SOME RECENT CASES
We can respect Lody; we can have no other feelings but the bitterest
scorn and contempt for such traitorous miscreants as the ex-naval
gunner, Charles Parrott, who, early in 1913, was sentenced to four
years' penal servitude, under the Official Secrets Act of 1911, for
selling official secrets likely to be useful to the enemy.
The class of traitor to which Parrott belongs represents the spy in
his very lowest and most contemptible guise. About these wretched
agents among us there is no redeeming feature. Patriotism is, to them,
a word of no meaning; to their country they have no attachment: their
one idea is to make money, and to do this they are willing to risk the
very existence of the nation to which they belong. Show them gold, and
there is no work on earth too dirty for them to undertake! And we have,
I fear, many such men in our public services. It is men of this stamp
who have made the very name of "spy" a by-word in all countries and all
times--not the men who risk their lives in order to gain an advantage
for the cause to which they are attached by every sacred obligation of
honour.
Parrott, up to August, 1912, was a gunner attached to H.M.S. "Pembroke"
at Sheerness. He was a warrant officer, and as such would have
opportunities of obtaining information which would be denied to those
of lower rank. The charge against him was, of course, not one of
spying, since the offence was not committed in time of war. It was
couched in the following terms:--
That he being a British officer did feloniously communicate at
Ostend to a person unknown certain information in regard to the
arms, armaments, dispositions and movements of ships and men of His
Majesty's Navy which was calculated, or intended to be, or might be
useful to an enemy.
In considering Parrott's case we have to remember that he was an
Englishman, in the service of the Crown in the Navy, and a British
officer. He was in a position of responsibility, and his pay, with
allowances, would work out at about £260 a year, so that he had not
even the excuse of poverty to urge in mitigation of his horrible
offence. He had been in the Navy for a number of years, and he was
regarded as an efficient and trustworthy officer, so that he was able
to become acquainted with matters which it was his obvious duty to
guard with the most jealous care. He had been associated with the
building of the "Agamemnon" on the Clyde, so that he was intimately
acquainted with all those particulars of guns and armaments which,
in the event of war, it would be of the utmost interest to an enemy
to know. He knew, in fact, of confidential matters of the utmost
importance.
Parrott, on July 11th, 1912, asked for and obtained leave of absence,
on the plea that he wanted to go to Devonport. On the same day he sent
a telegram, not from Sheerness, where he lived, but from Sittingbourne,
to "Richard Dinger," at an address in Berlin, saying, "Coming eight
o'clock Saturday, Seymour." The same day he left Sheerness by train. A
lady travelled with him as far as Sittingbourne, and then he went on
alone to Dover.
Apparently he had already become an object of suspicion, for on the
Admiralty Pier at Dover he was questioned by Detective-Inspector Grey.
He was searched, and on him was found a piece of torn paper on which
were the words: "When there is a chance," "Coming over on Saturday of
that same week," "You telegraph probably Saturday, then I make all my
arrangements to leave the moment I get order." On the other side of
the paper were the words, "Richard Dinger, Esq.," and "With much love,
yours, R."
Parrott's explanation of all this was that he had been writing to a
woman in the name of another man, and that he was going to meet her at
Ostend. In his pocket was found a naval signal-form, and in answer to
the Inspector he admitted that he was a naval officer, and asked that
his wife should not be told about the "lady." The Inspector decided to
let him go, but kept the paper.
Parrott evidently thought that the detective had no suspicion as to
the real motive of his visit to Ostend, or he would surely have taken
the alarm. He crossed, however, to Ostend, carefully shadowed all
the time by no less acute an observer than ex-inspector Melville of
Scotland Yard. When the boat arrived at Ostend, Parrott went through
the station, and was joined by another man. There was no greeting,
no welcome, no handshaking, not a sign of recognition; the other man
simply sidled up alongside Parrott and they went off together. Mr.
Melville formed the opinion that the man was a foreigner, and probably
a German. They went about together for a time and then Parrott returned
to Dover.
An inquiry followed, and ultimately Parrott's name was removed from the
Navy List. The case against him was not, however, complete, and it was
not until October that the police were able to lay him by the heels.
It was then found that he was having letters addressed to him in the
name of Couch delivered at a tobacconist's shop at Chelsea. Five or
six letters came to him, and on November 16th two police officers went
to the shop, where another letter had arrived. During the day Parrott
called, the letter was given to him, and he was at once arrested.
