TRANSCRIBER’S NOTE
* Italics are denoted by underscores as in _italics_.
* Small caps are represented in upper case as in SMALL CAPS.
* Letter spaced Greek text is enclosed in tildes as in ~καὶ τὰ λοιπά~.
* Footnotes have been renumbered. Each footnote is placed at the end
of the paragraph that includes its anchor.
* Obvious printer errors have been silently corrected, after
comparison with a later edition of this work. Greek text has also
been corrected after checking with this later edition and with
Perseus, when the reference was found.
* Original spelling, have been kept, but variant spellings were made
consistent when a predominant usage was found.
* Nevetherless, no attempt has been made at normalizing proper names
(i.e. Agrianes and Agriânes, Onchestus and Onchêstus, Megalêpolis
and Megalê-Polis, Mantinea and Mantineia, Crête and Krête,
Phenicians and Phœnicians, etc.). The author established at the
beginning of the first volume of this work some rules of
transcription for proper names, but neither he nor his publisher
follow them consistently.
* In the Table of Contents, some page numbers have been emended so
that they refer to the actual pages where chapters begin and end.
HISTORY OF GREECE.
BY
GEORGE GROTE, ESQ.
VOL. XII.
REPRINTED FROM THE LONDON EDITION.
NEW YORK:
HARPER & BROTHERS, PUBLISHERS,
329 AND 331 PEARL STREET.
1875.
[Illustration: AFRICAN TERRITORY OF CARTHAGE.]
[Illustration: PLAN to illustrate the BATTLE OF ISSUS.]
CONTENTS.
VOL. XII.
CHAPTER XCI.
FIRST PERIOD OF THE REIGN OF ALEXANDER THE GREAT — SIEGE AND
CAPTURE OF THEBES.
State of Greece at Alexander’s accession — dependence on the
Macedonian kings. — Unwilling subjection of the Greeks —
influence of Grecian intelligence on Macedonia. — Basis of
Alexander’s character — not Hellenic. — Boyhood and Education
of Alexander. — He receives instruction from Aristotle. — Early
political action and maturity of Alexander — his quarrels
with his father. Family discord. — Uncertainty of Alexander’s
position during the last year of Philip. — Impression produced
by the sudden death of Philip. — Accession of Alexander — his
energy and judgment. — Accomplices of Pausanias are slain by
Alexander — Amyntas and others are slain by him also. — Sentiment
at Athens on the death of Philip — language of Demosthenes
— inclination to resist Macedonia, yet without overt act. —
Discontent in Greece — but no positive movement. — March of
Alexander into Greece — submission of Athens. — Alexander is
chosen Imperator of the Greeks in the convention at Corinth —
continued refusal of concurrence by Sparta. — Conditions of the
vote thus passed — privileges granted to the cities. — Authority
claimed by Alexander under the convention — degradation of the
leading Grecian states. — Encroachments and tyranny of the
Macedonian officers in Greece — complaints of the orators at
Athens. — Violations of the convention at sea by Macedonian
officers. — Language of the complaining Athenians — they insist
only on strict observance of the convention. Boldness of their
language. — Encouragements held out by Persia to the Greeks.
— Correspondence of Demosthenes with Persia — justifiable and
politic. — March of Alexander into Thrace. He forces his way
over Mount Hæmus. — His victory over the Triballi. — He crosses
the Danube, defeats the Getæ, and returns back. — Embassy of
Gauls to Alexander. His self-conceit. — Victories of Alexander
over Kleitus and the Illyrians. — The Thebans declare their
independence against Macedonia. — They are encouraged by
Alexander’s long absence in Thrace, and by reports of his death.
— The Theban exiles from Athens get possession of Thebes. —
They besiege the Macedonians in the Kadmeia, and entreat aid
from other Greeks. Favorable sympathies shown towards them,
but no positive aid. — Chances of Thebes and liberation, not
unfavorable. — Rapid march and unexpected arrival of Alexander
with his army before Thebes. His good fortune as to the time of
hearing the news. — Siege of Thebes. Proclamation of Alexander.
Determination of the Thebans to resist. — Capture of Thebes by
assault. Massacre of the population. — Thebes is razed; the
Theban captives sold as slaves; the territory distributed among
the neighboring cities. — The Kadmeia is occupied as a Macedonian
Military post. Retribution upon the Thebans from Orchomenus and
Platæa. — Sentiments of Alexander, at the time and afterwards,
respecting the destruction of Thebes. — Extreme terror spread
throughout Greece. Sympathy of the Athenians towards the
Theban exiles. — Alexander demands the surrender of the chief
anti-Macedonian leaders at Athens. Memorable debate at Athens.
The demand refused. — Embassy of the Athenians to Alexander. He
is persuaded to acquiesce in the refusal, and to be satisfied
with the banishment of Charidemus and Ephialtes. — Influence
of Phokion in obtaining these milder terms — his increased
ascendency at Athens. — Alexander at Corinth — obedience of
the Grecian synod — interview with the philosopher Diogenes. —
Reconstitution of Orchomenus and Platæa. Return of Alexander to
Pella. — Military operations of Parmenio in Asia Minor against
Memnon.
1-49
CHAPTER XCII.
ASIATIC CAMPAIGNS OF ALEXANDER.
During Alexander’s reign, the history of Greece is nearly a
blank. To what extent the Asiatic projects of Alexander belonged
to Grecian history. — Pan-hellenic pretences set up by Alexander.
The real feeling of the Greeks was adverse to his success. —
Analogy of Alexander’s relation to the Greeks — with those
of the Emperor Napoleon to the Confederation of the Rhine. —
Greece an appendage, but a valuable appendage, to Macedonia. —
Extraordinary military endowments and capacity of Alexander.
— Changes in Grecian warfare, antecedent and contributory to
the military organization of Macedonia. — Macedonian military
condition before Philip. Good and firm cavalry: poor infantry.
— Philip re-arms and reorganizes the infantry. Long Macedonian
pike or sarissa. — Macedonian phalanx — how armed and arrayed.
— It was originally destined to contend against the Grecian
hoplites as organized by Epaminondas. — Regiments and divisions
of the phalanx — heavy-armed infantry. — Light infantry of
the line — Hypaspistæ, or Guards. — Light troops generally —
mostly foreigners. — Macedonian cavalry — its excellence — how
regimented. — The select Macedonian Body-guards. The Royal Pages.
— Foreign auxiliaries — Grecian hoplites — Thessalian cavalry —
Pæonians — Illyrians — Thracians, etc. — Magazines, war-office,
and depôt, at Pella. — Macedonian aptitudes — purely military
— military pride stood to them in lieu of national sentiment.
— Measures of Alexander previous to his departure for Asia.
Antipater left as viceroy at Pella. — March of Alexander to
the Hellespont. Passage across to Asia. — Visit of Alexander
to Ilium. — Analogy of Alexander to the Greek heroes. — Review
and total of the Macedonian army in Asia. — Chief Macedonian
officers. — Greeks in Alexander’s service — Eumenes of Kardia.
— Persian forces — Mentor and Memnon the Rhodians. — Succession
of the Persian crown — Ochus — Darius Codomannus. — Preparations
of Darius for defence. — Operations of Memnon before Alexander’s
arrival. — Superiority of the Persians at sea: their imprudence
in letting Alexander cross the Hellespont unopposed. — Persian
force assembled in Phrygia, under Arsites and others. — Advice of
Memnon, to avoid fighting on land, and to employ the fleet for
aggressive warfare in Macedonia and Greece. — Arsites rejects
Memnon’s advice, and determines to fight. — The Persians take
post on the river Granikus. — Alexander reaches the Granikus, and
resolves to force the passage at once, in spite of the dissuasion
of Permenio. — Disposition of the two armies. — Battle of the
Granikus. — Cavalry battle. — Personal danger of Alexander. His
life saved by Kleitus. Complete victory of Alexander. Destruction
of the Grecian infantry on the side of the Persians. — Loss
of the Persians — numbers of their leading men slain. — Small
loss of the Macedonians. — Alexander’s kindness to his wounded
soldiers, and severe treatment of the Grecian prisoners. —
Unskilfulness of the Persian leaders. Immense impression produced
by Alexander’s victory. — Terror and submission of the Asiatics
to Alexander. Surrender of the strong fortress of Sardis. — He
marches from Sardis to the coast. Capture of Ephesus. — He finds
the first resistance at Miletus. — Near approach of the Persian
fleet. Memnon is made commander-in-chief of the Persians. — The
Macedonian fleet occupies the harbor of Miletus, and keeps out
the Persians. Alexander declines naval combat. His debate with
Parmenio. — Alexander besieges Miletus. Capture of the city. —
The Persian fleet retires to Halikarnassus. Alexander disbands
his own fleet. — March of Alexander to Halikarnassus. Ada
queen of Karia joins him. Strong garrison, and good defensive
preparation, at Halikarnassus. — Siege of Halikarnassus. Bravery
of the garrison, under Ephialtes the Athenian. — Desperate sally
of Ephialtes — at first successful, but repulsed — he himself is
slain. — Memnon is forced to abandon Halikarnassus, and withdraw
the garrison by sea, retaining only the citadel. Alexander enters
Halikarnassus. — Winter campaign of Alexander along the southern
coast of Asia Minor. — Alexander concludes his winter campaign at
Gordium. Capture of Kelænæ. — Appendix on the Macedonian Sarissa.
49-104
CHAPTER XCIII.
SECOND AND THIRD ASIATIC CAMPAIGNS OF ALEXANDER — BATTLE OF ISSUS
— SIEGE OF TYRE.
Alexander cuts the Gordian knot. — He refuses the liberation of
the Athenian prisoners. — Progress of Memnon and the Persian
fleet — they acquire Chios and a large part of Lesbos — they
besiege Mitylene. Death of Memnon. Capture of Mitylene. — Hopes
excited in Greece by the Persian fleet, but ruined by the death
of Memnon. — Memnon’s death an irreparable mischief to Darius. —
Change in Darius’s plan caused by this event. He resolves to take
the offensive on land. His immense land-force. — Free speech and
sound judgment of Charidemus. He is put to death by Darius. —
Darius abandoned Memnon’s plans, just at the time when he had the
best defensive position for executing them with effect. — Darius
recalls the Grecian mercenaries from the fleet. — Criticism
of Arrian on Darius’s plan. — March of Alexander from Gordium
through Paphlagonia and Kappadokia. — He arrives at the line of
Mount Taurus — difficulties of the pass. — Conduct of Arsames,
the Persian satrap. Alexander passes Mount Taurus without the
least resistance. He enters Tarsus. — Dangerous illness of
Alexander. His confidence in the physician Philippus, who cures
him. — Operations of Alexander in Kilikia. — March of Alexander
out of Kilikia, through Issus, to Myriandrus. — March of Darius
from the interior to the eastern side of Mount Amanus. Immense
numbers of his army: great wealth and ostentation in it: the
treasure and baggage sent to Damascus. — Position of Darius on
the plain eastward of Mount Amanus. He throws open the mountain
passes, to let Alexander come through and fight a pitched battle.
— Impatience of Darius at the delay of Alexander in Kilikia.
He crosses Mount Amanus to attack Alexander in the defiles of
Kilikia. — He arrives in Alexander’s rear, and captures Issus.
— Return of Alexander from Myriandrus: his address to his army.
— Position of the Macedonian army south of the river Pinarus.
— Position of the Persian army north of the Pinarus. — Battle
of Issus. — Alarm and immediate flight of Darius — defeat of
the Persians. — Vigorous and destructive pursuit by Alexander —
capture of the mother and wife of Darius. — Courteous treatment
of the regal female prisoners by Alexander. — Complete dispersion
of the Persian army — Darius recrosses the Euphrates — escape
of some Perso-Grecian mercenaries. — Prodigious effect produced
by the victory of Issus. — Effects produced in Greece by the
battle of Issus. Anti-Macedonian projects crushed. — Capture
of Damascus by the Macedonians, with the Persian treasure and
prisoners. Capture and treatment of the Athenian Iphikrates.
Altered relative position of Greeks and Macedonians. — Alexander
in Phenicia. Aradus, Byblus, and Sidon open their gates to him.
— Letter of Darius soliciting peace and the restitution of the
regal captives. Haughty reply of Alexander. — Importance of
the voluntary surrender of the Phenician towns to Alexander.
— Alexander appears before Tyre — readiness of the Tyrians to
surrender, yet not without a point reserved — he determines
to besiege the city. — Exorbitant dispositions and conduct
of Alexander. — He prepares to besiege Tyre — situation of
the place. — Chances of the Tyrians — their resolution not
unreasonable. — Alexander constructs a mole across the strait
between Tyre and the mainland. The project is defeated. —
Surrender of the princes of Cyprus to Alexander — He gets hold
of the main Phenician and Cyprian fleet. — He appears before
Tyre with a numerous fleet, and blocks up the place by sea. —
Capture of Tyre by storm — desperate resistance by the citizens.
— Surviving males, 2000 in number, hanged by order of Alexander
— The remaining captives sold. — Duration of the siege for seven
months. Sacrifice of Alexander to Herakles. — Second letter from
Darius to Alexander, who requires unconditional submission. — The
Macedonian fleet overpowers the Persian and becomes master of
the Ægean with the islands. — March of Alexander towards Egypt
— siege of Gaza. — His first assaults fail — he is wounded — he
erects an immense mound round the town. — Gaza is taken by storm,
after a siege of two months. — The garrison are all slain, except
the governor Batis, who becomes prisoner, severely wounded. —
Wrath of Alexander against Batis, whom he causes to be tied to a
chariot, and dragged round the town. — Alexander enters Egypt,
and occupies it without resistance — He determines on founding
Alexandria. — His visit to the temple and oracle of Ammon. The
oracle proclaims him to be the son of Zeus. — Arrangements made
by Alexander at Memphis. — Grecian prisoners brought from the
Ægean. — He proceeds to Phenicia — message from Athens. Splendid
festivals. Reinforcements sent to Antipater. — He marches to
the Euphrates — crosses it without opposition at Thapsakus. —
March across from the Euphrates to the Tigris. Alexander fords
the Tigris above Nineveh, without resistance. — Eclipse of the
moon. Alexander approaches near the army of Darius in position. —
Inaction of Darius since the defeat at Issus. — Paralyzing effect
upon him produced by the captivity of his mother and wife. — Good
treatment of the captive females by Alexander — necessary to keep
up their value as hostages. — Immense army collected by Darius,
in the plains eastward of the Tigris — near Arbela. — He fixes
the spot for encamping and awaiting the attack of Alexander — in
a level plain near Gaugamela. — His equipment and preparation —
better arms — numerous scythed chariots — elephants. — Position
and battle array of Darius. — Preliminary movements of Alexander
— discussions with Parmenio and other officers. His careful
reconnoitring in person. — Dispositions of Alexander for the
attack — array of the troops. — Battle of Arbela. — Cowardice of
Darius — he sets the example of flight — defeat of the Persians.
— Combat on the Persian right between Mazæus and Parmenio.
Flight of the Persian host — energetic pursuit by Alexander. —
Escape of Darius. Capture of the Persian camp, and of Arbela.
— Loss in the battle. Completeness of the victory. Entire and
irreparable dispersion of the Persian army. — Causes of the
defeat — cowardice of Darius. Uselessness of his immense numbers.
— Generalship of Alexander. — Surrender of Babylon and Susa, the
two great capitals of Persia. Alexander enters Babylon. Immense
treasures acquired in both places. — Alexander acts as king of
Persia, and nominates satraps. He marches to Susa. He remodels
the divisions of his army. — Alexander marches into Persis
proper — he conquers the refractory Uxii, in the intermediate
mountains. — Difficult pass called the Susian Gates, on the way
to Persepolis. Ariobarzanes the satrap repulses Alexander, who
finds means to turn the pass, and conquer it. — Alexander enters
Persepolis. Mutilated Grecian captives. — Immense wealth, and
national monuments of every sort, accumulated in Persepolis. —
Alexander appropriates and carries away the regal treasures,
and then gives up Persepolis to be plundered and burnt by the
soldiers. — Alexander rests his troops, and employs himself in
conquering the rest of Persis. — Darius a fugitive in Media.
104-178
CHAPTER XCIV.
MILITARY OPERATIONS AND CONQUESTS OF ALEXANDER, AFTER HIS WINTER
QUARTERS IN PERSIS, DOWN TO HIS DEATH AT BABYLON.
The first four Asiatic campaigns of Alexander — their direct
bearing and importance in reference to Grecian history. — His
last seven years, farther eastward, had no similar bearing upon
Greece. — Darius at Ekbatana — seeks escape towards Baktria,
when he hears of Alexander approaching. — Alexander enters
Ekbatana — establishes there his depôt and base of operations.
— Alexander sends home the Thessalian cavalry — necessity for
him now to pursue a more desultory warfare. — Alexander pursues
Darius to the Caspian Gates, but fails in overtaking him. —
Conspiracy formed against Darius by Bessus and others, who seize
his person. — Prodigious efforts of Alexander to overtake and get
possession of Darius. He surprises the Persian corps, but Bessus
puts Darius to death. — Disappointment of Alexander when he
missed taking Darius alive. Regal funeral bestowed upon Darius.
His fate and conduct. — Repose of Alexander and his army at
Hekatompylus in Parthia. Commencing alteration in his demeanor.
He becomes Asiatized and despotic. — Gradual aggravation of
these new habits, from the present moment. — Alexander conquers
the mountains immediately south of the Caspian. He requires the
Greek mercenaries to surrender at discretion. Envoys from Sparta
and other Greek cities brought to him — how treated. — March of
Alexander farther Eastward — his successes in Asia and Drangiana.
— Proceedings against Philotas, son of Parmenio, in Drangiana.
Military greatness and consideration of the family. — Revelation
of an intended conspiracy made by Kebalinus to Philotas, for
the purpose of being communicated to Alexander. Philotas does
not mention it to Alexander. It is communicated to the latter
through another channel. — Alexander is at first angry with
Philotas, but accepts his explanation, and professes to pass
over the fact. — Ancient grudge against Philotas — advantage
taken of the incident to ruin him. — Kraterus and others are
jealous of Parmenio and Philotas. Alexander is persuaded to put
them both to death. — Arrest of Philotas. Alexander accuses him
before the assembled soldiers. He is condemned. — Philotas is
put to the torture, and forced to confess, both against himself
and Parmenio. — Parmenio is slain at Ekbatana, by order and
contrivance of Alexander. Mutiny of the soldiers when they learn
the assassination of Parmenio — appeased by the production of
Alexander’s order. — Fear and disgust produced by the killing
of Parmenio and Philotas. — Conquest of the Paropamisadæ, etc.
Foundation of Alexandria _ad Caucasum_. — Alexander crosses the
Hindoo-Koosh, and conquers Baktria. Bessus is made prisoner.
— Massacre of the Branchidæ and their families, perpetrated
by Alexander in Sogdiana. — Alexander at Marakanda and on the
Jaxartes. — Foundation of Alexandria _ad Jaxartem_. Limit of
march northward. — Alexander at Zariaspa in Baktria — he causes
Bessus to be mutilated and slain. — Farther subjugation of
Baktria and Sogdiana. Halt at Marakanda. — Banquet at Marakanda.
— Character and position of Kleitus. — Boasts of Alexander and
his flatterers — repugnance of Macedonian officers felt but
not expressed. — Scene at the banquet — vehement remonstrance
of Kleitus. — Furious wrath of Alexander — he murders Kleitus.
