The Plan of Attack.
On May 19, the enemy began their concentration, taking every conceivable
care and precaution. Most of their divisions reached the front by night
marches. The wheels of the gun-carriages and other vehicles, as also the
hoofs of the horses, were muffled.
Forty-two divisions under Generals von Boehn (7th Army) and Von Below
(1st Army) were concentrated between Pontoise and Berry-au-Bac and
between Berry-au-Bac and Rheims. In the centre, where their principal
effort was to be made, the Germans massed twenty-eight divisions of
picked storm-troops trained in the new methods of attack. Of these
twenty-eight divisions twenty-three previously formed part of General
Von Hutier’s famous “Army of Attack” which, in March, had broken through
the front of the Fifth British Army on the Somme. Since the middle of
April, all the picked divisions, except two, had been sent to the rear
and intensively trained in view of the coming attack. All the first-line
divisions, fifteen in number, knew the ground of the sector of attack,
having fought there in 1917. The objective of some of them was the same
as in the Battle of the Chemin-des-Dames in 1917.
[Illustration: THE OPPOSING FORCES DURING THE]
From June 5, five more divisions were engaged, making a total of
forty-seven divisions, or the equivalent of about sixty French divisions
(German regiments having three more companies than French regiments, and
divisions one more regiment). The enemy order of battle between the Oise
and Rheims on May 27, extended along three zones of attack--a central
zone, from Leuilly to Berry-au-Bac, which was the principal sector of
attack, and two secondary zones on the wings--between Pontoise and
Leuilly to the west and between Berry-au-Bac and Rheims to the east.
[Illustration: GERMAN ATTACK OF MAY 27, 1918.]
The plan of attack was similar to that adopted in the Battle of the
Somme. Each division had two regiments in the first line and one in
reserve. Each leading regiment had two battalions side by side in deep
echelon formation, with one supporting battalion. Battalions of
storm-troops, liquid-fire companies, independent detachments of
machine-gunners, companies of cyclists and mountain battalions were
added to each division.
Each regiment was provided with numerous heavy and light machine-guns,
mine-throwers, and accompanying guns. An idea of the huge numbers of the
latter may be gained from the fact that sixty-eight batteries of four
guns each were counted in two regiments.
The infantry attack was prepared and supported by a formidable
concentration of guns of all calibres. The artillery of the 7th German
Army on the Leuilly--Berry-au-Bac front was estimated at 1,450
batteries--_i.e._ fifty batteries per mile, of which twenty supported
the infantry. This artillery concentration greatly exceeded that of the
preceding German offensives of 1917 and 1918.
[Illustration: THE GERMAN ADVANCE ON MAY 27 AND 28.]
The Break-through.
The opposing Allied forces were much smaller. From Pinon to Craonnelle
the front was held by the 30th and 11th French Corps (6th Army, General
Duchesne) with head-quarters at Tartiers and Braine respectively. The
sector from Craonnelle to the outskirts of Rheims was held by the Ninth
British Corps which had been placed at the disposal of General Micheler,
commanding the French 5th Army. Rheims was held by the 1st French
Colonials, in _liaison_ on the left with the French 45th Division
forming the British right wing. Most of these troops had already been
engaged in the big battles of March and April.
After a terrifically intense artillery preparation which began at
midnight and included great quantities of gas-shells, the German
infantry rushed forward between 3.30 and 4 a.m., preceded by a powerful
creeping barrage and, in places, by tanks. The surprise was complete.
The French stood the bombardment heroically and made a desperate
resistance. Near Laffaux, the 21st (Territorial) Regiment fought to the
last man rather than fall back. However, in spite of heroic resistance
and heavy sacrifices, the German onrush bore down the Allies by sheer
weight of numbers.
To the west, a German corps with a division of reserves outflanked Pinon
Wood and converged towards Laffaux Plateau, but were unable to reach the
Aisne, whilst another corps gained a footing on the Chemin-des-Dames and
advanced slowly towards Vailly. In the centre, where the attack was more
furious and powerful, the enemy advanced rapidly, reaching the Aisne
before 11 a.m., between Chavonne and Concevreux. Another corps reached
the river in the morning, between Concevreux and Berry-au-Bac. To the
east, a third corps attacked from north to south and maintained its
positions level with those of the neighbouring corps on the right.
* * * * *
In the afternoon, the advance continued south of the Aisne, being more
rapid in the centre than on the wings. The River Vesle was reached
towards 7.30 p.m. in the neighbourhood of Bazoches and Magneux, Fismes,
and Braine fell into the hands of the enemy.
* * * * *
By the evening of the 27th it was known that German first-line divisions
alone had been engaged and that they had advanced from nine to twelve
miles in the centre without excessive casualties, driving back the 11th
French and 9th British Corps, which had fought with the greatest courage
and determination in an endeavour to make up for their deficiency in
numbers by superhuman bravery and endurance. The 64th Infantry Regiment
in particular covered itself with glory.