In his presence the letter was opened. Inside were two £5 Bank of
England notes--which, it was afterwards shown, had been in circulation
in Germany--and a letter bearing the postmark "London, E.," which was
as follows:--
Dear Mr. Couch,--I am very much obliged to you for your prompt reply
to my last letter. Now I beg to place in your hands some questions
in addition to my last letter. Have the goodness to leave as soon as
possible for Firth of Forth, ascertaining about the following:--Which
parts of the Fleet are in or off the Forth since November 5. Only
the vessels of the First and Eighth Destroyer Flotilla, or which
other men-of-war of any kind else? Where is the Second Destroyer
Flotilla now? Have there been mobilising tests of the Flotillas and
coast defences in the Firth of Forth? What are the Flotillas doing or
proposing now? What number of Royal Fleet Reserve Class A are called
in now for the yearly exercise? Where do they exercise? Are any of
these men kept longer than a fortnight? I think it will be necessary
to stay some days at Firth of Forth for gathering information about
those questions. I should be much obliged if I could be informed as
soon as you have got satisfying statements about one or several of
these points. Do not wait to answer until you have found out all I
wish to know.
Enclosed £10 as travel expenses for the last and this journey. Please
tell me in the next letter after having returned to London your
expenses that I can hand you the balance if the £10 should not do
it. I beg you to keep yourself ready, if possible also in the near
future, to run over immediately to any place as soon as rumours as
to extraordinary preparations of material and personal are running.
In such a case please do not wait until you have received an order
from me, but leave on your own accord, and at the same time send
your address and make your doings known to me with particulars of the
reason.--Yours truly, Richard.
I have given this letter in full for several reasons. Parrott was
not definitely charged with giving information to Germany, but the
letter is obviously the work of a German, and, moreover, a German who
was working in London--for it was posted in the Eastern district!
It suggests, moreover, that the Germans suspected that some naval
movements were on foot, and were willing to pay handsomely to get
the news; it will be noted that Parrott was practically given _carte
blanche_ to spend what he liked without waiting for authority from
his master. A subsequent examination of his banking account showed
that he had paid in about fourteen £5 notes, some of which had been in
circulation in Germany. He had also been in Hamburg and Flushing, two
centres of German espionage.
Parrott's own explanation of the affair was that he met a woman in a
London music hall and went over to Ostend to see her. While he was
there he failed to meet the woman, but a man came up to him and asked
him if he was expecting to meet anyone. He replied that he expected to
meet a lady, and the man then professed to know about her, and said she
was unable to come. After that he received a letter from the man he met
at Ostend. At that time he had been dismissed from the Service, and the
letter expressed the concern of the writer, and the lady had offered
to help him. He replied asking what assistance they could give, and had
a letter asking him to go to Hamburg. He went and met the man, who said
he was a newspaper correspondent, and asked him to write an article
once a week dealing with naval matters--a story curiously like that
told by the spy Schulz. He afterwards received a letter from "Richard"
outlining the kind of article required. The man said: "Let me know the
progress of warships building, ships launched, ships laid down, and
the movements of ships. Send me a specimen article dealing with the
subject." He then bought a copy of a naval paper and from it wrote an
article, which he sent.
Then Parrott described how he got a letter from the lady asking him to
go to Rotterdam to see her. This he did, hoping, as he said, "to induce
her to come to England, as he wished to raise the question why he was
dismissed from the Service." Not unnaturally the lady declined to come,
but Parrott admitted that she told a man who was with her to pay his
expenses, and then gave him 100 francs.
"I have little doubt but that you were entrapped by a woman," said Mr.
Justice Darling, in sending Parrott to four years' penal servitude.
"You have been long under suspicion," his Lordship added; "I do not
believe for a moment it was a first offence."
Even the Liberal journals which had long insisted that there were no
German spies in England thought this sentence was inadequate. "It will
strike most people," said the _Daily Chronicle_, "as not erring on the
side of over-severity." The case was a flagrant abuse of a most sacred
trust, and deserved all the punishment the law allowed; as a matter of
fact, it deserved a good deal more, and Parrott was more than lucky
that he was on trial, not in Germany, but in England.
The case of Karl Gustav Ernst is of very great interest, not only
as revealing some of the methods of the Kaiser's "master-spy," the
man Steinhauer, but also as showing the utter futility of relying on
"naturalisation" of Germans to protect us against spying.
