The German Offensive of June 12 and 18, against the Villers-Cotterets
and Rheims Salients.
The two flanks of the “pocket” which the German Offensive of May 27 had
made, _i.e._ the Aisne salient around the Woods of Laigue, Compiègne,
and Villers-Cotterets; and the Rheims salient backed by the Rheims
Mountain, formed both an obstacle and a menace to the Germans, who
accordingly decided to take them at all cost.
The Aisne salient was attacked first. From June 9 to 11, Von Hutier’s
Army tried to break through from the north, but failed after
endeavouring in vain to take Compiègne.
On June 12, an attack was made against the other side of the Aisne
salient. After an exceedingly intense artillery preparation, which began
at 2.30 a.m. and levelled the French lines, the enemy attacked in great
force to the north and north-east of the Villers-Cotterets Wood along
the Retz Stream.
[Illustration: FROM JUNE 9 (9/6) TO JUNE 18 (18/6) THE GERMANS
UNSUCCESSFULLY ATTACKED THE AISNE AND RHEIMS SALIENTS.
_The Aisne Salient covered Compiègne and the road to Paris. The Rheims
Salient covered the left wing of the Army of Champagne._]
To the north, along the Aisne, in the neighbourhood of Amblény, the
Germans, despite very heavy losses, were unable to make progress, being
held in check by the Moroccan Division. To the south, in the region of
Longpont and Corey, they advanced only 400 to 500 yards. In the centre,
where the principal effort was being made, they succeeded, by means of
violent bombardments, in driving the French from the plateau, west of
Retz Ravine and, after capturing Cœuvres, St. Pierre-Aigle, and
Vertes-Feuilles Farm, progressed in the direction of Montgobert. On the
13th, they entered Laversine, but could neither debouch from Cœuvres
nor advance west of Vertes-Feuilles Farm. Once again they had failed.
On the 15th, a spirited French counter-attack cleared the Retz stream,
recaptured Cœuvres, and advanced the French line to the east of
Montgobert, the outskirts of Chaffosse and to the west of Chavigny.
The enemy unsuccessfully attacked the Rheims salient on June 18, from
Vrigny to La Pompelle (see the Michelin Guide: “Rheims and the Battles
for its possession”).
The German Peace Offensive (“Friedensturm”) of July 15.
The Germans, desirous of an early decision and hypnotised once again by
the vision of Paris--threatened on the north from the Oise Valley and on
the east from the Ourcq and Marne Valleys--decided on a new and still
more powerful offensive, which they named the “Friedensturm” or “Peace
Battle.”
The collapse of this offensive--final turning point of the war--was all
the more striking in that it was conceived and executed on truly
“kolossal” lines. The enemy attacked on a front still wider than that of
the Marne, extending from Château-Thierry to Massiges on the outskirts
of Argonne, and measuring fifty-four miles in length. (For particulars
of the Battle of Champagne, see the Michelin Guide: “Champagne and
Argonne.” French edition.)
By a frontal attack, Ludendorff aimed at separating the Allied Armies of
the north from those of the east, by outflanking Verdun (_via_ St.
Menehould and the upper Aisne Valley) on the one hand, and Rheims and
the Mountain of Rheims (_via_ the Marne Valley) on the other hand.
[Illustration: WHAT THE GERMANS EXPECTED FROM THEIR “FRIEDENSTURM.”]
Once this result obtained, the Germans would then march on Paris, which
would be unable to make a prolonged resistance. It was a re-staging of
Von Moltke’s dream, four years after the first Battle of the Marne!
To carry out this ambitious scheme, the enemy concentrated all the means
at their disposal in a supreme effort to snatch the victory. For a month
formidable quantities of tanks, storm-troops and batteries of heavy and
light artillery were concentrated. Ammunition depots were accumulated
right up to the first lines, and huge quantities of bridge-building
material collected. All these preparations were made at night, the
minutest care and every possible precaution being taken to ensure
secrecy.
Between Château-Thierry and Rheims the German aim was two-fold; firstly,
to cross the Marne and march southwards towards Montmirail and the Petit
Morin Valley, and secondly, to follow the river eastwards and attack
Epernay. The objectives for the first day were Epernay and points five
to six miles south of the Marne.
Before July 15, the enemy had seven divisions on the front of attack, to
which seven others were now added. On the Mountain of Rheims and on the
Marne, in the first line and in reserve, he had about thirty divisions
all told, including several of the most famous, _e.g._ the 1st and 2nd
Guards, 200th Chasseurs, etc.
On the Marne front the line of attack extended from Chartèves to Vrigny.
