THE OPERATIONS OF GENERAL FRENCH IN THE EASTERN TRANSVAAL, FROM 27TH
JANUARY TO 16TH APRIL 1901
It may be remembered that at the close of 1900 the Boer chiefs, De Wet
and Botha, had invented a concerted scheme of some magnitude. They had
arranged that Hertzog should enter Cape Colony and proceed to
Lambert's Bay to meet a ship which was said to be bringing from Europe
mercenaries, guns, and ammunition. De Wet was to follow south _viâ_ De
Aar, join hands with Hertzog, and together, with renewed munitions of
war and a tail of rebels at their heels, attack Cape Town. General
Botha at the same time was to keep the British occupied in the Eastern
Transvaal and prevent them drawing off troops to the south, and, so
soon as the plans of De Wet and Hertzog were being carried out, he was
to enter Natal with a picked force of 5000 mounted men and make for
Durban.
Having seen how the parent scheme, the invasion of the Cape Colony,
was frustrated, it is necessary to turn to scheme two, and follow
General French in the remarkable operations which defeated Botha's
designs. A considerable concentration of Boers, under the Commandants
Louis Botha, Smuts, Spruyt, and Christian Botha, had taken place in
Ermelo, Carolina, and Bethel, which districts constituted depôts for
the supply of the enemy's forces. The Commander-in-chief therefore
decided to sweep the country between the Delagoa and Natal Railway
lines, from Johannesburg to the Swazi and Zulu frontiers, and to clear
it of supplies and families. With this object in view, on the 28th of
January the following columns were concentrated from the meridian of
Springs: Major-General Paget, Brigadier Alderson, Colonel E. Knox
(18th Hussars), Lieutenant-Colonel Allenby (6th Dragoons),
Lieutenant-Colonel Pulteney (Scots Guards), and Brigadier-General
Dartnell (Commandant of Volunteers, Natal).
The troops--the southern columns under the command of Lieutenant-General
Sir John French--were to form a north and south line between the
railway, and thus drive the enemy before them to Ermelo. They were
commanded from north to south in the order shown above. While this line
was advancing, Lieutenant-Colonel Campbell and Lieutenant-Colonel Spens,
moving a march south from Middelburg and Wonderfontein, were to act as
side stops, while Major-General Smith-Dorrien, with a force 3000
strong, was to advance from Belfast _viâ_ Carolina to Lake Chrissie, for
the purpose of preventing the Boers from breaking north-east. A weak
column, under Lieutenant-Colonel Colville (Rifle Brigade), was to work
south of Colonel Dartnell to cover the movement of supplies, first from
Greylingstad to the north, and then from Standerton to Ermelo.
[Illustration: MAP SHOWING THE OPERATIONS AND DISPOSITIONS OF TROOPS
IN THE EASTERN TRANSVAAL]
Eventually, owing to the movements of De Wet, General Paget was
recalled from this sphere of action, and his place was taken by
Colonel Campbell. General Alderson's and Knox's lines of advance were
slightly diverted to the north, and the line between them was filled
by Lieutenant-Colonel Pulteney, who originally was to have been held
in reserve.
The first two marches took the western troops to a line north of
Greylingstad to Vangatfontein, in the valley of the Wilge River, where
there was a two days' halt till the 31st. The march was not without
excitement, for Beyers was found to be ensconced in a strong and
extended position stretching north and south, and covering the
approach to the valley of the Wilge River. Bushman's Kop, fourteen
miles east of Springs, was strongly held, and the advanced troops of
Knox and Allenby were assailed with fierce artillery from the
surrounding heights. But when Allenby's mounted men had wheeled round
the south of the position, the Boers thought it high time to retreat,
leaving behind them two dead. This was on the 29th. Two days were
spent in receiving supplies from Greylingstad and sending the emptied
waggons full of Boer families to the rail and clearing the country of
supplies.
The Boers, holding a chain of sloping hills some twenty-three miles
west of Bethal, were again encountered on the 1st of February. While
Colonel Rimington (commanding Colonel Pulteney's mounted troops)
worked round the north of the position, Colonel Allenby and the rest
of Pulteney's troops held them in front. But the wily Dutchmen, now
rapidly becoming demoralised, instantly they found their flank
threatened, were off to the east before they could be cut off. The
commanders on the right had also met with slight opposition.
