WHY GERMANY DECIDED UPON WAR
Austria-Hungary had long been anxious to go to war. She had been
straining at the leash for years. The peaceful issue to the Annexation
crisis had not pleased Austrian statesmen. They were still less
satisfied at the check put upon their aggressive plans at the time of
the signing of the Treaty of Bucharest. In the first instance, the
credit of preserving peace was entirely due to Germany. She was not
ready. On the second occasion, Italy’s refusal to fight against the
Serbs or to stand by Austria in an aggressive war was probably the
decisive factor, for then Germany was ready, and only waiting for a
good pretext to break the peace of Europe.
When Kaiser Wilhelm heard of the assassination at Sarajevo he
immediately saw that the chance so long sought had come. Such an
opportunity would never occur again. But he knew that he must play
his cards with skill. The Emperor of Austria would be delighted at a
chance of punishing Servia, for her statesmen, who felt secure under
the protection of Russia, had used expressions in parleying with
Austria that irritated the aged Emperor. He could not brook that small
Balkan States of very recent growth should place themselves on a level
with the Austro-Hungarian Empire. His councillors succeeded in making
him believe that the Serbs were responsible for the crime of Sarajevo.
The aged Emperor, perhaps, had some suspicion of the truth. He did not
want to know it, however. Providence had intervened and removed an
obnoxious personage, and had at the same time given Austria a chance of
thrashing Servia. The Emperor considered that the thrashing was long
overdue. Why should he, the faithful son of the Church, inquire too
closely into events that had fallen out so propitiously? The Emperor,
however, only wished to send a punitive expedition to Belgrade.
Gunboats could bombard the capital from the Danube, and Austria’s
honour would be satisfied. The Emperor in no wise wished for a war with
Russia. Apart from other considerations, he was bound in honour not to
seek a quarrel with the “peace” Czar. When the Annexation crisis was
at its height, Emperor Francis Joseph sent Prince Hohenlohe to St.
Petersburg with an autograph letter, begging the Czar to allow him to
end his days in peace. The terms in which this document was couched
made it almost impossible for Austria to seek war with Russia so long
as Emperor Francis Joseph was at the head of affairs. It was a breach
of the honour that reigns among monarchs, for the appeal had been made
as from a brother-sovereign. Kaiser Wilhelm was aware of this. But he
was ready to stoop to any crime to accomplish his object. He and his
councillors decided that the aged man at Schönbrunn could be deceived.
He must think that the war would be merely a local affair. The
Austrians, too, were longing to show their prowess against Servia, but
a war with Russia would not be popular either in Austria or Hungary. It
is doubtful whether any Austro-Hungarian statesman who understood the
situation would have consented to acts that must inevitably lead to a
European war. The idea of a series of small wars, first against Italy
and then against the mutinous Balkan States, was favoured in Vienna.
Kaiser Wilhelm had a singular talent for discovering unscrupulous men.
The German Ambassador in Vienna, Count Tchirsky, was a complete tool
in the hands of the Kaiser. He did not hesitate to lie to Count Tisza
when occasion occurred. Count Tisza is a man of peculiar loyalty, and
he could not understand utter unscrupulousness in another. Moreover,
like all aristocrats, he was at a disadvantage in dealing with Germans,
as he was a gentleman and his opponents were not. He was always at
Budapesth, and therefore had no chance of watching the machinations
employed by the Germans in Vienna. With Count Berchtold the German
Ambassador had an easy task. The Count did not take things seriously,
and fell into the toils spread for him by German statesmen. He really
believed that the Emperor was an old man in his dotage, and neglected
the other side of his character. In spite of his age and weakness, the
Emperor Francis Joseph had enjoyed a unique experience as the oldest
reigning monarch in Europe, and was able through this to judge of any
question with an acumen exhibited by few politicians.
