Austria was represented by an arch-plotter, Consul-General Krai, who

worked the pro-Austrian propaganda; the same man who was in Monastir

when I was there in 1903-4, and he did not like my reappearance in

Scutari. Count Mancinelli represented Italy. France had not in 1908

begun her pro-Slav intrigues in Albania, and had but a feeble

representative, who picked quarrels with the Austrian attache over

the latter's bulldog. But as in the Near East even a consular dog is

suspected of politics, this may, for all I know, have been the first

sproutling of France's subsequent conduct.

The Austrian Consulate-General, with Krai at its head, was easily

top-dog in Scutari then. The Slavs punned on his name: "Krai hoche

bit' Kralj!" (Krai wants to be king). Especially he looked on the

mountains as an Austrian preserve, and sent parties of Austrians

there. The Turkish Government, acutely suspicious of "tourists,"

consequently forbade all strangers to travel inland--pretending

danger. Just before my arrival, an Englishman, who arrived with

letters to the Vali from our Embassy at Constantinople, had been

refused a permit to travel inland, and had gone for a tour in

Montenegro instead.

Our dear old Albanian Vice-Consul, M. Nikola Summa, however, said

that if I would go without permission the tour could be easily

managed. And so it was. The now notorious Essad Pasha, then Bey, was

head of the Scutari gendarmerie, and I dodged his patrols

successfully in the grey dawn.

Essad, known through the land as "the tyrant of Tirana," had till

recently commanded gendarmerie at Janina. By his unscrupulous

extortions and his quarrels he had made the place too hot to hold

him, and had been transferred to Scutari, where he was very

unpopular. The tale current about him was that he had married a

second wife because his first had not borne him a son; that he lived

in terror of being poisoned by the discarded lady, and Scutari

cheerfully wished her speedy success.

Head of the family of Toptani of Tirana, he was known to be very

ambitious, and was therefore employed by the Turkish Government, who

thought it safer to make a friend than a foe of him. His elder

brother, Gani Bey, had been murdered in Constantinople some years

earlier, by a son of the Grand Vezir by order, it was said, of Abdul

Hamid. The murder had been dramatically avenged by Gjujo Fais, one

of Gani's serving men, who shot the assassin in broad daylight on

the Galata bridge. A spirited ballad, one of the most popular in the

land, describes this feat. Gjujo's life was spared, but 'in 1908 he

was still in prison, and Essad was despised for having left his

brother to be avenged by a servant. Essad took vengeance later, as

we shall see.

In the Albanian mountains, as in Bosnia, it was impossible not to

wonder at the great work done by Austria. Every Catholic tribe had

its neat and usually well-caredfor church, whose priest lived hard

by in a house rough, it is true, but superior in its arrangements to

the average native dwelling.

Europe had entrusted Austria with the care of the Catholics of North

Albania. She had trained priests, built and maintained churches and

hospices, had built the Cathedral of Scutari, and established and

protected the first Albanian schools of the North. Austria had

carried out Europe's behest well.

With but few exceptions all the mountain priests were Albanians, and

almost all had had part of their training in Austria. In knowledge

and intelligence they were much ahead of the almost untrained

"popas" of Montenegro, who had never been beyond their own borders.

In the case of the higher ecclesiastical orders the difference was

even more marked, for they included many very cultivated and able

men.

The Catholic quarter of Scutari had greatly advanced since my first

visit in 1901. New shops and businesses had been opened, and the

streets repaved. I made the acquaintance of many of the townsfolk,

and was struck by-the far higher standard of cleanliness to be found

here than in Cetinje.

The idea that the Montenegrin could teach civilization to the

Albanian was patently absurd.

Scutari was hotly excited over the bomb affair of Cetinje. The trial

of the prisoners, who had been in close confinement for nearly a

year, came on in May. Scutari, as a whole, expressed disgust for the

Montenegrins: "Nikita," folk said, "is our enemy. But he has done

well for Montenegro. If God had given us a Prince like him we should

have known how to value him." Petar Plamenatz left Scutari to defend

the prisoners, and his consular colleagues--including Lobatcheff

--foretold that all would receive heavy sentences, for they had no

great opinion of Petar's powers.

The trial proved highly sensational. The fact that a good deal of

evidence was given by a Bosnian journalist--one Nastitch--who was

proved later in the Frledjung trial to be a discreditable witness,

has led to the erroneous opinion in some quarters that the plot was

a bogus affair. But the plot was a very genuine one, as I learnt

beyond all doubt from my own observations, from details given me by

relatives of some of the men implicated, and other Montenegrin

sources. It was, in fact, the first round in the death-or-victory

struggle for supremacy between the Karageorgevitches and the

Petrovitches, the prize for which was to be the headship of Great

Serbia.

I had learnt already in 1905 the growing ill-feeling against Prince

Nikola, and had remarked that his most bitter critics had lived in

Russia or Serbia.

There was also talk of a widespread secret society, known as the

Club. A club in the Near East means something revolutionary. The

people of Andrijevitza, who told me later on in hushed whispers

about the "Clubashi," were amazed to hear that in London the police

permitted clubs to exist in the best thoroughfares. The Clubashi

went round the country spreading Great Serbian propaganda. Its

headquarters were in Belgrade, where it worked by inciting the

numerous Montenegrin students to revolution. The brother of one of

these students, and the son of one of the arrested men, both gave me

details. The students met in an eating-house at Belgrade, since

notorious, "At the sign of the Green Garland" (Zelenom Vjencu).

Great Serbia could not have two heads. The Petrovitches were

therefore to be rendered impotent. All the powder and ammunition

magazines of Montenegro were to be simultaneously seized, and the

Prince was to be killed, or--and many preferred this--terrorized

into abdication. Nikola was represented by the propagandists as the

tyrant that stood in Great Serbia's path. Any one who has passed

hours and days in Near Eastern eating-houses and cafes knows the

ceaseless political altercations which go on and the violence of the

sentiments habitually expressed, heightened ever by one glass more

of rakia, "josh jedan!" The South Slav is a born orator, and sweeps

away himself and his listeners on a flood of eloquence. I have seen

livid wrath over mere trivialities. Had our Foreign Office but

graduated in a Balkan pot-house its outlook on things Near Eastern

would have been greatly extended.

The plot against Prince Nikola failed, for one of the said students

had doubts about it and wrote to his brother, who held an official

position in Montenegro, hinting at sinister events. The recipient

told me that he feared at first that his brother was mixed in the

affair, and wrote a very strong remonstrance. In return the boy

supplied the Montenegrin Government with full details as to the

routes by which the conspirators would enter the country with their

bombs.

They were all arrested on arrival. Some came via Cattaro, others

overland to Andrijevitza, for the Vassojevitch tribe, together with

the Bratonitchitch and the Drobnjaci, were deeply dipped in the

plot, and in touch with the propaganda worked by Serb komitadjis in

the district between Serbia and Montenegro. Vassojevitch paid

heavily. Three of her finest youths were condemned to be publicly

shot. The whole population, including even the mothers of the

condemned, were ordered to witness the execution, and to the further

anguish of the relatives the bodies were buried "like dogs" by the

wayside.

Such was the plot. The question was: Who was behind the Montenegrin

students in Belgrade, and who supplied the bombs? These came from

the Royal Serbian arsenal at Kraguyevatz, where, in 1902, I had

heard so much of Karageorgism. It was asserted at the trial that

Prince George of Serbia had been concerned in obtaining them. That

they were brought from Serbia by Montenegrins was proven. It was

then clearly the duty of the Serbian Government to investigate into

a conspiracy planned on its own soil against a neighbour state and

punish the supplier of Government bombs. It not only, however,

refused to extradite certain Montenegrin students, who were suspect,

but it made no arrests, asserted violently it knew nothing of the

plot, took no steps to obtain information, and withdrew its

representative from Montenegro.

To one who, like myself, knew from personal experience that you

cannot even draw a cow or buy a carpet in Serbia without the

knowledge of the Serbian police, the conduct of the Serbian

Government was entirely unconvincing, and the obvious reply to

Serbia's "We know nothing," was "But it is your business to know and

to take such steps as to make it impossible in the future for a gang

of students in a pot-house in the capital to plot the murder of a

neighbour sovereign, and to obtain Government bombs for the purpose.

Who superintends the foreign students in your capital?"

Pashitch, when interviewed on the subject, replied only that

Montenegro had made demands for extradition "completely incompatible

with our constitution and laws, and so they could not be fulfilled."

He was Prime Minister during part of this troublous time, but did

nothing to make peace between the two rival Serb nations.

Montenegro claimed that even before the discovery of the plot

Belgrade knew that something was happening, as Serb papers had been

carrying on an anti-Petrovitch propaganda openly, and had reported

that the Montenegrin students of Belgrade University had read a

proclamation calling on Montenegrins to revolt.

Of the accused, several turned informers against others, and asked

for pardon. Others begged for light sentences, but did not deny

guilt. The ex-Minister Gjurovitch denied all complicity, and so did

poor Marusitch, but his wild and loudly expressed plans for turning

Montenegro upside down and inside out went hopelessly against him.

Both men got heavy sentences.

Lobatcheff, the Russian Vice-Consul, was furious at the arrest of

Marusitch, the ex-Russian military surgeon, declared him a harmless

chatterbox, and said Prince Nikola had lost his head. So had all

Montenegro. Neither party knew which would come out "top-dog"; each

suspected the other, and spies and treachery were rampant. Prince

Nikola leapt at any evidence that would help him crush his enemies,

and Nastitch, the spy, took advantage of his terror to help widen

the gap that already yawned between Serbia and Montenegro. The

Prince was terrified. Not only was his life threatened, but even if

that were spared he dreaded losing the one thing for which he had

lived and striven--the throne of Great Serbia. That Austria, as some

have stated, should have planned the coup is very improbable. For

one thing, its object was to strengthen Serbia by joining the two

states under one dynasty. Not even Sofia Petrovna nor Lobatcheff,

both red-hot believers in Holy Russia and haters of Austria, ever

even suggested to me that Austria was the cause: they ascribed it

all to Nikola's own folly, and were pro-Serb. That Austria should

try to take advantage of the complication was but natural.

Among the accused who got crushingly heavy sentences of imprisonment

in irons was Radovitch, since well known as one of Nikola's fiercest

opponents. He was known as a "Clubashi," and as an engineer had

built the prison at Podgoritza, to which he was now doomed. "My God,

why did I build cells like this?" is said to have been his cry on

entering, for the prison was inhuman in its arrangements.

"True or false," I noted in my diary at the time, "the charge

against the Crown Prince George of Serbia will probably split Serbia

and Montenegro. ... I hope old Nikola's reign won't end in fiasco."

By the time the trial was ended much else had happened. In June King

Edward and the Tsar had met at Reval. England and Russia had indeed

"agreed." And things were acute in Morocco. The junior staff of the

Austrian consulate chaffed me, and asked when we meant to fight

Germany. I declared "Never." My friend the attache assured me that

if we went on in the way we were going we should be obliged to have

military conscription. The Macedonian question now was acute.

England was believed to have arranged with Russia to take active

steps in Turkey. We discussed it endlessly. The attache used to dine

with me, and we agreed that our respective countries were guilty. If

the Powers wished, they could establish order easily. No Power

wanted order. Each was seeking its own interests. Never has there

been more hypocritical humbug talked by both great and small Powers

than over Macedonia. They handed moral letters about law and order

to the Turk with one hand, and with the other distributed

revolutionary funds to effectually prevent the establishment of

either. Each group preferred to burn up the whole place rather than

let the other get a bit of it.

The ethics of the situation were illustrated by Lobatcheff, who

asked me whether I thought Montenegro safe for tourists. On my

replying that I had had no difficulties, he told me that a Czech had

very recently been murdered there for his money, and his body cut to

pieces and hidden. The Montenegrin peasants had declared that,

contrary to their advice, he had gone over the Albanian frontier,

and the remains had only been accidentally discovered. Lobatcheff

had had the details from Dr. Perisitch, the Prince's physician, who

had made the post mortem.

Next day the Austrian attache came laughing, and told how some Czech

tourists had just arrived, and at once bought and put on fezzes as a

protection against the "fanatical inhabitants," who, so they had

been told in Cetinje, had lately murdered a Czech. I gave him

Lobatcheff's report, which put a very different complexion on the

matter. When it was too late Lobatcheff came to beg me to consider

the tale of the murder as strictly confidential. The Austrians were

on no account to hear of it! Nor could I make him see that it was

only fair to warn others beside Russians and English. In fact

Lobatcheff's ideas were little less crude than those of Montenegro.