The operations of the 2nd of February much resembled those of the
previous day, for some 2000 Boers, who had planted themselves about
ten miles west of Bethal, ceased their opposition to Colonel Allenby,
when they found Pulteney's cavalry sweeping round to their north, and
they made such haste to depart that they left behind them an English
15-pounder gun, with damaged breech. The village of Bethal was reached
by General French on the 4th, all Boers, save a few women and
children, having fled. The troops were now hurriedly pushing forward
with a view to surrounding Ermelo. Their position was as follows:
Allenby on the south-east; Dartnell on the south and south-west;
Pulteney on the west; Knox on the north-west; Anderson and Campbell on
the north; and Smith-Dorrien on the north-east and east. The enemy,
seeing security at this place thus threatened, split into two
factions. Louis Botha, with a following of some 3000 men, scurried to
the north toward Komati without impediment, in the form of families
and stock, while the rest, protecting their waggons, retreated toward
Piet Retief. Botha, while scurrying as aforesaid, discovered on the
5th that Smith-Dorrien's force, about 3000 strong (with a big convoy
for his own, Campbell's, and Alderson's columns), had reached
Bothwell, north of Lake Chrissie. Here was a fine chance! and the Boer
leader speedily availed himself of it. He determined to attack the
British column before the troops of Campbell and Alderson, moving from
the west, could get in touch with it. Accordingly, dividing his force
into three, and rising betimes, in the thick mists of daybreak, on the
6th, he delivered a vigorous semicircular attack upon the camp. This
was successfully repulsed.
The Boers lost heavily, General Spruyt and several field-cornets being
among the slain. The British had one officer and twenty-three men
killed, three officers and fifty-two men wounded. Some 300 horses were
killed or stampeded during the surprise. The Boers, owing to the heavy
fog of the morning, got away to the north. At the moment Botha was
making his attack on the camp, the officer bearing orders from General
French for General Smith-Dorrien, after an exciting and hazardous
ride, reached Bothwell. Owing to the fight these orders--to move on
the 6th to a position E.N.E. of Ermelo--could then not be executed.
General Smith-Dorrien therefore remained at Bothwell.
Meanwhile, in the south, fighting went forward. Colonel Allenby, who
had been rapidly pushing east, came on the enemy's rearguard, which
was occupying a ridge south of Ermelo. With infantry and artillery,
and supported by Dartnell's Brigade, he engaged them, holding them on
the west while the mounted troops endeavoured to wheel round the
southern flank and surround them. But the Boers, who had had a long
start, nimbly made good their escape over the Vaal at Witpunt before
Allenby's troops could possibly reach that point, and consequently the
brilliant attempt to cut off their retreat proved a failure. Ermelo
was occupied on the 6th, and thus the first phase of the operations
was accomplished.
* * * * *
It was now necessary to sweep the country from Ermelo to the Swazi
frontier, which movement occupied from the 9th to the 16th of
February. To this end the flanks were immediately opened out again,
and the line Bothwell-Ermelo-Amersfoort taken. From this line the
force wheeled half-right, the left flank (rationed on reduced scale up
to the 20th) beginning to extend east towards Swaziland on the 9th.
The whole force was now so ordered as to form a complete cordon for
the purpose of hemming in the enemy and their belongings in the
south-eastern corner of the Transvaal. The troops were here to
converge on Amsterdam and Piet Retief from north and south-west, and,
with the escort to the convoy from Utrecht, were to form a line from
Utrecht and the Natal frontier to the Swazi frontier north of Piet
Retief. On the 9th General Smith-Dorrien, moving east-north-east,
encountered the Boers, and Colonel Mackenzie and his gallant men, with
the assistance of the 2nd Imperial Light Horse, succeeded in
capturing a convoy and putting twenty-one Boers _hors de combat_ by a
brilliant charge.
Affairs were somewhat hampered by lack of supplies, but at last (on
the 10th) a convoy from Standerton having come in, the right wing
(Dartnell and Allenby) were provided for. On the following day General
French moved on, while Colville's emptied waggons started back with a
pathetic load of Boer families and prisoners and British sick.
[Illustration: POSITION OF FORCES AROUND ERMELO]
On the 12th, the Boers offered some opposition to the advancing troops
of Pulteney and Allenby, and near Klipfontein they, for a wonder, made
a stand, and gave Colonel Rimington and the Inniskilling Dragoons an
opportunity for smart work. A dashing charge, magnificently led,
cleared the ground, and five dead Boers and some wounded were left to
tell the tale of the encounter.
On the 13th Dartnell, who had taken up a position at Amersfoort, moved
from thence steadily in line with the whole force, which proceeded
with insignificant opposition to clear away stock and destroy
supplies.