We are constantly told that it is impossible for us to take steps
against "naturalised" Germans, as we have solemnly undertaken to treat
them in all respects as Englishmen, and we have even "naturalised" many
Germans since the outbreak of war. The Ernst case ought to have been
sufficient warning of the danger arising from the naturalised alien,
but apparently there is no limit to the innocent trustfulness of our
sleepy Home Office. How long it will be before we learn that a German
no more changes his nature by adopting naturalisation than an ass does
if he clothes himself in a lion's skin I cannot say; I only hope it
will not be brought home to us by some terrible catastrophe which will
seriously affect our fighting power. Ernst, be it remembered, was not
even naturalised; he claimed to have been born in England, and posed as
an Englishman. Yet he was a spy; how much more, then, have we reason
to suspect the recently "naturalised alien" whose national sympathies
have not been blunted by birth and long residence in this country? The
leopard cannot change his spots, and "once a German, always a German,"
is the only safe rule for us in the present crisis.
Ernst, who was a hairdresser in the Caledonian Road, London, had been
for sixteen years in business there. His function was to act as a sort
of "post-office" for Steinhauer of Potsdam, by whom letters were sent
to him for distribution throughout England. In order to minimise risks
of detection, these letters were posted in various parts of London.
Ernst, of course, besides acting as "post-office," made inquiries on
his own account, and did some of the work of getting into touch with
other agents. He was paid all out-of-pocket expenses and a kind of
retaining fee, first of £1 a month, and then, when he pointed out that
the business was both risky and important, £1 10s. a month.
Ernst first came under suspicion of the Nameless Department as long
ago as October, 1911, and we ought to admit with cheerful gratitude
that he was a very valuable ally to us! From the very commencement
the authorities were, I happen to know, alive to what was going on,
and the closest observation was kept on the hairdresser's shop. All
letters were opened by the postal authorities, their contents were
carefully copied, and a most useful accumulation of information thus
came into the hands of the astute director of the Department. It was
not specifically stated that Parrott was detected in this way, but as
letters were sent to him by Ernst we may well assume that by such means
the authorities were put on his track.
One of the most useful pieces of information picked up was a list of
names and addresses of persons to whom letters from Germany were sent
for distribution, and who were spies at Chatham, Sheerness, Portsmouth,
Rosyth, and other places. An amusing feature of the case was that
after all these letters had been carefully examined and copied by the
Post Office they were delivered in the ordinary course with only a
very slight delay, and thus the suspicions of the spies, if indeed
they entertained any, were most effectually put to sleep. The Nameless
Department was not quite the fool the Germans had some excuse for
thinking it!
An important discovery made early in the case was the _nom de guerre_
of Steinhauer of Potsdam. He had at that time become "Mrs. Reimers."
"Mr. J. Walters, c/o K.G. Ernst" was soon found to be Ernst himself,
who had long before suggested the adoption of that name to avoid
suspicion.
It will illustrate the thoroughness of German methods to mention that
most of the letters sent to Ernst were written on English paper,
so that when he posted them there would be nothing to call special
attention to them. One of the letters from Steinhauer read in court was
a request for English paper and envelopes, which Ernst duly forwarded
as "samples." Many of the letters intercepted by the Post Office
contained money, mostly in the shape of bank-notes.
The work that Ernst was doing was sufficiently important to justify a
visit from the redoubtable Steinhauer himself, as we learn from Ernst's
own statement. During the time he was in custody Ernst made a statement
to a detective in which he said:--
I am sorry I was introduced into this business. Kronauer introduced
me. I thought it was only a private inquiry business. I have only
seen Steinhauer once. That was just before Christmas in 1911.
He came to my shop on a Sunday morning. My shop was open and I had
several customers there. He said to me, "Are you Mr. Ernst?" and I
said, "Yes." He said, "Do you know me?" I said, "No." He said, "You
have heard of me, I am Steinhauer. I see you are busy now. I want
to have a quiet chat with you. I will come back after the shop is
closed. What time do you close?" I said, "Twelve o'clock."
He said, "All right, I will come back after that, and went away. He
returned later and came into my parlour, where we sat down and had a
long talk."
This statement is exceedingly interesting, as we know that Steinhauer,
as described in another chapter, was in London about this time, when he
actually went to Buckingham Palace as a member of the Kaiser's suite.
That he should be able to spare time to visit a man in Ernst's position
shows what work the latter was doing, and also throws a good deal of
light on the class of agent most useful to the Germans--the "small"
man, whose insignificant position does so much to guard him against
suspicion.