* * * * *
On the 28th, at day-break, the Germans resumed their attacks with
increased vigour, especially on the wings, where their success on the
previous day had been less marked. To the west, the 30th French Corps,
which had suffered heavily on the 27th, was reinforced by fresh
divisions, with orders to cover Soissons, which was in danger of being
encircled. This corps succeeded in checking the enemy to the north, on
the Cuffiès-Crouy-Bucy-le-Long line, but on the right the Germans
crossed the Vesle during the night, driving a wedge into the Murton
Valley and advancing eastwards towards Soissons. Some of their advanced
detachments reached the town, but were immediately driven out.
* * * * *
In the centre, the 11th Corps was again compelled to fall back;
Mont-Notre-Dame, Bruys and Dôle Woods were taken by the enemy, who
reached Loupeigne.
* * * * *
To the east, the fighting was also bitter. The British 9th Corps lost
the Saint-Thierry Hills and fell back, especially on the left, where the
Germans, advancing beyond the Ardre, got a footing on the tablelands to
the north of Arcis-le-Ponsart.
* * * * *
However, the French 21st Corps (General Degoutte) came to the rescue and
on the extreme right, Colonials and Algerian troops of the 45th Division
prevented the enemy crossing the Vesle, west of Rheims.
* * * * *
The Germans, whose casualties were heavy, had been compelled to engage
their second-line divisions.
[Illustration: GENERAL DEGOUTTE.]
[Illustration: THE GERMAN ADVANCE FROM MAY 29 TO 31.]
The Attack on the Wings.--The Race to the Marne.
The Kaiser, the Crown Prince, Hindenburg and Ludendorff held a war
council on the evening of the 28th, and in view of the results obtained,
altered the original plans. The battle, which was to have been merely a
diversion, previous to a general attack on the British front, was now to
form the principal offensive. Ludendorff accordingly ordered the attack
to be pushed vigorously on the wings and to exploit to the full the
success in the centre, in order to reach the Marne as rapidly as
possible and cut the Paris-Châlons-Nancy Railway.
From the 29th onwards, the battle developed. On the right wing, the
French divisions, which defended Soissons from the north, were
overwhelmed and compelled to fall back westwards without, however,
abandoning Cuffiès. Soissons, unprotected and in flames, was entered by
the enemy after fierce street fighting, in which they sustained heavy
losses. The Moroccan Division, which had arrived in the neighbourhood of
Chaudun at noon, was immediately sent to the western outskirts of
Soissons and along the Crise, in support of what remained of the
first-lines. Fresh divisions were also brought up to the south-east of
the town, with orders to check the German push at all cost, which they
did to the last man. The 9th Battalion of Chasseurs (4th Division, to
quote one example only) resisted heroically at Hartennes and Taux, in
which region the Germans were unable to make appreciable progress. In
the centre, the enemy’s effort southwards enabled two of their corps to
reach Fère-en-Tardenois and advance beyond that town.
Further to the east, they continued to advance along the Valley of the
Ardre. Driving back the 45th Division and the Colonials who were
defending the Vesle, they reached the Gueux-Tramery front-line in the
evening. Rheims was still covered by the impregnable “La Neuvillette”
lines.
Early in the morning of May 30, the enemy, supported by masses of
artillery, attacked to the west and south of Soissons towards
Villers-Cotterets Wood. North of the Aisne, where the 170th Division,
astride of the river, resisted the enemy’s furious assaults, progress
was insignificant.
On their right, the Moroccan Division on the Mercin-Lechelle front
resisted stubbornly, as usual. On the Montagne-de-Paris Hill, the
Foreign Legion stood firm. Zouaves and Algerian Tirailleurs, after
desperate indecisive fighting, which lasted until nightfall, succeeded
in checking the enemy on the Chaudun-Chazelle-Vierzy line.
Further to the south, at Plessier-Huleu, the Chasseurs of the 4th
Division stubbornly opposed the German advance which was very slow in
this region, thanks to the bravery and self-sacrifice of this division.
It was only with the greatest difficulty that the enemy advanced between
Parcy-Tigny and Grand-Rozoy, occupying Oulchy-le-Château after very hard
fighting.
In the centre, the Germans who had just been reinforced, were racing
towards the Marne. The first division to reach the river arrived at
about 2 p.m., the next at about 6 p.m., then pushed on towards
Château-Thierry, where the 10th Colonials (General Marchand) were just
organising the defence of the town. To the east of the salient thus
formed, the French front extended along the Verneuil-Ville-en-Tardenois
line, whence it linked up with the Janvry and Gueux positions.
The resistance of the French stiffened and became increasingly
effective. Ever on the watch, General Pétain, with that shrewd
discernment of which he had given numberless proofs since the Battle of
Verdun, realised that this was not a mere enemy feint, and brought up
reinforcements. Meanwhile, the Germans continued to engage their
reserves in the battle.
North of the Aisne the Germans succeeded in clearing the approaches to
Soissons as far as Courtil. On the south of the river, the Moroccan
Division held their ground until noon without flinching, and took part
in the counter-offensive by the 35th and 51st Divisions, which
re-occupied Courmelles and the banks of the Crise. However, at
night-fall, the Germans counter-attacked violently and forced them
slightly back westwards.