Like the Cetinje folk, he expected that the result of the

Anglo-Russian agreement would be that Russia would get all she

wanted, and was vexed that I took up the cause of the Albanians. The

more I saw of the Albanians and of the Slav intrigues for their

destruction, the more I thought Albania worthy of help. The

enterprising and industrious Albanian was worth a dozen of the

conceited idle Montenegrins. Except Prince Nikola and the hotelier

Vuke Vuletitch, it was hard to find a Montenegrin in Cetinje who

used his brains--if he had any. An educated Albanian is often a

highly cultivated man, whereas even Lobatcheff was forced to admit

that Paris and Petersburg could not make more of a Montenegrin than

a Petar Plamenatz or a Marusitch. Nor was the Austrian Consul Kral

better pleased with my Albanian travels. It was reported to him that

whereas the mountains had formerly been pro-Austrian, they had

become, since my visit, entirely pro-English. He concluded,

ridiculously enough, that I was sent by the British Government, and

made a long report to Vienna about me, as I ascertained later. I was

unaware then of the activity being shown by the Franco-Russian

combine and England, and thought his anxiety overdone. To an outside

observer, however, Anglo-Russian activity also seemed perilous.

Baron Greindl, Belgian Minister at Berlin at that very time, wrote

(July 4, Letter 49): "I asked the Secretary of State yesterday ...

if he had not yet received the English proposals with regard to

reforms in Macedonia. .. . I said that another point seemed

disquieting to me, viz. the way in which the preliminary pourparlers

were conducted between London and St. Petersburg to the exclusion of

Austria-Hungary, whose interests were of the most importance in

Balkan affairs."

That Krai spied my movements is perhaps under these circumstances

not surprising, more especially as Lobatcheff, who hated him, called

out derisively to him at a friendly gathering of all the Consuls:

"Have not you found out what the English-woman is here for yet?"

which made matters worse.

The political tension was felt even in the remote corners of the

Albanian mountains. Tribesmen vaguely expected war. An Austrian

advance in the Sanjak was rumoured.

I was up in the mountains when the astounding news arrived that

there had been a Turkish revolution. It was incredible. I hastened

to Scutari. Not one Consulate as yet had any information, except

that a Constitution had been proclaimed. Scutari was wildly excited.

The foreign representatives were sceptical and contemptuous. The

thing was impossible. Not till Sunday, August 2nd, did the official

proclamations and rejoicing begin. Then all North Albania was wild

with joy. Moslem and Christian united. It was believed that Europe

had intervened, and the Turk would rule no more. The mountain men

swarmed down in their best, were feasted by the town, shouted "Long

live Constituzi," and fired their rifles till not a cartridge was

left in the town. Yet with over two thousand armed men in the town

for two days and nights, and no police force to cope with an

outbreak, not a single disorder occurred. Every one was far too

happy to do wrong, and enjoyed themselves wholeheartedly. Even the

French Consul and Lobatcheff, who did not conceal their

anti-Albanian feelings, said: "Mon Dieu! what a people this would be

if they had a just ruler!"

The Mirdites were cautious. Their Abbot, Premi Dochi, waited to see

which way the wind blew before committing his flock. In reply to the

newly-appointed Vali, who asked why the Mirdites did not come to

take the oath of fealty, he replied that when he was allowed to

return from exile to Mirdita, he promised that he would concern

himself solely with spiritual affairs, and was therefore powerless;

that the only head the Mirdites recognized was Prenk Bib Doda, their

chief, who was unfortunately in exile still at Constantinople. He

alone could put matters right. It was an astute move. The Young

Turks at once sent Prenk home.

On September 30th Prenk Pasha rode up into Mirdita and was received

by his delighted people. I went with him, and witnessed the wildly

magnificent scene. Mirdita believed no Turkish promises. They had

never seen "a Constituzi"; they did not know if they would like it,

and thought it was a "flam of the devil." Nor were they pleased to

see the two Young Turk representatives, Halil and Khiassim Beys. It

took all the eloquence of the Abbot to talk them over, and only

after long deliberations did they consent to swear a "besa" (peace

oath) till Ash Wednesday, 1909, stipulating at the same time for the

retention of their old privileges and their old laws.

Premi Dochi's successful scheme for the restoration to Mirdita of

Prenk Bib Doda was a masterpiece, which might have well led to the

autonomy of Albania. Had Prenk been a born leader of men, not only

Mirdita but all the mountain tribes would have rallied to him. But

alas! there was nothing of the leader in him. Thirty years of

enforced idleness and exile had turned him from a rebel youth into a

stout and amiable elderly gentleman, with a considerable sense of

humour, but devoid of all capacity or even desire, to rule.

The Abbot's trump card was not an ace--it was not even a knave.

Meanwhile the Austrian Consulate was bubbling with rumours of a

quarrel at Ischl between King Edward VII and the Emperor Franz

Josef. It was said that King Edward had rudely walked out of the

Royal box at the theatre where he was the Emperor's guest, in the

middle of the performance, and had given as an excuse that the

performance was improper. The consular youths refused to believe any

play could be too highly flavoured for the King of England, judging

by pieces which they knew he had witnessed, and declared there had

been a political quarrel. This was later officially denied. In any:

case the result was the same--friction and misunderstanding between

the two countries--and it is evident that King Edward's journeys to

Reval cannot have pleased Franz Josef.

Nor was there any sign that the Turkish Constitution would be a

success. The Albanian Moslems were soon furious to find that instead

of giving them freedom, it meant that they would all now have to

give military service. The districts of Ipek, Prizren, Djakova,

Upper Dibra, Scutari, and others who had hitherto been exempt,

declared that they had not fought the Turk for years in order to be

conquered now. The Christians, who had believed that "Constituzi"

meant the Turk was going, were horrified. Nothing would induce them

to fight for the Turks. Already in September I found distrust of the

Turk all through Kosovo vilayet. The Moslems who had gathered at

Ferizovitch and demanded Constitution of Abdul Hamid saw they had

been tricked. They declared they had been summoned to fight Austria,

and said they were ready to do that, but they would never allow

themselves to be dictated to by the Turks.

I talked with the two Young Turk officers, Halil and Khiassim Bey,

at Scutari. They were hopelessly ignorant. Knew, in fact, no more

about a Constitution than did the up-country mountain men. It was a

sort of magic word which was to put all right. They were arranging

to be photographed in new uniforms with plenty of gold braid, and

were childishly happy. When I said: "But you have the Bulgar

question, the Greek, the Serb, and Albanian questions all to solve

in Europe alone--surely those are more important than new uniforms,"

they replied: "These questions no longer exist. We have made a law.

All are now Ottomans!"

"You may make a law that a cat is a dog," said I, "but it will

remain a cat."

They expressed horror that I should compare human beings to animals,

and Halil persisted: "It will be like England. In England you have

the people of Scotland and Ireland. But they are all English. A man

from Scotland, for example, would not say 'I am Scotch.'"

"But he would," I persisted. "If you call an Irishman, English, he

will probably knock you down." They were surprised and incredulous.

They had no plans, no ideas. That no one wanted to be an Ottoman,

and that, contracted to "Ot" the word was used as a term of contempt

to denote "Turk" by the town Christians was unknown to them. Albania

was, in fact, for the Young Turks, the most important of its

European possessions, for, well handled, it might have remained

loyal to the Turk against the dreaded Slav. But Constantinople did

nothing to achieve this. And Scutari was infuriated because, though

the prisoners had been released in honour of the Constitution

throughout the land, the doors of Scutari prisons were still closed.

Folk began to say: "The Young Turk is as bad as the Old."

I took a long journey up into Kosovo vilayet to districts which had

previously been practically closed to travellers for many years,

visiting Djakova, Prizren, Prishtina, Mitrovitza, and the plain of

Kosovo. Here it seemed obvious that the new regime must fail. The

Serbs everywhere were in very much of a minority, and their headmen

--the Bishop of Prizren, the Archimandrite of Grachanitza, the

master of the Serb theological school at Prizren, and others frankly

lamented the Turkish revolution, and looked on it only as a

frustration of all their schemes. A well-governed Turkey was the

last thing they wished for, as it would prevent the creation of

Great Serbia. Prizren itself was so overwhelmingly Albanian that the

Serbian College, with its students brought even from Montenegro and

other non-Turk lands, seemed ridiculously artificial.

Nor were the Albanians any longer pleased about the revolution. They

meant to accept nothing that would bring them further under Turkish

power. As for the Turkish authorities, they were still under the

magic of the blessed word "Constitution," and in order that

foreigners should be so too, sent gendarmes ahead to prepare a group

of "peasants rejoicing under the Constitution" at Djakova, ready for

the arrival of some French delegates.

I was back in Scutari when, on October 5th, came the startling news

that Ferdinand of Bulgaria had proclaimed himself Tsar of

independent Bulgaria. This confirmed the Christians of the town in

their rooted belief that all that was going on was arranged by the

Great Powers for the purpose of entirely overthrowing the Turk.

Tuesday, October 6th, the Austrian attache had supper with me, and

was bubbling with excitement. He had a great piece of news, but it

might not yet be told. I was to try and guess< He would tell me so

soon as possible. Wednesday and Thursday passed, and on Friday

early, in rushed my old Marko crying: "War is declared by Serbia,

Russia, Montenegro, and Turkey against Austria!" Why, he did not

know. Running out to learn, I met the attache beaming: "We have

annexed Bosnia and the Herzegovina!" he said. "Then you have done a

dashed silly thing!" said I. He was greatly surprised, and promised

to come to dinner with me and fight it out. I went to the

Montenegrin Consulate and found Petar Plamenatz almost in tears with

a red-hot proclamation of Prince Nikola's in his hands, calling on

all Serbs of all countries to unite and denounce the breaking of the

Berlin Treaty, and laying great stress on the fact that all his

ancestors were buried in the Herzegovina, which was now seized by

Austria. Petar was of opinion that war was inevitable, otherwise all

the plans of the Serbs for Great Serbia were ruined. Serbs and

Montenegrins must act as brothers.

Excitement in the town was further heated by the arrival of the

French Minister from Belgrade, who interviewed the newly-arrived

Prenk Bib Doda, and the wildest things were reported and believed,

even that England, Germany, and Austria had combined to crush the

Slavs. Folk discussed which Power would land there. Prizren was said

to have declared itself independent. And one of the political

prisoners of the Cetinje bomb affair, who had been condemned to

fifteen years, escaped and took refuge in Scutari. In the general

excitement I never learnt his name, and he left for Serbia.

The Austrian attache duly came to dinner, and explained that it was

absolutely necessary to annex Bosnia as the Young Turks were

preparing for the general elections. The two provinces were

nominally part of the Turkish Empire, and the Turks would claim that

they should be represented in their Parliament. Europe had never

intended the provinces to revert to Turkey; they had been entirely

Austrian for thirty years, and the change was in name only. It would

also make it possible to give the provinces a liberal and civilian

government, a thing not possible when it was a question only of a

military occupation. I countered with: "Let sleeping dogs lie."

Europe would never have taken it from Austria, and if it had been

agreed that Austria should retire from part she would have been

necessarily heavily compensated. He replied: "Ah, but you don't know

something we know, and which has expedited the affair. England is on

the point of annexing Egypt. The same problem faces you there." I

did not believe this possible, and declared that we were pledged to

the Egyptians to restore the land to them. I believed, then, we

should keep our word. He laughed, and said he had certain

information that we should annex it. Nor would he agree, when I

persisted, that Austria had made a mistake in not bringing the

question up before the signatory Powers. We discussed the

anti-Austrian propaganda, which I had found rife in Bosnian He

believed it to have been largely due to the uncertainty of the

position, and declared that, faced with the fait accompli, the Serbs

would drop the intrigues which kept up the agitation, and that a

civilian government and a constitution would speedily ameliorate

everything.

Austria was already withdrawing the officers' families from the

Sanjak, and complete evacuation would follow. She dropped also the

Uvatz-Mitrovitza railway scheme which the Young Turks seemed not

over-willing to permit.

Moslem wrath, fierce against Austria, was further excited by the

arrival of malcontent Moslems from the annexed provinces, who had

thrown up their businesses and emigrated to the Young Turks. A

curio-dealer from Mostar, whom I knew, was among them He and his

friends had all believed that the Turkish revolution meant that

Bosnia-Herzegovina would be the Sultan's once more. I asked why

there had been no rising, and he explained humorously that, except

his wife's scissors, he had no weapon to rise with. The "Schwabs"

had called in all knives big enough to fight with, some weeks before

the annexation was proclaimed.

