"On the 1st of April, at half past three in the afternoon, two
divisions of the English fleet, under the command of Vice-Admiral
Lord Nelson, and a rear-admiral, weighed anchor, and stood
eastward, and by the south of the middle passage of the road, where
they anchored. This force consisted of twelve ships of the line;
and several large frigates, gun-boats, and other smaller vessels;
in all, thirty-one sail.
"On the 2d of April, at three-quarters past nine in the morning,
the wind south-east, both the vessels to the south and the vessels
to the north of the middle road, weighed anchor. The ships of the
line, and heavy frigates, under Lord Nelson, steered for the
Konigstiefe, to take their stations, in order, along the line of
defence confided to me. The gunboats, and small vessels, took their
stations near the town; and the division of Admiral Parker,
consisting of eight ships of the line, and some small vessels,
steered with a press of sail southwards, to the right wing of
defence.
"At half past ten, the foremost ship of Admiral Nelson's division
passed the southernmost ship of the line of defence. I gave those
ships that were within shot the signal for battle. The block-ships,
Provesteen, and Wagner, and immediately after these the Jutland,
between which and the block-ship Dannebrog, the leading English
ship of seventy-four guns fixed her station, by throwing out one of
her rear-anchors, obeyed the signal, by a well directed and well
supported fire. By degrees, the rest of the ships came up; and, as
they sailed past, on both sides of the ships already at anchor,
they formed a thick line: which, as it stretched northward to the
ship of the line the Zealand, engaged not more than two-thirds of
the line of defence committed to me; while the Trekroner--or Three
Crowns Battery--and the block-ships Elephanten and Mars, with the
frigate Hielperen, did not come at all into the action.
"In half an hour, the battle was general. Ten ships of the line,
among which was one of eighty guns, the rest chiefly seventy-fours,
and from six to eight frigates, on the one side: on the other,
seven block-ships; of which, only one of seventy-four, the rest of
sixty-four and under; two frigates; and six smaller vessels. _This
was the respective strength of the two parties_. The enemy had, on
the whole, _two ships to one_: and the block-ship Provesteen had,
besides a ship of the line and the rear-admiral, two frigates
against her; by which she was raked the whole time, without being
able to return a shot.
"If I only recapitulate, _historically_, what your highness, and
along with you a great portion of the citizens of Denmark and
Europe, have seen, I may venture to call that an unequal combat,
which was maintained, and supported, for four hours and a half,
with unexampled courage and effect--in which the fire of the
superior force was so much weakened, for an hour before the end of
the battle, that several of the English ships, and particularly
Lord Nelson's, were obliged to fire only single shots--that this
hero, himself, in the middle and very heat of the battle, sent a
flag of truce on shore to propose a cessation of hostilities--if I
also add, that _it was announced to me, that two English ships of
the line had struck_; but, being supported by fresh ships, again
hoisted their flags--I may, in such circumstances, be permitted to
say, and I believe _I may appeal to the enemy's own confession_,
that in this engagement Denmark's ancient naval reputation blazed
forth with such incredible splendor, that I thank Heaven all Europe
are the witnesses of it!
"Yet the scale, if not equal, did not decline far to the
disadvantage of Denmark. The ships that were first and most
obstinately attacked, even surrounded by the enemy, the
incomparable Provesteen, Wagner, and Jutland, fought till almost
all their guns were dismounted; but these vessels were obliged to
give way to superior force, _and the Danish fire ceased along the
whole line from north to south_.
"At half past eleven, the Dannebrog ship of the line, which, lay
along-side Admiral Nelson, was set on fire. I repaired, with my
flag, on board the Holstein, of the line, belonging to the north
wing; _but the Dannebrog long kept her flag flying, in spite of
this disaster_. At the end of the battle, she had two hundred and
seventy men killed and wounded.
"At half past two, the Holstein was so shattered, and had so many
killed and wounded, and so many guns dismounted, that I _then
carried the pendant to be hoisted instead of my flag, and went on
shore, to the battery of the Three Crowns_, from whence I commanded
the north wing; _which was slightly engaged with the division of
Admiral Parker_, till about four o'clock, when I received orders
from your royal highness to put an end to the engagement.
"Thus, the quarter of the line of defence, from the Three Crowns to
the frigate Hielperen, was in the power of the enemy; and the
Hielperen, finding herself alone, slipped her cables, and steered
to Stirbfeir. The ship Elven, after she had received many shots in
the hull, and had her masts and rigging shot away, and a great
number killed and wounded, retreated within the Crowns. The
gunboats, Nyebrog and Aggershuus--which last towed the former away,
when near sinking--ran ashore, and the Gurnarshe floating-battery,
which had suffered much, together with the block-ship Dannebrog,
shortly after the battle, blew up.
"Besides the visible loss the enemy have suffered, I am convinced,
their loss in killed and wounded is considerable. The advantage the
enemy have gained by their victory, too, _consists merely in ships
which are not fit for use, in spiked cannon, and gunpowder damaged
by sea-water_.
