IV

This awakening of a sense of duty to the State is leading to a more

thorough understanding of the particular State to which we happen to

belong—I mean of course the British Empire. This is another and a very

promising change in the national mind. During the last few months a new

vision has come to many of us of what the British Empire really is.

Speaking of Britons in general, I am afraid it must be confessed that

our knowledge of the Empire, our grasp of its significance, have been

inadequate to the immense human issues, and to the corresponding

responsibilities, which the Empire involves. We have been proud of this

vast heritage, we have complacently enjoyed the advantages which come to

all of us from its possession, we have talked vaguely and largely about

imperialism, but we have hardly taken our imperial duties to heart. Some

of us may have done so, but not the nation as a whole. To the majority

of the electorate the Empire has been a side issue, or a thing that

might be left to look after itself. It seemed too big and too broadly

based to be in danger of disturbance. Few of us gave much thought to it;

few of us allowed our imaginations to play round its meaning; still

fewer took the trouble to study its history. Had we done so we should

have realized, as I am afraid not many did realize, that a day would

dawn when our right to possess this Empire would be put to the proof,

when we should be challenged before the world to show that our

intelligence and our valour were equal to the vast imperial enterprise

on which we had engaged.

But let us not forget that the British Empire, in its present extent and

organization, is a comparatively recent phenomenon. In size, in wealth,

in the civilization of its component parts and their close relations

with one another, its characteristics are so different from what they

were a century ago that we can draw no parallel with the Napoleonic era.

And now, for the first time in its history, this Greater Britain is

being attacked—and attacked with unexampled vehemence and resolution. It

is a new experience, and like all new experiences it is compelling a

readjustment of thought.

This is a war of the Empire, by the Empire, for the Empire—and by the

Empire I mean all for which the Empire stands, its ideals as well as its

actualities. The Colonies and India are fighting for us and we are

fighting for them. Our fellow subjects in India are represented by a

great army of fine warriors, who have helped to check the would-be

invaders of our shores. Gurkhas, Sikhs, and Pathans have shed their

blood that London might be safe. Mohammedan, Hindu, and Christian have

fallen side by side in defence of the liberties of our race. This, I

say, is a new thing in our history. We feel a deepened intimacy with

these widely sundered races; the dominions over the seas seem no further

off than the next county. The Germans predicted that the outbreak of war

would split the Empire into fragments. It has given the Empire a

splendid solidarity such as it never before possessed. It has made us a

greater nation, not in the sense that it has added to our dominions, but

in the deeper sense that it has caused our political consciousness to

dilate to the imperial scale. The political organization of the Empire

is acquiring a corporate mind, just as the mother country after the

defeat of the Spanish Armada awoke to a new consciousness of her

national individuality and began to know herself for what she was.

The parallel is profoundly interesting. It took the English people many

centuries to discover their own country. The English in the reign of

Henry VIII had a vaguer notion of England than we have of Canada (very

few had seen a map of England); of Scotland than we have of Ceylon; of

Ireland than we have of Central Africa. But just as these vague

conceptions gave place in course of time to vision and realization and

patriotic love for England, so now we British are beginning to think of

the Empire as something more than a confused extension of our national

boundaries, or as a group of appendages to our national home. The Empire

is becoming _our country_, an inheritance of which we have to prove

ourselves worthy, and we are becoming its citizens in heart as well as

in name. Not that the change is already complete or even very far

advanced. But no close observer of present tendencies will doubt that

the movement of the national mind is in the direction of which I speak.

Our imperial soul is beginning to germinate. If the change continues its

ethical and spiritual consequences will be very great.

V

In connexion with this extension of our national consciousness one may

note at the present time some curious questionings among thoughtful men

as to the bearing of democratic theory on our imperial obligations. We

call ourselves a democracy; but there are moments, even in the course of

dealing with domestic problems, when we find it hard to reconcile the

facts with the theory. And the difficulty becomes greater in proportion

as we extend our thoughts to the imperial scale. According to the

democratic theory the people are to be consulted as to all that concerns

their interests. Well, there is nothing that concerns our interests

quite so deeply as the existence of the Empire. But when has the people

been consulted in the matter? Proud as the British may be of possessing

an empire on which the sun never sets, it is certain that the people as

a whole have never been asked whether they wished to possess such an

empire or not. They have never been asked how large they wished the

Empire to be; or whether they would or would not be content with

something less or greater. In an age when all things political are

supposed to be determined by voting it is a curious circumstance that

this, the greatest of political questions, has never been voted on at

all. Nay more. So far as I know, the British people have never said to

themselves, as the Germans have recently been saying, ‘Go to, now;

world-dominion shall be ours.’ It would tax the historian to fix the

period when the design for a world-wide empire became a definite

ambition of the British people. True, there have been statesmen like the

late Lord Beaconsfield, or Lord Chatham in an earlier age, who made

plans for increasing the dominions of the Crown. But the popular will

did not originate these designs, much as it may have applauded them when

they had been carried out—though even this has not always been the case.

Moreover, the control exercised even by statesmen over the process of

imperial expansion has been of a distinctly piecemeal character. As one

annexation followed another none of our ministers has foreseen where the

process would end. None of them has had a vision in advance of the

Empire as it exists to-day—in extent, in population, and in wealth. As

Seeley long ago pointed out, we have conquered half the world in a fit

of absence of mind. Indeed it would be extremely hard to fix

responsibility for the existence of the Empire, in its present

character, on any group or series of statesmen, or on any particular

generation of Britons—to say nothing of individual men. A province here,

a frontier there, an island somewhere else might be correctly set down

to an assignable wave of public opinion or to the diplomacy of a

particular minister. But the total growth seems to have escaped from

human control altogether. Certainly nothing would be more untrue than to

treat the existence of the Empire as though it corresponded to the

expressed will of the living generation. We have not _willed_ it into

being. We have found it there—like so many of the financial

obligations—e.g. the National Debt—which have been inherited from the

past, and have to be accepted whether we like them or not, in spite of

the maxim which is said to be the corner-stone of the constitution—‘No

taxation without representation’.

Our new vision of the Empire is teaching us another thing. We are

learning to understand more clearly the influence of the past on the

present. We begin to see that we inherit from the past something more

than the monuments of the mighty dead. We inherit the very form and

pressure of our national life; the range, significance and general

direction of our imperial duties. We inherit not our social problems

only; but the courage to attack them, and much of the wisdom which

guides us to their solution. These in all their essential features have

been determined not _by_ us but _for_ us by the action of forces which

did their work before we came into existence. We are therefore in no

mood to respond to the lines of the well-known hymn which bid us ‘give

the past unto the wind’. A past which has bequeathed to us our national

status and the broad outline of our imperial responsibilities, a past

which has given us our political idealism and our love of liberty,

cannot be ‘given to the wind’ without a degree of treachery of which the

fiercest anarchist in our midst is not capable. Without distinction we

feel ourselves bound to ‘carry on’; and what we are ‘carrying on’ is the

work of our fathers from the most distant ages to the present day. We

are learning the great truth of which Burke was the prophet—the

immortality of the State. The past is throbbing in our veins. The cause

we are fighting for is a thousand years old. Patriots and martyrs for

liberty are no longer mere names in the book of history; they are living

forces in our midst. The buried generations are with us. We are members

of a community which is continuous in time and has millions of members,

vast clouds of witnesses from every age, whose work is waiting for our

loyalty to make it complete.

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