— Intense remorse of Alexander, immediately after the deed. —
Active and successful operations of Alexander in Sogdiana. —
Capture of two inexpugnable positions — the Sogdian rock — the
rock of Choriênes. Passion of Alexander for Roxana. — Alexander
at Baktra — marriage with Roxana. His demand for prostration
or worship from all. — Public harangue of Anaxarchus during a
banquet, exhorting every one to render this worship. — Public
reply of Kallisthenes, opposing it. Character and history of
Kallisthenes. — The reply of Kallisthenes is favorably heard by
the guests — the proposition for worship is dropped. — Coldness
and disfavor of Alexander towards Kallisthenes. — Honorable
frankness and courage of Kallisthenes. — Kallisthenes becomes
odious to Alexander. — Conspiracy of the royal pages against
Alexander’s life — it is divulged — they are put to torture, but
implicate no one else; they are put to death. — Kallisthenes is
arrested as an accomplice — antipathy manifested by Alexander
against him and against Aristotle also. — Kallisthenes is
tortured and hanged. — Alexander reduces the country between the
Hindoo-Koosh and the Indus. — Conquest of tribes on the right
bank of the Indus — the rock of Aornos. — Alexander crosses the
Indus — forces the passage of the Hydaspes, defeating Porus —
generous treatment of Porus. — His farther conquests in the
Punjab. Sangala the last of them. — He reaches the Hyphasis
(Sutledge), the farthest of the rivers of the Punjab. His army
refuses to march farther. — Alexander returns to the Hydaspes.
— He constructs a fleet and sails down the Hydaspes and the
Indus. Dangerous wound of Alexander in attacking the Malli. —
New cities and posts to be established on the Indus — Alexander
reaches the ocean — effect of the first sight of tides. — March
of Alexander by land westward through the desert of Gedrosia —
sufferings and losses in the army. — Alexander and the army come
back to Persis. — Conduct of Alexander at Persepolis. Punishment
of the satrap Orsines. — He marches to Susa — junction with
the fleet under Nearchus, after it had sailed round from the
mouth of the Indus. — Alexander at Susa as Great King. Subjects
of uneasiness to him — the satraps — the Macedonian soldiers.
— Past conduct of the satraps — several of them are punished
by Alexander — alarm among them all — flight of Harpalus. —
Discontents of the Macedonian soldiers with the Asiatizing
intermarriages promoted by Alexander. — Their discontent with
the new Asiatic soldiers levied and disciplined by Alexander. —
Interest of Alexander in the fleet, which sails up the Tigris to
Opis. — Notice of partial discharge to the Macedonian soldiers
— they mutiny — wrath of Alexander — he disbands them all. —
Remorse and humiliation of the soldiers — Alexander is appeased
— reconciliation. — Partial disbanding — body of veterans
placed under command of Kraterus to return — New projects of
conquests contemplated by Alexander — measures for enlarging
his fleet. — Visit to Ekbatana — death of Hephæstion — violent
sorrow of Alexander. — Alexander exterminates the Kossæi. —
March of Alexander to Babylon. Numerous embassies which met him
on the way. — Alexander at Babylon — his great preparations
for the circumnavigation and conquest of Arabia. — Alexander
on shipboard, on the Euphrates and in the marshes adjoining.
His plans for improving the navigation and flow of the river.
— Large reinforcements arrive, Grecian and Asiatic. New array
ordered by Alexander, for Macedonians and Persians in the same
files and companies. — Splendid funeral obsequies of Hephæstion.
— General feasting and intemperance in the army. Alexander is
seized with a dangerous fever. Details of his illness. — No hope
of his life. Consternation and grief in the army. Last interview
with his soldiers. His death — Effect produced on the imagination
of contemporaries by the career and death of Alexander. — Had
Alexander lived, he must have achieved things greater still. —
Question raised by Livy, about the chances of Alexander if he
had attacked the Romans. — Unrivalled excellence as a military
man. — Alexander as a ruler, apart from military affairs — not
deserving of esteem. — Alexander would have continued the system
of the Persian empire, with no other improvement except that of
a strong organization. — Absence of nationality in Alexander —
purpose of fusing the different varieties of mankind into one
common type of subjection. — Mistake of supposing Alexander to
be the intentional diffuser of Greek civilization. His ideas
compared with those of Aristotle. — Number of new cities founded
in Asia by Alexander. — It was not Alexander, but the Diadochi
after him, who chiefly hellenized Asia. — How far Asia was ever
really hellenized — the great fact was, that the Greek language
became universally diffused. — Greco-Asiatic cities. — Increase
of the means of communication between various parts of the world.
— Interest of Alexander in science and literature — not great.
178-274
CHAPTER XCV.
GRECIAN AFFAIRS FROM THE LANDING OF ALEXANDER IN ASIA TO THE
CLOSE OF THE LAMIAN WAR.
State of the Grecian world when Alexander crossed the Hellespont.
— Grecian spirit might have been called into action if the
Persians had played their game well. — Hopes raised in Greece,
first by the Persian fleet in the Ægean, next by the two great
Persian armies on land. — Public acts and policy at Athens —
decidedly pacific. — Phokion and Demades were leading ministers
at Athens — they were of macedonizing politics. — Demosthenes
and Lykurgus, though not in the ascendent politically, are
nevertheless still public men of importance. Financial activity
of Lykurgus. — Position of Demosthenes — his prudent conduct
— Anti-Macedonian movement from Sparta — King Agis visits the
Persian admirals in the Ægean. His attempts both in Krete and
in the Peloponnesus. — Agis levies an army in Peloponnesus,
and makes open declaration against Antipater. — Agis, at first
partially successful, is completely defeated by Antipater, and
slain. — Complete submission of all Greece to Antipater — Spartan
envoys sent up to Alexander in Asia. — Untoward result of the
defensive efforts of Greece — want of combination. — Position
of parties at Athens during the struggle of Agis — reaction of
the macedonizing party after his defeat. — Judicial contest
between Æschines and Demosthenes. Preliminary circumstances as
to the proposition of Ktesiphon, and the indictment by Æschines.
— Accusatory harangue of Æschines, nominally against the
proposition of Ktesiphon, really against the political life of
Demosthenes. — Appreciation of Æschines, on independent evidence,
as an accuser of Demosthenes. — Reply of Demosthenes — oration De
Coronâ. — Funeral oration of extinct Grecian freedom. — Verdict
of the Dikasts — triumph of Demosthenes — exile of Æschines. —
Causes of the exile of Æschines — he was the means of procuring
coronation for Demosthenes. — Subsequent accusation against
Demosthenes, in the affair of Harpalus. — Flight of Harpalus
to Athens — his previous conduct and relations with Athens. —
False reports conveyed to Alexander, that the Athenians had
identified themselves with Harpalus. — Circumstances attending
the arrival of Harpalus at Sunium — debate in the Athenian
assembly — promises held out by Harpalus — the Athenians
seem at first favorably disposed towards him. — Phokion and
Demosthenes both agree in dissuading the Athenians from taking
up Harpalus. — Demand by Antipater for the surrender of Harpalus
— the Athenians refuse to comply, but they arrest Harpalus and
sequestrate his treasure for Alexander. — Demosthenes moves the
decree for arrest of Harpalus, who is arrested, but escapes. —
Conduct of Demosthenes in regard to the treasure of Harpalus —
deficiency of the sum counted and realized, as compared with
the sum announced by Harpalus. — Suspicions about this money —
Demosthenes moves that the Areopagus shall investigate the matter
— the Areopagites bring in a report against Demosthenes himself,
with Demades and others, as guilty of corrupt appropriation.
Demosthenes is tried on this charge, condemned, and goes into
exile. — Was Demosthenes guilty of such corrupt appropriation?
Circumstances as known in the case. — Demosthenes could not have
received the money from Harpalus, since he opposed him from first
to last. — Had Demosthenes the means of embezzling, after the
money had passed out of the control of Harpalus? Answer in the
negative. Accusatory speech of Deinarchus — virulent invective
destitute of facts. — Change of mind respecting Demosthenes,
in the Athenean public, in a few months. — Probable reality of
the case, respecting the money of Harpalus, and the sentence of
the Areopagus. — Rescript of Alexander to the Grecian cities,
directing that the exiles should be recalled in each. — Purpose
of the rescript — to provide partisans for Alexander in each of
the cities. Discontents in Greece. — Effect produced in Greece,
by the death of Alexander. The Athenians declare themselves
champions of the liberation of Greece, in spite of Phokion’s
opposition. — The Ætolians and many other Greeks join the
confederacy for liberation — activity of the Athenian Leosthenes
as General. — Athenian envoys sent round to invite co-operation
from the various Greeks. — Assistance lent to the Athenian envoys
by Demosthenes, though in exile. — He is recalled to Athens, and
receives an enthusiastic welcome. — Large Grecian confederacy
against Antipater — nevertheless without Sparta. Bœotia strongly
in the Macedonian interest. Leosthenes with the confederate
army marches into Thessaly. — Battle in Thessaly — victory of
Leosthenes over Antipater, who is compelled to throw himself
into Lamia, and await succors from Asia — Leosthenes forms the
blockade of Lamia: he is slain. — Misfortune of the death of
Leosthenes. Antiphilus is named in his place. Relaxed efforts
of the Grecian army. — Leonnatus, with a Macedonian army from
Asia, arrives in Thessaly. His defeat and death. — Antipater
escapes from Lamia, and takes the command. — War carried on by
sea between the Macedonian and Athenian fleets. — Reluctance
of the Greek contingents to remain on long-continued service.
The army in Thessaly is thinned by many returning home. —
Expected arrival of Kraterus to reinforce Antipater. Relations
between the Macedonian officers. — State of the regal family,
and of the Macedonian generals and soldiery, after the death of
Alexander. — Philip Aridæus is proclaimed king: the satrapies
are distributed among the principal officers. — Perdikkas the
chief representative of central authority, assisted by Eumenes
of Kardia. — List of projects entertained by Alexander at the
time of his death. The generals dismiss them as too vast. —
Plans of Leonnatus and Kleopatra. — Kraterus joins Antipater in
Macedonia with a powerful army. Battle of Krannon in Thessaly.
Antipater gains a victory over the Greeks though not a complete
one. — Antiphilus tries to open negotiations with Antipater, who
refuses to treat except with each city singly. Discouragement
among the Greeks. Each city treats separately. Antipater grants
favorable terms to all, except Athenians and Ætolians. Antipater
and his army in Bœotia — Athens left alone and unable to resist.
Demosthenes and the other anti-Macedonian orators take flight.
Embassy of Phokion, Xenokrates, and others to Antipater. — Severe
terms imposed upon Athens by Antipater. — Disfranchisement and
deportation of the 12,000 poorest Athenian citizens. — Hardship
suffered by the deported poor of Athens — Macedonian garrison
placed in Munychia. — Demosthenes, Hyperides, and others, are
condemned to death in their absence. Antipater sends officers
to track and seize the Grecian exiles. He puts Hyperides to
death. — Demosthenes in sanctuary at Kalauria — Archias with
Thracian soldiers comes to seize him — he takes poison, and
dies. — Miserable condition of Greece — life and character of
Demosthenes. — Dishonorable position of Phokion at Athens under
the Macedonian occupation.
275-331
CHAPTER XCVI.
FROM THE LAMIAN WAR TO THE CLOSE OF THE HISTORY OF FREE HELLAS
AND HELLENISM.
Antipater purges and remodels the Peloponnesian cities. He
attacks the Ætolians, with a view of departing them across to
Asia. His presence becomes necessary in Asia: he concludes a
pacification with the Ætolians. — Plans of Perdikkas — intrigues
with the princesses at Pella. — Antigonus detects the intrigues,
and reveals them to Antipater and Kraterus. — Unpropitious turn
of fortune for the Greeks, in reference to the Lamian war. —
Antipater and Kraterus in Asia — Perdikkas marches to attack
Ptolemy in Egypt, but is killed by a mutiny of his own troops.
Union of Antipater, Ptolemy, Antigonus, etc. New distribution of
the satrapies, made at Triparadeisus. — War between Antigonus and
Eumenes in Asia. Energy and ability of Eumenes. He is worsted
and blocked up in Nora. — Sickness and death of Antipater. The
Athenian orator Demades is put to death in Macedonia — Antipater
sets aside his son Kassander, and names Polysperchon viceroy.
Discontent and opposition of Kassander. — Kassander sets up
for himself, gets possession of Munychia, and forms alliance
with Ptolemy and Antigonus against Polysperchon. Plans of
Polysperchon — alliance with Olympias in Europe, and with Eumenes
in Asia — enfranchisement of the Grecian cities. — Ineffectual
attempts of Eumenes to uphold the imperial dynasty in Asia: his
gallantry and ability: he is betrayed by his own soldiers, and
slain by Antigonus. — Edict issued by Polysperchon at Pella, in
the name of the imperial dynasty — subverting the Antipatrian
oligarchies in the Grecian cities, restoring political exiles,
and granting free constitutions to each. — Letters and measures
of Polysperchon to enforce the edict. State of Athens: exiles
returning: complicated political parties: danger of Phokion.
— Negotiations of the Athenians with Nikanor, governor of
Munychia for Kassander. — Nikanor seizes Peiræus by surprise.
Phokion, though forewarned, takes no precautions against it.
— Mischief to the Athenians, as well as to Polysperchon, from
Nikanor’s occupation of Peiræus; culpable negligence, and
probable collusion, of Phokion. — Arrival of Alexander (son of
Polysperchon): his treacherous policy to the Athenians; Kassander
reaches Peiræus. — Intrigues of Phokion with Alexander — he tries
to secure for himself the protection of Alexander against the
Athenians. — Return of the deported exiles to Athens — public
vote passed in the Athenian assembly against Phokion and his
colleagues. Phokion leaves the city, is protected by Alexander,
and goes to meet Polysperchon, in Phokis. — Agnonides and others
are sent as deputies to Polysperchon, to accuse Phokion and to
claim the benefit of the regal edict. — Agnonides and Phokion
are heard before Polysperchon — Phokion and his colleagues are
delivered up as prisoners to the Athenians. Phokion is conveyed
as prisoner to Athens, and brought for trial before the assembly.
Motion of his friends for exclusion of non-qualified persons.
— Intense exasperation of the returned exiles against Phokion
— grounds for that feeling. — Phokion is condemned to death —
vindictive manifestation against him in the assembly, furious
and unanimous. — Death of Phokion and his four colleagues. —
Alteration of the sentiment of the Athenians towards Phokion, not
long afterwards. Honors shown to his memory. — Explanation of
this alteration. Kassander gets possession of Athens and restores
the oligarchical or Phokionic party. — Life and character of
Phokion. — War between Polysperchon and Kassander, in Attica
and Peloponnesus. Polysperchon is repulsed in the siege of
Megalopolis, and also defeated at sea. — Increased strength of
Kassander in Greece — he gets possession of Athens. — Restoration
of the oligarchical government at Athens, though in a mitigated
form, under the Phalerean Demetrius. — Administration of the
Phalerean Demetrius at Athens, in a moderate spirit. Census taken
of the Athenian population — Kassander in Peloponnesus — many
cities join him — the Spartans surround their city with walls.
— Feud in the Macedonian imperial family — Olympias puts to
death Philip Aridæus and Eurydikê — she reigns in Macedonia: her
bloody revenge against the partisans of Antipater. — Kassander
passes into Macedonia — defeats Olympias, and becomes master
of the country — Olympias is besieged in Pydna, captured, and
put to death. — Great power of Antigonus in Asia. Confederacy
of Kassander, Lysimachus, Ptolemy, and Seleukus against him. —
Kassander founds Kassandreia, and restores Thebes. — Measures of
Antigonus against Kassander — he promises freedom to the Grecian
cities — Ptolemy promises the like. Great power of Kassander in
Greece. — Forces of Antigonus in Greece. Considerable success
against Kassander. — Pacification between the belligerents.
Grecian autonomy guaranteed in name by all. Kassander puts
to death Roxana and her child. — Polysperchon espouses the
pretensions of Herakles, son of Alexander, against Kassander.
He enters into compact with Kassander, assassinates the young
prince, and is recognized as ruler of Southern Greece. —
Assassination of Kleopatra, last surviving relative of Alexander
the Great, by Antigonus. — Ptolemy of Egypt in Greece — after
some successes, he concludes a truce with Kassander. Passiveness
of the Grecian cities. — Sudden arrival of Demetrius Poliorketes
in Peiræus. The Athenians declare in his favor. Demetrius
Phalereus retires to Egypt. Capture of Munychia and Megara. —
Demetrius Poliorketes enters Athens in triumph. He promises
restoration of the democracy. Extravagant votes of flattery
passed by the Athenians towards him. Two new Athenian tribes
created. — Alteration of tone and sentiment in Athens, during
the last thirty years. — Contrast of Athens as proclaimed free
by Demetrius Poliorketes, with Athens after the expulsion of
Hippias. — Opposition made by Demochares, nephew of Demosthenes,
to these obsequious public flatteries. — Demetrius Phalereus
condemned in his absence. Honorable commemoration of the deceased
orator Lykurgus. Restrictive law passed against the philosophers
— they all leave Athens. The law is repealed next year, and
the philosophers return to Athens. — Exploits of Demetrius
Poliorketes. His long siege of Rhodes. Gallant and successful
resistance of the citizens. — His prolonged war, and ultimate
success in Greece, against Kassander. — Return of Demetrius
Poliorketes to Athens — his triumphant reception — memorable
Ithyphallic hymn addressed to him. — Helpless condition of
the Athenians — proclaimed by themselves. — Idolatry shown to
Demetrius at Athens. He is initiate in the Eleusinian mysteries,
out of the regular season. — March of Demetrius into Thessaly —
he passes into Asia and joins Antigonus — great battle of Ipsus,
in which the four confederates completely defeat Antigonus, who
is slain and his Asiatic power broken up and partitioned. —
Restoration of the Kassandrian dominion in Greece. Lachares makes
himself despot at Athens, under Kassander. Demetrius Poliorketes
returns, and expels Lachares. He garrisons Peiræus and Munychia.
— Death of Kassander. Bloody feuds among his family. — Demetrius
acquires the crown of Macedonia. — Antigonus Gonatas (son of
Demetrius) master of Macedonia and Greece. Permanent rule of
the Antigonid dynasty in Macedonia, until the conquest of that
country by the Romans. — Spirit of the Greeks broken — isolation
of the cities from each other by Antigonus. — The Greece of
Polybius cannot form a subject of history by itself, but only as
an appendage to foreign neighbors. — Evidence of the political
nullity of Athens — public decree in honor of Demochares — what
acts are recorded as his titles to public gratitude.
331-393
CHAPTER XCVII.
SICILIAN AND ITALIAN GREEKS — AGATHOKLES.
Constitution established by Timoleon at Syracuse — afterwards
exchanged for an oligarchy. — Italian Greeks — pressed upon
by enemies from the interior — Archidamus king of Sparta
slain in Italy. — Growth of the Molossian kingdom of Epirus,
through Macedonian aid — Alexander the Molossian king brother
of Olympias. — The Molossian Alexander crosses into Italy to
assist the Tarentines. His exploits and death. — Assistance
sent by the Syracusans to Kroton — first rise of Agathokles. —
Agathokles distinguishes himself in the Syracusan expedition —
he is disappointed of honors — becomes discontented and leaves
Syracuse. — He levies a mercenary force — his exploits as
general in Italy and Sicily. — Change of government at Syracuse
— Agathokles is recalled — his exploits against the exiles —
his dangerous character at home. — Farther internal changes at
Syracuse — recall of the exiles — Agathokles readmitted — swears
amnesty and fidelity. — Agathokles, in collusion with Hamilkar,
arms his partisans at Syracuse, and perpetuates a sanguinary
massacre of the citizens. — Agathokles is constituted sole
despot of Syracuse. — His popular manners, military energy,
and conquests. Progress of Agathokles in conquering Sicily.