In one of his letters Ernst represented himself as "a zealous stamp
collector," of course to explain, in the event of detection, the
constant remittances he was receiving from Germany. This letter,
addressed to "Miss Reimers," ran:--
Dear Mr. Steinhauer,--Best thanks for the 100 marks, which were
handed to me mid-day to-day. If you think it right you can in future
send my advance direct to me without having recourse to a third
person--namely, in the following way. I am a zealous stamp collector.
Many of my customers and also my assistants know this. On the
occasion of the next remittance copy the following letter:--
"Dear Mr. Ernst,--Your last parcel of stamps arrived just in time
to be included in last month's sale. Messrs. Kurt Moeser and also
Koehler, the Berlin stamp auctioneers, are realising good prices at
their sales. I have enclosed 100 marks on account, and will forward
balance later. A receipt for the enclosed by return will oblige."
I have sent you last Sunday's paper. What I can see from the case
Henschel will go over to the British Secret Service just as the doctor
from Glasgow has done. It has also occurred to me that Henschel's
wife's maiden name was Miss Riley, and that one of Scotland Yard's
Special Service Inspectors, who had the case in hand, was also called
Riley. In conclusion, many greetings.--I remain, yours, J. Walters.
It may be mentioned incidentally that the "doctor from Glasgow" was
Armgaard Carl Graves, a well-known spy. Henschel was a German who was
accused in London on his own confession of disclosing naval secrets
and of conspiring with the ex-gunner Parrott. It was suggested that
certain information he gave was communicated under the understanding
that he should not be prosecuted, and under the circumstances the Crown
withdrew the case, the accused giving an undertaking that he would not
in any way make known the matter with which he had become acquainted.
Ernst's case was hopeless from the start; in fact, so complete was the
evidence, that as soon as Mr. Bodkin had opened the case for the Crown,
his counsel withdrew, explaining that the prisoner had assured him he
had had nothing to do with espionage, but that he (counsel) was sure
Mr. Bodkin would not make an opening statement he could not justify.
Ernst was sent to seven years' penal servitude. "You are a mean,
mercenary spy," said Mr. Justice Coleridge in sentencing him, "ready to
betray your country to the enemy for money; equally ready, I dare say,
to betray Germany to us for an increased reward." The case could not
have been better summed up.
I will now pass on to the case of Armgaard Carl Graves, which is
remarkable chiefly for its extraordinary sequel. Graves, who was
arrested in Glasgow, had been receiving letters at the Post Office
in the name of "John Stafford." When he was taken into custody a
memorandum-book found in his pocket was found to contain a number of
leaves gummed together at the open edges. When they were cut apart the
police found groups of figures opposite German phrases, apparently
constituting a code. In a pocket-case several more groups of figures
were found, the number 271 being subtracted from each. That afterwards
supplied the key to the code. There was also a note in German relating
to a new gun under construction by Beardmore and Company, and three
code telegrams from Amsterdam. There were also found a number of
maps covering the Firth of Forth and the vicinity, and a bundle of
cartridge cases, including two of the latest British Army pattern. The
description of the new gun was said to be practically accurate, and it
was also stated that Graves' code appeared to indicate every class of
ship in the Navy, and also such strategic points as Scapa Flow, Moray
Firth and Cromarty--the same code which is probably being used by the
naval spies still amongst us to-day.
This code, used for the telegrams between the prisoner and his
Continental correspondents, was, said counsel for the Crown, a very
deadly one to be found in his possession. If the person utilising it
were in a certain place on a certain day and found that mines were
being laid, he would telegraph the figures 11,719 to 11,729. "He seems
to be the ideal character for a spy," counsel added; "he has a very
high intelligence, and is sociable, genial and affable, while his
moral character is not of a very high standard." He was sentenced to
eighteen months' imprisonment. "Well--exit Armgaard Carl Graves," was
the prisoner's only remark on hearing the decision.
Graves was sentenced on July 23rd, 1912. On June 7th, 1913, came the
amazing announcement that he had been released. When, and why he
was set at liberty, no one outside official circles knows; all the
information given was that "Graves was released in due course of law,
but there is no further information to give." Graves's own story was
that he was released in order that he might join the British Secret
Service, but this fact, and even the fact that he had been released,
came to us from America. The sensational story of his release and
subsequent adventures was published by the _New York American_ in the
following narrative:--
Armgaard Carl Graves, former secret agent in the German service,
who was convicted of espionage in England last July and sentenced
to eighteen months' imprisonment, declares that shortly after his
sentence he was released in order that he might join the British
Secret Service.
