This doctrine had its commencement about half a century ago. Its chief
founder was the French philosopher Comte. Comte, being a lover of
systematic theory, and at the same time a man of religious tendency, was
impressed by the then new physiological researches of Bichat; and he
conceived the old idea, expressed in bygone days by Menenius Agrippa,
that human societies, indeed all human-kind, may be regarded as one
whole, An Organism, and men--as live particles of separate organs, each
having his definite destination to fulfil in the service of the whole
organism.
Comte was so fascinated by this idea that he founded his philosophical
theory on it; and this theory so captivated him that he quite forgot
that his point of departure was no more than a pretty comparison,
suitable enough in a fable, but in no way justifiable as the foundation
of a science. As it often happens, he took his pet hypothesis for an
axiom, and so imagined that his whole theory was based upon the most
firm and positive foundations.
According to his theory it appeared that, as mankind is an organism,
therefore the knowledge of what man is and what his relation to the
world ought to be, is only possible through the knowledge of the
properties of this organism. And to be able to learn these properties
man is fitted to make observations upon other lower organisms and to
draw deductions from their lives.
Therefore, first, the true and exclusive method of science, according to
Comte, is the inductive one, and science is only science when it has
experiment for its basis. Secondly, the final aim and the summit of
science becomes the new science concerning the imaginary organism of
Mankind, or the organic being,--Mankind. This new hypothetic science is
Sociology. From this view of science it generally turns out that all
former knowledge was false, and that the whole history of mankind, in
the sense of its self-consciousness, divides itself into three, or
rather two, periods. First, the theological and metaphysical period,
from the beginning of the world to Comte. And, secondly, the modern
period of true science, positive science, beginning with Comte.
All this was very well, but there was one mistake in it, which was this:
that all this edifice was built on the sand, on an arbitrary (and
incorrect) assertion that mankind, collectively considered, was an
organism.
This assertion is arbitrary because, if we are to acknowledge the
existence of mankind as an organism, which is beyond observation, we
might as well acknowledge the existence of the triple God and similar
theological propositions.
It was incorrect, because to the idea of mankind, that is, of men, the
definition of an organism was added, whereas man lacks the essential
characteristics of an organism,--a centre of sensation or consciousness.
We call an elephant, as well as a bacterium, organisms, only because we
suppose by analogy in these beings that there is unification of
sensations, or consciousness. But human societies and mankind lack this
essential; and therefore, however many other general character-signs we
may find in mankind and in an organism,--without this, the assertion
that man is an organism is incorrect.
But notwithstanding the arbitrariness and incorrectness of the
fundamental proposition of Positive Philosophy, it was accepted by the
so-called "Educated World" with great sympathy, because of that great
fact, important for the crowd, that it afforded a justification of the
existing order of things by recognizing the lawfulness of the existing
division of labour; that is, of violence in mankind. It is remarkable in
this respect that from the writings of Comte, composed of two parts,--a
Positive Philosophy and a Positive Politics,--only the first part was
accepted on new experimental principles by the learned world, that which
justified the existing evil in human society. The second part, treating
of the moral, altruistic duties, following from this recognition of
mankind as an organism, was considered not only unimportant but even
unscientific.
Here the same thing was repeated which occurred with the two parts of
Kant's writings. The "Critique of Pure Reason," was accepted by science;
but the "Critique of Practical Reason," that part which contains the
essence of moral doctrine, was rejected. In the teaching of Comte, that
was recognized to be scientific which humoured the reigning evil.
But the Positive Philosophy accepted by the crowd, based on an arbitrary
and incorrect supposition, was by itself too ill-grounded, and therefore
too unsteady, and could not be sustained by itself.
And now, among the idle play of ideas of so-called "Men of Science,"
there has appeared a similarly arbitrary and incorrect assertion, not at
all new, to the effect that all living beings (that is, organisms),
proceed one from another; not only one organism from another, but one
organism from many; that during a very long period, a million of years,
for instance, not only may a fish and a duck have proceeded from one and
the same forefather, but also one organism might have proceeded from
many separate organisms; so, for instance, out of a swarm of bees a
single animal may proceed. This arbitrary and incorrect assertion was
accepted by the learned world with still greater sympathy.
The assertion was arbitrary, because no one has ever seen how one kind
of organism is made from others; and therefore the hypothesis about the
Origin of Species will always remain a mere supposition and never become
an experimental fact.
The hypothesis was incorrect, because the solution of the problem of the
Origin of Species by the theory of the laws of inheritance and
accommodation during an infinitely long period, is not a solution of the
problem at all, but the mere reiteration of the question in another
form.
According to the solution of this problem by Moses (to oppose which is
the object of Comte's theory), it appeared that the variety of the
species of living beings proceeded from the will of God and his infinite
omnipotence. According to the Theory of Evolution, it appears that the
variety of species of living beings proceeded from themselves in
consequence of the infinite variety of conditions of inheritance and
environment in an infinite period of time.