The Agrigentines take alarm and organize a defensive alliance
against him. — They invite the Spartan Akrotatus to command
— his bad conduct and failure. — Sicily the only place in
which a glorious Hellenic career was open. Peace concluded by
Agathokles with the Agrigentines — his great power in Sicily.
— He is repulsed from Agrigentum — the Carthaginians send an
armament to Sicily against him. — Position of the Carthaginians
between Gela and Agrigentum — their army reinforced from home.
— Operations of Agathokles against them — his massacre of
citizens at Gela. — Battle of the Himera, between Agathokles
and the Carthaginians. — Total defeat of Agathokles by the
Carthaginians. — The Carthaginians recover a large part of
Sicily from Agathokles. His depressed condition at Syracuse. —
He conceives the plan of attacking the Carthaginians in Africa.
— His energy and sagacity in organizing this expedition. His
renewed massacre and spoliation. — He gets out of the harbor, in
spite of the blockading fleet. Eclipse of the sun. He reaches
Africa safely. — He burns his vessels — impressive ceremony
for affecting this, under vow to Demeter. — Agathokles marches
into the Carthaginian territory — captures Tunês — richness and
cultivation of the country. — Consternation at Carthage — the
city force marches out against him — Hanno and Bomilkar named
generals. — Inferior numbers of Agathokles — his artifices to
encourage the soldiers. — Treachery of the Carthaginian general
Bomilkar — victory of Agathokles. — Conquests of Agathokles among
the Carthaginian dependencies on the eastern coast — Religious
terror and distress of the Carthaginians. Human sacrifice. —
Operations of Agathokles on the eastern coast of Carthage —
capture of Neapolis, Adrumetum, Thapsus, etc. — Agathokles
fortifies Aspis — undertakes operations against the interior
country — defeats the Carthaginians again. — Proceedings of
Hamilkar before Syracuse — the city is near surrendering — he
is disappointed, and marches away from it. — Renewed attack of
Hamilkar upon Syracuse — he tries to surprise Euryalus, but is
totally defeated, made prisoner, and slain. — The Agrigentines
stand forward as champions of Sicilian freedom against Agathokles
and the Carthaginians. — Mutiny in the army of Agathokles at
Tunês — his great danger, and address in extricating himself.
— Carthaginian army sent to act in the interior — attacked by
Agathokles with some success — his camp is pillaged by the
Numidians. — Agathokles invites the aid of Ophellas from Kyrênê.
— Antecedent circumstances of Kyrênê. Division of coast between
Kyrênê and Carthage. — Thimbron with the Harpalian mercenaries is
invited over to Kyrênê by exiles. His checkered career, on the
whole victorious, in Libya. — The Kyrenæans solicit aid from the
Egyptian Ptolemy, who sends Ophellas thither. Defeat and death of
Thimbron. Kyrenaica annexed to the dominions of Ptolemy, under
Ophellas as viceroy. — Position and hopes of Ophellas. He accepts
the invitation of Agathokles. He collects colonists from Athens
and other Grecian cities. — March of Ophellas, with his army,
and his colonists, from Kyrênê to the Carthaginian territory
— sufferings endured in the march. — Perfidy of Agathokles —
he kills Ophellas — gets possession of his army — ruin and
dispersion of the colonists. — Terrible sedition at Carthage —
Bomilkar tries to seize the supreme power — he is overthrown and
slain. — Farther successes of Agathokles in Africa — he captures
Utica, Hippo-Zarytus, and Hippagreta. — Agathokles goes to
Sicily, leaving Archagathus to command in Africa. Successes of
Archagathus in the interior country. — Redoubled efforts of the
Carthaginians — they gain two great victories over Archagathus.
— Danger of Archagathus — he is blocked up by the Carthaginians
at Tunis. — Agathokles in Sicily. His career at first prosperous.
Defeat of the Agrigentines. — Activity of Agathokles in Sicily
— Deinokrates in great force against him. — Agrigentine army
under Xenodokus — opposed to the mercenaries of Agathokles —
superiority of the latter. — Defeat of Xenodokus by Leptines
— Agathokles passes over into Africa — bad state of his army
there — he is defeated by the Carthaginians. — Nocturnal panic
and disorder in both camps. — Desperate condition of Agathokles
— he deserts his army and escapes to Sicily. — The deserted
army kill the two sons of Agathokles, and capitulate with the
Carthaginians. — African expedition of Agathokles — boldness of
the first conception — imprudently pushed and persisted in. —
Proceedings of Agathokles in Sicily — his barbarities at Egesta
and Syracuse. — Great mercenary force under Deinokrates in
Sicily — Agathokles solicits peace from him, and is refused —
he concludes peace with Carthage. — Battle of Torgium — victory
of Agathokles over Deinokrates. — Accommodation and compact
between Agathokles and Deinokrates. — Operations of Agathokles in
Liparæ, Italy, and Korkyra — Kleonymus of Sparta. — Last projects
of Agathokles — mutiny of his grandson Archagathus — sickness,
poisoning, and death of Agathokles. — Splendid genius of action
and resource — nefarious dispositions — of Agathokles. — Hellenic
agency in Sicily continues during the life of Agathokles, but
becomes then subordinate to preponderant foreigners.
393-452
CHAPTER XCVIII.
OUTLYING HELLENIC CITIES. — 1. IN GAUL AND SPAIN. — 2. ON THE
COAST OF THE EUXINE.
Massalia—its situation and circumstances.—Colonies planted by
Massalia—Antipolis, Nikæa, Rhoda, Emporiæ—peculiar circumstances
of Emporiæ.—Oligarchical government of Massalia—prudent
political administration.—Hellenizing influence of Massalia
in the West—Pytheas, the navigator and geographer.—Pontic
Greeks—Pentapolis on the south-west coast.—Sinôpê—its envoys
present with Darius in his last days—maintains its independence
for some time against the Mithridatic princes—but become
subject to them ultimately—The Pontic Herakleia—oligarchical
government—the native Mariandyni reduced to serfs.—Political
discord at Herakleia—banishment of Klearchus—partial democracy
established.—Continued political troubles at Herakleia—assistance
invoked from without.—Character and circumstances of Klearchus—he
makes himself despot of Herakleia—his tyranny and cruelty.—He
continues despot for twelve years—he is assassinated at a
festival.—Satyrus becomes despot—his aggravated cruelty—his
military vigor.—Despotism of Timotheus, just and mild—his energy
and ability.—Despotism of Dionysius—his popular and vigorous
government—his prudent dealing with the Macedonians, during the
absence of Alexander in the East.—Return of Alexander to Susa—he
is solicited by the Herakleotic exiles—anger of Dionysius,
averted by the death of Alexander.—Prosperity and prudence of
Dionysius—he marries Amastris—his favor with Antigonus—his
death.—Amastris governs Herakleia—marries Lysimachus—is divorced
from him—Klearchus and Oxathres kill Amastris—are killed by
Lysimachus.—Arsinoê mistress of Herakleia. Defeat and death
of Lysimachus. Power of Seleukus.—Herakleia emancipated from
the despots, and a popular government established—recall of
the exiles—bold bearing of the citizens towards Seleukus—death
of Seleukus.—Situation and management of Herakleia as a free
government—considerable naval power.—Prudent administration of
Herakleia, as a free city, among the powerful princes of Asia
Minor—general condition and influence of the Greek cities on the
coast.—Grecian Pentapolis on the south-west of the Euxine—Ovid
at Tomi.—Olbia—in the days of Herodotus and Ephorus—increased
numbers, and multiplied inroads of the barbaric hordes.—Olbia in
later days—decline of security and production.—Olbia pillaged and
abandoned—afterwards renewed.—Visit of Dion the Rhetor—Hellenic
tastes and manners—ardent interest in Homer.—Bosporus or
Pantikapæum.—Princes of Bosporus—relations between Athens and
Bosporus.—Nymphæum among the tributary cities under the Athenian
empire—how it passed under the Bosporanic princes.—Alliance and
reciprocal good offices between the Bosporanic princes Satyrus,
Leukon, etc. and the Athenians. Immunities of trade granted to
the Athenians.—Political condition of the Greeks of Bosporus—the
princes called themselves archons—their empire over barbaric
tribes.—Family feuds among the Bosporanic princes—war between
Satyrus and Eumelus—death of Satyrus II.—Civil war between
Prytanis and Eumelus—victory of Eumelus—he kills the wives,
children, and friends, of his brother.—His victorious reign and
conquests—his speedy death.—Decline of the Bosporanic dynasty,
until it passed into the hands of Mithridates Eupator.—Monuments
left by the Spartokid princes of Bosporus—sepulchral tumuli near
Kertch (Pantikapæum).—Appendix on the Localities near Issus.
453-495
INDEX 497
[Illustration: MAP SHEWING THE MARCHES OF ALEXANDER.]
HISTORY OF GREECE.
CHAPTER XCI.
FIRST PERIOD OF THE REIGN OF ALEXANDER THE GREAT — SIEGE AND CAPTURE
OF THEBES.
My last preceding volume ended with the assassination of Philip of
Macedon, and the accession of his son Alexander the Great, then
twenty years of age.
It demonstrates the altered complexion of Grecian history, that we
are now obliged to seek for marking events in the succession to
the Macedonian crown, or in the ordinances of Macedonian kings. In
fact, the Hellenic world has ceased to be autonomous. In Sicily,
indeed, the free and constitutional march, revived by Timoleon,
is still destined to continue for a few years longer; but all the
Grecian cities south of Mount Olympus have descended into dependents
of Macedonia. Such dependence, established as a fact by the battle
of Chæroneia and by the subsequent victorious march of Philip over
Peloponnesus, was acknowledged in form by the vote of the Grecian
synod at Corinth. While even the Athenians had been compelled to
concur in submission, Sparta alone, braving all consequences,
continued inflexible in her refusal. The adherence of Thebes was not
trusted to the word of the Thebans, but ensured by the Macedonian
garrison established in her citadel, called the Kadmeia. Each
Hellenic city, small and great,—maritime, inland, and insular—(with
the single exception of Sparta), was thus enrolled as a separate unit
in the list of subject-allies attached to the imperial headship of
Philip.
Under these circumstances, the history of conquered Greece loses its
separate course, and becomes merged in that of conquering Macedonia.
Nevertheless, there are particular reasons which constrain the
historian of Greece to carry on the two together for a few years
longer. First, conquered Greece exercised a powerful action on her
conqueror—“Græcia capta ferum victorem cepit”. The Macedonians,
though speaking a language of their own, had neither language for
communicating with others, nor literature, nor philosophy, except
Grecian and derived from Greeks. Philip, while causing himself to be
chosen chief of Hellas, was himself not only partially hellenized,
but an eager candidate for Hellenic admiration. He demanded the
headship under the declared pretence of satisfying the old antipathy
against Persia. Next, the conquests of Alexander, though essentially
Macedonian, operated indirectly as the initiatory step of a series
of events, diffusing Hellenic language (with some tinge of Hellenic
literature) over a large breadth of Asia,—opening that territory to
the better observation, in some degree even to the superintendence,
of intelligent Greeks—and thus producing consequences important in
many ways to the history of mankind. Lastly, the generation of free
Greeks upon whom the battle of Chæroneia fell, were not disposed
to lie quiet if any opportunity occurred for shaking off their
Macedonian masters. The present volume will record the unavailing
efforts made for this purpose, in which Demosthenes and most of the
other leaders perished.
Alexander (born in July 356 B. C.), like his father Philip,
was not a Greek, but a Macedonian and Epirot, partially imbued with
Grecian sentiment and intelligence. It is true that his ancestors,
some centuries before, had been emigrants from Argos; but the kings
of Macedonia had long lost all trace of any such peculiarity as might
originally have distinguished them from their subjects. The basis of
Philip’s character was Macedonian, not Greek: it was the self-will of
a barbarian prince, not the _ingenium civile_, or sense of reciprocal
obligation and right in society with others, which marked more or
less even the most powerful members of a Grecian city, whether
oligarchical or democratical. If this was true of Philip, it was
still more true of Alexander, who inherited the violent temperament
and headstrong will of his furious Epirotic mother Olympias.
A kinsman of Olympias, named Leonidas, and an Akarnanian named
Lysimachus, are mentioned as the chief tutors to whom Alexander’s
childhood was entrusted.[1] Of course the Iliad of Homer was among
the first things which he learnt as a boy. Throughout most of his
life, he retained a passionate interest in this poem, a copy of
which, said to have been corrected by Aristotle, he carried with him
in his military campaigns. We are not told, nor is it probable, that
he felt any similar attachment for the less warlike Odyssey. Even as
a child, he learnt to identify himself in sympathy with Achilles,—his
ancestor by the mother’s side, according to the Æakid pedigree. The
tutor Lysimachus won his heart by calling himself Phœnix—Alexander,
Achilles—and Philip, by the name of Peleus. Of Alexander’s boyish
poetical recitations, one anecdote remains, both curious and of
unquestionable authenticity. He was ten years old, when the Athenian
legation, including both Æschines and Demosthenes, came to Pella to
treat about peace. While Philip entertained them at table, in his
usual agreeable and convivial manner, the boy Alexander recited for
their amusement certain passages of poetry which he had learnt—and
delivered, in response with another boy, a dialogue out of one of the
Grecian dramas.[2]
[1] Plutarch, Alexand. c. 5, 6.
[2] Æschines cont. Timarch. p. 167.
At the age of thirteen, Alexander was placed under the instruction of
Aristotle, whom Philip expressly invited for the purpose, and whose
father Nikomachus had been both friend and physician of Philip’s
father Amyntas. What course of study Alexander was made to go
through, we unfortunately cannot state. He enjoyed the teaching of
Aristotle for at least three years, and we are told that he devoted
himself to it with ardor, contracting a strong attachment to his
preceptor. His powers of addressing an audience, though not so well
attested as those of his father, were always found sufficient for his
purpose: moreover, he retained, even in the midst of his fatiguing
Asiatic campaigns, an interest in Greek literature and poetry.
At what precise moment, during the lifetime of his father, Alexander
first took part in active service, we do not know. It is said that
once, when quite a youth, he received some Persian envoys during the
absence of his father; and that he surprised them by the maturity of
his demeanor, as well as by the political bearing and pertinence of
his questions.[3] Though only sixteen years of age, in 340 B.
C., he was left at home as regent while Philip was engaged in
the sieges of Byzantium and Perinthus. He put down a revolt of the
neighboring Thracian tribe called Mædi, took one of their towns, and
founded it anew under the title of Alexandria; the earliest town
which bore that name, afterwards applied to so many other towns
planted by him. In the march of Philip into Greece (338 B.
C.), Alexander took part, commanded one of the wings at the
battle of Chæroneia, and is said to have first gained the advantage
on his side over the Theban sacred band.[4]
[3] Plutarch, Alex. 5.
[4] Plutarch, Alex. 9. Justin says that Alexander was the
companion of his father during part of the war in Thrace (ix. 1).
Yet notwithstanding such marks of confidence and coöperation, other
incidents occurred producing bitter animosity between the father and
the son. By his wife Olympias, Philip had as offspring Alexander
and Kleopatra: by a Thessalian mistress named Philinna, he had a
son named Aridæus (afterwards called Philip Aridæus:) he had also
daughters named Kynna (or Kynanê) and Thessalonikê. Olympias, a
woman of sanguinary and implacable disposition, had rendered herself
so odious to him, that he repudiated her, and married a new wife
named Kleopatra. I have recounted in the preceding volume[5] the
indignation felt by Alexander at this proceeding, and the violent
altercation which occurred during the conviviality of the marriage
banquet; where Philip actually snatched his sword, threatened his
son’s life, and was only prevented from executing the threat by
falling down through intoxication. After this quarrel, Alexander
retired from Macedonia, conducting his mother to her brother
Alexander king of Epirus. A son was born to Philip by Kleopatra.
Her brother or uncle Attalus acquired high favor. Her kinsmen and
partisans generally were also promoted, while Ptolemy, Nearchus, and
other persons attached to Alexander, were banished.[6]
[5] Vol. XI. Ch. xc. p. 513.
[6] Plutarch, Alex. 10. Arrian, iii. 6, 8.
The prospects of Alexander were thus full of uncertainty and peril,
up to the very day of Philip’s assassination. The succession to the
Macedonian crown, though transmitted in the same family, was by no
means assured as to individual members; moreover, in the regal house
of Macedonia[7] (as among the kings called Diadochi, who acquired
dominion after the death of Alexander the Great), violent feuds and
standing mistrust between father, sons, and brethren, were ordinary
phænomena, to which the family of the Antigonids formed an honorable
exception. Between Alexander and Olympias on the one side, and
Kleopatra with her son and Attalus on the other, a murderous contest
was sure to arise. Kleopatra was at this time in the ascendent;
Olympias was violent and mischievous; and Philip was only forty-seven
years of age. Hence the future threatened nothing but aggravated
dissension and difficulties for Alexander. Moreover his strong
will and imperious temper, eminently suitable for supreme command,
disqualified him from playing a subordinate part, even to his own
father. The prudence of Philip, when about to depart on his Asiatic
expedition, induced him to attempt to heal these family dissensions
by giving his daughter Kleopatra in marriage to her uncle Alexander
of Epirus, brother of Olympias. It was during the splendid marriage
festival, then celebrated at Ægæ, that he was assassinated—Olympias,
Kleopatra, and Alexander, being all present, while Attalus was in
Asia, commanding the Macedonian division sent forward in advance,
jointly with Parmenio. Had Philip escaped this catastrophe, he
would doubtless have carried on the war in Asia Minor with quite as
much energy and skill as it was afterwards prosecuted by Alexander:
though we may doubt whether the father would have stretched out to
those ulterior undertakings which, gigantic and far-reaching as
they were, fell short of the insatiable ambition of the son. But
successful as Philip might have been in Asia, he would hardly have
escaped gloomy family feuds; with Alexander as a mutinous son, under
the instigations of Olympias,—and with Kleopatra on the other side,
feeling that her own safety depended upon the removal of regal or
quasi-regal competitors.
[7] See the third chapter of Plutarch’s life of Demetrius
Poliorkêtês; which presents a vivid description of the feelings
prevalent between members of regal families in those ages.
Demetrius, coming home from the chase with his hunting javelins
in his hand, goes up to his father Antigonus, salutes him, and
sits down by his side without disarming. This is extolled as an
unparalleled proof of the confidence and affection subsisting
between the father and the son. In the families of all the other
Diadochi (says Plutarch) murders of sons, mothers, and wives,
were frequent—murders of brothers were even common, assumed to be
precautions necessary for security. Οὕτως ἄρα πάντη δυσκωνοίνητον
ἡ ἀρχὴ καὶ μεστὸν ἀπιστίας καὶ δυσνοίας, ὥστε ἀγάλλεσθαι τὸν
μέγιστον τῶν Ἀλεξάνδρου διαδόχων καὶ πρεσβύτατον, ὅτι μὴ φοβεῖται
τὸν υἱὸν, ἀλλὰ προσίεται τὴν λόγχην ἔχοντα τοῦ σώματος πλήσιον.
Οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ μόνος, ὡς εἰπεῖν, ~ὁ οἶκος οὗτος~ ἐπὶ πλείστας
διαδοχὰς τῶν τοιούτων κακῶν ἐκαθάρευσε, μᾶλλον δὲ ~εἷς μόνος~ τῶν
ἀπ᾽ Ἀντιγόνου Φίλιππος ἀνεῖλεν υἱόν. ~Αἱ δὲ ἄλλαι σχεδὸν ἁπᾶσαι~
διαδοχαὶ πολλῶν μὲν ἔχουσι παίδων, πολλῶν δὲ μητέρων φόνους καὶ
γυναικῶν· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀδελφοὺς ἀναιρεῖν, ὥσπερ οἱ γεωμέτραι τὰ
αἰτήματα λαμβάνουσιν, οὕτω ~συνεχωρεῖτο κοινόν τι νομιζόμενον
αἴτημα καὶ βασιλικὸν~ ὑπὲρ ἀσφαλείας.