Amsterdam was occupied by Smith-Dorrien on the 14th, and on the 16th
General French, with the troops of Knox and Pulteney, made his entry
into Piet Retief, where the landdrost at once surrendered. Rains had
now made the already almost impassable country into one mighty morass,
and the mists, fogs, and torrents rendered the position of the troops
a critical one. Great consternation prevailed as to the fate of
Colonel Burn-Murdoch, on whom all hopes were set. He had been charged
by the General Officer Commanding in Natal with the duty of conveying,
from Utrecht, food to the force, and had apparently got lost in the
mists and bog, for not a sign of his anxiously awaited convoy could be
discovered. This convoy had left Newcastle on the 12th, but it was not
till the 27th that its welcome supplies reached the famishing troops,
who, from the 20th, had had to subsist entirely on the country, while
the horses ate grass only. The rivers had by this time become raging
torrents, and the roads, quagmires. The Boer farms had already been
cleared out, and only by offering a sovereign for a 200-lb. bag of
mealies could the natives be prevailed upon to unearth their buried
treasure. The ration during this lean period sounds distinctly
unpleasing: three-quarters of a pound of mealie meal (ground in the
steam mill at Piet Retief), and an ounce of mealie coffee (an infusion
of the same meal roasted and ground), made the sole variation to a
diet of saltless meat. The men nevertheless maintained their health
and cheeriness, their constant hauls conducing much to their
enlivenment, and the number in hospital was abnormally low. Still
there was vast annoyance in the fact that they were unable to be up
and doing.
A new line of supply was opened on the 28th, when Colonel Bullock
started from Volkrust to Piet Retief with a convoy of ninety-one
waggons. Though this reached its destination in safety on the 5th of
March, it was not till he returned with a second load, on the 21st of
March, that sufficient oats could reach Piet Retief to enable the
force to move. Despite the inconvenience of delay a tremendous amount
of work was carried on, the troops pushing continually into Swaziland
and tackling Boers who struggled to slip through the British line, and
many captures were made both north and south of the border. The
surrounding country was thoroughly cleared, and many guns and much
ammunition were brought to light. The Engineers also worked like
Trojans, improving the roads and bridging the numerous, now swollen,
rivers and spruits that abounded in the district. As an instance of
the force of the unceasing floods between the 6th and 13th of March,
it may be mentioned that the Assegai, which is normally fordable,
averaged 12 feet in depth, and on the 12th rose to 18 feet.
[Illustration: A NIGHT ATTACK: DEFENDING A TRAIN DERAILED BY THE BOERS
Drawing by Frank Dadd, R.I.]
The position of the forces on the 1st of March stood thus:--
General Smith-Dorrien (who had moved south from Amsterdam on the 25th
of February) was now eight miles north of Piet Retief, while his
mounted troops, under Colonel Henry, had penetrated into Swaziland. At
Piet Retief was General French, with Colonels Knox and Pulteney, some
of whose mounted troops, under Colonel Rimington, were covering the
road south-west of Luneberg as far as Schihoek, whence Colonel
Burn-Murdoch carried on the line to Utrecht. Colonels Campbell and
Allenby were twelve and seventeen miles south-east of Piet Retief
respectively, Colonel Alderson was at Marienthal, and General Dartnell
at Intombi River. Colonel Bullock was at Wakkerstroom.
Soon the Utrecht-Luneberg line was abandoned as a line of supply, and
the troops were based on Utrecht. On the 18th of March General
Dartnell occupied the village of Paul Pietersburg, and Colonel
Rimington seized the stone bridge over the Pivaan River running south
of it, while Colonel Alderson built a pontoon bridge over the Pongola
River at Yagd Drift.
On the 21st General French, with Colonels Knox and Pulteney, moved on,
leaving General Smith-Dorrien in command north of the Pongola. Here
the latter, with the columns of Colonels Campbell and Allenby, held a
line from Langdraai Drift, in the Lower Pongolo, by Platnek, Mahamba,
Zaudbauk, and Piet Retief, to Yagd Drift, so as to prevent Boers from
breaking north and north-west.
Colonel Knox now set about clearing the country to the east, between
the Pivaan and Pongola Rivers, to prevent the Boers breaking back
south of the Pongola, while General French, continuing his march with
the columns of General Dartnell and Colonel Pulteney, moved on
Vryheid, where he established his headquarters on the 25th of March.
