WRITING last year, Captain Aylward, in his work on the Transvaal,
indicated that South Africa would be a burning question for the British
taxpayer in the summer of 1879. That period of time has not yet arrived,
but already the question has come home to the aggrieved individual
aforesaid in an unpleasantly novel and alarming manner. In spite of
instructions from home, Sir Bartle Frere has initiated an aggressive war
on the Zulu nation which already represents an expenditure of a million
and a half, and which, before it is fought out to the bitter end, will
occasion the expenditure of a much larger sum. In a time of unexampled
commercial distress, when thousands of homes have been made desolate;
when tender and delicate women who have been nursed in luxury and comfort
have been deprived of their daily bread; when grey-haired old men have
found themselves after the struggle of a life made paupers; when the most
the majority of us can do is to meet the inevitable expenditure of the
passing day—we are committed, in accordance with the Imperial instincts
of officials in high quarters, to a warlike policy of which none can tell
the result or calculate the cost. This, alas! is no new thing where our
South African colonies are concerned. A war is begun by a blundering
ruler, or in accordance with the wishes of interested parties, and the
ignorant public at home has to pay the bill. Sir Arthur Cunynghame, in
his last work, expresses the hope that for the Kaffir wars which were in
existence when he was at the Cape the British taxpayer would not have to
pay; nevertheless, in the Budget £344,000 are put down for the Transkei
war. Mr. Trollope goes a step further, and plainly shows that the
colonist, whether as farmer or labourer or trader, is much better off
than men of the same class at home, and that it is unjust we should be
taxed by an immense military expenditure for their benefit alone.
Speaking of the Transvaal, he adds, “Great as is the parliamentary
strength of the present Ministry, Parliament would hardly endure the idea
of paying permanently for the stability and security of a Dutch
population out of the British pocket.” And yet in Natal the _Daily News_
correspondent estimates that our war with Cetewayo will cost twelve
millions. It is to be questioned whether we as a people have been
pecuniarly benefited by South African colonies. They offer no such
advantages as a field of emigration as New Zealand or Canada or
Australia. The emigrant is afraid of a Kaffir war, and he goes
elsewhere. If the colonists had to pay for their own wars, we should
have had fewer of them, and by this time they would have been in a much
more flourishing condition. Nor should we have been trembling, as we
have of late, lest any morning we might hear the Zulu army had marched
into Natal and had not left a white man alive to tell the tale of the
terrible tragedy that ensued. I maintain there would be no end to these
Kaffir scares and Kaffir wars so long as the men and money of the mother
country are so employed, and so long as the colonial governors are
allowed to rush into war. If a man goes to live in South Africa he
should do so with the feeling that he runs a certain risk, and that
knowledge would make him live on good terms with the natives. High
interest, as the late Duke of Wellington is reported to have said, means
bad security. In a similar manner, we may say, cheap land means bad
security; and the farmer who buys the freehold of his farm in Natal for
less than the rent he has to pay for it at home cannot expect to be as
secure in purse or person as a farmer in the Weald of Kent. In 1811 was
our first Kaffir war. It was waged on our part in the most cruel
manner—no quarter was given by the white man—no prisoners taken—all were
slaughtered till the Kaffirs were driven backwards and eastwards across
the Great Fish River. In 1819 we had another fight, as was to be
expected. Wars lead to wars. What the sword wins the sword only can
retain. Lord Charles Somerset, who had Imperial ideas of the most
pronounced character, took it into his head to elect Gaika as the sole
head of Kaffirland, when in reality the paramount chief was Hintza. In
1818, by seizing the wife of one of the latter’s chief councillors, and
other aggressive acts, Gaika drew upon himself the enmity of his
superior, and was defeated in a fierce battle with great slaughter.
After the defeat Gaika appealed to the British Government to assist him,
not in bringing about a reconciliation, but in making war on his enemies.
Accordingly a powerful force of regular troops and armed colonists, to
the number of 3,352 men, under Colonel Brereton, was despatched to fight
on behalf of this wretched savage. The reward of their valour consisted
in more than 30,000 head of cattle, of which 21,000 of the finest were
given to the colonists and the rest to Gaika. As a natural consequence,
the plundered tribes, rendered desperate by famine, crossed the Fish
River in great numbers, drove in the small military posts, and compelled
the border colonists to abandon their dwellings. Additional troops were
sent to the frontier, and a plan was formed for the re-invasion of
Kaffirland. But before that plan was carried out, the Kaffirs, to the
number of 9,000, led by Makanna, attacked Grahamstown, and would have
taken it had not the leader, in accordance with the custom of the heroes
of his country, sent a message overnight to inform Colonel Willshire, the
British commandant, that he would breakfast with him next morning. This
gave the British time to prepare, and the result was 1,400 Kaffirs were
left dead on the field. After this Colonel Willshire and Landdrost
Stockenstrom advanced into the enemy’s country, carrying fire and
slaughter everywhere. At length Makanna, to obtain better terms for his
people, freely surrendered himself into the hands of the English; but
this act had no effect on the latter, who proceeded to drive away the
Kaffirs and to annex 3,000 square miles of fertile territory. The
Kaffir, of course, became more incensed against us than ever. He saw his
lands taken away, and an inferior chief placed, as it were, in power; but
for a while, however, we had no regular fighting, only occasional brushes
in consequence of cattle stealing, real or pretended. There is a foray
recorded in the Cape Government Gazette of 1823 as a very meritorious
affair. At daybreak on the 5th, Major Somerset, having collected his
force, passed with celerity along a ridge, and at daylight had the
satisfaction of pouring into the centre of Makanna’s kraal with a
rapidity that at once astonished and completely overset the Kaffirs. A
few assegais were thrown, but the attack was made with such vigour that
little resistance could be made. _As many Kaffirs having been destroyed
as it was thought would evince our superiority and power_, Major Somerset
stopped the slaughter, and secured the cattle to the amount of about
7,000 head.