A Moslem demonstration took place outside the Austrian consulate.

The consular staff sent for Browning pistols, and insisted on

ordering one for me, too, as declared my lodgings outside the town

were dangerous. There was a whirlpool of contrary currents. Just

before the Turkish revolution took place Essad Bey, who was aware of

what was going on but, characteristically, meant to keep clear till

he knew which was the winning side, applied for leave to go abroad

for his health, which appeared excellent, and abroad he remained

till Young Turk victory was certain.

In the first frenzy of joy, over what they believed to be the coming

reign of liberty and justice, one of the cries of the townsfolk had

been: "Now if Essad ever dares come back they will hang him, and

give back all the lands and monies he has stolen!" Essad, however,

outwitted the Young Turks as easily as he later outwitted the

British Foreign Office. Whatever happened, he would be "butter-side

uppermost." He announced that he, too, was a Young Turk, and

returned in triumph as a member of the Committee of Union and

Progress. This did more in Scutari to shake all faith in the new

regime than anything else. Excitement grew. War was expected at any

moment. Serbia and Montenegro were reported to have mobilized, and

all frontiers were armed. On October 28th I find in my diary: "Had

urgent appeal to go to Belgrade, but decided not--I don't want to

get badly mixed in their politics." The Montenegrins were all for

war, and the wildest reports reached us of Prince George of Serbia's

efforts to precipitate it.

Russia, still reeling from her Japanese thrashing and torn with

internal troubles, could do nothing. That was plain to every one but

the South Slavs.

Baron Nopcsa, the Hungarian traveller, whose knowledge of Albanian

matters is unrivalled, returned from a tour in the mountains. He was

violently anti-Serb, and, in reply to my hope that war would be

avoided, said very earnestly: "It can't be. Russia Is rapidly

recovering. The Slavs mean our destruction; it is now or never for

us. Our one chance is to crush them before they become too strong."

I suggested there was room for both. He maintained there was not.

"Let the Slav once get the upper hand, and there will be room for no

one else. You had better remember that!" As a choice of evils, he

favoured union with Germany against the common foe.

The pro-Serb attitude of England astonished every one except the

"Great Serbians," who did not think it strong enough, and hoped for

British naval support at least. To the Austrians it was

incomprehensible that England should have made such a complete

volte-face since 1878. The Czech consul-general, the Croatian

secretary, and the Dalmatian doctor--all Slavs--were dead against

Serbia and-all her claims. And in spite of the surprise expressed by

England it appeared that the question of Bosnia's status had been

discussed with England almost immediately after the proclamation of

the Young Turk revolution. For a Reuter telegram had reported:

"August 12, Vienna. . . . it was agreed at the conference between

Baron Aehrenthal and Sir Charles Hardinge at Ischl to-day that any

developments arising in Bosnia and the Herzegovina from the

constitutional changes in Turkey should be considered as purely

internal matters affecting Austria-Hungary and not involving any

question of international policy." Sir Charles Hardinge, who had

come in company with King Edward VII, at once returned to England.

The Moslems regarded the annexation as a Christian attack on Islam,

and, as it was Ramazan, demonstrated loudly at night in the

Christian quarter of Scutari. The Turkish Government boycotted all

Austrian goods, and as the bulk of Scutari's imports came from

Trieste the town felt this severely. The attache told me that

England was believed to be behind this boycott for commercial

purposes, and that as Austria manufactured a great deal expressly

for the Turkish market a prolonged boycott must spell ruin. How

easily we thought it spelt in those days!

Montenegro, meanwhile, went rabid because her special envoy to

Belgrade, Yanko Vukotitch, cousin to the Princess, was stopped, and,

it was said, searched on Austrian territory. Things were touch and

go. The Montenegrin army was preparing to fall on Cattaro. War

seemed inevitable, for England's attitude caused the Montenegrins to

believe that they had only to begin and British aid was certain.

Imaginative people actually saw the Mediterranean fleet coming up

the Adriatic. They were spoiling for a fight. I was sure our bark

was far worse than our bite was likely to be, but was very anxious,

for we had no British representative in Cetinje to advise

moderation, and, while we went on barking, Montenegro might bite.

Montenegrin and Austrian troops faced each other on the frontier,

and a rifle fired by a man full of rakia might set the whole ablaze.

People at home did not know how close the spark and the powder lay.

If war ensued, it would mean the end of Turkey in Europe. In spite

of tension between Christian and Moslem, the Albanians remembered

that blood is thicker than water, and were very anxious to

consolidate their position by adopting a common alphabet for all

Albania. This, owing to Turkish prohibitions, had previously been

impossible. For Italy and Austria, who printed school books in

Albanian, did so for their own purposes, and not to encourage

nationality, and so each used a different alphabet and changed it

not infrequently.

A great national meeting of representatives of all Albania was held

at Monastir, which the Albanians then reckoned as one of their

towns. The Latin alphabet was chosen, a common system of orthography

adopted, and the frontiers of Albanian territory discussed. The

Turks, alarmed at the growth of Albanian Nationalism, again began

restrictions, and hurried to arrange for the election to Parliament

of such members only as were pro-Turk. As I wrote at the time: "The

so-called election is no election at all. The tyrant of Tirana,

Essad Bey, a man who is greatly detested, and has an awful

reputation, is to be member for Tirana, elected' by the peasants who

are terrified of him. Even Scutari is surprised he has succeeded in

making them do it. He is head of the gendarmerie, and this gives him

great power." It has been said that in an emergency you can always

trust a Turk to do the wrong thing. Every mistake possible to make

in Albania, the Young Turks made, and while they still rubbed

Albania up the wrong way, Austria was still boycotted. Kral himself

tried vainly to unload a barge of sugar. And still Serbia,

Montenegro, and Austria showed their teeth on the frontier. The

Crown Prince George of Serbia was reported to be about to assume the

command of the army as a second Stefan Dushan. But his rush to

Petersburg and appeal to the Tsar met with rebuff and refusal.

Russia was not yet ready for another war, as Lobatcheff sadly

admitted.

We became used to reports several times a week that war had begun

somewhere or other. But the town was in a fever of excitement when,

towards the middle of November, we heard that the British fleet had

arrived in the Adriatic, and that the Admiral was about to visit

Scutari. "War for certain! Albania is saved!" cried folk. The hotel

reported that the Admiral and suite had engaged rooms, and were

coming via Cetinje. The British fleet must be in the Bocche di

Cattaro! The Vali decided to send a band and a guard of honour to

meet him. I suggested that Edward VII was coming in person, but

people were past seeing jokes. Our Vice-Consul had had no news at

all, and was agitated. All day the Admiral and British fleet were

expected. The Crimea would be repeated, and Turkey saved. Next day

brought forth--a British charge d'affaires and five ladies who had

merely come for fun to see the bazar, and were overpowered by

finding themselves officially received. All Scutari, perhaps all

Turkey, tense and tremulous, waited to see what steps Great Britain

would take. And its representative, all unaware of what political

fever in the Balkans is, saw the bazar, had tea at the Austrian

Consulate, and went back again to Cetinje, escorted to the boat by a

Turkish guard. Then the storm broke! What did Great Britain mean?

Scutari was amazed, perplexed, bewildered; wild rumours flew. An

Anglo-Austrian Alliance--a break with Russia--a slap in the face for

the Turks. Nothing was too crazy to be believed and repeated. A

knock came at my door. In came Lobatcheff in full uniform. He said

that his Tsar had been insulted in his person. Was fizzling with

excitement. Had I any information for him? Had the British

Government reversed its policy? What was the object of this mission

to Scutari? And so on--red hot. I told him there was nothing to be

excited about. "An English official had come for a holiday. That was

all. Did he suppose that a diplomat on business would bring a party

of ladies?" But the Russian had got all his bristles up. "That I

decline to believe," he said. "I have too high an idea of the skill

of your Foreign Office to believe they would send a man at such a

moment to visit the bazar for no purpose!" And it took me ever so

long to talk him round. Having settled Russia and got rid of him, in

came Mr. Summa, our Vice-Consul, also deeply troubled. The Vali had

asked him for an explanation of the policy of Great Britain. He,

too, was of opinion that the Foreign Office could not have concocted

such a plan as a visit to the bazar, except for some deep and

obscure purpose. The Young Turks having made a Constitution,

naturally expected Great Britain, also a Constitutional country,

etc. etc. Why had not the British envoy visited the Vali? In fact,

you could hardly blow your nose in Scutari without being suspected

of political intentions.

Then came a message from Petar Plamenatz, who was ill, and wished to

see me. The Slav kettle gets hot in a minute. Petar, who was not

such a big pot as he imagined, was boiling over. His Prince, his

country, and--worst of all--himself, had all been insulted. Why had

he, who was Consul-General for Montenegro, not been called on? With

Petar, as usual, I was very firm. "This gentleman," said I,

"doubtless heard of your illness in Cetinje. He came here as a

tourist, and so naturally did not wish to disturb you. Why should

he, when he came not on official business, but merely to see the

bazar?" Petar was squashed. The whole episode illustrates the fact,

which few people in West Europe appreciate, namely, that in the Near

East politics are a nervous disease.

I left for Cetinje shortly afterwards. My last letter said: "The

war-clouds are thickening. The people here who foretell the future

in sheep's bladebones and fowls' breastbones have foretold nothing

but blood for weeks. ... It is said that by the end of four months

Austria will occupy the Sanjak as far as Mitrovitza."

"To save us," say the Albanians, "if the Serbs are allowed to have

it, it will at once be Russian. We should be lost, and our religion

crushed. If Montenegro declared war the Albanians will at once

reoccupy Dulcigno; that forced cession of Dulcigno, engineered by

Gladstone, has done more to keep up hatred here than anything else."

"I gather from the Press cuttings that none of the reviewers like my

idea that the Constitution can't last. But so far as I can make out,

only the English and the French papers believe--or pretend to

believe--in it." To me it seemed, indeed, clear that the Young Turk

regime was bound to fail. No one but the Young Turks wanted it, and

they had started it at least thirty years too late. Territorial

aggrandizement was what Greece, Bulgaria, Serbia, and Montenegro

wanted. Russia and Austria, too, were both burning to "free

Christians from the Turkish yoke." And if Turkey reformed herself

into an earthly Paradise, the lands those Christians lived in would

be lost for ever.

Then came talk of withdrawing the international gendarmerie from

Macedonia. This I could not believe possible. "England will never do

anything so crazy!" I declared.

"She will though," said the Austrian Consulate, "and so soon as the

Young Turks have enough rope they will hang themselves." And sure

enough the gendarmerie was withdrawn, and the Young Turk let loose

to go as he pleased. In Cetinje I found popular opinion furious both

with the Young Turks and with Austria. Either and each would prevent

the formation of Great Serbia. All were for war, and still believed

England would support them if they began. I went to the drinkshops

as being the centres from which to distribute information, and told

gendarmes, soldiers, and pot-house visitors generally that England

Would not go to war for them.

"But," they declared, "your own Prime Minister in Parliament has

said: 'We will never allow the Treaty of Berlin to be violated.' Our

guns are on the frontier pointing at Cattaro. It is war!"

"Oh, they tell a lot of lies in our Parliament," said I. "Don't

believe them. We are not going to fight. You will get no help."

I was exceedingly afraid some fool would start firing, for they were

getting tired of doing nothing on the frontier in the cold. All the

Corps Diplomatique, save Austria, interviewed me, anxious to hear

how the Constitution was working in Albania. None of them had any

belief in it. The French Minister even said it would require twenty

Napoleons to solve Turkey's many problems, and the Turks had not

one.

The Prince sent for me, and I saw he, too, expected war, for he

questioned me about the Red Cross, and asked me whether I could get

medical aid from England.

The steamer in which I left Cattaro was empty of goods because of

the boycott, and of passengers because of the political situation.

There was a non-commissioned Austrian officer with me in the second

class. As the boat left the shore he said fervently: "Gott sei dank!

Gott sei dank! I have got away. The war will begin very soon now,

and every one in Cattaro will be killed, like a rat in a trap. We

shall win in the end. But Cattaro will fall at once. I have been

there for weeks with the guns pointed on us day and night. Gott

bewahre!" He, like Baron Nopesa, believed it to be a case of "Now or

never!" Austria must fight. If she waited a few years the Slav

combine would be too strong.