Here General Hildyard had accumulated a large reserve of supplies for
the whole force, thus materially facilitating the progress of further
operations.
The movement to clear the angle between the Swazi and Zulu frontiers
began on the 27th of March and terminated on the 15th of April.
General Dartnell, with ten days' supplies, moved east from Vryheid,
with Pulteney east-south-east on his right rear, and Alderson (who
started two days later from some four miles south of the Pivaan
Bridge) on his left rear. Colonel Pulteney speedily came in contact
with Grobelaar's commando, drove it north, where it came in collision
with General Dartnell, who, after some skirmishing, killed and wounded
some twenty Boers. The General was now forced to push on with mounted
troops and a few guns only, for the country was impassable for wheeled
transport, and therefore it had to be left behind in charge of the
infantry. He formed a depôt some thirty miles east-south-east of
Vryheid, while Colonel Alderson formed his about twenty-five miles
north-east of Vryheid.
More fighting took place on the 31st between the Boers and General
Dartnell some twelve miles north of his depôt, in which engagement
four Boers were slain, ten taken prisoners, and waggons, cattle, and
sheep were captured. Their pom-pom--previously destroyed to prevent it
being of service to us--was thrown over a precipice by the flying foe.
The troops moving on east through the low-lying bush veldt came on
more Boers on the 2nd, engaged them, cleared the country, returned to
Toovernsaarsrust on the 4th, and moved on the 5th and 6th to Vryheid,
where General Dartnell for five days took a well-earned rest.
Colonel Alderson had meanwhile taken a prodigious share in the work.
He had sped hot foot after a party of Boers that had broken
northwards, caught them on the 3rd near the junction of the Pivaan and
Pongola Rivers, and succeeded in effecting the capture of their
cattle, waggons, and mules. On the following day he rested at
Nooitgadacht, a place six miles east of Vryheid. He then (on the 6th)
passed Vryheid, and proceeded, in three columns, to sweep the country
south of that place, while General Dartnell acted as a stop on the
line Vryheid-Toovernsaarsrust. By the 13th Colonel Alderson had
fulfilled his mission, and "accomplished all that was feasible." He
then returned to Vryheid, and the difficult and fatiguing operations
were practically concluded.
The various columns now left from this part of the theatre of war in
the following order: Colonel Pulteney, being urgently needed by the
Commander-in-Chief for use in the north of Middelburg, left Vryheid on
the 1st, and entrained from Glencoe on the 4th. General Dartnell on
the 12th, from Vryheid, marched _viâ_ Newcastle to Volkrust, there to
rest and refit. General Alderson passed through Vryheid on the 13th,
reaching the rail at Glencoe on the 16th, and General Smith-Dorrien
with his own, Colonel Campbell's, and Colonel Allenby's columns,
marched north from Piet Retief on the 14th towards the Delagoa
Railway.
The results of the prodigious energy of General French's force during
the two and a half months, from the 27th of January to the 16th of
April, were amazing. These zealous and untiring warriors had entirely
swept the country between the Delagoa and Natal railway lines, from
Johannesburg to the Swazi and Zulu frontiers, travelling across the
most difficult country, rendered doubly so by tempest and flood, and
living almost on starvation fare.
Nevertheless 1332 Boers had been placed _hors de combat_ (369 killed
and wounded, 233 taken prisoners, 730 surrendered), while an
incalculable amount of supplies had been removed or destroyed,
including 11 guns, 1280 rifles, 218,249 rounds of ammunition, 2281
waggons and carts, and 272,752 head of stock (7303 horses, 377 mules,
7653 trek oxen, 42,328 cattle, and 215,089 sheep). How much farther
the work might have proved successful had it not been for the
negotiations between Botha and the Commander-in-Chief which took place
during the movement, cannot be stated. Certain it is that General
French was much hampered by the palaver which ended in air, for
Botha's ruse or so-called negotiations enabled the Boers to slip
northwards unmolested. As the pacific nature of the negotiations has
been the subject of much comment, it is as well to append the origin
and substance of them.
On February 23 a telegram was received by Sir Alfred Milner from the
Commander-in-Chief, Pretoria, which stated, under date of the 22nd
February, that Mrs. Botha had come back from meeting her husband,
bringing from him an answer to a verbal message from the
Commander-in-Chief, that if he desired it, he (General Botha) would
meet him as to the means of bringing the war to an end, but on the
express understanding that the question of the independence of the
Transvaal and Orange River Colony should not be discussed in any way.
The meeting would probably take place at Middelburg.