Compare Tacitus, Histor. v. 8, about the family feuds of the
kings of Judæa; and Xenoph. Hieron. iii. 8.
In noticing the Antigonid family as a favorable exception, we
must confine our assertion to the first century of that family.
The bloody tragedy of Perseus and Demetrius shortly preceded the
ruin of the empire.
From such formidable perils, visible in the distance, if not
immediately impending, the sword of Pausanias guaranteed both
Alexander and the Macedonian kingdom. But at the moment when the blow
was struck, and when the Lynkestian Alexander, one of those privy
to it, ran to forestall resistance and place the crown on the head
of Alexander the Great[8]—no one knew what to expect from the young
prince thus suddenly exalted at the age of twenty years. The sudden
death of Philip in the fulness of glory and ambitious hopes, must
have produced the strongest impression, first upon the festive crowd
assembled,—next throughout Macedonia,—lastly, upon the foreigners
whom he had reduced to dependence, from the Danube to the borders
of Pæonia. All these dependencies were held only by the fear of
Macedonian force. It remained to be proved whether the youthful son
of Philip was capable of putting down opposition and upholding the
powerful organization created by his father. Moreover Perdikkas,
the elder brother and predecessor of Philip, had left a son named
Amyntas, now at least twenty-four years of age, to whom many looked
as the proper successor.[9]
[8] Arrian, i. 25, 2; Justin, xi. 2. See Vol. XI. p. 517.
[9] Arrian, De Rebus post Alexandrum, Fragm. ap. Photium, cod.
92. p. 220; Plutarch, De Fortunâ Alex. Magn. p. 327. πᾶσα δὲ
ὕπουλος ἦν ἡ Μακεδονία (after the death of Philip) πρὸς Ἀμύνταν
ἀποβλέπουσα καὶ τοὺς Ἀερόπου παῖδας.
But Alexander, present and proclaimed at once by his friends, showed
himself both in word and deed, perfectly competent to the emergency.
He mustered, caressed, and conciliated, the divisions of the
Macedonian army and the chief officers. His addresses were judicious
and energetic, engaging that the dignity of the kingdom should be
maintained unimpaired,[10] and that even the Asiatic projects already
proclaimed should be prosecuted with as much vigor as if Philip still
lived.
[10] Diod. xvii. 2.
It was one of the first measures of Alexander to celebrate with
magnificent solemnities the funeral of his deceased father. While
the preparations for it were going on, he instituted researches
to find out and punish the accomplices of Pausanias. Of these
indeed, the most illustrious person mentioned to us—Olympias—was
not only protected by her position from punishment, but retained
great ascendency over her son to the end of his life. Three
other persons are mentioned by name as accomplices—brothers and
persons of good family from the district of Upper Macedonia called
Lynkêstis—Alexander, Heromenes, and Arrhabæus, sons of Aëropus. The
two latter were put to death, but the first of the three was spared,
and even promoted to important charges, as a reward for his useful
forwardness in instantly saluting Alexander king.[11] Others also,
we know not how many, were executed; and Alexander seems to have
imagined that there still remained some undetected.[12] The Persian
king boasted in public letters,[13] with how much truth we cannot
say, that he too had been among the instigators of Pausanias.
[11] Arrian, i. 25, 2; Curtius, vii. 1, 6. Alexander son
of Aëropus was son-in-law of Antipater. The case of this
Alexander—and of Olympias—afforded a certain basis to those who
said (Curtius, vi. 43) that Alexander had dealt favorably with
the accomplices of Pausanias.
[12] Plutarch, Alexand. 10-27; Diodor. xvii. 51; Justin, xi. 11.
[13] Arrian, ii. 14, 10.
Among the persons slain about this time by Alexander, we may number
his first-cousin and brother-in-law Amyntas—son of Perdikkas (the
elder brother of the deceased Philip): Amyntas was a boy when his
father Perdikkas died. Though having a preferable claim to the
succession, according to usage, he had been put aside by his uncle
Philip, on the ground of his age and of the strenuous efforts
required on commencing a new reign. Philip had however given in
marriage to this Amyntas his daughter (by an Illyrian mother) Kynna.
Nevertheless, Alexander now put him to death,[14] on accusation of
conspiracy: under what precise circumstances, does not appear—but
probably Amyntas (who besides being the son of Philip’s elder
brother, was at least twenty-four years of age, while Alexander
was only twenty) conceived himself as having a better right to the
succession, and was so conceived by many others. The infant son of
Kleopatra by Philip is said to have been killed by Alexander, as a
rival in the succession; Kleopatra herself was afterwards put to
death by Olympias during his absence, and to his regret. Attalus,
also, uncle of Kleopatra and joint commander of the Macedonian army
in Asia, was assassinated under the private orders of Alexander, by
Hekatæus and Philotas.[15] Another Amyntas, son of Antiochus (there
seems to have been several Macedonians named Amyntas) fled for safety
into Asia:[16] probably others, who felt themselves to be objects of
suspicion, did the like—since by the Macedonian custom, not merely a
person convicted of high treason, but all his kindred along with him,
were put to death.[17]
[14] Curtius, vi. 9, 17. vi. 10, 24. Arrian mentioned this
Amyntas son of Perdikkas (as well as the fact of his having been
put to death by Alexander before the Asiatic expedition), in
the lost work τὰ μετὰ Ἀλέξανδρον—see Photius Cod. 92. p. 220.
But Arrian, in his account of Alexander’s expedition, _does not
mention_ the fact; which shows that his silence is not to be
assumed as a conclusive reason for discrediting allegations of
others.
Compare Polyænus, v. 60; and Plutarch, Fort. Alex. Magn. p. 327.
It was during this expedition into Thrace and Illyria, about
eight months after his accession, that Alexander promised to
give his sister Kynna in marriage to Langarus prince of the
Agrianes (Arrian, Exp. Al. M. i. 5, 7). Langarus died of sickness
soon after; so that this marriage never took place. But when
the promise was made, Kynna must have been a widow. Her husband
Amyntas must therefore have been put to death during the first
months of Alexander’s reign.
[15] See my last preceding volume, Chap. xc. p. 518; Diod. xvii.
2; Curtius, vii. 1, 6; Justin, ix. 7 xi. 2. xii. 6; Plutarch,
Alexand. 10; Pausanias, viii. 7, 5.
[16] Arrian, i. 17 10; Plutarch, Alex. 20, Curtius, iii. 28, 18.
[17] Curtius, vi. 42, 20. Compare with this custom, a passage in
the Ajax of Sophokles, v. 725.
By unequivocal manifestations of energy and address, and by
despatching rivals or dangerous malcontents, Alexander thus speedily
fortified his position on the throne at home. But from the foreign
dependents of Macedonia—Greeks, Thracians, and Illyrians—the like
acknowledgment was not so easily obtained. Most of them were disposed
to throw off the yoke; yet none dared to take the initiative of
moving, and the suddenness of Philip’s death found them altogether
unprepared for combination. By that event the Greeks were discharged
from all engagement, since the vote of the confederacy had elected
him personally as Imperator. They were now at liberty, in so far
as there was any liberty at all in the proceeding, to elect any
one else, or to abstain from reëlecting at all, and even to let
the confederacy expire. Now it was only under constraint and
intimidation, as was well known both in Greece and Macedonia, that
they had conferred this dignity even on Philip—who had earned it by
splendid exploits, and had proved himself the ablest captain and
politician of the age. They were by no means inclined to transfer
it to a youth like Alexander, until he had shown himself capable
of bringing the like coercion to bear, and extorting the same
submission. The wish to break loose from Macedonia, widely spread
throughout the Grecian cities, found open expression from Demosthenes
and others in the assembly at Athens. That orator (if we are to
believe his rival Æschines), having received private intelligence of
the assassination of Philip, through certain spies of Charidemus,
before it was publicly known to others—pretended to have had it
revealed to him in a dream by the gods. Appearing in the assembly
with his gayest attire, he congratulated his countrymen on the death
of their greatest enemy, and pronounced high encomiums on the brave
tyrannicide of Pausanias, which he would probably compare to that
of Harmodius and Aristogeiton.[18] He depreciated the abilities of
Alexander, calling him Margites (the name of a silly character in
one of the Homeric poems), and intimating that he would be too much
distracted with embarrassments and ceremonial duties at home, to have
leisure for a foreign march.[19] Such, according to Æschines, was
the language of Demosthenes on the first news of Philip’s death. We
cannot doubt that the public of Athens, as well as Demosthenes, felt
great joy at an event which seemed to open to them fresh chances of
freedom, and that the motion for a sacrifice of thanksgiving,[20]
in spite of Phokion’s opposition, was readily adopted. But though
the manifestation of sentiment at Athens was thus anti-Macedonian,
exhibiting aversion to the renewal of that obedience which had been
recently promised to Philip, Demosthenes did not go so far as to
declare any positive hostility.[21] He tried to open communication
with the Persians in Asia Minor, and also, if we may believe
Diodorus, with the Macedonian commander in Asia Minor, Attalus. But
neither of the two missions was successful. Attalus sent his letter
to Alexander; while the Persian king,[22] probably relieved by the
death of Philip from immediate fear of Macedonian power, despatched
a peremptory refusal to Athens, intimating that he would furnish no
more money.[23]
[18] Æschines adv. Ktesiphont. c. 29. p. 469. c. 78 p. 608;
Plutarch, Demosth. 22.
[19] Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 547. c. 50.
[20] Plutarch, Phokion, 16.
[21] We gather this from Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 551. c. 52.
[22] Diodorus (xvii. 5) mentions this communication of
Demosthenes to Attalus; which, however, I cannot but think
improbable. Probably Charidemus was the organ of the
communications.
[23] This letter from Darius is distinctly alluded to, and even
a sentence cited from it, by Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 633, 634.
c. 88. We know that Darius wrote in very different language
not long afterwards, near the time when Alexander crossed into
Asia (Arrian, ii. 14, 11). The first letter must have been sent
shortly after Philip’s death, when Darius was publicly boasting
of having procured the deed, and before he had yet learnt to fear
Alexander. Compare Diodor. xvii. 7.
Not merely in Athens, but in other Grecian States also, the death
of Philip excited aspirations for freedom. The Lacedæmonians, who,
though unsupported, had stood out inflexibly against any obedience
to him, were now on the watch for new allies; while the Arcadians,
Argeians, and Eleians, manifested sentiments adverse to Macedonia.
The Ambrakiots expelled the garrison placed by Philip in their city;
the Ætolians passed a vote to assist in restoring those Akarnanian
exiles whom he had banished.[24] On the other hand, the Thessalians
manifested unshaken adherence to Macedonia. But the Macedonian
garrison at Thebes, and the macedonizing Thebans who now governed
that city,[25] were probably the main obstacles to any combined
manifestation in favor of Hellenic autonomy.
[24] Diodor. xvii. 3.
[25] Diodorus (xvii. 3) says that the Thebans passed a vote to
expel the Macedonian garrison in the Kadmeia. But I have little
hesitation in rejecting this statement. We may be sure that
the presence of the Macedonian garrison was connected with the
predominance in the city of a party favorable to Macedonia. In
the ensuing year, when the resistance really occurred, this was
done by the anti-Macedonian party, who then got back from exile.
Apprised of these impulses prevalent throughout the Grecian world,
Alexander felt the necessity of checking them by a demonstration
immediate, as well as intimidating. The energy and rapidity of his
proceedings speedily overawed all those who had speculated on his
youth, or had adopted the epithets applied to him by Demosthenes.
Having surmounted, in a shorter time than was supposed possible,
the difficulties of his newly-acquired position at home, he marched
into Greece at the head of a formidable army, seemingly about two
months after the death of Philip. He was favorably received by the
Thessalians, who passed a vote constituting Alexander head of Greece
in place of his father Philip; which vote was speedily confirmed by
the Amphiktyonic assembly, convoked at Thermopylæ. Alexander next
advanced to Thebes, and from thence over the isthmus of Corinth
into Peloponnesus. The details of his march we do not know; but
his great force, probably not inferior to that which had conquered
at Chæroneia, spread terror everywhere, silencing all except his
partisans. Nowhere was the alarm greater than at Athens. The
Athenians recollecting both the speeches of their orators and the
votes of their assembly,—offensive at least, if not hostile, to the
Macedonians—trembled lest the march of Alexander should be directed
against their city, and accordingly made preparation for standing
a siege. All citizens were enjoined to bring in their families and
properties from the country, insomuch that the space within the walls
was full both of fugitives and of cattle.[26] At the same time, the
assembly adopted, on the motion of Demades, a resolution of apology
and full submission to Alexander: they not only recognized him as
chief of Greece, but conferred upon him divine honors, in terms
even more emphatic than those bestowed on Philip.[27] The mover,
with other legates, carried the resolution to Alexander, whom they
found at Thebes, and who accepted their submission. A young speaker
named Pytheas is said to have opposed the vote in the Athenian
assembly.[28] Whether Demosthenes did the like—or whether, under the
feeling of disappointed anticipations and overwhelming Macedonian
force, he condemned himself to silence,—we cannot say. That he did
not go with Demades on the mission to Alexander, seems a matter of
course, though he is said to have been appointed by public vote to
do so, and to have declined the duty. He accompanied the legation
as far as Mount Kithæron, on the frontier, and then returned to
Athens.[29] We read with astonishment that Æschines and his other
enemies denounced this step as a cowardly desertion. No envoy could
be so odious to Alexander, or so likely to provoke refusal for the
proposition which he carried, as Demosthenes. To employ him in such
a mission would have been absurd; except for the purpose probably
intended by his enemies, that he might be either detained by the
conqueror as an expiatory victim,[30] or sent back as a pardoned and
humiliated prisoner.
[26] Demadis Fragment. ὑπὲρ τῆς δωδεκαετίας, p. 180.
[27] Arrian, i. 1, 4.
[28] Plutarch, Reipub. Ger. Præcept. p. 804.
[29] Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 564. c. 50; Deinarchus cont.
Demosth. p. 57; Diodor. xvii. 4; Plutarch, Demosth. c. 23
(Plutarch confounds the proceedings of this year with those of
the succeeding year). Demades, in the fragment of his oration
remaining to us, makes no allusion to this proceeding of
Demosthenes.
The decree, naming Demosthenes among the envoys, is likely enough
to have been passed chiefly by the votes of his enemies. It was
always open to an Athenian citizen to accept or decline such an
appointment.
[30] Several years afterwards, Demades himself was put to death
by Antipater, to whom he had been sent as envoy from Athens
(Diodor. xviii. 48).
After displaying his force in various portions of Peloponnesus,
Alexander returned to Corinth, where he convened deputies from the
Grecian cities generally. The list of those cities which obeyed
the summons is not before us, but probably it included nearly all
the cities of Central Greece. We know only that the Lacedæmonians
continued to stand aloof, refusing all concurrence. Alexander asked
from the assembled deputies the same appointment which the victorious
Philip had required and obtained two years before—the hegemony or
headship of the Greeks collectively for the purpose of prosecuting
war against Persia.[31] To the request of a prince at the head of an
irresistible army, one answer only was admissible. He was nominated
Imperator with full powers, by land and sea. Overawed by the presence
and sentiment of Macedonian force, all acquiesced in this vote except
the Lacedæmonians.
[31] Arrian, i. 1, 2. αἰτεῖν παρ᾽ αὐτῶν τὴν ἡγεμονίαν τῆς ἐπὶ
τοὺς Πέρσας στρατείας, ἥντινα Φιλίππῳ ἤδη ἔδοσαν· καὶ αἰτήσαντα
λαβεῖν παρὰ πάντων, πλὴν Λακεδαιμονίων, etc.
Arrian speaks as if this request had been addressed only to the
Greeks _within_ Peloponnesus; moreover he mentions no assembly
at Corinth, which is noticed (though with some confusion) by
Diodorus, Justin, and Plutarch. Cities out of Peloponnesus,
as well as within it, must have been included; unless we
suppose that the resolution of the Amphiktyonic assembly, which
had been previously passed, was held to comprehend all the
extra-Peloponnesian cities, which seems not probable.
The convention sanctioned by Alexander was probably the same as that
settled by and with his father Philip. Its grand and significant
feature was, that it recognized Hellas as a confederacy under the
Macedonian prince as imperator, president, or executive head and
arm. It crowned him with a legal sanction as keeper of the peace
within Greece, and conqueror abroad in the name of Greece. Of its
other conditions, some are made known to us by subsequent complaints;
such conditions as, being equitable and tutelary towards the members
generally, the Macedonian chief found it inconvenient to observe,
and speedily began to violate. Each Hellenic city was pronounced,
by the first article of the convention, to be free and autonomous.
In each, the existing political constitution was recognized as it
stood; all other cities were forbidden to interfere with it, or to
second any attack by its hostile exiles.[32] No new despot was to
be established; no dispossessed despot was to be restored.[33] Each
city became bound to discourage in every other, as far as possible,
all illegal violence—such as political executions, confiscation,
spoliation, redivision of land or abolition of debts, factious
manumission of slaves, etc.[34] To each was guaranteed freedom of
navigation; maritime capture was prohibited, on pain of enmity from
all.[35] Each was forbidden to send armed vessels into the harbor of
any other, or to build vessels or engage seamen there.[36] By each,
an oath was taken to observe these conditions, to declare war against
all who violated them, and to keep them inscribed on a commemorative
column. Provision seems to have been made for admitting any
additional city[37] on its subsequent application, though it might
not have been a party to the original contract. Moreover, it appears
that a standing military force, under Macedonian orders, was provided
to enforce observance of the convention; and that the synod of
deputies was contemplated as likely to meet periodically.[38]
[32] Demosthenes (or Pseudo-Demosthenes), Orat. xvii. De
Fœdere Alexandrino, p. 213, 214. ἐπιτάττει ἡ συνθήκη εὐθὺς ἐν
ἀρχῇ, ἐλευθέρους εἶναι καὶ αὐτονόμους τοὺς Ἕλληνας.—Ἐστὶ γὰρ
γεγραμμένον, ἐάν τινες τὰς πολιτείας τὰς παρ᾽ ἑκάστοις οὔσας, ὅτε
τοὺς ὅρκους τοὺς περὶ τῆς εἰρήνης ὤμνυσαν, καταλύσωσι, πολεμίους
εἶναι πᾶσι τοῖς τῆς εἰρήνης μετέχουσιν....
[33] Demosthen. Orat. de Fœdere Alex. p. 213.
[34] Demosth. ib. p 215.
[35] Demosth. ib. p. 217. ἔστι γὰρ δήπου ἐν ταῖς συνθήκαις, τὴν
θάλατταν πλεῖν τοὺς μετέχοντας τῆς εἰρήνης, καὶ μηδένα κωλύειν
αὐτοὺς μηδὲ κατάγειν πλοῖον μηδενὸς τούτων· ἐὰν δέ τις παρὰ ταῦτα
ποιῇ, πολέμιον εἶναι πᾶσι τοῖς τῆς εἰρήνης μετέχουσιν....
[36] Demosth. ib. p. 218, 219. Böhnecke, in his instructive
comments on this convention (Forschungen auf dem Gebiete der
Attischen Redner, p. 623), has treated the prohibition here
mentioned as if it were one specially binding the Macedonians
not to sail with armed ships into the Peiræus. This undoubtedly
is the particular case on which the orator insists; but I
conceive it to have been only a particular case under a general
prohibitory rule.