"We have the whole of the German army with us," said the officer,

"and you could do nothing to stop us."

Probably he was correct. In 1908 Russia was quite impotent, and the

Central Powers might have won.

But Germany insisted on peace.

I arrived in London, and was amazed to find for the first time

people who believed in the Young Turks. They would listen to no

facts, and would not believe me when I said that the Turkish Empire,

as it stood, would probably barely survive one Parliament. A

prophecy which was almost exactly fulfilled.

CHAPTER SIXTEEN

1909

An accident and a long illness forced me to spend 1909 in London. In

March came a significant change in Serbia. Prince George, the Crown

Prince, in a fit of uncontrolled rage, amounting to mania, kicked

his valet down some stone steps and killed him. Rumours of the

Prince's strange and violent conduct had long been rife. He escaped

trial by renouncing all rights to succession to the throne, and his

brother, Prince Alexander, became heir. Alexander was said to have

the support of the regicide officers' party, the Black Hand. George,

too, had his partisans, who declared that if he were as mad as his

great-grandfather, old Karageorge, so much the better, he would lead

Serbia to glory.

In March, too, came the counter-revolution against the Young Turk

regime. I had learnt from a letter from Albania that this was about

to take place. It failed, to my regret, for I hoped that its success

would result in the landing of international forces, and that

international control might solve the Balkan problem peacefully. I

believed then that rule by the Western Powers would be better than

that of the Turks. Now that we Know that these so-called civilized

Powers will starve millions, and bomb helpless crowds, in order to

obtain land and supremacy, many of us blush for the criticisms we

once showered on the state of Macedonia.

The Young Turk won in 1909, and Abdul Hamid was called on to

abdicate. Essad Pasha (formerly Bey) the ex-gendarmerie commander at

Scutari, was now hand in glove with the Young Turks. He played, in

fact, on whichever side he thought to gain something for himself. He

managed to be one of the three who took the fatal message to the

terrified Sultan, and spoke the words: "Abdul, the nation hath

pronounced thee deposed!" Thus dramatically avenging the murder of

his brother Gani fifteen years before, very completely. Abdul went,

and with him went the Empire. He had lived a life of terror, and

played a long game of "bluff." But those who knew him intimately

declare that his success with the Powers depended more on the way

they outwitted each other than on his skill as a diplomatist. Recent

revelations have shown us that the much talked of intrigues of the

East are child's play compared to the plans built by the West.

Hitherto all that went wrong in Turkey was ascribed to Abdul Hamid.

The Young Turks had now no scapegoat, and were in a perilous

position with foes within and without. They resolved, therefore,

that the only way to consolidate the Empire was to forcibly

Ottomanize the population as fast as possible. But it was too late

by many years for this. The Balkan States had expended huge sums on

propaganda in Turkish territory, and knew that if their oft-repeated

demands for reform were carried out, all their plans for territorial

aggrandizement would be ruined. They fitted out bands and hurried on

propaganda. The Serbs had started the Narodna Odbrana society, and

opened a school in which officers trained komitadji bands, taught

bomb throwing, train wrecking, mining, and shooting, to volunteers.

These were designed primarily for attack on Austria to avenge the

annexation of Bosnia. They acted also with ferocity in Macedonia

against the Bulgars. Serbia, whose propaganda in Macedonia was very

recent, tried to make up now, by planting schools and sending forth

komitadjis.

Austria early in 1909 dropped her North and South railway scheme.

But the Slavs clamoured still for an East and West line, and Russia

backed them, and Prince Nikola still cried out about his ancestors,

who, for the time, remained buried in the Herzegovina. Russia

demanded that the Dardanelles should now be opened to her warships.

It came out that when Baron von Aehrenthal met Izvolsky--Russian

Minister for Foreign Affairs--at Buchlau in September 1908, Izvolsky

had agreed to the Austrian annexation of Bosnia in exchange for the

opening of the Dardanelles. He may have believed this would

automatically follow any violation of the Berlin Treaty. But he was

outwitted. Would that he had always been! After much argle-bargle

Europe decided to accept the fait accompli in Bosnia, and not to

reassemble the signatory Powers. Serbia did not receive the corridor

she demanded through the Sanjak, and signed an agreement accepting

the changed state of Bosnia. Prince Nikola, in consideration of his

lost and buried ancestors, obtained certain concessions in the

status of Antivari. Russia, as war was impossible for her, did all

she could to maintain peace, even undertaking a large share of the

pecuniary compensation demanded of Bulgaria by the Turks. To Serbia

she counselled moderation, but, as we have learnt from recently

published documents, pledged herself' to support Serbia later on. On

March 6, 1909, the Serb representative in Petersburg informed

Belgrade: "Chamjakow informed me very confidentially that . . . in

the audience which took place on Monday the Tsar said that the

situation was terrible, for Russia was unprepared for war, and the

defeat of Russia would be the ruin of Slavdom . . . In answer to the

question what attitude Russia would assume in case Austria should

attack Serbia, the President of the Duma said: We did something no

other State has done up till now. We proclaimed to the Whole world

that we are not in a position to make war, but we shall consider any

attempt to coerce Serbia as the beginning of a European

conflagration, in which we cannot at present join. But it will flame

up in the future when we are in a position to have our way."

(Telegram xvi, Bogitchevitch). Russia thus very clearly told Serbia

so early as 1909 that so soon as Russia was ready, Serbia had but to

provoke Austria to retaliation and the European war, from which

Russia hoped to obtain so much, would at once blaze up. "You press

the button, and we'll do the rest."

As one result of the Bosnian crisis, Izvolsky lost his popularity.

In 1910 he was retired from the post of Minister for Foreign

Affairs, which he had held since 1906, and went to Paris as Russian

ambassador, where he toiled unremittingly at inciting France to

co-operate in his schemes. Already in October 1908 he had thus

instructed M. Vesnitch, Serb Minister in Paris: "Russia has hitherto

supported Serbia, and will continue to support her, however and

wherever she can. You must come to an understanding soon with

Montenegro. . . . Further, you must come to an understanding with,

Bulgaria, and in this we shall honestly support you. We no longer

desire a Great Bulgaria. Such an idea we now look on as a mistake"

(i.e. it would block the route to Constantinople). This is the first

official proof we have of Russia's plan to construct a Balkan League

for her own use, from which it is clear Bulgaria was to derive no

benefit. Before going to Paris, Izvolsky laid yet another stick

ready to kindle the European blaze. In October 1909 he made an

agreement with Italy, whose hatred of Austria was increasing, by

which Italy and Russia "bind themselves to a mutually benevolent

attitude, the former in regard to Russia's interests in the

Dardanelles, and the latter in regard to Italy's interests in

Tripoli and the Cyrenaica." Italy, in fact, under cover of military

manoeuvres, made extensive military preparations against Austria in

1909, while hostilities over Bosnia were possible. Baron Nopcsa told

me bitterly in 1910: "We shall never again rely on Italy. She

mobilized against us last year." That his statement was true was

confirmed to me later by Mr. Wadham Peacock, who told me he had been

at that time in Verona, seen active preparations, and heard the

approaching war against Austria freely discussed by Italian

officers.

The Albanians hastened to consolidate their position by holding two

important National Congresses at Dibra and Elbasan, at which a

scheme for national education was discussed, and the formation of

Courts of Justice, road-making, and the purpose to which taxes were

to be applied. These, they insisted, were to be used for national

works. The Young Turks would give no pledge to this effect, and

foolishly tried to extort a tax to pay for the Bulgar rising of

1903. They ordered also the disarming of Albania, and sent a large

force into Kosovo vilayet for this purpose.

The Albanians, led by that very gallant chieftain, Isa Boletin,

rose, and fierce fighting ensued, which, had the Turks but known it,

was the beginning of the end. They hopelessly alienated the

Albanians, the one race whom they might have had as ally.

Another important event was the trial at Agram of a number of Serbs

and Croats accused of conspiracy with Serbia against the

Austro-Hungarian Government. Thirty-three were condemned to various

terms of imprisonment, but were released on appeal, and brought a

countercharge of libel against Dr. Fried Jung, a Journalist, for

asserting in the Neue Freie Presse that they had been subsidized by

Belgrade, and advocating that Belgrade should be purged of a nest of

conspirators. Pashitch, Spalaikovitch, and the Slovenski Jug

(founded in 1904), and others were accused. There was no question of

Friedjung's bona fides. He founded his article upon what he believed

to be genuine documents, and on the evidence of Nastitch, the

Bosnian, who had given sensational evidence at the Cetinje bomb

trial. Nastitch proved to be a professional spy, and the evidence

forged. Friedjung lost his case, and the sentences of the condemned

men were annulled. But his contention that plots against Austria

were being made in Belgrade has been proved undoubtedly true by

later events. The accused denied everything at the trial, but so

soon as war broke out in 1914 the Serbo-Croat party appeared with

ready-made plans, and Supilo, who had most vehemently protested his

innocence, appeared as a recognized leader. The trial, in truth,

resembles the case of The Times v. Parnell. The Times, like

Friedjung, lost its case not because the charge was false, but

because all the evidence produced was forged. That Parnell was

intimately acquainted with and connected with all the anti-English

work going on in Ireland is now well known. Friedjung was correct.

Belgrade winked at the anti-Austrian work that was going on. The

komitadji school was taught by Serb officers. Evidence was not easy

to get, for, as it was explained to me by the pro-Serb party in

Bosnia, in 1906, nothing of importance was written down, and the

Austrians searched the post vainly. And the fact that they told me

the Slovenski Jug was directed against Austria prevented me from

joining it. Friedjung's failure proves only the folly of employing a

stupid spy, not the innocence of the accused. Pashitch, after war

began, never ceased trumpeting his schemes for Great Serbia. He

grudges even now a few snippets to Italy, without whose aid it might

not have been made. To assert that Pashitch, who, with his set, had

worked to make Great Serbia ever since they had removed the

Obrenovitch from its path in 1903, was innocent of plotting against

Austria in 1909-10, is to ask for too much credulity. Had not Russia

already said the road to Constantinople lay through Vienna?

England had previously been uneasy about the regicides, and had

demanded their dismissal from the Serb army, but now ceased to

trouble about them. They were probably needed to teach in the bandit

school of the Narodna Odbrana. And henceforth they held important

posts. The original gang of some fifty murderers, officers and

civilians, developed into a formidable society called the Tsrna Ruka

(Black Hand), which became a government within a government. The

Black Hand was responsible to none. Many members of the Government

were reported to belong to it, a convenient Jekyll and Hyde

arrangement, by means of which crimes of all kind could be

committed, for which the Government took no responsibility, and of

which it denied all knowledge. King Petar having been put on the

throne by this gang, had naturally no power over them, and Prince

Alexander was reported to have joined the society. Talk there was

about it all enough to lead one to think "No smoke without fire."

Members of the Tsrna Ruka joined the police force, and so secured

their plans against police interference. By means of a paper called

Premont they preach violent chauvinism, and advocated savage

methods. Damian Popovitch, the head assassin, held an important

post. Efforts on the part of politicians, who disapproved of its

methods, to break up the society failed. Unexplained deaths took

place. The Black Hand brooked no interference.

CHAPTER SEVENTEEN

1910

Ill and crippled with sciatica, but hopeless of recovery in England,

I managed to get to Scutari in April 1910, hoping there to find a

sun-cure, and at least to learn what was happening.

Things had gone from bad to worse. No one now believed in

"Constitution." The attitude of the populace on the Sultan's

accession day showed this. No reforms or improvements had as yet

been even begun. People said: "We will not give money to the Turks

to buy gold braid for officers and guns to kill us with."

Lobatcheff had gone to Mitrovitza to hold it as a Slav outpost. My

friend, the attache, had left after having almost fought a duel

with the French Consul over his bulldog. Dushan Gregovitch

represented Montenegro. Italy and Austria were redoubling their

efforts to win over the Albanians by showering "benefits" upon

them, although each had formally agreed not to countenance the

partition of Albania, and the Nationalist Albanians were making

strides in spite of the efforts of enemies. At the time of the Young

Turk revolution some thirty Albanian papers were being published

abroad. Now, as the Constitution promised freedom of the Press,

printing was going on all over Albania, and the new alphabet was

universally adopted. The Albanian girls' school at Koritza was

filled to overflowing. The South strove to throw off Greek

influence, and at Elbasan a school for training teachers was opened

with mixed Moslem and Christian staff. As the Albanian poet had

sung, it was a case of:

Awake, Albanians, awake!