This telegram was sent to Mr. Chamberlain, who replied, February 23:--
"I am glad to hear of Botha's desire to treat, and I hope that
it is genuine. He will find us most anxious, in that case, to
meet him on all points affecting individual position. We have
already made clear the policy we intend to pursue as to future
government."
On March 1 Lord Kitchener telegraphed:--
"I have had a long interview with Botha, who showed very good
feeling, and seemed anxious to bring about peace. He asked for
information on a number of subjects which he said that he
should submit to his Government and people, and if they agreed
he should visit Orange River Colony and get them to agree. They
should all then hand in their arms and finish the war. He told
me that they could go on for some time, and that he was not
sure of being able to bring about peace without independence.
He tried very hard for some kind of independence, but I
declined to discuss such a point, and said that a modified form
of independence would be most dangerous and likely to lead to
war in the future."
Lord Kitchener then detailed the points upon which Botha required
information. These points were noted by the Commander-in-Chief, and
his suggestions were embodied in a telegram of March 3 from Sir Alfred
Milner to Mr. Chamberlain. The Colonial Secretary replied on March 6,
suggesting modifications which his Majesty's Government desired should
be made in the letter to Botha. A telegram from Sir Alfred Milner of
March 9 reported that he and Lord Kitchener were both opposed to the
assistance to burghers being limited to loans, but that the amended
message was sent to the Commandant on March 7.
Lord Kitchener, in a telegram to Mr. Brodrick on March 20, detailed
the terms of his letter to Commandant Botha:--
"With reference to our conversation at Middelburg on 28th
February, I have the honour to inform you that in the event of
a general and complete cessation of hostilities and the
surrender of all rifles, ammunition, cannon, and other
munitions of war in the hands of the burghers or in Government
depôts or elsewhere, his Majesty's Government is prepared to
adopt the following measures:--
"His Majesty's Government will at once grant an amnesty in the
Transvaal and Orange River Colonies for all _bona fide_ acts of
war committed during the recent hostilities. British subjects
belonging to Natal and Cape Colony, while they will not be
compelled to return to those colonies, will, if they do so, be
liable to be dealt with by the law of those colonies, specially
passed to meet the circumstances arising out of the present
war. As you are doubtless aware, the special law in the Cape
Colony has greatly mitigated the ordinary penalties for high
treason in the present cases.
"All prisoners of war now in St. Helena, Ceylon, or elsewhere
will, on the completion of the surrender, be brought back to
their country as quickly as arrangements can be made for their
transport.
"At the earliest practicable date military administration will
cease and will be replaced by civil administration in the form
of Crown Colony Government. There will therefore be, in the
first instance, in each of the new Colonies a Governor and an
Executive Council, consisting of a certain number of official
members, to whom a nominated unofficial element will be added.
But it is the desire of his Majesty's Government, as soon as
circumstances permit, to introduce a representative element,
and ultimately to concede to the new Colonies the privilege of
self-government. Moreover, on the cessation of hostilities a
High Court will be established in each of the new Colonies to
administer the law of the land, and this court will be
independent of the Executive.
"Church property, public trusts, and orphans' funds will be
respected. Both the English and Dutch languages will be used
and taught in public schools where parents of the children
desire it, and allowed in Courts of Law.
"As regards the debts of the late Republican Governments, his
Majesty's Government cannot undertake any liability. It is,
however, prepared, as an act of grace, to set aside a sum not
exceeding £1,000,000 to repay inhabitants of the Transvaal and
Orange River Colonies for goods requisitioned from them by the
late Republican Governments or, subsequent to annexation, by
commandants in the field being in a position to enforce such
requisitions. But such claims will have to be established to
the satisfaction of a Judge or Judicial Commission appointed by
the Government to investigate and assess them, and if exceeding
in the aggregate £1,000,000, they will be liable to reduction
_pro rata_.
"I also beg to inform your Honour that the new Government will
take into immediate consideration the possibility of assisting
by loan the occupants of farms who will take the oath of
allegiance to repair any injury sustained by destruction of
buildings or loss of stock during the war, and that no special
war tax will be imposed on farmers to defray the expense of the
war.
"When burghers require the protection of firearms such will be
allowed to them by licence and on due registration, provided
they take the oath of allegiance. Licences also will be issued
for sporting rifles, guns, &c., but military firearms will only
be allowed for means of protection.