Strange to say, this mode of impressing the Kaffir with the fact of our
superiority and power only made matters worse, and the commissioners of
inquiry had to report, in July, 1825, that the annexation had entailed
expenses upon the Government and sacrifices upon the people in no degree
compensated with the acquirement of the territory which was the object of
it. A similar remark may be made at the present time, for, as soon as a
colony gets strong enough, its first effort is to fight the mother
country with a hostile tariff. It seems then, as now, nothing was easier
than to get up a _casus belli_. Mr. Thomas Baines, the great African
traveller, illustrates in an amusing manner what is meant by justice to
the natives by some of our colonists. “I was speaking to a friend,” he
writes, “respecting the new discoveries, and we both agreed that it would
be wrong to make war upon the natives and take the gold-fields away from
them.” “But,” said my friend, “I would work with foresight. I would
send cattle farmers to graze their herds near the borders, and the
Kaffirs would be sure to steal them; but, if not, the owner could come
away, and he could even withdraw his herdsmen and let them run night and
day, then the Kaffirs could not resist the temptation. We could go in
and claim the stolen cattle, and, if the Kaffirs resisted and made war,
of course they would lose their country.”
Our next Kaffir war was, as all our Kaffir wars were, discreditable to
ourselves. The war was not only, writes Mr. Trollope, bloody, but
ruinous to thousands. The cattle were of course destroyed, so that no
one was enriched. Of the ill blood then engendered the effects still
remain. Three hundred thousand pounds were spent by the British. But at
last the Kaffirs were supposed to have been conquered, and Sir Benjamin
D’Urban triumphant. Lord Glenelg himself, however, declared that the
Kaffirs had “ample justification.” It seems to an impartial observer
that the war was entirely brought about by the English. After his
expulsion from the Kat river, Macomo, the son of Gaika, retired to the
banks of the Chumie, but so far from instigating his people to plunder
the colony, he appears to have done his best to restrain them. On that
head we have abundant testimony, but it suited the Colonial Governor to
have him and his brother Tyalie removed, and removed they were under
really aggravating circumstances. Our own soldiers did their work well,
and we have graphic pictures of burning villages, ruined cultivations,
and people driven away like wild beasts. The chief was sulky, writes
Colonel Wade, and well he might be. Another cause of the war was the
frontier system, which constantly led to collisions with the natives. As
the Chief Tyalie declared, “Every year a commando comes, every week a
patrol comes, every day farmers come and seize our cattle.” It was then
the infuriated natives swept over the colony, to be in turn driven back.
The murder of the great chief Hintza appears to have been an
extraordinarily brutal one. It is stated to me, writes Lord Glenelg,
“that Hintza repeatedly cried for mercy, that the Hottentots present
granted the boon, and abstained from killing him; that this office was
then undertaken by Mr. Southey, and that then the dead body of the fallen
chief was basely and inhumanly mutilated.”
Under Sir Peregrine Maitland we had a fourth Kaffir war. Almost his
first act was to commit an unpardonable sin in Kaffir eyes—the erection
of a fort in their territory. As they said in their own expressive
language, the new chief smelt of war, and war soon came. A Kaffir stole
an axe; he was sent to Grahamstown to be tried at the circuit court. The
chief Tola said that was contrary to the treaty that all such offences
were to be tried at Fort Beaufort. The plea was in vain—the man was
sent; an attempt was made to rescue him, and a Hottentot policeman was
shot. At once the English took the field to avenge the insult in blood.
In 1850 the fifth Kaffir war arose, and the inhabitants of one advanced
military village after another were murdered. This went on for nearly
two years, but was at last suppressed by dint of hard fighting. It cost
Great Britain, wrote Mr. Trollope, upwards of two millions of money, with
the lives of about four hundred fighting men.
Our Natal territory cost us a little war initiated by Sir George Napier
in 1841. At first the war went very much in favour of the Dutch. Then a
larger force came, and the Dutch succumbed to numbers. It was not,
however, till 1843 that the twenty-four still existing members of the
Volksraad declared Her Majesty’s Government to be supreme. In the case
of the Orange Free State we had a war which resulted in our beating the
Dutch and winning the place, only to relinquish it again. Our rule in
Natal led to our little war with King Langalibalele, who had come to live
in Natal as king of the Hlubi tribe, who is now living, after a good many
lives had been lost, near Capetown at an expense to the Government of
£500 a year. In England it was felt that the chief had been unfairly
used, the trial was adjudged to have been conducted with over-strained
rigour, and the punishment to have been too severe. There would have
been no war at all had it not been for the blunders of mischievous
go-betweens. And now once more we are at war, and a cry has been raised
for the extermination of the whole Zulu race; and when that is over,
there will be fresh hordes of hostile natives to be fought, new lands to
be annexed, a scientific frontier to be gained, and the colonists will
make fortunes out of the millions thus spent. I ask in sorrow, How long
is England to be strained and denuded of men and money for these costly
wars? Surely it is a reproach alike to the Christianity and
statesmanship of our time that we have not yet hit on a more excellent
way.