It was proposed some weeks ago that there should be a day of national
humiliation. The highest authority in the land rejected that form of
expression, and I believe that we all approved of the rejection.
No, we do not want a day of national humiliation. If ever it is right
for a country to hold up its head, it is right for our country to-day.
But nevertheless there is something, not wholly different from this, for
which in the spirit of our argument I would earnestly appeal. There is a
way in which every one of us can do something, and even can do much, to
promote the solid foundations of a stable peace. I repeat that we do not
want a national humiliation. But we at least who must stay at home have
a need and duty of individual and national self-examination. It cannot
indeed be a duty incumbent on the men at the front—they have other
matters to attend to—but, most remarkably, the evil temper against which
it is directed is not on the whole the temper of the men at the front.
But for us—it is a thing we can do, and a thing we should do. We should
examine ourselves—is our patriotism such as to lead towards the
perfectly organized state? Do we desire for our country and ourselves
only the best things we know, beauty and truth and love and wholesome
living? Do we seek, by this infallible criterion of values, to guarantee
both ourselves and our country against the corrupt self-seeking which is
the ultimate cause of war?
Right as our cause is to-day, has not the wrong which we are labouring
to undo been fostered by ourselves as by others, if not in our case by
direct international action, yet by the exhibition of a jealous and
menacing spirit of rivalry? Do we not constantly endeavour to lower
other nations in our private and public talk, in the world of letters,
and in trade? Is our journalism, is our literature of the war—though I
gladly acknowledge some most excellent things in both—yet are they on
the whole such as we can look upon with satisfaction?
I am entirely without sympathy for the attempts made by a few among our
learned men, and by very many who are far from learned, to belittle the
intellectual and moral debt of Europe to Germany, and to prove for
instance that Goethe—_Goethe_—was a great exemplar of selfishness. And
horrible things as I believe her armies have done in the war, yet the
attitude which demands that when peace returns Germany or Prussia should
be intentionally humiliated and excluded from the European family of
nations, to my own feeling is actually repellent, and to my judgement is
an attitude of self-satisfaction, morally dangerous in the extreme, and
politically absurd. Surely, whatever others may do, we on our side
should fight our terrific battle like gentlemen, without rancour or
venom, and with eagerness, above all, when the fight is done, to
recognize the merits of our adversary which both his passion and ours
have for the moment travestied, and to renew the international bonds of
commerce, science, art, and philosophy. We ought not to fall below the
standard set us by our private soldiers upon Christmas Day, and indeed,
as we hear, upon every day of the war.
Punishment and humiliation let us leave to consequences and to history.
Belligerents are not good moral judges of each other. Much of what we
hear to-day in anticipation of the sequel of the war brings irresistibly
to my mind the profound wisdom of George Meredith’s warning against the
ridiculous attempt at a union of ill temper and policy.
The patriotism we have attempted to portray implies and demands that we
should desire for our country, not a triumph of vanity and
self-interest, but a share in such a solid work of organization as shall
be most favourable to the performance of a true state’s function in
_every_ community of Europe. Thus alone can we deserve well of our
country, and our country of the world.
-----
Footnote 1:
_L’Orientation religieuse de la France actuelle_, pp. 62, 63.
Footnote 2:
_Practical Ethics_, pp. 64, 65.
Footnote 3:
These sentences are taken from an address, ‘Ueber das Verhältniss der
Politik zur Moral’, published in 1875, among the _Reden und Aufsätze_
of Gustav Rümelin, Chancellor of the University of Tübingen.
Footnote 4:
The mistake of attempting to deal with both subjects was discovered
too late to be remedied, but some remarks on the second which were
omitted in the delivery of the lecture are here printed.
Footnote 5:
The reader to whom discussions of the subject of the preceding
paragraphs are new, and who desires to pursue them, is recommended to
refer to F. H. Bradley, _Ethical Studies_, v and vi; Green,
_Principles of Political Obligation_, in _Works_, vol. ii, or as
separately published; Bosanquet, _Philosophical Theory of the State_.
The line followed in these books runs back through Hegel to Plato and
Aristotle, on whose political philosophy see vol. i of Newman’s
edition of Aristotle’s _Politics_. My short statement does not
profess, of course, to represent the views of any one of the writers
named.
Footnote 6:
‘By nature’ here does not mean what the reader is likely to suppose.
On Spinoza’s doctrine see Green, op. cit.
Footnote 7:
Essay _Of Empire_. Cf. _Of Greatness of Kingdoms and Estates_. That
Bacon should be thought a great _moral_ guide seems strange, but his
political essays (notably that _Of Plantations_), like his others, are
of course full of wisdom.
Footnote 8:
I introduce the word in order to indicate the danger of using it. It
inevitably suggests an antithesis to something higher (‘duty’ or
‘principle’), and so is taken to mean, not the end of the state, but
some subordinate part of that end.
Footnote 9:
What is said here of slavery was suggested by a passage in Green, op.
cit.