[37] Arrian, ii. 1, 7; ii. 2, 4. Demosth. de Fœd. Alex, p. 213.
Tenedos, Mitylênê, Antissa, and Eresus, can hardly have been
members of the convention when first sworn.
[38] Demosth. Orat. de Fœd. Alex. p. 215. ἐστὶ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς
συνθήκαις ἐπιμελεῖσθαι ~τοὺς συνεδρεύοντας καὶ τοὺς ἐπὶ τῇ
κοινῇ φυλακῇ τεταγμένους~, ὅπως ἐν ταῖς κοινωνούσαις πόλεσι μὴ
γίγνωνται θάνατοι μηδὲ φυγαὶ παρὰ τοὺς κειμένους ταῖς πόλεσι
νόμους.... Οἱ δὲ τοσοῦτον δέουσι τούτων τι κωλύειν, ὥστε καὶ
συγκατασκευάζουσιν, etc. (p. 216).
The persons designated by οἱ δὲ, and denounced throughout this
oration generally, are, Alexander or the Macedonian officers and
soldiers.
A passage in Deinarchus cont. Demosth. p. 14, leads to the
supposition, that a standing Macedonian force was kept at
Corinth, occupying the Isthmus. The Thebans, however, declared
against Macedonia (in August or September 335 B. C.),
and proceeding to besiege the Macedonian garrison in the Kadmeia,
sent envoys to entreat aid from the Arcadians. “These envoys
(says Deinarchus) got with difficulty by sea to the Arcadians”—οἳ
κατὰ θάλασσαν ~μόλις~ ἀφίκοντο πρὸς ἐκείνους. Whence should this
difficulty arise, except from a Macedonian occupation of Corinth?
Such was the convention, in so far as we know its terms, agreed
to by the Grecian deputies at Corinth with Alexander; but with
Alexander at the head of an irresistible army. He proclaimed it as
the “public statute of the Greeks”,[39] constituting a paramount
obligation, of which he was the enforcer, binding on all, and
authorizing him to treat all transgressors as rebels. It was set
forth as counterpart of, and substitute for, the convention of
Antalkidas, which we shall presently see the officers of Darius
trying to revive against him—the headship of Persia against that of
Macedonia. Such is the melancholy degradation of the Grecian World,
that its cities have no alternative except to choose between these
two foreign potentates—or to invite the help of Darius, the most
distant and least dangerous, whose headship could hardly be more than
nominal, against a neighbor sure to be domineering and compressive,
and likely enough to be tyrannical. Of the once powerful Hellenic
chiefs and competitors—Sparta, Athens, Thebes—under each of whom the
Grecian world had been upheld as an independent and self-determining
aggregate, admitting the free play of native sentiment and character,
under circumstances more or less advantageous—the two last are now
confounded as common units (one even held under garrison) among the
subject allies of Alexander; while Sparta preserves only the dignity
of an isolated independence.
[39] Arrian, i. 16, 10. παρὰ τὰ κοινῇ δόξαντα τοῖς Ἕλλησιν.
After the death of Darius, Alexander pronounced that the Grecian
mercenaries who had been serving with that prince, were highly
criminal for having contravened the general vote of the Greeks
(παρὰ τὰ δόγματα τὰ Ἑλλήνων), except such as had taken service
before that vote was passed, and except the Sinopeans, whom
Alexander considered as subjects of Persia and not partakers τοῦ
κοινοῦ τῶν Ἑλλήνων (Arrian, iii. 23, 15; iii. 24, 8, 9).
It appears that during the nine months which succeeded the swearing
of the convention, Alexander and his officers (after his return to
Macedonia) were active, both by armed force and by mission of envoys,
in procuring new adhesions and in re-modelling the governments of
various cities suitably to their own views. Complaints of such
aggressions were raised in the public assembly of Athens, the only
place in Greece where any liberty of discussion still survived.
An oration, pronounced by Demosthenes, Hyperides, or one of the
contemporary, anti-Macedonian politicians (about the spring or early
summer of 335 B. C.),[40] imparts to us some idea both of
the Macedonian interventions steadily going on, and of the unavailing
remonstrances raised against them by individual Athenian citizens. At
the time of this oration, such remonstrances had already been often
repeated. They were always met by the macedonizing Athenians with
peremptory declarations that the convention must be observed. But
in reply, the remonstrants urged, that it was unfair to call upon
Athens for strict observance of the convention, while the Macedonians
and their partisans in the various cities were perpetually violating
it for their own profit. Alexander and his officers (affirms this
orator) had never once laid down their arms since the convention was
settled. They had been perpetually tampering with the governments
of the various cities, to promote their own partisans to power.[41]
In Messênê, Sikyon, and Pellênê, they had subverted the popular
constitutions, banished many citizens, and established friends of
their own as despots. The Macedonian force, destined as a public
guarantee to enforce the observance of the convention, had been
employed only to overrule its best conditions, and to arm the
hands of factious partisans.[42] Thus Alexander in his capacity of
Imperator, disregarding all the restraints of the convention, acted
as chief despot for the maintenance of subordinate despots in the
separate cities.[43] Even at Athens, this imperial authority had
rescinded sentences of the dikastery, and compelled the adoption of
measures contrary to the laws and constitution.[44]
[40] This is the oration περὶ τῶν πρὸς Ἀλέξανδρον συνθηκῶν
already more than once alluded to above. Though standing among
the Demosthenic works, it is supposed by Libanius as well as by
most modern critics not to be the production of Demosthenes—upon
internal grounds of style, which are certainly forcible. Libanius
says that it bears much resemblance to the style of Hyperides.
At any rate, there seems no reason to doubt that it is a genuine
oration of one of the contemporary orators. I agree with
Böhnecke (Forschungen, p. 629) in thinking that it must have
been delivered a few months after the convention with Alexander,
before the taking of Thebes.
[41] Demosthenes (or Pseudo-Demosth.), Orat. De Fœdere Alex. p.
216. Οὕτω μὲν τοίνυν ῥᾳδίως τὰ ὅπλα ἐπήνεγκε ὁ Μακεδὼν, ὥστε οὐδὲ
κατέθετο πώποτε, ἀλλ᾽ ἔτι καὶ νῦν περιέρχεται καθ᾽ ὅσον δύναται,
etc.
[42] Demosth. ib. p. 214, 215.
[43] Demosth. (or Pseudo-Demosth.) Orat. De Fœdere Alex. p.
212, 214, 215, 220, where the orator speaks of Alexander as the
τύραννος of Greece.
The orator argues (p. 213) that the Macedonians had recognized
despotism as contrary to the convention, in so far as to expel
the despots from the towns of Antissa and Eresus in Lesbos. But
probably these despots were in correspondence with the Persians
on the opposite mainland, or with Memnon.
[44] Demosth. ib. p. 215. τοὺς δ᾽ ἰδίους ὑμᾶς νόμους ἀναγκάζουσι
λύειν, τοὺς μὲν κεκριμένους ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις ἀφιέντες, ἕτερα
δὲ παμπλήθη τοιαῦτα βιαζόμενοι παρανομεῖν....
At sea, the wrongful aggressions of Alexander or his officers had
been not less manifest than on land. The convention, guaranteeing
to all cities the right of free navigation, distinctly forbade each
to take or detain vessels belonging to any other. Nevertheless the
Macedonians had seized, in the Hellespont, all the merchantmen coming
out with cargoes from the Euxine, and carried them into Tenedos,
where they were detained, under various fraudulent pretences, in
spite of remonstrances from the proprietors and cities whose supply
of corn was thus intercepted. Among these sufferers, Athens stood
conspicuous; since consumers of imported corn, ship-owners, and
merchants, were more numerous there than elsewhere. The Athenians,
addressing complaints and remonstrances without effect, became at
length so incensed, and perhaps uneasy about their provisions,
that they passed a decree to equip and despatch 100 triremes,
appointing Menestheus (son of Iphikrates) admiral. By this strenuous
manifestation, the Macedonians were induced to release the detained
vessels. Had the detention been prolonged, the Athenian fleet would
have sailed to extort redress by force; so that, as Athens was more
than a match for Macedon on sea, the maritime empire of the latter
would have been overthrown, while even on land much encouragement
would have been given to malcontents against it.[45] Another incident
had occurred, less grave than this, yet still dwelt upon by the
orator as an infringement of the convention, and as an insult to
Athenians. Though an express article of the convention prohibited
armed ships of one city from entering the harbor of another, still
a Macedonian trireme had been sent into Pieræus to ask permission
that smaller vessels might be built there for Macedonian account.
This was offensive to a large proportion of Athenians, not only as
violating the convention, but as a manifest step towards employing
the nautical equipments and seamen of Athens for the augmentation of
the Macedonian navy.[46]
[45] Demosth. (or Pseudo-Demosth.) Orat. De Fœdere Alex. p. 217.
εἰς τοῦτο γὰρ ὑπεροψίας ἦλθον, ὥστε εἰς Τένεδον ἅπαντα τὰ ἐκ τοῦ
Πόντου πλοῖα κατήγαγον, καὶ σκευωρούμενοι περὶ αὐτὰ οὐ πρότερον
ἀφεῖσαν, πρὶν ὑμεῖς ἐψηφίσασθε τριήρεις ἕκατον πληροῦν καὶ
καθέλκειν εὐθὺς τότε—ὃ παρ᾽ ἐλάχιστον ἐποίησεν αὐτοὺς ἀφαιρεθῆναι
δικαίως τὴν κατὰ θάλασσαν ἡγεμονίαν.... p. 218. Ἕως γὰρ ἂν ἐξῇ
τῶν κατὰ θάλασσαν καὶ μόνοις ἀναμφισβητήτως εἶναι κυρίοις (the
Athenians), τοῖς γε κατὰ γῆν πρὸς τῇ ὑπαρχούσῃ δυνάμει ἐστὶ
προβολὰς ἑτέρας ἰσχυροτέρας εὑρέσθαι, etc.
We know that Alexander caused a squadron of ships to sail round
to and up the Danube from Byzantium (Arrian, i. 3, 3), to meet
him after his march by land from the southern coast of Thrace.
It is not improbable that the Athenian vessels detained may have
come loaded with a supply of corn, and that the detention of the
corn-ships may have been intended to facilitate this operation.
[46] Demosth. (or Pseudo-Demosth.) Orat. De Fœdere Alex. p. 219.
“Let those speakers who are perpetually admonishing us to observe
the convention (the orator contends), prevail on the imperial chief
to set the example of observing it on his part. I too impress upon
you the like observance. To a democracy nothing is more essential
than scrupulous regard to equity and justice.[47] But the convention
itself enjoins all its members to make war against transgressors; and
pursuant to this article, you ought to make war against Macedon.[48]
Be assured that all Greeks will see that the war is neither directed
against them nor brought on by your fault.[49] At this juncture, such
a step for the maintenance of your own freedom as well as Hellenic
freedom generally, will be not less opportune and advantageous than
it is just.[50] The time is come for shaking off your disgraceful
submission to others, and your oblivion of our own past dignity.[51]
If you encourage me, I am prepared to make a formal motion—To declare
war against the violators of the convention, as the convention itself
directs.”[52]
[47] Demosth. ib. p. 211. οἶμαι γὰρ οὐδὲν οὕτω τοῖς
δημοκρατουμένοις πρέπειν, ὡς περὶ τὸ ἴσον καὶ τὸ δίκαιον
σπουδάζειν.
I give here the main sense, without binding myself to the exact
phrases.
[48] Demosth. ib. p. 213. καὶ γὰρ ἔτι προσγέγραπται ἐν ταῖς
συνθήκαις, πολέμιον εἶναι, τὸν ἐκεῖνα ἅπερ Ἀλέξανδρος ποιοῦντα,
ἁπᾶσι τοῖς τῆς εἰρήνης κοινωνοῦσι, καὶ τὴν χώραν αὐτοῦ, καὶ
στρατεύεσθαι ἐπ᾽ αὐτὸν ἅπαντας. Compare p. 214 init.
[49] Demosth. ib. p. 217. οὐδεὶς ὑμῖν ἐγκαλέσει ποτε τῶν Ἑλλήνων
ὡς ἄρα παρέβητέ τι τῶν κοινῇ ὁμολογηθέντων, ἀλλὰ καὶ χάριν
ἕξουσιν ὅτι μόνοι ἐξηλέγξατε τοὺς ταῦτα ποιοῦντας, etc.
[50] Demosth. ib. p. 214. νυνὶ δ᾽, ὅτ᾽ εἰς ταὐτὸ δίκαιον ἅμα καὶ
ὁ καιρὸς καὶ τὸ σύμφερον συνδεδράμηκεν, ἄλλον ἄρα τινὰ χρόνον
ἀναμενεῖτε τῆς ἰδίας ἐλευθερίας ἅμα καὶ τῆς τῶν ἄλλων Ἑλλήνων
ἀντιλαβέσθαι;
[51] Demosth. ib. p. 220. εἰ ἄρα ποτὲ δεῖ παύσασθαι αἰσχρῶς
ἑτέροις ἀκολουθοῦντας, ἀλλὰ μηδ᾽ ἀναμνησθῆναι μηδεμιᾶς φιλοτιμίας
τῶν ἐξ ἀρχαιοτάτου καὶ πλείστου καὶ μάλιστα πάντων ἀνθρώπων ἡμῖν
ὑπαρχουσῶν.
[52] Demosth. (or Pseudo-Demosth.) Orat. De Fœdere Alex. ἐὰν οὖν
κελεύητε, γράψω, καθάπερ αἱ συνθῆκαι κελεύουσι, πολεμεῖν τοῖς
παραβεβηκόσιν.
A formal motion for declaring war would have brought upon the
mover a prosecution under the Graphê Paranomôn. Accordingly, though
intimating clearly that he thought the actual juncture (what it was,
we do not know) suitable, he declined to incur such responsibility
without seeing beforehand a manifestation of public sentiment
sufficient to give him hopes of a favorable verdict from the
Dikastery. The motion was probably not made. But a speech so bold,
even though not followed up by a motion, is in itself significant
of the state of feeling in Greece during the months immediately
following the Alexandrine convention. This harangue is only one among
many delivered in the Athenian assembly, complaining of Macedonian
supremacy as exercised under the convention. It is plain that the
acts of Macedonian officers were such as to furnish ample ground for
complaint; and the detention of all the trading ships coming out of
the Euxine, shows us that even the subsistence of Athens and the
islands had become more or less endangered. Though the Athenians
resorted to no armed interference, their assembly at least afforded
a theatre where public protest could be raised and public sympathy
manifested.
It is probable too that at this time Demosthenes and the other
anti-Macedonian speakers were encouraged by assurances and subsidies
from Persia. Though the death of Philip, and the accession of an
untried youth of twenty, had led Darius to believe for the moment
that all danger of Asiatic invasion was past, yet his apprehensions
were now revived by Alexander’s manifested energy, and by the renewal
of the Grecian league under his supremacy.[53] It was apparently
during the spring of 335 B. C., that Darius sent money to sustain
the anti-Macedonian party at Athens and elsewhere. Æschines affirms,
and Deinarchus afterwards repeats (both of them orators hostile
to Demosthenes)—That about this time, Darius sent to Athens 300
talents, which the Athenian people refused, but which Demosthenes
took, reserving however 70 talents out of the sum for his own
private purse: That public inquiry was afterwards instituted on the
subject. Yet nothing is alleged as having been made out;[54] at
least Demosthenes was neither condemned, nor even brought (as far
as appears) to any formal trial. Out of such data we can elicit no
specific fact. But they warrant the general conclusion, that Darius,
or the satraps in Asia Minor, sent money to Athens in the spring of
335 B. C., and letters or emissaries to excite hostilities against
Alexander.
[53] Diodorus, xvii. 7.
[54] Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 634; Deinarchus adv. Demosth. s.
11-19, p. 9-14. It is Æschines who states that the 300 talents
were sent to the Athenian people, and refused by them.
Three years later, after the battle of Issus, Alexander in his
letter to Darius accuses that prince of having sent both letters
and money into Greece, for the purpose of exciting war against
him. Alexander states that the Lacedæmonians accepted the money,
but that all the other Grecian cities refused it (Arrian, ii. 14,
9). There is no reason to doubt these facts; but I find nothing
identifying the precise point of time to which Alexander alludes.
That Demosthenes, and probably other leading orators, received such
remittances from Persia, is no evidence of that personal corruption
which is imputed to them by their enemies. It is no way proved
that Demosthenes applied the money to his own private purposes. To
receive and expend it in trying to organize combinations for the
enfranchisement of Greece, was a proceeding which he would avow as
not only legitimate but patriotic. It was aid obtained from one
foreign prince to enable Hellas to throw off the worse dominion of
another. At this moment, the political interests of Persia coincided
with that of all Greeks who aspired to freedom. Darius had no chance
of becoming master of Greece; but his own security prescribed to
him to protect her from being made an appendage of the Macedonian
kingdom, and his means of doing so were at this moment ample, had
they been efficaciously put forth. Now the purpose of a Greek patriot
would be to preserve the integrity and autonomy of the Hellenic world
against all foreign interference. To invoke the aid of Persia against
Hellenic enemies,—as Sparta had done both in the Peloponnesian war
and at the peace of Antalkidas, and as Thebes and Athens had followed
her example in doing afterwards—was an unwarrantable proceeding: but
to invoke the same aid against the dominion of another foreigner, at
once nearer and more formidable, was open to no blame on the score
either of patriotism or policy. Demosthenes had vainly urged his
countrymen to act with energy against Philip, at a time when they
might by their own efforts have upheld the existing autonomy both for
Athens and for Greece generally. He now seconded or invited Darius,
at a time when Greece single-handed had become incompetent to the
struggle against Alexander, the common enemy both of Grecian liberty
and of the Persian empire. Unfortunately for Athens as well as for
himself, Darius, with full means of resistance in his hands, played
his game against Alexander even with more stupidity and improvidence
than Athens had played hers against Philip.
While such were the aggressions of Macedonian officers in the
exercise of their new imperial authority, throughout Greece and the
islands—and such the growing manifestations of repugnance to it at
Athens—Alexander had returned home to push the preparations for his
Persian campaign. He did not however think it prudent to transport
his main force into Asia, until he had made his power and personal
ascendency felt by the Macedonian dependencies, westward, northward,
and north-eastward of Pella—Illyrians, Pæonians, and Thracians.
Under these general names were comprised a number[55] of distinct
tribes, or nations, warlike and for the most part predatory. Having
remained unconquered until the victories of Philip, they were not
kept in subjection even by him without difficulty: nor were they at
all likely to obey his youthful successor, until they had seen some
sensible evidence of his personal energy.
[55] Strabo speaks of the Thracian ἔθνη as twenty-two in number,
capable of sending out 200,000 foot, and 15,000 horses (Strabo,
vii. Fragm. Vatic. 48).
Accordingly, in the spring, Alexander put himself at the head of a
large force, and marched in an easterly direction from Amphipolis,
through the narrow Sapæan pass between Philippi and the sea.[56] In
ten days’ march he reached the difficult mountain path over which
alone he could cross Mount Hæmus (Balkan.) Here he found a body of
the free Thracians and of armed merchants of the country, assembled
to oppose his progress; posted on the high ground with waggons
in their front, which it was their purpose to roll down the steep
declivity against the advancing ranks of the Macedonians. Alexander
eluded this danger by ordering his soldiers either to open their
ranks, so as to let the waggons go through freely—or where there was
no room for such loose array, to throw themselves on the ground with
their shields closely packed together and slanting over their bodies;
so that the waggons, dashing down the steep and coming against the
shields, were carried off the ground, and made to bound over the
bodies of the men to the space below. All the waggons rolled down
without killing a single man. The Thracians, badly armed, were then
easily dispersed by the Macedonian attack, with the loss of 1500 men
killed, and all their women and children made prisoners.[57] The
captives and plunder were sent back under an escort to be sold at the
seaports.