Let not mosques nor churches divide you.

The true religion of the Albanian is his national ideal.

Nationalism gained in Scutari by the death of the old Austrian

Archbishop, and the elevation in his place of Mgr. Serreggi, an

Albanian patriot.

Fighting was going on in Kosovo vilayet, but the Christians of

Scutari firmly believed that Austria, as protector of the Catholics,

would never allow the Turkish army to enter the Catholic districts.

In the town the Turks pursued a foolish policy. Only one per cent,

of the Christians understood Turkish, and about 20 per cent, of the

Moslems, and but few could read or write it. Nevertheless the Turks

gave out all notices in Turkish, and the people did not even trouble

to ask their meaning.

Then came a grave event. One Sunday morning my old Marko, in whose

house I lodged, announced solemnly: "Last night Teresi had a

terrible dream about you. To-day you will have important news from

England. God grant nothing bad has happened to your noble family." I

chaffed the old man, saying: "There is no post to-day!" And then

came a knock at the door, and the old blue kavas from the British

Consulate handed me a note from M. Summa. "I regret to inform you of

the death of our beloved Sovereign, Edward VII, which I have just

learnt by telegraph from Salonika." Teresi's reputation as a dreamer

became immense.

King Edward VII, in a short reign, had largely contributed towards

bringing Great Britain from a state of "splendid isolation" into a

tangle of--to me--very doubtful associates. I wrote: "The King's

death knocks out one's ideas of what sort of a position England is

going to hold. . . . Poor George ascends the throne in an awfully

difficult time, with internal and foreign politics both in a regular

tangle. A far more difficult beginning than Edward had. For, then,

we had not upset the whole balance of power in Asia and Europe by

making that alliance with Japan. I always hated it. The result . . .

the predominance of Germany in Europe, is going to cost us dear. And

when Japan has got all she can out of us, she will turn round and

bite."

And in the same week I noted: "The newly-appointed British Minister

is coming here to-morrow. Thank goodness there is no acute political

crisis on now, as there was when the last man came." Mr. and Mrs.

Beaumont arrived, and there followed in pursuit of them a King's

messenger, who bore the assent of the British Government to Prince

Nikola's desire to proclaim himself king.

His position now hurt badly. The Petrovitches were the oldest Balkan

dynasty, and were the lowest in rank. The Montenegrins were divided

as to the desirability of the change. Prince Danilo and his set were

said to favour it strongly. The thing was decided upon suddenly, and

the country consented. "I expect some Power engineered it," says my

diary. And soon the rumour was very certain that the step had been

taken by the advice and with the agreement of King Ferdinand of

Bulgaria. "Which do you love best--me or Ferdinand?" Prince Nikola

had asked me suddenly, when I last visited him. "You, of course,

Sire!" said I, and wondered at the time why he had Ferdinand on the

brain.

That the Turkish Empire would now soon break up, was the general

belief, and Kings Ferdinand and Nikola would divide the peninsula.

Bulgaria would obtain her Alsace-Lorraine, Macedonia, and Nikita

would reign over Great Serbia from Prizren.

Fighting continued in Kosovo vilayet. Meanwhile I was carried

dangerously ill to the Austrian hospital, and lay helpless between

bouts of agony and injections of morphine. The Albanians came and

wept over me, and prayed for advice and help. When I was nearly

screaming with pain they implored me to make an effort and write for

them to the Foreign Office and the papers, for the Turkish army was

approaching. I was dragged to a sitting position, managed to write

two letters, and fainted with the pain. Vain agony. Nothing could

break the journalistic ring which forbade any criticism of the Young

Turks. A foolish policy, for it led them to believe their actions

beyond criticism, and helped their undoing. The more they blundered,

the more Italy, and Austria, and Russia rejoiced. They expected the

Withdrawal of the international gendarmerie to send the Turks

downhill with a crash. England, probably, was not guilty of

withdrawing for that reason, but was much less well informed,

because more sparsely represented, than the other Powers. And we

were already tangled in Russia's plans, and did not know what they

were.

The Turks sent over increased forces and artillery into Kosovo

vilayet, and Scutari learnt with dismay that in spite of the valour

of the Kosovo men they were being forced back and back, and the

Turkish army was approaching Scutari.

Prenk Pasha, who had been made a member of the Committee of Union

and Progress, had promised the Turks safe-conduct through Mirdita.

This was in strict conformity with the policy explained to me by the

Abbot Premi Dochi in 1904, viz. that the Turk must be maintained

until Albania was sufficiently organized to stand alone, otherwise

the Slav, the more relentless foe, would fall upon her. The other

Catholic tribes were wildly dismayed, and the headmen ran from one

consulate to another begging advice. None was given them. They were

far too poorly armed to resist, and in July 1910 the Turkish army

entered Scutari and ordered the populace to give up its arms. They

did so quietly. The Christians had few to give. The Moslems feared,

by rising, to provoke an Austrian intervention.

I was too ill to be taken out to see what was going on, and, to my

great disappointment, was still unable to move when the celebration

on the occasion of Nikita's elevation to kingship took place in

August.

Montenegro had raised a loan from England the year before, and had

expended the whole of it in making electric light in Cetinje and

building a Government house of superlative ugliness, and so vast

that it seemed obviously intended to administer a much larger

territory than Montenegro.

Scutari was excited about Montenegrin doings. Foreign visitors

flocked to Cetinje to assist at the fete. Bulgaria was represented

by King Ferdinand himself, Serbia, only by the Crown Prince, and he,

said rumour, decided to come only at the last minute. Conclusions

about a Bulgar-Montenegrin combine were freely drawn. One point both

Montenegrins and Albanians agreed upon, "A king must have a kingdom.

The Powers would not otherwise have allowed him to be king. Soon

there will be war!"

While still in hospital I received an English paper, with

illustrations of the launch of a Dreadnought. The doctor, a

Dalmatian Slav, looked at them sadly. "Why do you do these things?"

he asked. "You are forcing on war. You will ruin Austria. We admire

everything English, except your Dreadnoughts. Each time you build

one, we of the Triple Alliance are forced to build one too. We

Austrians have no colonies, and never want any. We need no navy. We

are already overtaxed, and the breaking-point must come one day. You

eat us up with your terrible wealth. To my mind all Europe is mad.

We have one common danger--the peoples of Africa and Asia, who are

developing rapidly. If we want to save European civilization we must

federate against the common foe. If ever there is a war in Europe

--and God forbid--it will be the suicide of the white races. They

will fight to extermination, and the day of the coloured people will

dawn. We shall deserve our fate. It will be the result of our own

folly."

Where he is now I know not. His words come back to me always. After

three months I emerged from the hospital, well but weak, into a

dismayed and depressed Scutari. The Turks were trying to hamper

nationalism by ordering Albanian to be printed in Arabic characters,

and making Turkish compulsory in the schools. They had roused fierce

anger, too, by publicly flogging some offenders, a punishment

regarded in Albania as so shameful and humiliating that it bred

sympathy for the victim and hatred for the inflicter. Has it,

perhaps, the same result in India and Egypt?

Our next news was that Montenegro's feelings were woefully hurt.

Nikola had Just been made king--but Montenegro was the only state in

Europe on which the special mission to announce the death of King

Edward and the accession of King George had not called. Montenegro

had spent much on sending Prince Danilo to attend the funeral, and

Princess Militza is distantly related to Queen Mary. The omission

rankled very badly. It would be interesting to know who suggested

that King Nikola should be left out.

Having achieved kingship, Nikola soon began to act. So soon as the

Turks had persuaded the Albanians to disarm, they began to make a

census of all fit for military service. This the Christians swore

they would never give, and were furious with Austria for not

intervening. The Moslems, too, vowed they would not serve outside

Albania. And before any one knew what was going to happen a number

of the Gruda tribe went over the border into Montenegro. Numbers of

the Hoti and Shkreli followed. Scutari was astounded. The Austrians

were furious, and vowed Russia had paid for it. The Turks clapped on

further anti-Albanian laws, and most of the papers were suppressed.

The Koritza girls' school was closed, and news of arrests came from

all over the country. The Turks circulated copies of the Arabic

alphabet, and ordered its use, and the Albanians burnt them.

To escape the winter I went to Egypt, nor will I detail my six

months' stay there, except to note that it entirely changed my ideas

about the Austrian occupation of Bosnia. My diary towards the close

of my stay notes: "I wouldn't be a native under British rule at any

price. They may 'do a lot of good to you,' but, dear God! they do

let you know their contempt for you, and drive your inferiority into

you. Any one with any spunk would rather go to hell his own way than

be chivied to heaven by such odiously superior beasts. . . . The

Moslems are not grateful for 'benefits' they do not want, and the

Christians are discontented and annoyed, as in Bosnia." During the

winter I heard from Albania that a fresh revolt was planning; that

General Garibaldi had promised arms and men, and that it would break

out in the spring. Before leaving Egypt for Europe I stayed at

Alexandria, and saw my friend the attache, who was now a full-blown

Austrian consul, and retracted the criticisms I had made to him on

Austria in Bosnia.

At Constantinople, I learnt that the Albanian revolution had broken

out. Popovitch, the Montenegrin Minister, complained bitterly that

his Government gave him no information, and left him to answer the

Turks' charges of complicity as best he could. He was so anxious

about the affair that it was obvious Montenegro was "dipped" in

whatever was happening, and he begged me to go straight to the scene

of action.

CHAPTER EIGHTEEN

1911 AND THE INSURRECTION OF THE CATHOLICS

I arrived in Cetinje on May 5th, and found Italy had built a

Legation bigger than that of Austria. France had erected a gay villa

in the main street. Great Britain still only parlour-boarded at the

hotel for a few months in the year. The elephantine Vladni Dom

(Government House) dominated the town, and two ridiculous new houses

in the "new art" style had been built in the main street out of

the "pickings" so folk said, of the British loan, the whole of which

had been spent on useless ostentation. I had hoped that it would

have been used for irrigating, or otherwise developing the land, and

promptly sold out my few shares in disgust--and at par. I wonder how

many other people got out as cheaply?

Vuko Vuletitich was swollen with pride over his daughter, who, as

Madame Rizoff, held a great position as wife of the Bulgarian

Minister in Rome and was known as "la bella Montenegrina." Through

Rizoff I was told Montenegro hoped to attain to much.

I had been so disgusted over the bomb affair in 1908 that I had

fully intended not to visit Montenegro again. I was sick of the web

of intrigue which entangled the land. But now it seemed that only

from Montenegro could I watch the case for Albania.

I was summoned to the palace, and received by the whole royal

family, who were very gay, and did not conceal the fact that they

expected and wanted war, and bade me go to Podgoritza, where the

Queen's cousin, General Yamko Vukotitch, was in command of affairs.

The details of the insurrection I have told in my book, The Struggle

for Scutari. Here I will narrate only those political facts which

fear of injuring my informants compelled me then to withhold.

Briefly: the insurrection was planned by King Nikola as part of his

effort to obtain a kingdom. Taking advantage of the unrest caused by

Young Turk rule, he used as his lever old Sokol Batzi, a worthy man

of the Gruda tribe, who had fought against the Turks in 1877, and

therefore taken Montenegrin nationality. Nikola rewarded him

suitably, and Sokol, in return, served him with dog-like fidelity.

To Sokol, much respected by the tribesmen, Nikola entrusted the task

of inducing the Albanian Catholics to migrate in numbers into

Montenegro, promising them that if they would revolt against the

Turks their wives and children should have shelter and protection

till their land was freed from the Turks, and that they should

receive sufficient arms and ammunition. Nikola himself promised

independence to the tribesmen. Sokol was a simple-minded old fellow.

Bitterly did he and his family repent later of the way they had let

themselves be made cat's paws of. A considerable sum of money was

collected in Montenegro to finance the revolution. An Austrian Slav

doctor was engaged, and a rough hospital prepared, and a store of

maize purchased. These preparations went on through the winter.

Montenegro's protests, to Europe, of her innocence were lies which

were black even for diplomacy, As for the interview which Prince

Danilo gave to the Morning Post, it was a shameless tissue of

falsehoods. He declared that Montenegro had supplied no arms or

ammunition to the insurgents, when at that very time his cousin,

Yanko Vukotitch, was distributing weapons and directing the military

operations under my eyes.