"As regards the extension of the franchise to Kaffirs in the
Transvaal and Orange River Colony, it is not the intention of
his Majesty's Government to give such franchise before
representative government is granted to these Colonies, and if
then given, it will be so limited as to secure the just
predominance of the white races. The legal position of coloured
persons will, however, be similar to that which they hold in
Cape Colony.
"In conclusion, I must inform your Honour that if the terms now
offered are not accepted after a reasonable delay for
consideration, they must be regarded as cancelled."
To this Botha replied:--
"I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your Excellency's
letter stating what steps your Excellency's Government is
prepared to take in the event of a general and total cessation
of hostilities. I have advised my Government of your
Excellency's said letter; but, after the mutual exchange of
views at our interview at Middelburg on 28th February last, it
will certainly not surprise your Excellency to know that I do
not feel disposed to recommend that the terms of the said
letter shall have the earnest consideration of my Government. I
may add, also, that my Government and my chief officers here
entirely agree with my views."
Botha's private opinions are to be found in an address to the
burghers, which was subsequently discovered among papers captured by
Sir Bindon Blood at Roos Senekal. He said:--
"The spirit of Lord Kitchener's letter makes it very plain to
you all that the British Government desires nothing else but
the destruction of our Afrikander people, and acceptance of the
terms contained therein is absolutely out of the question.
Virtually, the letter contains nothing more, but rather less,
than what the British Government will be obliged to do should
our cause go wrong. Notice that they will give us a Legislative
Council consisting of their own officials and members nominated
by themselves. The voice of the people is thus totally
unrecognised.... The more we are aggrieved by the enemy the
more steadfastly we ought to stand for our good and lawful
rights. Let us, as Daniel in the lions' den, place our trust in
God alone, for in His time and in His way He will certainly
give us deliverance."
On April 19th Mr. Chamberlain telegraphed to the High Commissioner as
follows:--
"As our terms have been refused by Botha, they are of course
withdrawn, and his Majesty's Government do not think it
advisable that you or Kitchener should reopen negotiations.
Should Botha or other leaders make any further suggestions of
their own accord Kitchener will, of course, forward them to us
without expressing any opinion upon them to those who make
them. But neither Mrs. Botha nor any one else should be led to
suppose that we could consider terms more favourable to the
Boers than those which have been rejected. The Secretary of
State for War will send a copy of this to Kitchener."
That the negotiations were looked upon with disfavour by all parties
concerned is undoubted. A letter written by one of Reuter's
correspondents expresses the very general view taken by the British in
the field:--
"The Parliamentary paper giving particulars of the peace
negotiations has been eagerly read by all ranks of the Army. It
is impossible to shut one's eyes to the fact that the British
forces now operating in South Africa are profoundly
dissatisfied with them. On all hands, and from all ranks, the
same complaint is heard, that they are too lenient, and are not
calculated to bring permanent peace to South Africa. There is
no bitterness against the Boers; that feeling has long ago died
out, but when the men came to read the terms of peace proposed
by the British Government, they remembered their dead comrades
whose graves mark the line of march, and asked themselves: 'Is
it for this that they have died?' The Army, which has undergone
countless hardships and dangers, is less articulate than a
municipal body in England, but surely it should have its say.
The regular Army, perhaps, is expected not to think or to
express its thought about politics, but to fight, and only to
fight; but the South Africans, the Canadians, and the
Australians will give expression to their sentiments. They
declare that in the terms of peace offered by the British
Government there are all the elements of future rebellion and
unrest. 'Give the Boers,' they say, 'even more than we have
promised them, but let it be as a free gift after surrender,
and not as a condition of surrender.' Curiously enough, these
sentiments are shared entirely by the Burghers who have
surrendered, and who are only waiting for the end of
hostilities to take their places as British subjects,
determined to do their utmost for the peaceful development of a
country which, under British rule, will be as much theirs as
anybody else's. One of them, speaking to me the other day, put
forward his view of the case. 'If the British grant terms to
those burghers now under arms,' he said, 'they at once
establish for all time a confession of weakness. We shall tell
each other and our children that we have never been beaten,
and, as we increase in numbers, the tales of former prowess and
invincibility will perpetuate a national feeling. If you allow
burghers to carry rifles after surrender you will have petty
revolts for the next ten years. There is no need of a Mauser or
a Lee-Metford to defend the burgher against the native. Give
him a shot-gun or a revolver, and no native will molest him.
The demand for the retention of arms is nothing more nor less
than the result of a determination on the part of the Boers to
use them against you at the very slightest provocation. To give
them rifles is suicidal.'"