[56] Strabo, vii. p. 331 (Fragm.); Arrian, i. 1, 6; Appian, Bell.
Civil. iv. 87, 105, 106. Appian gives (iv. 103) a good general
description of the almost impassable and trackless country to the
north and north-east of Philippi.
[57] Arrian, i. 1, 12, 17. The precise locality of that steep
road whereby Alexander crossed the Balkan, cannot be determined.
Baron von Moltke, in his account of the Russian campaign in
Bulgaria (1828-1829), gives an enumeration of four roads,
passable by an army, crossing this chain from north to south (see
chap. i. of that work). But whether Alexander passed by any one
of these four, or by some other road still more to the west, we
cannot tell.
Having thus forced the mountain road, Alexander led his army over the
chain of Mount Hæmus, and marched against the Triballi: a powerful
Thracian tribe,—extending (as far as can be determined) from the
plain of Kossovo in modern Servia northward towards the Danube,—whom
Philip had conquered, yet not without considerable resistance and
even occasional defeat. Their prince Syrmus had already retired with
the women and children of the tribe into an island of the Danube
called Peukê, where many other Thracians had also sought shelter. The
main force of the Triballi took post in woody ground on the banks of
the rivet Zyginus, about three days’ march from the Danube. Being
tempted however, by an annoyance from the Macedonian light-armed, to
emerge from their covered position into the open plain, they were
here attacked by Alexander with his cavalry and infantry, in close
combat, and completely defeated. Three thousand of them were slain,
but the rest mostly eluded pursuit by means of the wood, so that
they lost few prisoners. The loss of the Macedonians was only eleven
horsemen and forty foot slain; according to the statement of Ptolemy,
son of Lagus, then one of Alexander’s confidential officers, and
afterwards founder of the dynasty of Greco-Egyptian kings.[58]
[58] Arrian, i. 2.
Three days’ march, from the scene of action, brought Alexander to the
Danube, where he found some armed ships which had been previously
ordered to sail (probably with stores of provision) from Byzantium
round by the Euxine and up the river. He first employed these ships
in trying to land a body of troops on the island of Peukê; but his
attempt was frustrated by the steep banks, the rapid stream, and
the resolute front of the defenders on shore. To compensate for
this disappointment, Alexander resolved to make a display of his
strength by crossing the Danube and attacking the Getæ; tribes,
chiefly horsemen armed with bows,[59] analogous to the Thracians
in habits and language. They occupied the left bank of the river,
from which their town was about four miles distant. The terror of
the Macedonian successes had brought together a body of 4000 Getæ,
visible from the opposite shore, to resist any crossing. Accordingly
Alexander got together a quantity of the rude boats (hollowed out of
a single trunk) employed for transport on the river, and caused the
tent-skins of the army to be stuffed with hay in order to support
rafts. He then put himself on shipboard during the night, and
contrived to carry across the river a body of 4000 infantry, and 1500
cavalry; landing on a part of the bank where there was high standing
wheat and no enemy’s post. The Getæ, intimidated not less by this
successful passage than by the excellent array of Alexander’s army,
hardly stayed to sustain a charge of cavalry, but hastened to abandon
their poorly fortified town and retire father away from the river.
Entering the town without resistance, he destroyed it, carried away
such movables as he found, and then returned to the river without
delay. Before he quitted the northern bank, he offered sacrifice to
Zeus the Preserver—to Hêraklês—and to the god Ister (Danube) himself,
whom he thanked for having shown himself not impassable.[60] On the
very same day, he recrossed the river to his camp; after an empty
demonstration of force, intended to prove that he could do what
neither his father nor any Grecian army had ever yet done, and what
every one deemed impossible—crossing the greatest of all known rivers
without a bridge and in the face of an enemy.[61]
[59] Strabo, vii. p. 303.
[60] Arrian, i. 4, 2-7.
[61] Neither the point where Alexander crossed the Danube,—nor
the situation of the island called Peukê,—nor the identity of the
river Lyginus—nor the part of Mount Hæmus which Alexander forced
his way over—can be determined. The data given by Arrian are too
brief and too meagre to make out with assurance any part of his
march after he crossed the Nestus. The facts reported by the
historian represent only a small portion of what Alexander really
did in this expedition.
It seems clear, however, that the main purpose of Alexander
was to attack and humble the Triballi. Their locality is known
generally as the region where the modern Servia joins Bulgaria.
They reached eastward (in the times of Thucydides, ii. 96) as
far as the river Oskius or Isker, which crosses the chain of
Hæmus from south to north, passes by the modern city of Sophia,
and falls into the Danube. Now Alexander, in order to conduct
his army from the eastern bank of the river Nestus, near its
mouth, to the country of the Triballi, would naturally pass
through Philippopolis, which city appears to have been founded
by his father Philip, and therefore probably had a regular road
of communication to the maritime regions. (See Stephanus Byz.
v. Φιλιππόπολις.) Alexander would cross Mount Hæmus, then,
somewhere north-west of Philippopolis. We read in the year 376
B. C. (Diodor. xv. 36) of an invasion of Abdêra by the
Triballi; which shows that there was a road, not unfit for an
army, from their territory to the eastern side of the mouth of
the river Nestus, where Abdêra was situated. This was the road
which Alexander is likely to have followed. But he must probably
have made a considerable circuit to the eastward; for the route
which Paul Lucas describes himself as having taken direct from
Philippopolis to Drama, can hardly have been fit for an army.
The river Lyginus may perhaps be the modern Isker, but this is
not certain. The Island called Peukê is still more perplexing.
Strabo speaks of it as if it were near the mouth of the Danube
(vii. p. 301-305). But it seems impossible that either the range
of the Triballi, or the march of Alexander, can have extended so
far eastward. Since Strabo (as well as Arrian) copied Alexander’s
march from Ptolemy, whose authority is very good, we are
compelled to suppose that there was a second island called Peukê
higher up the river.
The Geography of Thrace is so little known, that we cannot wonder
at our inability to identify these places. We are acquainted, and
that but imperfectly, with the two high roads, both starting from
Byzantium or Constantinople. 1. The one (called the King’s Road,
from having been in part the march of Xerxes in his invasion
of Greece, Livy, xxxix. 27; Herodot. vii. 115) crossing the
Hebrus and the Nestus, touching the northern coast of the Ægean
Sea at Neapolis, a little south of Philippi, then crossing the
Strymon at Amphipolis, and stretching through Pella across Inner
Macedonia and Illyria to Dyrrachium (the Via Egnatia). 2. The
other, taking a more northerly course, passing along the upper
valley of the Hebrus from Adrianople to Philippopolis, then
through Sardicia (Sophia) and Naissus (Nisch), to the Danube near
Belgrade; being the high road now followed from Constantinople to
Belgrade.
But apart from these two roads, scarcely anything whatever is
known of the country. Especially the mountainous region of
Rhodopê, bounded on the west by the Strymon, on the north and
east by the Hebrus, and on the south by the Ægean, is a Terra
Incognita, except the few Grecian colonies on the coast. Very few
travellers have passed along, or described the southern or King’s
Road, while the region in the interior, apart from the high
road, was absolutely unexplored until the visit of M. Viquesnel
in 1847, under scientific mission from the French government.
The brief, but interesting account, composed by M. Viquesnel,
of this rugged and impracticable district, is contained in the
“Archives des Missions Scientifiques et Litteraires”, for 1850,
published at Paris. Unfortunately, the map intended to accompany
that account has not yet been prepared; but the published data,
as far as they go, have been employed by Kiepert in constructing
his recent map of Turkey in Europe; the best map of these regions
now existing, though still very imperfect. The Illustrations
(Erläuterungen) annexed by Kiepert to his map of Turkey, show
the defective data on which the chartography of this country is
founded. Until the survey of M. Viquesnel, the higher part of the
course of the Strymon, and nearly all the course of the Nestus,
may be said to have been wholly unknown.
The terror spread by Alexander’s military operations was so great,
that not only the Triballi, but the other autonomous Thracians
around, sent envoys tendering presents or tribute, and soliciting
peace. Alexander granted their request. His mind being bent upon war
with Asia, he was satisfied with having intimidated these tribes so
as to deter them from rising during his absence. What conditions he
imposed, we do not know, but he accepted the presents.[62]
[62] Arrian, i. 4, 5; Strabo, vii. p. 301.
While these applications from the Thracians were under debate, envoys
arrived from a tribe of Gauls occupying a distant mountainous region
westward towards the Ionic Gulf. Though strangers to Alexander,
they had heard so much of the recent exploits, that they came with
demands to be admitted to his friendship. They were distinguished
both for tall stature and for boastful language. Alexander readily
exchanged with them assurances of alliance. Entertaining them at a
feast, he asked, in the course of conversation, what it was that they
were most afraid of, among human contingencies? They replied, that
they feared no man, nor any danger, except only, lest the heaven
should fall upon them. Their answer disappointed Alexander, who had
expected that they would name him, as the person of whom they were
most afraid; so prodigious was his conceit of his own exploits. He
observed to his friends that these Gauls were swaggerers. Yet if we
attend to the sentiment rather than the language, we shall see that
such an epithet applies with equal or greater propriety to Alexander
himself. The anecdote is chiefly interesting as it proves at how
early an age the exorbitant self-esteem, which we shall hereafter
find him manifesting, began. That after the battle of Issus he should
fancy himself superhuman, we can hardly be astonished; but he was as
yet only in the first year of his reign, and had accomplished nothing
beyond his march into Thrace and his victory over the Triballi.
After arranging these matters, he marched in a south-westerly
direction into the territory of the Agriânes and the other Pæonians,
between the rivers Strymon and Axius in the highest portion of their
course. Here he was met by a body of Agriânes under their prince
Langarus, who had already contracted a personal friendship for him
at Pella before Philip’s death. News came that the Illyrian Kleitus,
son of Bardylis, who had been subdued by Philip, had revolted at
Pelion (a strong post south of lake Lychnidus, on the west side of
the chain of Skardus and Pindus, near the place where that chain is
broken by the cleft called the Klissura of Tzangon or Devol[63])—and
that the western Illyrians, called Taulantii, under their prince
Glaukias, were on the march to assist him. Accordingly Alexander
proceeded thither forthwith, leaving Langarus to deal with the
Illyrian tribe Autariatæ, who had threatened to oppose his progress.
He marched along the bank and up the course of the Erigon, from a
point near where it joins the Axius.[64] On approaching Pelion, he
found the Illyrians posted in front of the town and on the heights
around, awaiting the arrival of Glaukias their promised ally. While
Alexander was making his dispositions for attack, they offered their
sacrifices to the gods: the victims being three boys, three girls,
and three black rams. At first they stepped boldly forward to meet
him, but before coming to close quarters, they turned and fled into
the town with such haste that the slain victims were left lying
on the spot.[65] Having thus driven in the defenders, Alexander
was preparing to draw a wall of circumvallation round the Pelion,
when he was interrupted by the arrival of Glaukias with so large a
force as to compel him to abandon the project. A body of cavalry,
sent out from the Macedonian camp under Philotas to forage, were in
danger of being cut off by Glaukias, and were only rescued by the
arrival of Alexander himself with a reinforcement. In the face of
this superior force, it was necessary to bring off the Macedonian
army, through a narrow line of road along the river Eordaikus, where
in some places there was only room for four abreast, with hill or
marsh everywhere around. By a series of bold and skilful manœuvres,
and by effective employment of his battering-train or projectile
machines to protect the rear-guard, Alexander completely baffled
the enemy, and brought off his army without loss.[66] Moreover these
Illyrians, who had not known how to make use of such advantages of
position, abandoned themselves to disorder as soon as their enemy had
retreated, neglecting all precautions for the safety of their camp.
Apprised of this carelessness, Alexander made a forced night-march
back, at the head of his Agrianian division and light troops
supported by the remaining army. He surprised the Illyrians in their
camp before daylight. The success of this attack against a sleeping
and unguarded army was so complete, that the Illyrians fled at once
without resistance. Many were slain or taken prisoners; the rest,
throwing away their arms, hurried away homeward, pursued by Alexander
for a considerable distance. The Illyrian prince Kleitus was forced
to evacuate Pelion, which place he burned, and then retired into the
territory of Glaukias.[67]
[63] For the situation of Pelion, compare Livy, xxxi. 33, 34, and
the remarks of Colonel Leake, Travels in Northern Greece, vol.
iii. ch. 28. p. 310-324.
[64] Assuming Alexander to have been in the Territory of the
Triballi, the modern Servia, he would in this march follow mainly
the road which is now frequented between Belgrade and Bitolia;
through the plain of Kossovo, Pristina, Katschanik (rounding
on the north-eastern side the Ljubatrin, the north-eastern
promontory terminating the chain of Skardus), Uschkub, Kuprili,
along the higher course of the Axius or Vardar, until the point
where the Erigon or Tscherna joins that river below Kuprili. Here
he would be among the Pæonians and Agrianes, on the east—and the
Dardani and Autariatæ, seemingly on the north and west. If he
then followed the course of the Erigon, he would pass through
the portions of Macedonia then called Deuripia and Pelagonia:
he would go between the ridges of the mountains, through which
the Erigon breaks, called Nidje on the south, and Babuna on the
north. He would pass afterwards to Florina, and not to Bitolia.
See Kiepert’s map of these regions—a portion of his recent map of
Turkey in Europe—and Griesbach’s description of the general track.
[65] Arrian, i. 5, 12.
[66] Arrian, i. 6, 3-18.
[67] Arrian, i. 6, 19-22.
Just as Alexander had completed this victory over Kleitus and the
Taulantian auxiliaries, and before he had returned home, news reached
him of a menacing character. The Thebans had declared themselves
independent of him, and were besieging his garrison in the Kadmeia.
Of this event, alike important and disastrous to those who stood
forward, the immediate antecedents are very imperfectly known to
us. It has already been remarked that the vote of submission on the
part of the Greeks to Alexander as Imperator, during the preceding
autumn, had been passed only under the intimidation of a present
Macedonian force. Though the Spartans alone had courage to proclaim
their dissent, the Athenians, Arcadians, Ætolians, and others, were
well known even to Alexander himself, as ready to do the like on
any serious reverse to the Macedonian arms.[68] Moreover the energy
and ability displayed by Alexander had taught the Persian king that
all danger to himself was not removed by the death of Philip, and
induced him either to send, or to promise, pecuniary aid to the
anti-Macedonian Greeks. We have already noticed the manifestation
of anti-Macedonian sentiment at Athens—proclaimed by several of
the most eminent orators—Demosthenes, Lykurgus, Hyperides, and
others; as well as by active military men like Charidemus and
Ephialtes,[69] who probably spoke out more boldly when Alexander was
absent on the Danube. In other cities, the same sentiment doubtless
found advocates, though less distinguished; but at Thebes, where
it could not be openly proclaimed, it prevailed with the greatest
force.[70] The Thebans suffered an oppression from which most of
the other cities were free—the presence of a Macedonian garrison
in their citadel; just as they had endured, fifty years before,
the curb of a Spartan garrison after the fraud of Phœbidas and
Leontiades. In this case, as in the former, the effect was to arm the
macedonizing leaders with absolute power over their fellow-citizens,
and to inflict upon the latter not merely the public mischief of
extinguishing all free speech, but also multiplied individual insults
and injuries, prompted by the lust and rapacity of rulers, foreign
as well as domestic.[71] A number of Theban citizens, among them
the freest and boldest spirits, were in exile at Athens, receiving
from the public indeed nothing beyond a safe home, but secretly
encouraged to hope for better things by Demosthenes and the other
anti-Macedonian leaders.[72] In like manner, fifty years before,
it was at Athens, and from private Athenian citizens, that the
Thebans Pelopidas and Mellon had found that sympathy which enabled
them to organize their daring conspiracy for rescuing Thebes from
the Spartans. That enterprise, admired throughout Greece as alike
adventurous, skilful, and heroic, was the model present to the
imagination of the Theban exiles, to be copied if any tolerable
opportunity occurred.
[68] Arrian, i. 7, 5.
[69] Ælian, V. H. xii. 57.
[70] Demades, ὑπὲρ τῆς δωδεκαετίας, s. 14. Θηβαῖοι δὲ μέγιστον
εἶχον δεσμὸν τὴν τῶν Μακεδόνων φρουρὰν, ὑφ᾽ ἧς οὐ μόνον τὰς
χεῖρας συνεδέθησαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν παῤῥησίαν ἀφῄρηντο....
[71] The Thebans, in setting forth their complaints to the
Arcadians, stated—ὅτι οὐ τὴν πρὸς τοὺς Ἕλληνας φιλίαν Θηβαῖοι
διαλῦσαι βουλόμενοι, τοῖς πράγμασιν ἐπανέστησαν, οὐδ᾽ ἐναντίον
τῶν Ἑλλήνων οὐδὲν πράξοντες, ~ἀλλὰ τὰ παρ’ αὐτοῖς ὑπὸ τῶν
Μακεδόνων ἐν τῇ πόλει γινόμενα φέρειν οὐκέτι δυνάμενοι, οὐδὲ τὴν
δούλειαν ὑπομένειν, οὐδὲ τὰς ὕβρεις ὁρᾷν τὰς εἰς τὰ ἐλεύθερα
σώματα γινομένας~.
See Demades περὶ τῆς δωδεκαετίας, s. 13, the speech of Cleadas,
Justin, xi. 4; and (Deinarchus cont. Demosth. s. 20) compare
Livy, xxxix. 27—about the working of the Macedonian garrison at
Maroncia, in the time of Philip son of Demetrius.
[72] Demades περὶ τῆς δωδεκαετίας, Fragm. ad fin.
Such was the feeling in Greece, during the long absence of Alexander
on his march into Thrace and Illyria; a period of four or five
months, ending at August 335 B. C. Not only was Alexander
thus long absent, but he sent home no reports of his proceedings.
Couriers were likely enough to be intercepted among the mountains and
robbers of Thrace; and even if they reached Pella, their despatches
were not publicly read, as such communications would have been read
to the Athenian assembly. Accordingly we are not surprised to hear
that rumors arose of his having been defeated and slain. Among these
reports, both multiplied and confident, one was even certified by a
liar who pretended to have just arrived from Thrace, to have been
an eye-witness of the fact, and to have been himself wounded in
the action against the Triballi, where Alexander had perished.[73]
This welcome news, not fabricated, but too hastily credited, by
Demosthenes and Lykurgus,[74] was announced to the Athenian assembly.
In spite of doubts expressed by Demades and Phokion, it was believed
not only by the Athenians and the Theban exiles there present, but
also by the Arcadians, Eleians, Ætolians and other Greeks. For a
considerable time, through the absence of Alexander, it remained
uncontradicted, which increased the confidence in its truth.
[73] Arrian, i. 7, 3. Καὶ γὰρ καὶ πολὺς ὁ λόγος (of the death of
Alexander) καὶ παρὰ πολλῶν ἐφοίτα, ὅτι τε χρόνον ἀπῆν οὐκ ὀλίγον
καὶ ὅτι οὐδεμία ἀγγελία παρ᾽ αὐτοῦ ἀφῖκτο, etc.