He was sent to America, and there discovered that envoys of Germany
and Japan had met in New York with the object of completing an
anti-American agreement. He succeeded in making a copy of the
document and cabling it to the British Foreign Office.
He never got any payment from England, however, so has decided
to make the contents public. The agreement binds Germany not to
interfere in a great Japanese scheme of colonisation in the South
Seas.
Graves afterwards published a book in which he professed to give away
many of the secrets of the German spy system. Information we have
received from other sources shows that a great deal of the book is well
founded, and it may well be that on the whole it is a fairly reliable
exposure of German methods. But the last thing one should do is to
trust or believe the spy!
According to Graves--whose account we should accept with considerable
reserve--the heads of the departments of the spy-organisation in Berlin
are all German officers, recruited from "the old feudal aristocracy."
He declares that though they plan the work, they never execute it. "No
active or commissioned officer," he says, "does Secret Service work."
He shows, too, that whatever ethics they may hold about doing dirty
work themselves, the German officers wash their hands entirely of the
methods their subordinates may choose or find it necessary to adopt.
One of them explained the matter to him in terms which admit of no
misunderstanding. He said:--
We cannot afford to be squeamish. The interests at stake are too vast
to let personal ethical questions stand in the way. What would be
required of you in the first instance is to gain for us information
such as we seek. The means by which you gain this information will be
left entirely to your own discretion. We expect results.
It was also made clear to him that he had only himself to depend
upon, and if he got into trouble he would get no help. "Be pleased to
understand," was the official warning given at the first interview,
"that this service is dangerous, and no official assistance could be
given in any circumstances."
As to the agents employed in this work, Graves says the Personal
Branch, the most important, is managed from the Wilhelmstrasse, the
German Foreign Office, the Emperor in person, or his immediate Privy
Councillor. He adds:--
The personnel consists of all classes of men and women. Princes and
counts, lawyers and doctors, actors and actresses, mondaines of the
great world, demi-mondaines of the half-world, waiters and porters,
all are made use of as occasion requires. It may well happen that
your interesting acquaintance in the saloon of an express steamer,
or your charming companion in the tea-room of the Ritz, is the paid
agent of some Government.
A sinister side of the profession is also revealed; grave risks are run
by the spy even from his own side. A woman named Olga Bruder, whose
death in a hotel on the Russian border was described as suicide, is
said to have been poisoned; a Lieutenant von Zastrov was compelled to
fight duels until he was at last killed. They knew too much, Graves
declares, and the death sentence came from their own employers. One can
well believe it, for the records of German espionage show that in their
own interests the Germans stick at nothing.
One episode which Graves relates concerns a famous dancer, still
living, whom the Germans believed to be a Russian Government spy. They
suspected that she had an "affair" with a young officer in the Potsdam
garrison, and one night they became interested in a gold "vanity bag"
which the young officer had given to her; they believed it contained
some secret military intelligence. How they got possession of it was
very clever.
The dancer was at supper at the Ice Palace in Berlin, and her bag lay
on the table. A "clumsy" waiter upset a glass of champagne on the
cloth. Instantly the cloth was whipped off, and, with the bag inside
it, was taken away. A moment or two later back came the waiter with
the bag and many apologies. The waiter was a clever spy, and in the
moment or two that he had been absent the incriminating letter had been
secured. The bag was offered to the dancer, who at once opened it, and
finding the letter had disappeared, promptly said the bag was not
hers. But she was put over the frontier just the same.
Many more cases might be cited to show the ramifications of the German
spy system in England, but I have selected the foregoing as typical,
and most of the others follow more or less the same general outline.
They all point to the same conclusion: that the number of German agents
in England is endless, that they are to be found in all places and
in all ranks of society, that they are clever and daring to the last
degree, and that nothing is too large or too small for their attention.
Many of them, no doubt, have been interned; many of them, no doubt, are
still at work, risking everything in their ceaseless efforts to bring
about our undoing. There is only one effective protection--_to make
a clean sweep of all Germans and Austrians, naturalised or not_, and
confine them in the concentration camps until the war is over. Treat
them properly, by all means, but put them out of the way of doing us
harm.
This drastic measure, it is true, will not protect us against the
traitor within our gates, but it would at least do much to remove the
greatest source of peril.