Footnote 10:
Regarding this ideal, and others less ambitious, there is always the
question whether they do not presuppose a moral progress which would
make an actual organization needless.
Footnote 11:
The number of British embassies and legations abroad is fifty-seven
(Whitaker).
Footnote 12:
It is ridiculous to give this name to the state’s normal duty of
developing its own life.
Footnote 13:
This cannot be called an unconditional duty, if that means a duty
which in no circumstances can be superseded by a higher duty (_every_
duty is unconditional except as against a higher). I honour the German
Chancellor for his frank statement that the violation of Belgian
neutrality was an ‘Unrecht’ (a violation of law; i.e. something which
is almost always, but not always, wrong). What was false was the
description, as ‘a matter of life and death’, of the supposed superior
duty taken to justify the supersession of the inferior. And what was
revolting, and only too significant, was the revelation, in the phrase
‘a scrap of paper’, of the belief that the supersession of a duty is a
trifle.
Footnote 14:
See the introduction to the translation of Kant’s essay (1893, now
republished). There is a slighter sketch in W. A. Phillips’
instructive _Confederation of Europe_, 1914.
Footnote 15:
The conduct of the ‘Concert of Europe’ in recent years may be
contrasted very favourably with that of the Holy Alliance, and may
well be taken as a good augury; and it is better to emphasize this
than to dwell on the defects of the Concert. At the same time, one
must remember that it has been mainly concerned with troubles arising
from the decay of the Turkish Empire, and that this Empire has not
been considered as a full member of the European ‘Family’, and so has
not been treated as one of the United States of Europe would have to
be.
Footnote 16:
I do not remember, and have not found, any passage in his writings
which shows in what precise form he conceived this ideal.
Footnote 17:
The latter, for example, in the instructive little book called _The
War and Democracy_, by members of that admirable society, ‘The
Workers’ Educational Association’.
Footnote 18:
As regards its social spirit and its standard of social values,
England can hardly be called democratic. It is probably less so than
France was under the third Napoleon.
Footnote 19:
I must point out that it by no means follows from the doctrine of the
state’s moral end that the state should promulgate or encourage one
particular view regarding the duties of its citizens or its own
future. On the contrary, one may hold that doctrine and yet hold that
the state should abstain from doing this and, however much it may
support or enforce education, should, within the necessary limits,
leave ‘ideas’ to prevail or fail through the process of free
competition.
Footnote 20:
In his lectures on the Philosophy of History, Hegel spoke of
‘world-historical’ individuals and peoples, who represent for a time
that ‘world-spirit’ whose ‘right’ is supreme; and perhaps some rash
German reader might cry, ‘Yes, France a century ago, and Germany now.’
But he will not find a word in Hegel to countenance his claim; and if
he builds his hopes on military power he might ponder Hegel’s final
sentence about the astounding victories of Napoleon: ‘Never was the
powerlessness of victory shown in a clearer light than then.’ I do not
mean to imply that, according to Hegel, what we call the best
intentions are bound to prevail. No philosopher was less inclined to
ignore painful facts. His whole philosophy might even be called an
attempt to understand and justify them.
Footnote 21:
My indebtedness in this Paper to Bishop Butler will be obvious to all
who know his sermons on ‘Resentment’ and on ‘The Forgiveness of
Injuries’.
Footnote 22:
Among these faults I should count our failure to intervene in the
Schleswig-Holstein War.
Footnote 23:
Hegel, _Philosophy of Right_, s. 324.
Footnote 24:
The professors, it is said, have been mobilized in the service of
Germany. And on the general merits of the dispute this is so. But I am
not aware of evidence that philosophers of repute have adopted, say,
Bernhardi’s or Treitschke’s views of justification by force. Eucken,
though he stands up for his country, does so partly on the ground that
Bernhardi is not representative, and we must be allowed to discount
the popular use of hard sayings from Nietzsche, though he has very
probably misled the multitude. Nietzsche is not a thinker whom he that
runs may read. Wundt, I think, is simply misinformed and credulous,
while strongly affected by national bias and vanity. I may add that
the idea of ‘culture’ in the earlier period is right and fine. I cite
from Kant what is probably the original account of it: ‘We are
_civilized_ to the point of wearisomeness, into all sorts of social
courtesy and politeness. But before we can be held to be _moralized_
there is a very long way to go. For culture implies more than
civilization, it implies the idea of morality.’ Kant’s _Werke_ (R.)
7,329. He is censuring the expenditure on ‘expansion’, as thwarting
the spiritual growth of the citizens.
Footnote 25:
_Manchester Lectures on Germany in 19th Century_, 2nd. ed. 19.
Footnote 26:
_New Statesman_, February 6 and 13.
Footnote 27:
See T. H. Green, _Lectures on Principles of Political Obligation_, ss.
157–75.
Footnote 28:
Lord Haldane’s Montreal address, ‘Higher Nationality’, republished in
_The Conduct of Life_, Murray, 1914.
Footnote 29:
Green, op. cit., s. 175.
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