The Theory of Evolution, speaking plainly, asserts only that (by chance)
in an infinite period of time, anything you like may proceed from
anything else you choose.
This is no answer to the question; it is simply the same question put
differently: instead of Will is put Chance, and the co-efficient of the
Infinite is transferred from Omnipotence to Time.
But this new assertion, enforced by Darwin's followers in an arbitrary
and inaccurate spirit, maintained the first assertion of Comte, and
therefore it became the Revelation for our time, and the foundation of
all sciences, even that of the history of philosophy and religion; and
besides, according to the _naïve_ confession of Darwin himself, the idea
was awakened in him by the law of Malthus; and therefore he pointed to
the "Struggle for Existence" not only of men but of all living beings,
as a fundamental law of every living thing, and this was exactly what
was wanted by the crowd of idle people for their own justification.
Two unstable theories which could not stand on their own feet supported
each other, and so received a show of stability. Both the theories bore
in them a sense, precious to the crowd, that men are not to be blamed
for the existing evil in human societies, that the existing order is
what should be; and thus the new theory was accepted by the crowd in the
sense wanted by them, with full confidence and unprecedented enthusiasm.
Thus the new scientific doctrine was founded upon two arbitrary and
incorrect propositions, accepted in the same way that dogmas of faith
are accepted. Both in matter and form this new doctrine is remarkably
like the Church-Christian one. In matter, the similarity lies in the
fact that in both doctrines alike a fantastical meaning is attached to
really existing things, and this artificial meaning is taken as the
object of our research.
In the Church-Christian doctrine, to Christ who did really exist, is
attributed the fantastic conception of being God Himself, screened. In
the Positive doctrine, to the really existing fact of live men is
attributed the fantastical attributes of an organism.
In form, the similarity of these two doctrines is remarkable, since, in
both cases, a theory emanating from one class of men is accepted as the
only and infallible truth. In the Church-Christian doctrine, the
Church's way of understanding God's revelation to men is regarded as the
sacred and only true one. In the doctrine of Positivism, certain men's
way of understanding science is regarded as absolutely correct and true.
As the Church-Christians regard the foundation of their church as the
only origin of true knowledge of God, and only out of a kind of courtesy
admit that former believers may also be regarded as having formed a
church; so in precisely the same manner does Positive science, according
to its own statement, place its origin in Comte: and its
representatives, also only out of courtesy, admit the existence of
previous science, and that only as regarding certain thinkers, as, for
instance, Aristotle. Both the Church and Positive science altogether
exclude the ideas of all the rest of mankind, and regard all knowledge
outside their own as _erroneous_. The similarity persists. Just as to
the support of the first advental theological dogmas of the Trinity and
of the divinity of Christ comes the old--but newly-interpreted--dogmas
of man's fall and of his redemption by the death of Christ, and out of
these dogmas is developed popular Church teaching: so in our time, the
old dogma of Evolution comes in with new importance to help the
fundamental dogma of Comte concerning the organism of mankind; and from
these two elements the popular scientific doctrine has been formed. As
in one teaching, so in the other: the new dogma is necessary for the
support of the old one, and becomes comprehensible only in connection
with it. If to a believer in the Divinity of Christ, it is not clearly
comprehensible why God should come down to earth, the doctrine of
atonement explains it. If it is not quite clear to a believer in the
Organism of Mankind why a collection of individuals may be counted as an
organism, the dogma of Evolution is charged with the explanation. This
dogma is needed to reconcile the contradictions and certainties of the
first: mankind is an organism, and we see that it does not contain the
chief characteristic of an organism; how must we account for it?
Here the dogma of evolution comes in, and explains, Mankind is an
organism in a state of development. If you accept this, you may then
consider mankind as such.
As to any man free from superstitions about the trinity and the Divinity
of Christ, it is impossible even to understand the force and the meaning
of the teaching of atonement, which meaning comes only through the
acknowledgment of Christ as God Himself, so a man who is free from the
Positive superstition cannot even understand wherein lies the interest
of the theory of the Origin of Species and of Evolution; and this
interest is explained only when we learn the fundamental dogma, that
"Mankind is an Organism." And as the subtleties of theology are only
intelligible to those who believe in its fundamental dogmas, so also the
subtleties of sociology, which now occupy the minds of all adherents of
this recent and profound science, are intelligible only to believers.
The doctrine of atonement is necessary to reconcile the contradiction
between the first dogma and facts. God descended on earth to save men.
But men are not saved. How then explain this? The dogma of atonement
asserts "He saved those, who believed in atonement. If you believe in
atonement, you are saved."