Lower down, the enemy progressed along the Ourcq Valley beyond
Neuilly-Saint-Front and approached Villers-Cotterets Wood, the outskirts
of which were stubbornly defended by the 2nd Cavalry Corps, fighting on
foot with the infantry.
To the south, the Germans made a dash for Château-Thierry, where they
were decimated by the 33rd Colonials fighting in the streets. Reaching
the Marne at Dormans and Vincelles, they approached Verneuil.
The enemy progressed slightly in the immediate vicinity of Rheims and
reached the line Saint-Brice-Ormes-Bligny. Fighting took place in the
suburbs near Tinqueux.
[Illustration: GENERAL BERTHELOT.]
[Illustration: THE GERMAN ADVANCE FROM JUNE 1 TO 5 (_between the two
continuous black lines_).]
The Westward Push.
On the evening of May 31, the German High Command held a new war
council, at which the Kaiser and Hindenburg declared in favour of the
continuance of the offensive. The push towards the Marne having absorbed
all the reserves of the corps engaged in the centre and to the east, the
enemy were unable to increase their efforts in the region of
Château-Thierry, where the French reserves were arriving in great
numbers. They therefore decided to push westwards.
Attacking at midnight, the enemy met with but little success in the
region of Soissons, but to the south-west of the town, where they still
had large reserves, they reached the Savières Stream and the
Dammard-Hautevesnes-Bussiares-Etrepilly line on the evening of June 1.
The 7th and 11th French Corps and the 2nd Cavalry Corps
counter-attacked, and made the enemy pay dearly for their advance in
this region.
On the same day, the Germans carried the northern side of
Château-Thierry, defended to the last by the French Colonial Division
(General Marchand) and the motorised machine-gun battalion of the 3rd
American Division which, later, prevented them from crossing the Marne.
On the east, the fighting was less fierce, but the 120th Division
(General Mordacq), in defending the wooded slopes in front of Cuchery,
sustained very bitter fighting. At the end of the line the Colonials
prevented any enemy advance in the direction of Rheims.
On June 2 the enemy’s plan was made clear. While their principal efforts
were directed westwards, south of the Aisne they reached Missy-aux-Bois,
and lower down heavy fighting took place in the afternoon on both banks
of the Ourcq. French cavalry, fighting on foot, drove back the enemy
with fine dash to the south of Dammard, but were compelled to fall back
in the evening, the enemy having received reinforcements.
* * * * *
On the 3rd the Germans launched a general attack against the
Villers-Cotterets Wood, between the Aisne and the Ourcq. All their
available reserves (three divisions of fresh troops) attacked with the
first-line divisions. To the north, they carried Missy-aux-Bois and
progressed beyond it, and after sustaining very heavy casualties reached
Amblény and Dommiers, where they were checked by French reinforcements.
Lower down, they reached Longpont, and advancing along the Ourcq, south
of the wood, progressed towards La Ferté-Milon _via_ Troësnes.
In the evening, after heavy losses, they were held up on the
Montaigu-Dommiers-Longpont line, thus leaving Villers-Cotterets Woods
still intact.
[Illustration: GENERAL FOCH (_on the left_) AND GENERAL FAYOLLE (_on
the right_).]
On June 4, the fighting was less fierce. Combats still took place, but
they had neither the scope nor the strategical importance of those of
the preceding days.
* * * * *
The Crown Prince’s Army was now exhausted. On June 5, this army from the
Oise to La Pompelle numbered thirty-four first-line divisions. All its
reserves had been engaged, with the exception of seven divisions, of
which two were inferior troops and two fairly good. Eight divisions had
been withdrawn from the battle.
From June 5 onwards, enemy action was purely local, the Germans being
often compelled to defend themselves against French counter-attacks. To
the north, the Moroccan Division recaptured the Amblény positions by
night. Hard fighting continued all along the Savières Stream, from
Troësnes to Longpont, where the French recovered part of the lost
ground, and to the north-west of Château-Thierry on the
Dammard-Veuilly-la-Poterie-Belleau-Bouresches line, where the American
troops, co-operating with French divisions, gave signal proofs of their
courage and determination. On June 10, the 2nd American Division
recaptured Belleau Wood. Furious combats took place on the Mountain of
Rheims and in the neighbourhood of Bligny, Champlat, Sainte-Euphraise
and Vrigny, where French, British and Italian troops vigorously resisted
the German push.
American Units Engaged from June 1 to 10, 1918.
=2nd Division= =Major-General Omar Bundy.=
comprising:
_3rd Infantry Brigade_ _Brig.-Gen. E. M. Lewis_
_4th_ “ “ (_Marines_) “ “ _James G. Harbord_
_2nd Artillery_ “ “ _Chamberlaine_
This division was engaged west of Château-Thierry and opposite Belleau
Wood.
[Illustration: MAJOR-GENERAL OMAR BUNDY.