[74] Demades περὶ τῆς δωδεκαετίας, ad fin. ἡνίκα Δημοσθένης
καὶ Λυκοῦργος τῷ μὲν λόγῳ παραταττόμενοι τοὺς Μακεδόνας ἐνίκων
ἐν Τριβάλλοις, μόνον δ᾽ οὐχ ὁρατὸν ἐπὶ τοῦ βήματος νεκρὸν τὸν
Ἀλέξανδρον προέθηκαν ... ἐμὲ δὲ στυγνὸν καὶ περίλυπον ἔφασκον
εἶναι μὴ συνευδοκοῦντα, etc.
Justin, xi. 2. “Demosthenem oratorem, qui Macedonum deletas omnes
cum rege copias à Triballis affirmaverit, producto in concionem
auctore, qui in eo praelio, in quo rex ceciderit, se quoque
vulneratum diceret.”
Compare Tacitus, Histor. i. 34. “Vix dum egresso Pisone, occisum
in castris Othonem, vagus primum et incertus rumor, mox, ut _in
magnis mendaciis, interfuisse se quidam, et vidisse affirmabant_,
credulà famâ inter gaudentes et incuriosos.... Obvius in
palatio Julius Atticus, speculator, cruentum gladium ostentans,
occisum _à se_ Othonem exclamavit.”
It is stated that Alexander was really wounded in the head by a
stone, in the action with the Illyrians (Plutarch, Fortun. Alex.
p. 327).
It was upon the full belief in this rumor, of Alexander’s defeat and
death, that the Grecian cities proceeded. The event severed by itself
their connection with Macedonia. There was neither son nor adult
brother to succeed to the throne: so that not merely the foreign
ascendency, but even the intestine unity, of Macedonia, was likely
to be broken up. In regard to Athens, Arcadia, Elis, Ætolia, etc.,
the anti-Macedonian sentiment was doubtless vehemently manifested,
but no special action was called for. It was otherwise in regard
to Thebes. Phœnix, Prochytes, and other Theban exiles at Athens,
immediately laid their plan for liberating their city and expelling
the Macedonian garrison from the Kadmeia. Assisted with arms and
money by Demosthenes and other Athenian citizens, and invited by
their partisans at Thebes, they suddenly entered that city in arms.
Though unable to carry the Kadmeia by surprise, they seized in the
city, and put to death, Amyntas, a principal Macedonian officer, with
Timolaus, one of the leading macedonizing Thebans.[75] They then
immediately convoked a general assembly of the Thebans, to whom they
earnestly appealed for a vigorous effort to expel the Macedonians,
and reconquer the ancient freedom of the city. Expatiating upon the
misdeeds of the garrison and upon the oppressions of those Thebans
who governed by means of the garrison, they proclaimed that the happy
moment of liberation had now arrived, through the recent death of
Alexander. They doubtless recalled the memory of Pelopidas, and the
glorious enterprise, cherished by all Theban patriots, whereby he had
rescued the city from Spartan occupation, forty-six years before. To
this appeal the Thebans cordially responded. The assembly passed a
vote, declaring severance from Macedonia, and autonomy of Thebes—and
naming as Bœotarchs some of the returned exiles, with others of
the same party, for the purpose of energetic measures against the
garrison in the Kadmeia.[76]
[75] Arrian, i. 7, 1: compare Deinarchus cont. Demosthenes, s.
75. p. 53.
[76] Arrian, i. 7, 3-17.
Unfortunately for Thebes, none of these new Bœotarchs were men of
the stamp of Epaminondas, probably not even of Pelopidas. Yet
their scheme, though from its melancholy result it is generally
denounced as insane, really promised better at first than that of
the anti-Spartan conspirators in 380 B. C. The Kadmeia was instantly
summoned; hopes being perhaps indulged, that the Macedonian commander
would surrender it with as little resistance as the Spartan harmost
had done. But such hopes were not realized. Philip had probably
caused the citadel to be both strengthened and provisioned. The
garrison defied the Theban leaders, who did not feel themselves
strong enough to give orders for an assault, as Pelopidas in his
time was prepared to do, if surrender had been denied.[77] They
contented themselves with drawing and guarding a double line of
circumvallation round the Kadmeia, so as to prevent both sallies
from within and supplies from without.[78] They then sent envoys in
the melancholy equipment of suppliants, to the Arcadians and others,
representing that their recent movement was directed, not against
Hellenic union, but against Macedonian oppression and outrage,
which pressed upon them with intolerable bitterness. As Greeks and
freemen, they entreated aid to rescue them from such a calamity.
They obtained much favorable sympathy, with some promise and even
half-performance. Many of the leading orators at Athens—Demosthenes,
Lykurgus, Hyperides, and others—together with the military men
Charidemus and Ephialtes—strongly urged their countrymen to declare
in favor of Thebes and send aid against the Kadmeia. But the citizens
generally, following Demades and Phokion, waited to be better assured
both of Alexander’s death and of its consequences, before they
would incur the hazard of open hostility against Macedonia, though
they seem to have declared sympathy with the Theban revolution.[79]
Demosthenes farther went as envoy into Peloponnesus, while the
Macedonian Antipater also sent round urgent applications to the
Peloponnesian cities, requiring their contingents, as members of the
confederacy under Alexander, to act against Thebes. The eloquence of
Demosthenes, backed by his money, or by Persian money administered
through him, prevailed on the Peloponnesians to refuse compliance
with Antipater and to send no contingents against Thebes.[80] The
Eleians and Ætolians held out general assurances favorable to the
revolution at Thebes, while the Arcadians even went so far as to send
out some troops to second it, though they did not advance beyond the
isthmus.[81]
[77] Xenoph. Hellen. v. 4, 11. See Volume X. Ch. lxxvii. p. 81 of
this History.
[78] Arrian, i. 7, 14.
[79] Diodor. xvii. 8.
[80] Deinarchus cont. Demosth. p. 14. s. 19. καὶ Ἀρκάδων ἡκόντων
εἰς εσθμὸν, καὶ τὴν μὲν παρὰ Ἀντιπάτρου πρεσβείαν ἄπρακτον
ἀποστειλάντων, etc.
In the vote passed by the people of Athens some years afterwards,
awarding a statue and other honors to Demosthenes, these
proceedings in Peloponnesus are enumerated among his titles
to public gratitude—καὶ ὡς ἐκώλυσε Πελοποννησίους ἐπὶ Θήβας
Ἀλεξάνδρῳ βοηθῆσαι, χρήματα δοὺς καὶ αὐτὸς πρεσβεύσας, etc.
(Plutarch, Vit. X. Orator. p. 850).
[81] Arrian, i. 10, 2; Æschines adv. Ktesiphont. p. 634.
Here was a crisis in Grecian affairs, opening new possibilities
for the recovery of freedom. Had the Arcadians and other Greeks
lent decisive aid to Thebes—had Athens acted even with as much
energy as she did twelve years afterwards during the Lamian war,
occupying Thermopylæ with an army and a fleet—the gates of Greece
might well have been barred against a new Macedonian force, even
with Alexander alive and at its head. That the struggle of Thebes
was not regarded at the time, even by macedonizing Greeks, as
hopeless, is shown by the subsequent observations both of Æschines
and Deinarchus at Athens. Æschines (delivering five years afterwards
his oration against Ktesiphon) accuses Demosthenes of having by his
perverse backwardness brought about the ruin of Thebes. The foreign
mercenaries forming part of the garrison of the Kadmeia were ready
(Æschines affirms) to deliver up that fortress, on receiving five
talents: the Arcadian generals would have brought up their troops
to the aid of Thebes, if nine or ten talents had been paid to
them—having repudiated the solicitations of Antipater. Demosthenes
(say these two orators) having in his possession 300 talents from the
Persian king, to instigate anti-Macedonian movements in Greece, was
supplicated by the Theban envoys to furnish money for these purposes,
but refused the request, kept the money for himself, and thus
prevented both the surrender of the Kadmeia and the onward march
of the Arcadians.[82] The charge here advanced against Demosthenes
appears utterly incredible. To suppose that anti-Macedonian movements
counted for so little in his eyes, is an hypothesis belied by his
whole history. But the fact that such allegations were made by
Æschines only five years afterwards, proves the reports and the
feelings of the time—that the chances of successful resistance to
Macedonia on the part of the Thebans were not deemed unfavorable. And
when the Athenians, following the counsels of Demades and Phokion,
refused to aid Thebes or occupy Thermopylæ—they perhaps consulted the
safety of Athens separately, but they receded from the generous and
Pan-hellenic patriotism which had animated their ancestors against
Xerxes and Mardonius.[83]
[82] Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 634; Deinarch. adv. Demosth. p.
15, 16. s. 19-22.
[83] See Herod. viii. 143. Demosthenes in his orations frequently
insists on the different rank and position of Athens, as compared
with those of the smaller Grecian states—and of the higher and
more arduous obligations consequent thereupon. This is one grand
point of distinction between his policy and that of Phokion. See
a striking passage in the speech De Coronâ, p. 245. s. 77; and
Orat. De Republ. Ordinand. p. 176. s. 37.
Isokrates holds the same language touching the obligations of
Sparta,—in the speech which he puts into the mouth of Archidamus.
“No one will quarrel with Epidaurians and Phliasians, for looking
only how they can get through and keep themselves in being. But
for Lacedæmonians, it is impossible to aim simply at preservation
and nothing beyond—by any means, whatever they may be. If we
cannot preserve ourselves with honor, we ought to prefer a
glorious death.” (Isokrates, Orat. vi. Archid. s. 106.)
The backward and narrow policy, which Isokrates here proclaims
as fit for Epidaurus and Phlius, but not for Sparta—is precisely
what Phokion always recommended for Athens, even while Philip’s
power was yet nascent and unsettled.
The Thebans, though left in this ungenerous isolation, pressed
the blockade of the Kadmeia, and would presently have reduced the
Macedonian garrison, had they not been surprised by the awe-striking
event—Alexander arriving in person at Onchêstus in Bœotia, at the
head of his victorious army. The first news of his being alive was
furnished by his arrival at Onchêstus. No one could at first believe
the fact. The Theban leaders contended that it was another Alexander,
the son of Aëropus, at the head of a Macedonian army of relief.[84]
[84] Arrian, i. 7, 9.
In this incident we may note two features, which characterized
Alexander to the end of his life; matchless celerity of movement,
and no less remarkable favor of fortune. Had news of the Theban
rising first reached him while on the Danube or among the distant
Triballi,—or even when embarrassed in the difficult region round
Pelion,—he could hardly by any effort have arrived in time to save
the Kadmeia. But he learnt it just when he had vanquished Kleitus and
Glaukias, so that his hands were perfectly free—and also when he was
in a position peculiarly near and convenient for a straight march
into Greece without going back to Pella. From the pass of Tschangon
(or of the river Devol), near which Alexander’s last victories were
gained, his road lay southward, following downwards in part the
higher course of the river Haliakmon, through Upper Macedonia or the
regions called Eordæa and Elymeia which lay on his left, while the
heights of Pindus and the upper course of the river Aous, occupied
by the Epirots called Tymphæi and Parauæi, were on the right. On the
seventh day of march, crossing the lower ridges of the Cambunian
mountains (which separate Olympus from Pindus and Upper Macedonia
from Thessaly), Alexander reached the Thessalian town of Pelinna. Six
days more brought him to the Bœotian Onchestus.[85] He was already
within Thermopylæ, before any Greeks were aware that he was in march,
or even that he was alive. The question about occupying Thermopylæ by
a Grecian force was thus set aside. The difficulty of forcing that
pass, and the necessity of forestalling Athens in it by stratagem or
celerity, was present to the mind of Alexander, as it had been to
that of Philip in his expedition of 346 B. C., against the
Phokians.
[85] Arrian, i. 7. 6. See, respecting this region, Colonel
Leake’s Travels in Northern Greece, ch. vi. p. 300-304; ch.
xxviii. p. 303-305, etc.; and for Alexander’s line of march, the
map at the end of the volume.
His arrival, in itself a most formidable event, told with double
force on the Greeks from its extreme suddenness. We can hardly doubt
that both Athenians and Thebans had communications at Pella—that
they looked upon any Macedonian invasion as likely to come from
thence—and that they expected Alexander himself (assuming him to
be still living, contrary to their belief) back in his capital
before he began any new enterprise. Upon this hypothesis—in itself
probable, and such as would have been realized if Alexander had not
already advanced so far southward at the moment when he received the
news[86]—they would at least have known beforehand of his approach,
and would have had the option of a defensive combination open. As it
happened, his unexpected appearance in the heart of Greece precluded
all combinations, and checked all idea of resistance.
[86] Diodorus (xvii. 9) incorrectly says that Alexander came back
unexpectedly from _Thrace_. Had this been the fact, he would have
come by Pella.
Two days after his arrival in Bœotia, he marched his army round
Thebes, so as to encamp on the south side of the city; whereby he
both intercepted the communication of the Thebans with Athens, and
exhibited his force more visibly to the garrison in the Kadmeia.
The Thebans, though alone and without hope of succor, maintained
their courage unshaken. Alexander deferred the attack for a day or
two, in hopes that they would submit; he wished to avoid an assault
which might cost the lives of many of his soldiers, whom he required
for his Asiatic schemes. He even made public proclamation,[87]
demanding the surrender of the anti-Macedonian leaders Phœnix and
Prochytes, but offering to any other Theban who chose to quit the
city, permission to come and join him on the terms of the convention
sworn in the preceding autumn. A general assembly being convened,
the macedonizing Thebans enforced the prudence of submission to
an irresistible force. But the leaders recently returned from
exile, who had headed the rising, warmly opposed this proposition,
contending for resistance to the death. In them, such resolution
may not be wonderful, since (as Arrian[88] remarks) they had gone
too far to hope for lenity. As it appears however that the mass of
citizens deliberately adopted the same resolution, in spite of
strong persuasion to the contrary,[89] we see plainly that they had
already felt the bitterness of Macedonian dominion, and that sooner
than endure a renewal of it, sure to be yet worse, coupled with
the dishonor of surrendering their leaders—they had made up their
minds to perish with the freedom of their city. At a time when the
sentiment of Hellas as an autonomous system was passing away, and
when Grecian courage was degenerating into a mere instrument for the
aggrandizement of Macedonian chiefs, these countrymen of Epaminondas
and Pelopidas set an example of devoted self-sacrifice in the cause
of Grecian liberty, not less honorable than that of Leonidas at
Thermopylæ, and only less esteemed because it proved infructuous.
[87] Diodor. xvii. 9; Plutarch. Alexand. 11.
[88] Arrian, i. 7, 16.
[89] Diodor. xvii. 9.
In reply to the proclamation of Alexander, the Thebans made from
their walls a counter-proclamation, demanding the surrender of his
officers Antipater and Philotas, and inviting every one to join
them, who desired, in concert with the Persian king and the Thebans,
to liberate the Greeks and put down the despot of Hellas.[90] Such
a haughty defiance and retort incensed Alexander to the quick.
He brought up his battering engines and prepared everything for
storming the town. Of the murderous assault which followed, we find
different accounts, not agreeing with each other, yet not wholly
irreconcilable. It appears that the Thebans had erected, probably
in connection with their operations against the Kadmeia, an outwork
defended by a double palisade. Their walls were guarded by the least
effective soldiers, metics and liberated slaves; while their best
troops were bold enough to go forth in front of the gates and give
battle. Alexander divided his army into three divisions; one under
Perdikkas and Amyntas, against the outwork—a second, destined to
combat the Thebans who sallied out—and a third, held in reserve.
Between the second of these three divisions, and the Thebans in front
of the gates, the battle was so obstinately contested, that success
at one time seemed doubtful, and Alexander was forced to order up his
reserve. The first Macedonian success was gained by Perdikkas,[91]
who, aided by the division of Amyntas and also by the Agrianian
regiment and the bowmen carried the first of the two outworks, as
well as a postern gate which had been left unguarded. His troops
also stormed the second outwork, though he himself was severely
wounded and borne away to the camp. Here the Theban defenders fled
back into the city, along the hollow way which led to the temple of
Herakles, pursued by the light troops, in advance of the rest. Upon
these men, however, the Thebans presently turned, repelling them
with the loss of Eurybotas their commanding officer and seventy men
slain. In pursuing these bowmen, the ranks of the Thebans became
somewhat disordered, so that they were unable to resist the steady
charge of the Macedonian guards and heavy infantry coming up in
support. They were broken, and pushed back into the city; their rout
being rendered still more complete by a sally of the Macedonian
garrison out of the Kadmeia. The assailants being victorious on this
side, the Thebans who were maintaining the combat without the gates
were compelled to retreat, and the advancing Macedonians forced
their way into the town along with them. Within the town, however,
the fighting still continued; the Thebans resisting in organized
bodies as long as they could; and when broken, still resisting even
single-handed. None of the military population sued for mercy; most
of them were slain in the streets; but a few cavalry and infantry cut
their way out into the plain and escaped. The fight now degenerated
into a carnage. The Macedonians with their Pæonian contingents were
incensed with the obstinate resistance; while various Greeks serving
as auxiliaries—Phokians, Orchomenians, Thespians, Platæans,—had
to avenge ancient and grievous injuries endured from Thebes. Such
furious feelings were satiated by an indiscriminate massacre of
all who came in their way, without distinction of age or sex—old
men, women, and children, in houses and even in temples. This
wholesale slaughter was accompanied of course by all the plunder and
manifold outrage with which victorious assailants usually reward
themselves.[92]
[90] Diodor. xvii. 9.
[91] The attack of Perdikkas was represented by Ptolemy, from
whom Arrian copies (i. 8, 1), not only as being the first
and only attack made by the Macedonian army on Thebes, but
also as made by Perdikkas _without orders from Alexander_,
who was forced to support it in order to preserve Perdikkas
from being overwhelmed by the Thebans. According to Ptolemy
and Arrian, therefore, the storming of Thebes took place both
without the orders, and against the wishes, of Alexander; the
capture moreover was effected rapidly with little trouble to
the besieging army (ἡ ἅλωσις δι᾽ ὀλίγου τε καὶ ~οὐ ξὺν πόνῳ τῶν
ἑλόντων~ ξυνενεχθεῖσα, Arr. i. 9, 9): the bloodshed and pillage
was committed by the vindictive sentiment of the Bœotian allies.
Diodorus had before him a very different account. He affirms that
Alexander both combined and ordered the assault—that the Thebans
behaved like bold and desperate men, resisting obstinately and
for a long time—that the slaughter afterwards was committed by
the general body of the assailants; the Bœotian allies being
doubtless conspicuous among them. Diodorus gives this account at
some length, and with his customary rhetorical amplifications.
Plutarch and Justin are more brief; but coincide in the same
general view, and not in that of Arrian. Polyænus again (iv. 3
12) gives something different from all.
To me it appears that the narrative of Diodorus is (in its
basis, and striking off rhetorical amplifications) more credible
than that of Arrian. Admitting the attack made by Perdikkas,
I conceive it to have been a portion of the general plan of
Alexander. I cannot think it probable that Perdikkas attacked
without orders, or that Thebes was captured with little
resistance. It was captured by _one_ assault (Æschines adv.
Ktesiph. p. 524), but by an assault well-combined and stoutly
contested—not by one begun without preparation or order, and
successful after hardly any resistance. Alexander, after having
offered what he thought liberal terms, was not the man to shrink
from carrying his point by force; nor would the Thebans have
refused those terms, unless their minds had been made up for
strenuous and desperate defence, without hope of ultimate success.
