems to inculcate that indemnity is due to all
those _whose losses have arisen from the acts of our own Government, or
those acting under its authority_, while losses produced by the conduct
of the enemy are to be classed among the unavoidable calamities of
war.”[34] This is the most complete statement of the rule which I find.
After the Battle of New Orleans the question of the application of
this rule was presented repeatedly, and with various results. In one
case, a claim for “a quantity of fencing” used as fuel by troops of
General Jackson was paid by Congress; so also was a claim for damages
to a plantation “upon which public works for the defence of the country
were erected.”[35] On the other hand, a claim for “an elegant and
well-furnished house” which afforded shelter to the British army and
was therefore fired on with hot shot, also a claim for damage to a
house and plantation where a battery was erected by our troops, and on
both of which claims the Committee, simultaneously with the two former,
reported favorably, were disallowed by Congress.[36] In a subsequent
case both the report and action seem to have proceeded on a different
principle from that previously enunciated. At the landing of the
enemy near New Orleans, the levee was cut in order to annoy him. As a
consequence, the plantation of the claimant was inundated, and suffered
damages estimated at $19,250. But the claim was rejected, on the ground
that “the injury was done in the necessary operations of war.”[37]
Certainly this ground may be adopted in the present case, while it must
not be forgotten that in all the foregoing cases the claimants were
citizens within our own jurisdiction, whose property had been used
against a foreign enemy.
The multiplicity of claims arising in the War of 1812 prompted an Act
of Congress in 1816 for “the payment for property lost, captured,
or destroyed by the enemy.” In this Act it was, among other things,
provided,--
“That any person, who, in the time aforesaid [the late war],
has sustained damage by the destruction of his or her house
or building by the enemy, while the same was occupied as a
military deposit, under the authority of an officer or agent of
the United States, shall be allowed and paid the amount of such
damage, provided it shall appear that such occupation was the
cause of its destruction.”[38]
Two years later it was found, that, in order to obtain the benefits
of this Act, people, especially on the frontier of the State of New
York, had not hesitated at “fraud, forgery, and perhaps perjury.”[39]
Thereupon, the law, which by its terms was limited to two years, and
which it had been proposed to extend, was permitted to expire; and it
is accordingly now marked in our Statutes, “Obsolete.” But it is not
without its lesson. It shows what may be expected, should any precedent
be adopted by Congress to quicken the claimants now dormant in the
South. “It is the duty of a good Government to attend to the morals of
the people as an affair of primary concern.”[40] So said the Committee
in 1818, recommending the non-extension of the Act. But this warning is
as applicable now as then.
* * * * *
Among the claimants of the present day there are doubtless many of
character and virtue. It is hard to vote against them. But I cannot be
controlled on this occasion by my sympathies. Everywhere and in every
household there has been suffering which mortal power cannot measure.
Sometimes it is borne in silence and solitude; sometimes it is manifest
to all. In coming into this Chamber and asking for compensation, it
invites comparison with other instances. If your allowance is to be on
account of merit, who will venture to say that this case is the most
worthy? It is before us now for judgment. But there are others, not now
before us, where the suffering has been greater, and where, I do not
hesitate to say, the reward should be in proportion. This is an appeal
for justice. Therefore do I say, in the name of justice, Wait!
January 15th, the same bill being under discussion, Mr. Sumner
spoke as follows:--
There is another point, on which I forbore to dwell with sufficient
particularity when I spoke before. It is this: Assuming that this
claimant is loyal, I honor her that she kept her loyalty under the
surrounding pressure of rebellion. Of course this was her duty,--nor
more nor less. The practical question is, Shall she be paid for
it? Had she been disloyal, there would have been no proposition of
compensation. As the liability of the Nation is urged on the single
ground that she kept her regard for the flag truly and sincerely, it
is evident that this loyalty must be put beyond question; it must be
established like any other essential link of evidence. I think I do not
err in supposing that it is not established in the present case,--at
least with such certainty as to justify opening the doors of the
Treasury.
But assuming that in fact the loyalty is established, I desire to go
further, and say that not only is the present claim without any support
in law, but it is unreasonable. The Rebel States had become one immense
prison-house of Loyalty; Alabama was a prison-house. The Nation, at
every cost of treasure and blood, broke into that prison-house, and
succeeded in rescuing the Loyalists; but the terrible effort, which
cost the Nation so dearly, involved the Loyalists in losses also.
In breaking into the prison-house and dislodging the Rebel keepers,
property of Loyalists suffered. And now we are asked to pay for this
property damaged in our efforts for their redemption. Our troops came
down to break the prison-doors and set the captives free. Is it not
unreasonable to expect us to pay for this breaking?
If the forces of the United States had failed, then would these
Loyalists have lost everything, country, property, and all,--that is,
if really loyal, according to present professions. It was our national
forces that saved them from this sacrifice, securing to them country,
and, if not all their property, much of it. A part of the property
of the present claimant was taken in order to save to her all else,
including country itself. It was a case, such as might occur under
other circumstances, where a part--and a very small part--is sacrificed
in order to save the rest. According to all analogies of jurisprudence,
and the principles of justice itself, the claimant can look for nothing
beyond such contribution as Congress in its bounty may appropriate. It
is a case of bounty, and not of law.
It is a mistake to suppose, as has been most earnestly argued, that
a claimant of approved loyalty in the Rebel States should have
compensation precisely like a similar claimant in a Loyal State.
To my mind this assumption is founded on a misapprehension of the
Constitution, the law, and the reason of the case,--three different
misapprehensions. By the Constitution property cannot be taken for
public use without “just compensation”; but this rule was silent in the
Rebel States. International Law stepped in and supplied a different
rule. And when we consider how much was saved to the loyal citizen in
a Rebel State by the national arms, it will be found that this rule is
only according to justice.
I have no disposition to shut the door upon claimants. Let them be
heard; but the hearing must be according to some system, so that
Congress shall know the character and extent of these claims. Before
the motion of my colleague,[41] I had already prepared instructions
for the Committee, which I will read, as expressing my own conclusion
on this matter:--
“That the committee to whom this bill shall be referred, the
Committee on Claims, be instructed to consider the expediency
of providing for the appointment of a commission whose duty it
shall be to inquire into the claims of the loyal citizens of
the National Government arising during the recent Rebellion
anywhere in the United States, classifying these claims,
specifying their respective amounts, and the circumstances out
of which they originated, also, the evidence of loyalty adduced
by the claimants respectively, to the end that Congress may
know precisely the extent and character of these claims before
legislating thereupon.”
As this is a resolution of instruction, simply to consider the
expediency of what is proposed, I presume there can be no objection to
it.
Afterwards, on motion of Mr. Sumner, the bill, with all pending
propositions, was recommitted to the Committee on Claims.