Even worse was his statement: "It grieves my heart to see these

brave mountaineers die for the liberty of having their own schools

for their children." When not one single Albanian school was

permitted in Montenegro; forcible Slavizing was going on in the

Kuchi and Triepshl tribes, and the Catholic Albanians of Podgoritza

were not allowed to make a floor to their church and had to kneel on

the bare gravel.

At Podgoritza I soon saw that the Montenegrins wanted war. King

Nikola hoped thus to mend his damaged prestige. Mobilization began.

On July 11th Yanko told me all was ready, and he could take Scutari

in ten days. He offered to take me there on a gun carriage. The

artillery tracks to the mountains were completed, and the big guns

were going up. Ox-carts creaked past at night, taking up the

ammunition. The Turks, it was said with glee, dared not withdraw

troops from the Bulgar frontier, and were hampered with revolts

elsewhere. Soon, however, large Turkish forces arrived. It was clear

the untrained Maltsors could not stand against the overpowering

numbers. Too late they saw they had been tricked by the

Montenegrins, and cried to the Powers. At their request I helped

draw up a letter to Sir Edward Grey, explaining their situation and

their wishes, and we sent it. King Nikola, who was posing to the

Powers as the victim of the Albanian insurrection, was very angry

when he heard of this, and suspected me of instigating it. But I did

not. The Maltsors, too, were tricked by General Garibaldi, who had

promised to aid them and did not do so. They had expected the South

of Albania to rise also. Had it done so, I believe the Powers would

have been obliged to recognize the Albanian question, and much

future war might have been spared. But, unfortunately, the South

believed in Ismail Kemal, and he worked on which ever side paid him.

He was then in league with a Corfiote Greek, one Androutzos, who

boasted to me in a letter that he and Ismail had advised the South

against rising, and had "saved Albania." A few risings took place,

but not enough to make a mark in Europe.

Meanwhile Montenegro still expected war, and to every protest I made

that Montenegro could not fight the Turks single-handed I was always

told that Bulgarian help was certain. The army was anxious to begin,

for it was mobilized, and the revolt had cost more than had been

expected. But for the fund I raised the wretched refugees would have

suffered yet more bitterly. Montenegro cared nothing for them. All

she wanted was territory. Great Serbia was discussed with singular

cold-bloodedness, one of the schoolmasters saying at the

dinner-table that it would never be "made till the Petrovitches and

the Karageorgevitches are sent after the Obrenovitches." And King

Nikola's tactics were severely criticised. Either make war or

demobilize--the country could not stand the strain. I was warned not

to trust Stanko Markovitch, the Governor of Podgoritza, a sinister

figure enough, who had been raised suddenly to this height from

being master in a primary school, for "services rendered." "The

King's poisoner," said folk. "Beware!"

Foreign correspondents swarmed, and Russian officers came and

reconnoitred the frontier. The Turks occupied all the strategical

posts. Russia was not ready for war, and would not have it. Suddenly

the Maltsors were told Montenegro could do no more for them, and

they were to make peace, and go back to their burnt and pillaged

homes. Never has a people been more shamelessly betrayed. King

Nikola had used the poor creatures as a cat's paw, had failed, and

now brutally cast them out, and pretended to the Powers that

Montenegro was innocent. By brutal threats the Maltsors were induced

to accept the Turkish terms. But they stipulated I was to return

with them and stay the winter. This I undertook to do, and before

leaving was told by some one who had just had audience with the King

that owing to pressure from the Powers he had been forced to

postpone war till next year, but that Montenegrin troops would

occupy the strategical points so soon as the Turkish troops

withdrew, and I was to be ready. The Montenegrin army was, in fact,

never quite demobilized, and the King badgered the Powers

continually to order the withdrawal of the Turkish troops "which

threatened his frontier." Great Britain realized that Montenegro was

a spot which needed watching, and sent Count de Salis there as

Minister. High time, too.

I went to Scutari worn out with toil, responsibility, and the heat

which stood at 104 in the shade. France was now represented by a

Levantine Pole. Krajewsky, bitterly anti-Austrian, and very active.

English sympathy for the Maltsors had been aroused, and Mr. Nevinson

came out to report on the state of things and help me to organize

relief work. In order to close the Turkish frontier the Montenegrins

declared cholera in Scutari, though we saw no signs of it, and

quarantine was declared. We were cut off from news, and when

distributing quinine in the fever districts round Alessio learnt

suddenly that Italy had declared war, and was bombarding Tripoli. It

was a bolt from the blue. Italy had no casus belli, but as we have

seen, Izvolsky had arranged the affair two years before and no Power

protested, save that Austria forbade Italy to land in Albania.

Krajewsky became violently pro-Turk. Scutari rightly judged the war

as the first step towards the break-up of Turkey. The Turks behaved

with admirable tolerance. None of the Italians of the town were

Interfered with, and though war broke out on September 30th the

Italian Minister did not leave till October 23rd. Mr. Nevinson

returned to London, and I was left to carry on relief work.

All I could do to prevent the tribesmen being again cheated by

Montenegro I did. Petar Plamenatz, now consul, tried hard to buy

their help in the coming war by promising arms and liberty.

Montenegro intended no annexation, he said. "Nikita himself had

promised," said the tribesmen. But I now would not believe King

Nikola, even if he swore on the body of St. Peter Cetinski. His

actions were suspicious.

For the first time for many years he visited his Austrian rentiers,

and was warned by the Entente Ministers. "England," said Plamenatz,

"was firm; France mild, and Russia very disagreeable."

Montenegro was evidently in touch with Bulgaria. Plamenatz told me

that the bomb thrown into a mosque at Istib to excite reprisals or

force the Turks to declare War, had been expressly prepared in

Sofia, and anxiously awaited results.

Serbia and Montenegro were now on the worst terms. On December 24th,

the season of peace and goodwill, Plamenatz, in a rage, showed me a

telegram just received by the Orthodox priest of Scutari. The

Patriarchia had been persuaded to appoint one Dochitch, a

Montenegrin of Moracha, to the Bishopric of Prizren, in place of

Nicephor, dismissed for drunkenness and other inappropriate conduct.

Montenegro triumphed, and looked on Prizren as hers. The Serbs were

furious; the priests of Kosovo refused to recognize him, and had

telegraphed to the two priests of Scutari and Vraka to do so, too.

They, being Montenegrin, were all for Dochitch, and their tiny

flocks supported them.

Any Serbo-Montenegrin agreement seemed, then, quite impossible, and

Petar fulminated against Serb infamy.

CHAPTER NINETEEN

1912. THE FIRST DROPS OF THE THUNDERSTORM

1912 dawned ominously. Montenegro worked ceaselessly to rouse the

Maltsors, promising them that they should receive sufficient arms

and, this time, gain freedom. Meanwhile the Turks carried out their

agreement to feed the late insurgents very well. But Petar Plamenatz

never ceased quibbling over the French translation of the terms, and

inciting the tribesmen to quite impossible demands. Repeated

messages brought me varying dates for the commencement of

hostilities. Montenegro meant war. But Montenegro could not wage it

alone. Which Power was shoving her? I was fairly certain that

Bulgaria and Montenegro had some sort of an engagement, and learnt

later I was right.

Baron de Kruyff, Dutch correspondent and head of the Foreign

Journalists Society which visited Podgoritza in 1911, told me that

when he left Montenegro in June (1911) King Nikola, on hearing he

was going to Sofia, asked him to convey a letter thither, addressed

to a private individual, and to open it on crossing the frontier. On

doing so he found it contained another addressed to King Ferdinand,

with instructions to deliver it into the King's hands. He had an

audience, and did so. The letter contained the first proposals for a

Bulgar-Montenegrin agreement, by means of which each monarch should

aid the other to achieve his ambitions, and Nikola hoped to reign at

Prizren. King Ferdinand favoured de Kruyff with a long audience, and

asked him to convey the reply. De Kruyff objected that his sudden

return to Cetinje without obvious reason would excite suspicion. It

was therefore arranged that he should meet Popovitch as Montenegrin

envoy in Trieste. Which he did. I wonder if Russia knew this? I

fancy not.

Russia was now working for a Balkan Alliance, which, though

primarily directed against Austria, had for its ultimate goal the

acquisition of Constantinople. Nicholas II of Russia, like Nikola I

of Montenegro, was obsessed with a city. Russia was recuperating

rapidly. She was financed by France, and sure of military aid. She

had entangled England. The secular enmity of the Balkan peoples was

the one weak spot in her plan. To amend this she transferred

Hartwig, Russian Minister in Teheran, to Belgrade.

He had successfully worked the ruin of Persia. He was now to compass

that of Turkey. Hartwig was a man to stick at nothing. Dr. Dillon

tells us that his methods were so abominable that even the Russian

Foreign Office protested. "People asked how he dared oppose the

Foreign Office on which he depended. The answer was that he was

encouraged, and put up to it by the Tsar. When at last M. Izvolsky

extracted permission to recall the rebellious minister, Nicholas II

decorated him, and told him that his was the only policy Russia

could pursue with dignity and profit. . . . Thereupon he entrusted

Hartwig with the most important post in the Balkans."

De Schelking, secretary to the Russian Legation in Berlin, gives a

picture of Hartwig's immense influence: "Shortly after his arrival

in Belgrade, Hartwig created a most exceptional position for

himself. The King, Prince Alexander, Pashitch, none of these made

any decisions without consulting him first. . . . Every morning his

study was besieged by Serbian statesmen who came to ask advice" (The

Game of Diplomacy). It is amusing to compare de Schelking's account

with an order from Pashitch, November 14, 1912: "Take notice: Our

Ministers in Foreign lands are to be informed that Hartwig has not

visited the King, and that he comes to the Foreign Office less than

any of the other Ministers." According to de Schelking he had no

need to visit anybody. But I fancy Kings Ferdinand and Nikola made

their plans without consulting him. Nor can they be blamed for so

doing.

The alleged object of Hartwig's Balkan alliance was to protect the

Balkan peoples from further annexation. It was, however, difficult

to unite Bulgaria and Serbia, and would have been harder yet had

King Ferdinand known that Russia had already told Serbia that she

had no use for a Big Bulgaria. Perhaps neither the Serbo-Bulgar nor

the Bulgar-Greek alliances would have been effected, but for the

co-operation of Mr. J. B. Bourchier, whose honesty was beyond all

doubt, and who was trusted where a Balkan envoy would not have been.

He too, unfortunately, was unaware that Bulgaria's fate was already

sealed by Russia, and that England was too deeply tangled in Russian

intrigue to be able to stand for justice.

The Serbo-Bulgar alliance was signed on February 29,

1912, and was to be in force till December 1920. The two parties

were "unconditionally and without reservation to mutually aid each

other with all the forces of the State if one or more other States

should attack one of these countries" and "to support one another

with all force should any one of the Great Powers make the attempt

to forcibly acquire even temporarily any territory situate in the

Balkans, and at present under Turkish suzerainty." Russia meant none

but herself to put a finger in the Balkan pie.

Russia seems to have been doubtful about Montenegro, for the Serb

minister in Petersburg reports (February 17, 1912): "As regards the

visit of the King of Montenegro, and as regards Austro-Hungarian

relations . . . in pursuance of what was intended King Nikola was

given some energetic counsel to pursue a quiet line of conduct, and

not to let himself in for any adventures." Serbia now was on very

friendly terms with the Greeks and helping them to kill Bulgar

komitadjis in Macedonia. Montenegro, feeling secure in her

arrangements with Bulgaria, was induced to declare alliance with

Serbia. The Bulgar-Greek alliance, the hardest to make, was finally

negotiated.

These things were all secret, but the air was tense with them. We

were told we should know definitely if it were peace or war when

King Nikola returned from Petersburg in February. Prince Danilo at

the same time went to Sofia. We were told to be ready for war in

April. Gavrilovitch, who was Serb Minister at Cetinje, came to

Scutari with young M. Cambon, a significant combination, and was

visibly relieved when I told him I was doing all I could to keep

peace in the mountains Serbia, as we know now, was acting strictly

as Russia's tool, as shown by official documents, and Russia wished

to postpone the Balkan crash till she was ready. But having made the

Balkan Alliance, it took the bit in its teeth. Daily I saw

Montenegro shoving towards war, and the Turks steadily fortifying

Scutari.

On March 10th Petar Plamenatz was suddenly transferred to

Constantinople, and replaced by Jovan Jovitchevitch, who naively

said he had been instructed to ask me for maps and information.

Petar went to Constantinople, as he afterwards boasted, for the

express purpose of declaring war. "Ma guerre a moi!" he called it.