The similarity between these two doctrines holds good yet further. Being
founded on dogmas accepted by faith, these doctrines neither question
nor analyze their own principles, which, on the other hand, are used as
starting-points for the most extraordinary theories. The preachers of
these call themselves, in Theology, sanctified; in Positive knowledge,
scientific; in both cases, infallible. And at the same time, they
conceive the most peremptory, incredible, and unfounded assertions,
which they give forth with the greatest pomp and seriousness, and which
are with equal pomp and seriousness contradicted in all their details by
others who do not agree, and yet who equally recognize the fundamental
dogmas.
The Basil the Great of scientific doctrine, Herbert Spencer, in one of
his first writings expresses these doctrines thus: Societies and
organisms, says he, are alike in the following points: First, in that,
being conceived as small aggregates, they imperceptibly grow in mass, so
that some of them become ten thousand times bigger than their originals.
Secondly, in that, while in the beginning they have such simple
structure that they may almost be considered structureless, in their
growth they develop an ever-increasing complexity of structure.
Thirdly, in that, though in their early undeveloped period there does
not exist among them any dependence of particles upon one another, these
particles by and by acquire a mutual dependence, which at last becomes
so strong that the activity and the life of each part is possible only
with the activity and the lives of all others.
Fourthly, in this, that the life and the development of society is more
independent and longer than the life and the development of every unit
which goes to form it, and which is separately born and growing and
acting and multiplying and dying while the political body formed of such
continues to live one generation after another, developing in mass, in
perfection of structure, and in functional activity.
Then follow the points of difference between organisms and societies,
and it is demonstrated that these differences are only seeming ones, and
that organisms and societies are quite similar.
To an impartial man the question at once arises, What are you speaking
about, then? Why is mankind an organism or something similar? You say
that societies are similar to organisms according to these four points;
but even this comparison is incorrect. You take only a few
characteristics of an organism, and you then apply them to human
societies. You produce four points of similarity, then you take the
points of difference which you say are only seemingly so, and you
conclude that human societies may be considered as organisms. But this
is nothing else than an idle play of dialectics. On this ground we may
consider as an organism everything we choose. I take the first thing
which comes to my mind,--a forest, as it is planted in a field and grows
up: first beginning as a small aggregate and imperceptibly increasing in
mass. Secondly, "In the beginning the structure of an organism is
simple, then the complexity increases," and so on. This is the case with
the forest: at first there are only birch-trees, then hazel, and so on;
first all the trees grow straight, and afterwards they interlace their
branches. Thirdly, "The dependence of the parts increases so that the
life of each part depends upon the lives and activities of all the
others": it is exactly the same with the forest; the nut-tree keeps the
trunks warm (if you hew it down, the other trees will be frozen in
winter), the underwood keeps off wind, the seed-trees continue the
species, the tall and leafy ones give shadow, and the life of each tree
depends upon that of the rest. Fourthly, "Separate parts may die, but
the whole organism continues to live." Separate trees perish, but the
forest continues in life and growth.
The same holds good with the example so often brought by the defenders
of the scientific doctrine. Cut off an arm,--the arm will die: we may
say remove a tree from the shadow and the ground of a forest, it will
die.
Another remarkable similarity between this scientific doctrine and the
Church-Christian one,--and any other theory founded upon propositions
which are accepted through faith,--lies in their mutual capacity of
being proof against logic.
Having demonstrated that by this theory a forest may be considered as an
organism, you think you have proved to the followers of the theory the
incorrectness of their definition? Not at all. Their definition of an
organism is so loose and plastic that they can apply it to everything
they like.
Yes, they will say, you may consider the forest, too, as an organism. A
forest is a mutual co-operation of the individuals who do not destroy
each other; an aggregate: its parts can also pass into a closer
relationship, and by differentiation and integration it may become an
organism.
Then you will say, that in that case, the birds too and the insects, and
the herbs of this forest, which mutually co-operate and do not destroy
each other, may be considered, with the trees, to be an organism. They
would agree to this, too. According to their theory, we may consider as
an organism every collection of living beings which mutually co-operate,
and do not destroy one another. You can establish a connection and
co-operation between everything you like, and, according to evolution,
you can assert that from anything may proceed anything else you like, if
a long enough period is granted.
To those who believe in the Trinity, it is impossible to prove that it
does not exist. But one can show them that their assertion is not based
on knowledge, but is an assertion of faith, and that if they assert that
there are three Gods, I have an equal right to assert that there are 17½
Gods. One may say the same thing with yet better ground to the followers
of Positive and Evolutional science. On the basis of this science one
could undertake to prove anything one liked. And the strangest thing of
all is, that this same Positive science regards the scientific method as
a condition of true knowledge, and that it has itself defined the
elements of the scientific method. It professes that common sense is the
scientific method. And yet common sense itself discloses the fallacies
of the doctrine at every step. The moment those who occupied the
position of saints felt there was no longer anything sacred in them,
that they are cursed like the Pope and our own Synod, they immediately
called themselves not merely sacred, but "most sacred." The moment
science felt that it had given up common sense, it called itself The
Science of Reason, The Only Really Scientific Science.