Germany decided that the moment for letting a European war break loose
had come, and her reasons for this decision were weighty. The most
important of all was the “Slav danger,” as it was generally called
in Germany and Austria-Hungary. Twenty years ago the German family
averaged sixteen to eighteen children. In Austria, too, large families
had been the rule. The Magyars in Hungary still boasted big families,
but the cancer that had bitten into German social life was beginning
to be seen there, too. The one-child family had become the fashion in
Germany. The mode was adopted by the Germans in Austria. Statesmen
scolded, and proposed to tax bachelors and childless couples. But
they were unable to stop the terrifying decrease in the population.
Meanwhile, the Slavonic races in both Germany and Austria and Hungary
multiplied very rapidly. Military men complained that regiments,
officers and men, were composed entirely of Slavs, because there were
not sufficient Austro-Germans or Magyars. It was impossible to enter
a room where men of purely German extraction had assembled without
hearing of this “Slav danger,” which hung like a nightmare over the
ruling races in Germany. Austria and Hungary saw their preponderance
threatened. They doctored statistics to hide the truth. This was
of little use. The Slav type was unmistakable. Slavs did not care
to intermarry with Germans, and the race remained purely Slavonic,
although Serbs and Czechs often intermarried. A war would afford an
opportunity of reducing the Slav population. The military authorities
had arranged to place the regiments composed of subject-races in the
front of the battle so that they might be killed off. In 1914 leading
men in both Germany and Austria-Hungary considered that war was
inevitable within the next five years if they were to retain their
supremacy.
The financial factor, too, was largely responsible for hastening
the date of the war. Large sums had been spent on armaments in both
Germany and Austria-Hungary far beyond the capacity of either country.
Taxation had risen imperceptibly, and with it the cost of living. This
had affected the middle classes. It is doubtful whether the families
of officials in State employ and army officers ever got a really
satisfactory meal in the last years of preparation. Men dressed in
gorgeous uniforms, and with Orders and decorations that showed their
rank, walked about the streets gaunt and hungry-looking.
People said, “This cannot go on.” Statesmen saw that it would be
revolution or war. Austria was faced with bankruptcy unless she could
fight a successful war which would open fresh regions for exploitation
and relieve her of her surplus Slavs.
Undue importance was attached to news of unrest in Great Britain,
both in Germany and Austria-Hungary. Spies, men who were only too
ready to believe that Britain was at her last gasp, brought back
reports that a revolution was about to break out. The Irish question
was misunderstood. The greed and hate that had been nurtured in every
German heart prevented the spy from exercising any judgment, while
the statesmen who should have controlled their reports had also lost
their usual faculty of calm judgment in the bitterness of their hate.
The woman question, which was seen in its ugliest aspects abroad, made
the Germans realise that there was something wrong. Why were they
so discontented? What had been done to render them so bitter? The
question was asked in the Press and in public, and no explanation was
forthcoming.
Jews who travelled throughout Europe on business brought back evil
reports of conditions in England. They said that they had searched the
length and breadth of the land for a capable business man to push their
interests. They had returned from their quest unsatisfied. Germans and
Austrians who had resided in England explained this by saying that all
the better elements in the country had emigrated long ago. Men could
find no work unless they had influence. These facts were confirmed by
observation, and undue importance was attached to them, single examples
being too hastily accepted as indicative of the general state of things.
The preference shown by English business men for German clerks was
regarded as another proof that the English were “a back number.”
If Britain were degenerating, Russia was on the up-grade. She was
arming. She was reforming her public offices. Large loans had been
contracted, and she was about to build railways to the frontier. The
Austro-Russian front in Galicia bristled with fortresses. Every week
brought news of some new fortifications, made either on the Austrian
or the Russian side. The Slav peoples in the Balkans were also on the
up-grade. Everywhere the Germans saw themselves surrounded by Slavs,
who were educating and improving themselves.
Meanwhile, not only the German people, but the German army, was
deteriorating. Nasty stories, like _The Small Garrison_, were being
written, describing life in small garrison towns. The Austrian and
Hungarian officers were also suffering from the corrupt life which they
led. It was very uncertain whether they would have the necessary nerve
to take the initiative at a crisis. Kaiser Wilhelm saw that the time
was not far distant when his officers would be as bad as the Austrians.
It was bad policy to wait until the growing evil that had corrupted the
Austro-Hungarian army had infected his own.