"Car c'est moi qui l'a fait."

At the last moment, when war was seething, Hadji Avdil, Minister of

the Interior, started with a Reform Commission through Turkey. But

he only precipitated the end. A narrow-minded man, filled with

inordinate conceit of his own importance, he passed with difficulty

through Kosovo vilayet and arrived in Scutari on March 10th. Instead

of pacifying the excited Maltsors, he refused to meet them on any

terms which they considered safe. And he left matters far worse than

he found them. That he, too, expected war was evident, for he

appointed the military commandant Hussein Riza as Vali.

The Albanians of Kosovo again rose in revolt. Ise Boletin again led

them. They triumphed everywhere, and this time entered Uskub, where

their conduct was admitted to have been exemplary by the Foreign

Consuls. The Turks, finding that the Albanians were about to march

on Monastir, called a truce, and agreed to recognize the four

vilayets of Janina, Scutari, Kosovo, and part of Monastir, as an

autonomous Albanian province. The immediate result of the Albanian

victory was the overthrow of the chauvinistic Young Turk party and

the appointment of a more moderate Cabinet. The effect of this coup

on the Balkans was electric. Each Balkan State had pegged out for

itself a slice of Albania. Delenda est Albania was the one point on

which they agreed. Heedless of Russia, they hastened to make war

before Albania should have time to consolidate.

War preparations hurried on. Montenegro worked upon the discontent

caused by Hadji Avdil. King Nikola had returned from Russia, but had

not fixed the date of war as we had expected. I thought perhaps

Italy was shoving, in order to assist her war in Tripoli, which

still dragged on. But in a few weeks' visit to Rome I had a long

talk with San Giuliano, and perceived clearly that Italy was not

urging Montenegro.

There seemed but one possible explanation, and that was that an

understanding had been come to between Greece and Bulgaria, and that

Montenegro therefore felt certain of the co-operation of the whole

of the Bulgar army. In Rome, Popovitch, the Montenegrin Minister,

had told me, when announcing that General Martinovitch had been made

War Minister: "This means war."

Returned to Scutari, I went straight to the Greek consul and in the

middle of a chat on nothing particular, asked: "A propos, Monsieur,

is it true your Government has signed a treaty of alliance with

Bulgaria against Turkey!" The poor little man almost leapt from his

chair. "Mademoiselle!" he stammered, "you are surely aware there are

things political of which one may not speak." I begged him to say no

more. More was unnecessary. War I knew was now certain. The secret

alliance had, in fact, been signed on May 16th.

Next day a frontier fight took place, provoked by Montenegro. It

lasted seven hours. Every one cried: "It is war!" The Montenegrin

Consul was greatly agitated. He knew what his country was doing, and

cried: "Mon Dieu, Mademoiselle, I hope you will not write a book for

five years! You know too much."

To avoid being besieged in Scutari I left for Podgoritza at once,

and found Podgoritza so certain of war that I was begged to stay and

see the first shot fired. Why war was then postponed I never made

out. Perhaps Montenegro had to wait for Bulgaria.

Cetinje also expected war, and asked me to collect funds for the

wounded. The King begged me to prevent the Maltsors rising yet,

which showed me he again intended to make a tool of them. Kol

Mirashi, one of the pluckiest of the Maltsor patriots, told me they

all knew this, and meant to rise at once to show Europe they were

fighting for independence, and not for Montenegro.

I said: "Why not keep quiet and develop autonomy?" He replied:

"Impossible. The Montenegrin-Austrian plan is now complete, and will

soon be in motion. We must act independently. King Nikola went to

Russia for help. They refused him. So he has joined with Austria."

The Russian visit had been a fiasco. Lazar Mioushkovitch, who, with

Dushan Gregovitch, had accompanied the King, told me: "It was

terrible." Dushan Gregovitch--good looking, and remarkable rather

for high stakes at bridge than common-sense--rashly allowed himself

to be interviewed. Montenegro's grandiose schemes for conquest

appeared next day in the papers. "The Tsar was furious. He

threatened us even with annihilation! The King told him Dushan was

known to be a liar, but it was of no use. It is finished! We have no

more to expect from Russia!"

But war preparations hurried on. And some of the Bank employees told

me that the King had raised a loan in Vienna "in order to start an

Agricultural Bank!" They smiled.

Montenegro now tried to force the Turks to declare war by provoking

two bad frontier fights near Kolashin and Andrijevitza, each time

burning several Turkish blockhouses, and going far over the

frontier. The Powers ordered the recall of the Montenegrin troops on

August 5th, or they would have occupied the whole Berani district. I

went to Andrijevitza on August 27th and stayed there a month. The

big guns had already been taken up and were on the frontier, and

ammunition was widely distributed, not only to Montenegrins, but

also to the Serbs from Turkish territory, who came over the border

at night. General Yanko Vukotitch was in command. There was a

hospital full of wounded, and Andrijevitza was furious with the

Government for having broken faith. They had been promised

assistance, and had expected this fight to be followed at once by

war. The whole district was strongly anti-Petrovitch, and in close

touch with Serbia. Veshovitch, the frontier commandant, even said--

when I suggested that a declaration of war might be followed by the

re-occupation of the Sanjak by Austria, and a possible attack on

Montenegro: "What then? Anything would be better than the Government

we have down there!" and pointed Cetinjewards. Jovan Plamenatz

assured me emphatically that Austria would not attack them. And he

counted for certain on Bulgar support. The Turks, however, displayed

great restraint, and did not declare war. Veshovitch then told me

that as neither the efforts of Bulgaria nor Montenegro could force

them to it, Montenegro herself would begin. He had bombs ready to

spring another Turkish blockhouse, and so soon as he had finished

the big bread-oven for the army would do so, and cross the border.

Sniping, as I saw myself, was already going on daily.

A strange tale has been circulated that Montenegro mobilized but

four days before war broke out. The above facts show this to be

quite a mistake. Montenegro had been preparing over a year, and

could have begun in July.

I hastened to Cetinje to tell Count de Salis what was happening. He

replied that the Powers were doing nothing useful, and he feared it

was now too late.

I went to the Russia Institut. It was October 3rd. Sofia Petrovna

was happy and excited at the prospect of war; foretold the end of

the Turk and the triumph of the Holy Orthodox Church, to which she

was heart and soul passionately attached. While we were discussing

the situation, in hurried Yougourieff, one of the Russian officers

attached to the Legation, and superintending the Military Cadet

School financed by Russia, who, though she was no longer supporting

Nikola, was actively training young Montenegrins as cannon-fodder.

He stopped short on seeing me; hesitated; said something in Russian.

Seeing I was de trop, I rose to go. Sofia Petrovna bade me stay.

"Mademoiselle," she said, "knows the whole political situation. You

can speak before her."

He asked me doubtfully: "Will you promise not to send off what I say

to a newspaper?" I promised.

He sat down and began hotly in French to Sofia: "The Montenegrins

are absolutely mad! You must use all your influence to stop them.

They must not make this war! We have already told them so most

severely. They are mad, I tell you--we cannot and must not have war

now."

Sofia disagreed vehemently. All was ready. Things could not go on

like this. "But I tell you," said Yougourieff excitedly, "absolutely

there must be no Balkan war without Russia. And we are not ready."

Sofia persisted: "My friend--we shall intervene. We said we would

not in 1877--and we did. We shall now."

He became very serious. "I tell you this is not 1877. We cannot

intervene. Unless Austria intervenes, which God forbid, we have no

excuse for war. And nothing is yet ready. We are working as fast as

possible, but there is much yet to do. These people must wait!" He

was in deadly earnest, and plainly speaking the truth.

I asked quite suddenly: "And when will you be ready, Monsieur?"

"In two years from now, Mademoiselle, we shall be absolutely ready

for our great war!"

It was October 3rd, 1912. Russia began her great war on August 1,

1914. Yougourieff was only two months out. No wonder he made me

promise not to publish his remarks.

We learn now, from a report by Gruitch, Serbian Minister in London,

September 8, 1911, to the Serbian Foreign Office, that the date was

known to others as well. Speaking of the agreement about Morocco, he

says: "The agreement has one result, that war will be postponed

three or four years. . . . Both France and her allies are of opinion

that the war--even at the expense of great sacrifice, must be

postponed to a later time, that it to say, until the year 1914-15"

(see Bogitchevitch, xi). No wonder that Gavrilovitch and young

Cambon approved of my peace policy, and that Yougourieff was

emphatic.

I went to General Yanko Vukotitch's house. Rakia was flowing. He,

madame, his secretary, and others were in high feather. Yanko

explained the plan of campaign to me. He was to lead the main

division to Prizren. The two other divisions under Brigadier

Boshkovitch and General Martinovitch, were to attack Scutari, and,

having taken it, to join the triumphant Yanko at Prizren. No mention

was made of when the other Balkan States were to come in. Bulgarian

support was certain. Madame Yanko begged me to go with her husband

and photograph his entry into Prizren.

The whole campaign, it appeared, was expected only to last a few

weeks, and only 150 beds had been made ready at the hospital. The

Montenegrins honestly believed that theirs was the finest army for

its size in Europe.

General Martinovitch told me to go off to Podgoritza if I wanted to

see the first shot fired. When I arrived there on October 6th all

was ready and waiting. Another proof that the "four days'

mobilization" tale is an error.

King Nikola had made up his outstanding quarrel with his relatives,

and the Royal Voyvodas, Marko, Sharko, Bozho, and Gjuro all arrived.

On the night of the 8th all sang: "Let me see Prizren!"

There was wild excitement. No one mentioned the Serbs. I asked,

"What is the Serb army like?" They roared with laughter. "Oni

chuvahjuf svinje Gospodjitza!" (They are swineherds, lady!) Next

morning at 8 a.m. Prince Petar fired a gun into a Turkish camp

across the frontier.

The tale of the war has already been told. Here only a few

significant facts need telling.

Montenegro expected by rushing the first into war to occupy all the

coveted districts, including Prizren, before Serbia was ready.

Bulgaria would beat back the Turks, and Ferdinand and Nikita share

the bulk of the peninsula. The Montenegrins recked nothing of the

Serbs, but they miserably miscalculated. The Serbs reached Prizren

before they did.

It is possible that Bulgaria and Montenegro, in fact, forced on the

war. Both knew they would gain nothing by waiting for Russia. And if

two of the Balkan States insisted on war the other two were bound to

come in.

Montenegro's plan failed. Her first startling successes were due to

the fact that the Maltsor risings had largely cleared the way for

her. But as the Montenegrins began at once to treat Albanian

territory as their own, and even loot Catholic Albanian houses,

tension between the Maltsors and Montenegrins arose and increased.

The Maltsors flung away the Montenegrin caps dealt out to them,

withdrew in numbers, and soon consulted me as to whether they should

attack the Montenegrins in the rear and cut them off. I begged them

not to, as I then believed in the honesty of the Powers, and thought

Albania would get justice. I regret it now.

South Albania also perceived that the self-styled "liberators" who

poured in from Greece were but brigands intent on gain and murder,

and on November 28, 1912, Ismail Kemal, who was in Constantinople

when war broke out, managed with difficulty to return to his native

town Valona, where he hoisted the National flag, proclaimed the

independence of Albania, and formed a provisional government. It was

hoped that by thus showing that Albania wanted freedom, and detached

herself completely from the Turks, she would be respected by Europe.

For the Balkan Allies had stated they were at war only with the

Turks.

Official notification of Albania's resolve was sent to the Powers,

and the Albanians hoped for sympathy, for it was they who in fact

had aimed the first blow at Young Turk tyranny. The Greeks and

Montenegrins and Serbs, far from sympathizing with Albania's wish

for freedom, were incensed by it. The Greeks blockaded Valona, and

cut the telegraph. The yacht of the Duc le Monpensier, however, ran

the blockade, and took off Ismail Kemal, Gurikuchi, and that gallant

chieftain Isa Boletin. He had fought on the side of the Serb till he

saw what Serb victory would mean. The three pleaded their cause in

the capitals of Europe. Europe meanwhile seethed with intrigue.

Russia's plans were overset by the premature outbreak of the Balkan

war. But she was bent on getting all she could out of it for her

side, and dragged France along with her. At the beginning of the

Italy-Tripoli war, Izvolsky had written: "We must even now not only

concern ourselves with the best means of preserving peace and order

in the Balkans, but also with the matter of extracting the greatest

possible advantage to ourselves from coming events."