Despite the enemy’s minute precautions, the French were not taken
unawares. Thanks to their Intelligence Department and Aerial
Reconnoitring Service, the exact time and extent of the coming offensive
were known.
The artillery preparation began about midnight, the hour of attack
varying, from west to east, from 1.20 a.m., south of the Marne, to 4.20
a.m. at Chaumuzy.
During the night, the Germans had thrown bridges and pontoons across the
river, the two largest (25 to 30 feet in width) between Treloup and
Dormans, others in front of Courthiézy, Reuilly, Soilly, Chartèves, Mézy
and Jaulgonne. In spite of the dense smoke screens, these bridges were
promptly discovered by the Allied aviators who, bombing from a low
altitude, destroyed several of them, men and convoys being thrown into
the river. They also raked with machine-gun fire the German troops which
debouched on the southern bank of the river. In one day (the 15th)
French, British and American air-squadrons dropped over forty-four tons
of explosives on the bridges, inflicting severe losses on the enemy.
“_Rarely has a river been so ably defended_,” wrote the _Berliner
Tageblatt_ on July 17, and the defenders fully deserved this enemy
admission.
[Illustration: GENERAL DE MITRY (_in the centre_).]
Crossing the river before dawn, the Germans attacked the first-line
divisions holding the southern bank, from Chartèves to Mareuil-le-Port.
The American 3rd Division gallantly withstood the onslaught in the
region of Chartèves, Jaulgonne and Fossoy and, after fierce fighting,
forced the enemy back over the river, thereby helping to make the German
offensive a failure. The French defended the positions of Courthiézy,
Soilly, Chavenay, Nesle-le-Repons and Troissy with great stubbornness,
disputing the German advance foot by foot.
Among the numerous feats of arms performed in this region, that of the
33rd Colonial Regiment, which defended Mareuil-le-Port and stood firm in
Nesle-le-Repons Woods, was one of the most glorious. The enemy was
finally checked on the line: Celle-les-Condé, La Chapelle-Monthodon,
Comblizy (where the French reserves were already counter-attacking),
Oeuilly and Reuil.
North of the Marne, the enemy was held up on the first position
throughout the morning by two French divisions, and two Italian corps,
but succeeded, in the evening, in advancing as far as the second
position, where they were checked.
On the 16th, south of the Marne, French reinforcements continued the
counter-attacks begun on the previous evening in the direction of La
Chapelle-Monthodon, Chézy and Le Clos-Milon. Checked at this point, the
Germans attacked vigorously in the direction of Epernay. At about 4 p.
m., they launched a powerful attack to the east of Leuvrigny, and
succeeded in reaching the Chêne-la-Reine-Villesaint front. French and
Italian counter-attacks between the Marne and the Ardre were
unsuccessful, the attacking forces being thrown back on the
Belval-Venteuil line.
[Illustration: THE GERMAN ADVANCE TOWARDS EPERNAY ON JULY 16.]
Although Ludendorff had obtained slight tactical advantages to the
south-west of Rheims and on the Marne, he had entirely failed in
Champagne (see the Michelin Guide: “Champagne and Argonne,” French
edition). Abandoning his plan of outflanking Rheims from the east, he
now sought to turn the Mountain of Rheims from the south. A striking
success at all cost was considered necessary. Partly through temerity,
partly through an underestimation of the French strength, he resorted to
the dangerous manœuvre of concentrating his efforts against Epernay.
Recklessly throwing masses of men into the battle in an attempt to reach
his objective quickly by sheer weight of numbers, he launched five
powerful attacks in five different places. Considered in the whole,
these attacks were unsuccessful, while in the Ardre Valley the enemy was
vigorously counter-attacked. Meanwhile, four French divisions began an
offensive in the region of Dormans.
In spite of protecting smoke screens, the bridges across the Marne were
unceasingly bombarded by the Allied aviators and artillery, and
sometimes destroyed. The Germans accordingly reduced the number of these
bridges, and increased that of the less vulnerable foot-bridges. In this
way, thirty foot-bridges were built between Treloup and Reuil-sur-Marne.
The Allies’ resistance, so far from abating, stiffened, while each
attempt of the enemy to advance was checked with heavy loss. The Germans
were already beginning to show signs of exhaustion when on July 18 the
Allies’ great counter-offensive, which the German press had declared to
be impossible, was launched against the right flank and in the rear of
the German divisions, who were struggling desperately to reach Epernay.
[Illustration: THE ATTACKS AND COUNTER-ATTACKS OF JULY 17.]