What authority Diodorus followed, we do not know. He may have
followed Kleitarchus, a contemporary and an Æolian, who must have
had good means of information respecting such an event as the
capture of Thebes (see Geier, Alexandri M. Historiarum Scriptores
ætate suppares, Leips. 1844, p. 6-152; and Vossius, De Historicis
Græcis. i. x. p. 90, ed. Westermann). I have due respect for the
authority of Ptolemy, but I cannot go along with Geier and other
critics who set aside all other witnesses, even contemporary,
respecting Alexander, as worthy of little credit, unless where
such witnesses are confirmed by Ptolemy or Aristobulus. We must
remember that Ptolemy did not compose his book until after he
became king of Egypt, in 306 B. C.; nor indeed until
after the battle of Ipsus in 301, according to Geier (p. 1);
at least twenty-nine years after the sack of Thebes. Moreover,
Ptolemy was not ashamed of what Geier calls (p. 11) the “pious
fraud” of announcing, that two speaking serpents conducted the
army of Alexander to the holy precinct of Zeus Ammon (Arrian,
iii. 3). Lastly, it will be found that the depositions which are
found in other historians, but not in Ptolemy and Aristobulus,
relate principally to matters discreditable to Alexander. That
Ptolemy and Aristobulus _omitted_, is in my judgment far more
probable, than that other historians _invented_. Admiring
biographers would easily excuse themselves for refusing to
proclaim to the world such acts as the massacre of the Branchidæ,
or the dragging of the wounded Batiz at Gaza.
[92] Arrian, i. 8; Diodor. xvii. 12, 13.
More than five hundred Macedonians are asserted to have been
slain, and six thousand Thebans. Thirty thousand captives were
collected.[93] The final destiny of these captives, and of Thebes
itself, was submitted by Alexander to the Orchomenians, Platæans,
Phokians, and other Grecian auxiliaries in the assault. He must
have known well beforehand what the sentence of such judges would
be. They pronounced, that the city of Thebes should be razed to the
ground: that the Kadmeia alone should be maintained, as a military
post with Macedonian garrison: that the Theban territory should be
distributed among the allies themselves: that Orchomenus and Platæa
should be rebuilt and fortified: that all the captive Thebans,
men, women, and children, should be sold as slaves—excepting only
priests and priestesses, and such as were connected by recognized
ties of hospitality with Philip or Alexander, or such as had been
_proxeni_ of the Macedonians; that the Thebans who had escaped should
be proclaimed outlaws, liable to arrest and death, wherever they
were found; and that every Grecian city should be interdicted from
harboring them.[94]
[93] Diodorus (xvii. 14) and Plutarch (Alexand. 11) agree in
giving the totals of 6000 and 30,000.
[94] Arrian, i. 9; Diodor. xvii. 14.
This overwhelming sentence, in spite of an appeal for lenity by a
Theban[95] named Kleadas, was passed by the Grecian auxiliaries
of Alexander, and executed by Alexander himself, who made but one
addition to the excepting clauses. He left the house of Pindar
standing, and spared the descendants of the poet. With these
reserves, Thebes was effaced from the earth. The Theban territory was
partitioned among the reconstituted cities of Orchomenus and Platæa.
Nothing, except the Macedonian military post at the Kadmeia, remained
to mark the place where the chief of the Bœotian confederacy had
once stood. The captives were all sold, and are said to have yielded
440 talents; large prices being offered by bidders from feelings of
hostility towards the city.[96] Diodorus tells us that this sentence
was passed by the general synod of Greeks. But we are not called upon
to believe that this synod, subservient though it was sure to be when
called upon to deliberate under the armed force of Alexander, could
be brought to sanction such a ruin upon one of the first and most
ancient Hellenic cities. For we learn from Arrian that the question
was discussed and settled only by the Grecian auxiliaries who had
taken part with Alexander;[97] and that the sentence therefore
represents the bitter antipathies of the Orchomenians, Platæans, etc.
Without doubt, these cities had sustained harsh and cruel treatment
from Thebes. In so far as they were concerned, the retribution upon
the Thebans was merited. Those persons, however, who (as Arrian tells
us) pronounced the catastrophe to be a divine judgment upon Thebes
for having joined Xerxes against Greece[98] a century and a half
before,—must have forgotten that not only the Orchomenians, but even
Alexander of Macedon, the namesake and predecessor of the destroying
conqueror, had served in the army of Xerxes along with the Thebans.
[95] Justin, xi. 4.
[96] Diodor. xvii. 14; Justin, xi. 4: “pretium non ex ementium
commodo, sed ex inimicorum odio extenditur.”
[97] Arrian, i. 9, 13. Τοῖς δὲ μετασχοῦσι τοῦ ἔργου ξυμμάχοις,
οἷς δὴ καὶ ἐπέτρεψεν Ἀλέξανδρος τὰ κατὰ τὰς Θήβας διαθεῖναι,
ἔδοξε, etc.
[98] Arrian, i. 9, 10. He informs us (i. 9, 12) that there were
many previous portents which foreshadowed this ruin: Diodorus
(xvii. 10) on the contrary, enumerates many previous signs, all
tending to encourage the Thebans.
Arrian vainly endeavors to transfer from Alexander to the minor
Bœotian towns the odium of this cruel destruction—unparalleled in
Grecian history (as he himself says), when we look to the magnitude
of the city; yet surpassed in the aggregate by the subversion, under
the arms of Philip, of no less than thirty-two free Chalkidic cities,
thirteen years before. The known antipathy of these Bœotians was
invoked by Alexander to color an infliction which satisfied at once
his sentiment, by destroying an enemy who defied him—and his policy,
by serving as a terrific example to keep down other Greeks.[99] But
though such were the views which governed him at the moment, he came
afterwards to look back upon the proceeding with shame and sorrow.
The shock to Hellenic feeling, when a city was subverted, arose not
merely from the violent extinction of life, property, liberty, and
social or political institutions—but also from the obliteration of
legends and the suppression of religious observances, thus wronging
and provoking the local gods and heroes. We shall presently find
Alexander himself sacrificing at Ilium,[100] in order to appease the
wrath of Priam, still subsisting and efficacious, against himself and
his race, as being descended from Neoptolemus the slayer of Priam.
By his harsh treatment of Thebes, he incurred the displeasure of
Dionysus, the god of wine, said to have been born in that city, and
one of the principal figures in Theban legend. It was to inspirations
of the offended Dionysus that Alexander believed himself to owe
that ungovernable drunken passion under which he afterwards killed
Kleitus, as well as the refusal of his Macedonian soldiers to follow
him farther into India.[101] If Alexander in after days thus
repented of his own act, we may be sure that the like repugnance
was felt still more strongly by others; and we can understand the
sentiment under which, a few years after his decease, the Macedonian
Kassander, son of Antipater, restored the destroyed city.
[99] Plutarch, Alex. 11. ἡ μὲν πόλις ἥλω καὶ διαρπασθεῖσα
κατεσκάφη, τὸ μὲν ὅλον προσδοκήσαντος αὐτοῦ τοὺς Ἕλληνας πάθει
τηλικούτῳ ἐκπλαγέντας καὶ πτήξαντας ἀτρεμήσειν, ἄλλως δὲ καὶ
καλλωπισαμένου χαρίζεσθαι τοῖς τῶν συμμάχων ἐγκλήμασιν.
[100] Arrian, i. 11, 13. To illustrate farther the feeling of
the Greeks, respecting the wrath of the gods arising from the
discontinuance of worship where it had been long continued—I
transcribe a passage from Colonel Sleeman’s work respecting the
Hindoos, whose religious feelings are on so many points analogous
to those of the Hellênes:—
“Human sacrifices were certainly offered in the city of Saugor
during the whole Mahratta government, up to the year 1800—when
they were put a stop to by the local governor, Assa Sahib, a very
humane man. I once heard a learned Brahmin priest say, that he
thought the decline of his (Assa Sahib’s) family and government
arose from this innovation. ‘There is (said he) no sin in not
offering human sacrifices to the gods, where none have been
offered; _but where the gods have been accustomed to them, they
are very naturally annoyed when the rite is abolished, and visit
the place and the people with all kinds of calamity_.’ The priest
did not seem to think that there was anything singular in this
mode of reasoning: perhaps three Brahmin priests out of four
would have reasoned in the same manner.” (Sleeman, Rambles and
Recollections of an Indian Official, vol. i. ch. xv. p. 130).
[101] Plutarch, Alex. 13: compare Justin, xi. 4; and Isokrates ad
Philipp. (Or. v. s. 35), where he recommends Thebes to Philip on
the ground of pre-eminent worship towards Herakles.
It deserves notice, that while Alexander himself repented of
the destruction of Thebes, the macedonizing orator at Athens
describes it as a just, though deplorable penalty, brought by the
Thebans upon themselves by reckless insanity of conduct (Æschines
adv. Ktesiph. p. 524).
At the time, however, the effect produced by the destruction of
Thebes was one of unmitigated terror throughout the Grecian cities.
All of them sought to make their peace with the conqueror. The
Arcadian contingent not only returned home from the Isthmus, but even
condemned their leaders to death. The Eleians recalled their chief
macedonizing citizens out of exile into ascendency at home. Each
tribe of Ætolians sent envoys to Alexander, entreating forgiveness
for the manifestations against him. At Athens, we read with surprise
that on the very day when Thebes was assaulted and taken, the great
festival of Eleusinian Dêmêtêr, with its multitudinous procession
of votaries from Athens to Eleusis, was actually taking place,
at a distance of two days’ march from the besieged city. Most
Theban fugitives who contrived to escape, fled to Attica as the
nearest place of refuge, communicating to the Athenians their own
distress and terror. The festival was forthwith suspended. Every
one hurried within the walls of Athens,[102] carrying with him his
movable property into a state of security. Under the general alarm
prevalent, that the conqueror would march directly into Attica,
and under the hurry of preparation for defence,—the persons both
most alarmed and most in real danger were, of course, Demosthenes,
Lykurgus, Charidemus, and those others who had been loudest in speech
against Macedonia, and had tried to prevail on the Athenians to
espouse openly the cause of Thebes. Yet notwithstanding such terror
of consequences to themselves, the Athenians afforded shelter and
sympathy to the miserable Theban fugitives. They continued to do this
even when they must have known that they were contravening the edict
of proscription just sanctioned by Alexander.
[102] Arrian, i. 10, 4.
Shortly afterwards, envoys arrived from that monarch with a menacing
letter, formally demanding the surrender of eight or ten leading
citizens of Athens—Demosthenes, Lykurgus, Hyperides, Polyeuktus,
Mœroklês, Diotimus,[103] Ephialtes, and Charidemus. Of these the
first four were eminent orators, the last two military men; all
strenuous advocates of an anti-Macedonian policy. Alexander in his
letter denounced the ten as the causes of the battle of Chæroneia,
of the offensive resolutions which had been adopted at Athens after
the death of Philip, and even of the recent hostile proceedings
of the Thebans.[104] This momentous summons, involving the right
of free speech and public debate at Athens, was submitted to the
assembly. A similar demand had just been made upon the Thebans, and
the consequences of refusal were to be read no less plainly in the
destruction of their city than in the threats of the conqueror. That
even under such trying circumstances, neither orators nor people
failed in courage—we know as a general fact; though we have not the
advantage (as Livy had in his time) of reading the speeches made in
the debate.[105] Demosthenes, insisting that the fate of the citizens
generally could not be severed from that of the specific victims, is
said to have recounted in the course of his speech, the old fable—of
the wolf requiring the sheep to make over to him their protecting
dogs, as a condition of peace—and then, devouring the unprotected
sheep forthwith. He, and those demanded along with him, claimed the
protection of the people, in whose cause alone they had incurred
the wrath of the conqueror. Phokion on the other hand—silent at
first, and rising only under constraint by special calls from the
popular voice—contended that there was not force enough to resist
Alexander, and that the persons in question must be given up. He
even made appeal to themselves individually, reminding them of the
self-devotion of the daughters of Erechtheus, memorable in Attic
legend—and calling on them to surrender themselves voluntarily for
the purpose of perverting public calamity He added, that he (Phokion)
would rejoice to offer up either himself, or his best friend, if
by such sacrifice he could save the city.[106] Lykurgus, one of
the orators whose extradition was required, answered this speech
of Phokion with vehemence and bitterness; and the public sentiment
went along with him, indignantly repudiating Phokion’s advice. By a
resolute patriotism highly honorable at this trying juncture, it was
decreed that the persons demanded should not be surrendered.[107]
[103] The name of Diotimus is mentioned by Arrian (i. 10, 6),
but not by Plutarch; who names Demon instead of him (Plutarch,
Demosth. c. 23) and Kallisthenes instead of Hyperides. We know
nothing about Diotimus, except that Demosthenes (De Coronâ, p.
264) alludes to him along with Charidemus, as having received
an expression of gratitude from the people, in requital for a
present of shields which he had made. He is mentioned also, along
with Charidemus and others, in the third of the Demosthenic
epistles, p. 1482.
[104] Arrian, i. 10, 6; Plutarch, Vit. X. Orat. p. 847. ἐξῄτει
αὐτὸν (Demosthenes) ἀπειλὼν εἰ μὴ δοίησαν. Diodor. xvii. 15;
Plutarch, Demosth. 23.
[105] Livy; ix. 18. “(Alexander), adversus quem Athenis, in
civitate fractâ Macedonum armis, cernente tum maxime prope
fumantes Thebarum ruinas, concionari libere ausi sint homines,—id
quod ex monumentis orationum patet”, etc.
[106] Plutarch, Phokion, 9-17; Diodor. xvii. 15.
[107] Diodor. xvii. 15. Ὁ δὲ δῆμος τοῦτον μὲν (Phokion) τοῖς
θορύβοις ἐξέβαλε, προσάντως ἀκούων τοὺς λόγους.
On the motion of Demades, an embassy was sent to Alexander,
deprecating his wrath against the ten, and engaging to punish them
by judicial sentence, if any crime could be proved against them.
Demades, who is said to have received from Demosthenes a bribe of
five talents, undertook this mission. But Alexander was at first
inexorable; refusing even to hear the envoys, and persisting in his
requisition. It was only by the intervention of a second embassy,
headed by Phokion, that a remission of terms was obtained. Alexander
was persuaded to withdraw his requisition, and to be satisfied with
the banishment of Charidemus and Ephialtes, the two anti-Macedonian
military leaders. Both of them accordingly, and seemingly other
Athenians with them, passed into Asia, where they took service under
Darius.[108]
[108] Arrian, i. 10, 8; Diodor. xvii. 15; Plutarch, Phokion, 17;
Justin, xi. 4; Deinarchus cont. Demosth. p. 26.
Arrian states that the visit of Demades with nine other Athenian
envoys to Alexander, occurred _prior_ to the demand of Alexander
for the extradition of the ten citizens. He (Arrian) affirms
that immediately on hearing the capture of Thebes, the Athenians
passed a vote, on the motion of Demades, to send ten envoys,
for the purpose of expressing satisfaction that Alexander had
come home safely from the Illyrians, and that he had punished
the Thebans for their revolt. Alexander (according to Arrian)
received this mission courteously, but replied by sending a
letter to the Athenian people, insisting on the surrender of the
ten citizens.
Now both Diodorus and Plutarch represent the mission of Demades
as _posterior_ to the demand made by Alexander for the ten
citizens; and that it was intended to meet and deprecate that
demand.
In my judgment, Arrian’s tale is the less credible of the two.
I think it highly improbable that the Athenians would by public
vote express satisfaction that Alexander had punished the Thebans
for their revolt. If the macedonizing party at Athens was strong
enough to carry so ignominious a vote, they would also have been
strong enough to carry the subsequent proposition of Phokion—that
the ten citizens demanded should be surrendered. The fact, that
the Athenians afforded willing shelter to the Theban fugitives,
is a farther reason for disbelieving this alleged vote.
It was indeed no part of Alexander’s plan to undertake a siege of
Athens, which might prove long and difficult, since the Athenians had
a superior naval force, with the sea open to them, and the chance
of effective support from Persia. When therefore he saw, that his
demand for the ten orators would be firmly resisted, considerations
of policy gradually overcame his wrath, and induced him to relax.
Phokion returned to Athens as the bearer of Alexander’s concessions,
thus relieving the Athenians from extreme anxiety and peril. His
influence—already great and of long standing, since for years past
he had been perpetually re-elected general—became greater than ever,
while that of Demosthenes and the other anti-Macedonian orators must
have been lowered. It was no mean advantage to Alexander, victorious
as he was, to secure the incorruptible Phokion as leader of the
macedonizing party at Athens. His projects against Persia were mainly
exposed to failure from the possibility of opposition being raised
against him in Greece by the agency of Persian money and ships.
To keep Athens out of such combinations, he had to rely upon the
personal influence and party of Phokion, whom he knew to have always
dissuaded her from resistance to the ever-growing aggrandizement
of his father Philip. In his conversation with Phokion on the
intended Asiatic expedition, Alexander took some pains to flatter
the pride of Athens by describing her as second only to himself,
and as entitled to the headship of Greece, in case any thing should
happen to him.[109] Such compliments were suitable to be repeated in
the Athenian assembly: indeed the Macedonian prince might naturally
prefer the idea of Athenian headship to that of Spartan, seeing that
Sparta stood aloof from him, an open recusant.
[109] Plutarch, Phokion, 17; Plutarch, Alexand. 13.
The animosity of Alexander being appeased, Athens resumed her
position as a member of the confederacy under his imperial authority.
Without visiting Attica, he now marched to the Isthmus of Corinth,
where he probably received from various Grecian cities deputations
deprecating his displeasure, and proclaiming their submission to
his imperial authority. He also probably presided at a meeting of
the Grecian synod, where he would dictate the contingents required
for his intended Asiatic expedition in the ensuing spring. To the
universal deference and submission which greeted him, one exception
was found—the Cynic philosopher Diogenes, who resided at Corinth,
satisfied with a tub for shelter, and with the coarsest and most
self-denying existence. Alexander approached him with a numerous
suite, and asked him if he wished for anything; upon which Diogenes
is said to have replied,—“Nothing, except that you would stand a
little out of my sunshine.” Both the philosopher and his reply
provoked laughter from the bystanders, but Alexander himself was
so impressed with the independent and self-sufficing character
manifested, that he exclaimed,—“If I were not Alexander, I would be
Diogenes.”[110]
[110] Plutarch, Alex. 14.
Having visited the oracle of Delphi, and received or extorted
from the priestess[111] an answer bearing favorable promise for
his Asiatic schemes, he returned to Macedonia before the winter.
The most important permanent effect of his stay in Greece was the
reconstitution of Bœotia; that is, the destruction of Thebes, and
the reconstitution of Orchomenus, Thespiæ, and Platæa, dividing
between them the Theban territory; all guarded and controlled by a
Macedonian garrison in the Kadmeia. It would have been interesting
to learn some details about this process of destruction and
restitution of the Bœotian towns; a process not only calling forth
strong manifestations of sentiment, but also involving important and
difficult questions to settle. But unfortunately we are not permitted
to know anything beyond the general fact.
[111] Plutarch, Alex. 14.
Alexander left Greece for Pella in the autumn of 335 B. C.,
and never saw it again.
It appears, that during this summer, while he was occupied in
his Illyrian and Theban operations, the Macedonian force under
Parmenio in Asia had had to contend against a Persian army, or Greek
mercenaries, commanded by Memnon the Rhodian. Parmenio, marching into
Æolis, besieged and took Grynium; after which he attacked Pitanê,
but was compelled by Memnon to raise the siege. Memnon even gained
a victory over the Macedonian force under Kallas in the Troad,
compelling them to retire to Rhœteum. But he failed in an attempt to
surprise Kyzikus, and was obliged to content himself with plundering
the adjoining territory.[112] It is affirmed that Darius was engaged
this summer in making large preparations, naval as well as military,
to resist the intended expedition of Alexander. Yet all that we hear
of what was actually done implies nothing beyond a moderate force.
[112] Diodor. xvi. 7.