The Powers called a Conference of Ambassadors in London to try to

arrange a Balkan settlement. The Russian Ambassador in London

reports, February 25, 1913, that England wishes peace and a

compromise. Of France he states that M. Cambon "has directed himself

in reality entirely to me. . . . When I recall his conversations and

. . . add the attitude of Poincare, the thought comes to me that of

all the Powers, France is the only one which, not to say that it

wishes war, yet would look on it with least regret. . . . The

disposition of France offers us on the one hand a guarantee, but on

the other it must not happen that the war breaks out on account of

interests more French than Russian, and in any case not under

circumstances more favourable to France than to Russia."

The Conference inevitably became a struggle by Russia to obtain all

possible lands for her proteges regardless of the wishes of the

inhabitants. Possession of land for a short time in the Middle Ages

was given as reason for handing it over now.

"We might as justly claim Calais," I said to a Podgoritza

schoolmaster, "for it was ours at the same time!"

"Why don't you," said he. "You have a navy?"

Sir Edward Grey, in the interests of justice, stood out against Slav

rapacity, but Russia insisted on having either Scutari or Djakovo

for the Slavs; though Djakovo, a town of between two and three

thousand houses, contained but one hundred Serb families. Nor was

there a single Serb village near it. All were Albanian Moslems or

Catholics, but they were offered up as a living sacrifice on the

altar of Russia's ambitions.

Montenegro meanwhile was very bitter. Yanko had failed to take

Prizren. The population railed against the Government. The King had

never recovered popularity since the bomb affair. Some of the

condemned were still in prison.

Had Prizren been taken, things would have been very different. All

Montenegro had been trained from childhood to sing: "Onward, onward,

let me see Prizren!" and though the town consisted of nearly four

thousand Albanian houses and but 950 Serb ones, Prizren had become a

sort of insanity with them. Not only Prizren was not taken by

Montenegro, but Scutari was not either. The population now turned

with savage desire on Scutari, about which previously little had

been said.

It had been believed that Constantinople would soon fall, and that

the four Crown princes would enter it in state. Though how they

could have been so simple as to think Russia would permit this, it

is hard to understand.

The cry rose: "Russia helped us in 1877, why does she not come

forward now?" Whatever the heads of the land knew, the rank and file

had confidently expected Russian intervention.

Only by dragging in Austria could Russia's hand be forced. The Serbs

endeavoured to goad Austria into action. News reached us that they

had imprisoned and maltreated Prochaska, the Austrian Consul in

Prizren, and Montenegro's delight and expectation were immense. His

nose, said the Montenegrins, should be cut off just as though he

were a Turk. Prochaska was, in fact, a brother Slav, a Czech, a

capable man, whom I had met in 1908. Austria, it was confidently

asserted at the inn dinner table, would be forced to fight--or for

ever hide disgraced. Yanko Vukotitch's secretary, who had been up at

Prizren, described to me with the greatest gusto what happened: "Oh,

if you could but have seen what the officers did to Prochasko! They

rolled him on the ground, spat in his face, tore the Austrian flag,

did all that you can imagine that is most dirty upon him! Austria

will never dare tell the world what we did to her consul. All Europe

would laugh at her, and she would have to declare war."

"But why was this done?" I asked.

"Because he asked some dirty Albanians to his consulate."

"But a consul has the right to ask whom he pleases to his consulate.

It was his duty also to protect the Catholics."

"Very well. This is to teach Austria we have no need of her consuls.

Austria is finished!" He, as all the Montenegrins, was furious at

any attempt to save the Albanians from extirpation. All those who

would not be Slavized were to be killed.

Austria would have been fully justified in making war on Serbia. And

as Russia was not ready, and the Serbs engaged with the Turks, then

was the moment to do it. But Germany was strong for peace. "Berlin

had applied itself, above all, to calm the exasperation and desire

for intervention at the Ballplatz," says Baron Beyens, Belgian

Minister in Berlin. "The Archduke Ferdinand stated at Berlin that

Austria had come to the end of the concessions it could make to its

neighbour. The Emperor and his councillors showered upon him, none

the less, counsels of moderation, which William II when conducting

his guest to the railway station summarized in these expressive

words: "Above all, no folly (pas de betises). . . . But to lead

Austria to show itself more tractable, as it is believed here the

Imperial Government has succeeded in doing, is not enough to pacify

the conflict. It yet remains to bend the obstinate resistance of

Serbia, and to effect a diminution of her demands. There was a

rumour last week in the European Chancellories that M. Sasonov had

ceased to struggle against the Court party, which wishes to drag

Russia into war, though the soil of the Empire is undermined with

revolution and military preparations are yet insufficient."

Prochaska, after some weeks of imprisonment, was released. Austria

humbled her pride and accepted an apology. Prochaska was compensated

and bound to secrecy. As my informant had foretold, Austria dared

not tell her humiliation.

In Montenegro this produced a howl of contempt. Austria was

finished; you could do what you pleased with her with impunity; the

next war would be with Austria. Montenegro, on her side, thought

well to insult her. Perhaps one more stab would make her fight, and

then hurrah for Russia and Constantinople!

From the conquered districts came piteous reports of the hideous

cruelties which Serb and Montenegrin alike were committing on the

Albanian populations. Far from concealing their deeds, the

conquerors boasted of them. A Serb officer nearly choked with

laughter over his beer, as he told how his men had bayoneted the

women and children of Ljuma. And one of the Petrovitches boasted to

me that in two years no one in the conquered lands would dare speak

"that dirty language" (Albanian). Moslem men were given the choice

of baptism or death, and shot down. The women were unveiled, and

they and the children driven to church and baptized. "In one

generation we shall thus Serbize the lot!" they said. And later

evidence proved that these reports were true. No Turk ever treated

Armenian worse than did the two Serb peoples treat the Albanians in

the name of the Holy Orthodox Church. Stanko Markovitch, Governor of

Podgoritza, forbade the giving of any food to the starving people of

the burnt villages, and told me flatly that they were doomed to

die. Podgoritza exclaimed he was a fool to tell me this: "Now she

will denounce us in England and America, too!" But they did not deny

it. News came from Djakovo that Father Palitch, a plucky Franciscan,

whom I had met there in 1908, had been bayoneted to death for

refusing to make the sign of the cross in Orthodox fashion. The

account of his death, given by Moslems and Catholics alike, was

denied by the Montenegrin Government. Austria rightly insisted on an

examination, for, as a Catholic, he was under her protection. This

was made by a commission under Mgr. Miedia, Bishop of Prizren.

Father Palitch's body was exhumed. It was proved that he was killed

by bayonets, and the tale of the Montenegrins that he had been shot

when trying to escape was devoid of foundation, there being no

gunshot wounds in the body. The case was gone into fully. Austria a

second time accepted apology and certain compensations, and failed

to respond to provocation. No Russian intervention could now be

expected. But the Slavs continued to cry: "Death to Albania," and it

was the clear duty of Austria, and should have been also of Italy,

to save it. The organ of the Serb Black Hand, Piemont, advocated the

slaughter of all the inhabitants of Scutari, to punish them for

having dared to resist. War, as is always the case, had aroused the

worst passions of this--at best--semi-civilized race. But the

Powers realized that Russia's unbridled greed on behalf of her Serb

proteges must be checked.

Scutari was a town of 35,000 Albanian inhabitants. Montenegro was

ordered by the Powers to withdraw from Scutari, and Serbia from

Scutari and Durazzo. The Powers sent a naval demonstration, and

prepared a collective Note. The Tsar ordered King Nikola to yield.

But while he spoke publicly, the representatives of France and

Russia did all they could to impede the delivery of the Note till

too late, in order to give the Montenegrins time to acquire by fraud

what they could not take by force. King Nikola and many of his

subjects went about swearing aloud that if they did not get all they

wanted they would set the whole of Europe on fire, and the combined

Serb and Montenegrin armies would take Vienna.

The plans for the taking of Scutari by fraud had probably been long

laid. In February came news that the gallant commander of Scutari,

Hussein Riza Bey, had been murdered-and his place taken by the

notorious Essad Pasha. Essad had been servant of the Old Turk, and

then member of the Committee of Union and Progress. He aimed solely

at power for himself, and now became servant of the Slav. Hussein

Riza, seeing no help could be expected from the Turks, and

determined not to yield the town to the Slavs, decided to hand it

over to the Albanians. On his mother's side he was of Albanian

blood. His plan was to communicate with all the tribesmen, and to

arrange that they should fall on the besieging army in the rear

while he and his army made a simultaneous sortie. He hoped thus to

cut up the Montenegrin army and save the town. One of the Franciscan

fathers and another man were to steal through the lines at night and

arrange that the tribesmen should attack when Hussein Riza hoisted

the Albanian flag on the citadel. That night after Hussein Riza had

supped with Essad, he was shot dead a few yards away from the house

by two men disguised as women. Osman Bali and Mehmed Kavaja, both

servants of Essad, boasted afterwards they had done the deed. The

town crier proclaimed that nothing was to be said about the murder

and Essad, who was second, now took command, and soon entered into

communication with the Montenegrins. As he knew only Turkish and

Albanian, the letters went through the hands of the dragoman of the

Italian consulate.

Italy played an oddly double game. She was bound by Treaty to assist

Austria to preserve the integrity of Albania. But she did not object

to King Nikola--father of the Queen of Italy--taking the town if he

could. Italy was striving for influence in Montenegro, out of hatred

of Austria, and failed to see that the South Slav, not the

German-Austrian, was her real danger.

While France and Russia delayed matters, Petar Plamenatz drew up

terms with Essad. Provided he evacuated the town in time for

Montenegro to occupy it before the Powers could stop it, he was to

leave with all honours, and a large supply of arms and food. He was

also to aid the Serbs to reach Durazzo later, and as a reward was to

be recognized as ruler in his own district of Tirana. A vile enough

plot.

In order to deceive Europe, the Montenegrin Government telegraphed

everywhere an account of a huge fight, in which Scutari had been

taken, and thousands of Montenegrins wounded. But it was such a lie

that they dared not give it either to The Times' correspondent or to

me.

Essad withdrew. The Montenegrins entered without firing a shot.

Thus was Scutari betrayed to her enemy. That the plot was known to

the Italian Legation is clear, for the Italian war correspondents

had the information from the Legation and hurried to the spot the

day before.

King Nikola having obtained the town, tried to effect a bargain with

Austria by offering the Lovtchen in exchange for it. But I fancy the

Powers burked this.

The war was over. All through I used to say to myself: "War is so

obscene, so degrading, so devoid of one redeeming spark, that it is

quite impossible there can ever be a war in West Europe." This was

the one thing that consoled me in the whole bestial experience. War

brings out all that is foulest in the human race, and the most

disgusting animal ferocity poses as a virtue. As for the Balkan Slav

and his vaunted Christianity, it seemed to me all civilization

should rise and restrain him from further brutality.

Of the saving of Scutari by the arrival of International forces

under Admiral Sir Cecil Burney I have told elsewhere, and of the

months of relief work in the villages burnt by Serb and Montenegrin,

who had destroyed nearly every olive and fruit tree, and devastated

the land.

But even when their army of saviours arrived the luckless Scutarenes

were ordered to make no demonstration, and had to lay aside the

flowers and flags they were joyfully preparing. In return for their

obedience, their enemies reported in the papers that the "naval

force was received without interest or enthusiasm."

The Montenegrins left, after having burnt and pillaged nearly a

third of the bazar as vengeance.

At Podgoritza, where I went to fetch my store of relief stuff, I was

set on by a number of officials at the parcel office. Furious at

losing Scutari, they swore they would retake it and take Bosnia,

too. I told them not to talk so foolishly. They cried: "We--the Serb

people--have beaten the Turk. We are now a danger to Europe. We

shall take what we please. The Serbs will go to Vienna. We shall go

to Serajevo. We have the whole of the Russian army with us. If you

do not believe it--you will see. We shall begin in Bosnia!" This

was in May 1913. Yougourieff, by the way, was delighted at the

capture of Scutari, and told me that the fait accompli could not be

upset. "Except by accomplishing another," I said. The French and

Italian legations, too, were indecently elated.

The Great Serbia party explained its plans freely. King Ferdinand

was to be assassinated, and Bulgaria be suzerain to Serbia. There

was to be war with Austria. Any one in Great Serbia's path was to be

"removed." A friend, who was doing relief work at Uskub, told me

that there the Serb officers talked incessantly of their next war

with Austria, and were savagely extirpating the Bulgarian and

Albanian populations from the newly annexed districts.