"The number killed and wounded cannot yet be exactly ascertained;
but I calculate it, from sixteen to eighteen hundred men. Among the
former, it is with grief that I mention the captains of the
block-ship Infoedstratten and the frigate Kronbrog, Captain Thura
and First-Lieutenant Hauch, with several other brave officers:
among the wounded, the commander of the Dannebrog; who, besides
other wounds, has lost his right hand.
"I want expression, to do justice to the unexampled courage of the
officers and crews. The battle itself can only enable you to form
an idea of it.
"Olfert Fischer."
The honourable mind of Lord Nelson indignantly revolted at the meanness
conspicuous in this account; and he was resolved to chastise the
pusillanimous malignity which it was so clumsily adapted to cover, by
addressing the following letter, through General-Adjutant Lindholm, to
the Crown Prince of Denmark, that his royal highness might see his
lordship's sense of such a wretched attempt to deprive our hero of the
honour of a victory, and screen the Danish commander in chief, himself,
from the dreaded shame of a defeat not in itself by any means
disgraceful.
"St. George, at Sea,
22d April 1801.
"MY DEAR SIR,
"Commodore Fischer having, in a public letter, given an account to
the world of the battle of the 2d, called upon his royal highness
as a witness to the truth of it. I, therefore, think it right to
address myself to you, for the information of his royal highness;
as, I assure you, had this officer confined himself to his own
veracity, I should have treated his official letter with the
contempt it deserved, and allowed the world to appreciate the
merits of the two contending officers. I shall make a few, and very
few, observations on this letter. He asserts the superiority of
numbers on the part of the British; it will turn out, if that is of
any consequence, that the Danish line of defence, to the southward
of the Crown Islands, was much stronger, and more numerous, than
the British. We had only five sail of seventy-fours, two
sixty-fours, two fifties, and one frigate, engaged; a bomb vessel,
towards the latter end, threw some shells into the arsenal. Two
seventy-fours, and one sixty-four, by an accident, grounded; or the
Crown Islands, and the Elephanten and Mars, would have had full
employment: and, by the assistance of the frigates--who went to
try, alone, what I had directed the three sail of the line who
grounded to assist them in--I have reason to hope, they would have
been equally successful as that part of the British line engaged. I
am ready to admit, that many of the Danish officers and men behaved
as well as men could do, and deserved not to be abandoned by their
commander. I am justified in saying this, from Commodore Fischer's
own declaration. In his own letter, he states that, after he
quitted the Dannebrog, she long contested the battle. If so, more
shame for him to quit so many brave fellows! _Here_ was no
manoeuvering, it was downright fighting; and it was his duty to
have shewn an example of firmness becoming the high trust reposed
in him. He went in such a hurry, if he went before she
struck--which, but for his own declaration, I can hardly
believe--that he forgot to take his broad pendant with him, for
both pendant and ensign were struck together; and it is from this
circumstance, that I claimed the commodore as a prisoner of war. He
then went, as he says, on board the Holstein--the brave captain of
which did not want him--where he did not hoist his pendant. From
this ship, he went on shore, either before or after she struck, or
he would have been again a prisoner. As to his nonsense about
victory, his royal highness will not much credit him. I sunk,
burnt, captured, or drove into the harbour, the whole line of
defence to the southward of the Crown Islands. He says, he is told
that two British ships struck. Why did he not take possession of
them? I took possession of his as fast as they struck. The reason
is clear, that he did not believe it. He must have known the
falsity of the report, and that no fresh British ships did come
near the ships engaged. He states, that the ship in which I had the
honour to hoist my flag fired, latterly, only single guns. It is
true; for steady and cool were my brave fellows, and did not wish
to throw away a single shot. He seems to exult, that I sent on
shore a flag of truce. Men of his description, if they ever are
victorious, know not the feel of humanity. You know, and his royal
highness knows, that the guns fired from the shore could only fire
through the Danish ships which had surrendered; and that, if I
fired at the shore, it could only be in the same manner. God
forbid, that I should destroy an unresisting Dane! _When they
became my prisoners, I became their protector_. Humanity alone,
could have been my object; but Mr. Fischer's carcase was safe, and
he regarded not the sacred call of humanity. His royal highness
thought as I did. It has brought about an armistice; which, I pray
the Almighty, may bring about a happy reconciliation between the
two kingdoms. As I have not the names of all the ships
correct--only of the thirteen, including the seven sail of the line
which struck, remained at anchor, and fell into my possession after
the battle--I shall, therefore, be very much obliged to you, for a
correct list of their names; and the number of men, if possible to
be obtained, on board each, and the numbers sent from the shore
during the action. My earnest wish is, to be correct; and believe
me, dear Sir, with great esteem, your most obedient servant,
"Nelson and Bronte."
"General-Adjutant Lindholm."
Whatever severity may appear in this retort, it's, justice would be with
difficulty refuted. The answer of General-Adjutant Lindholm apologizes,
with very considerable address, for the commander in chief; but that
honourable officer's reasoning is also tinctured with as much national
partiality as is consistent with a due regard to truth. This is no
uncommon effect of patriotic zeal in the best minds, and may be traced
even in that of our hero.
"Copenhagen, 2d May 1801.
"MY LORD!
"Your lordship has imposed upon me a very painful task, by desiring
me to communicate to his Royal Highness the Crown Prince the
contents of that letter with which your lordship has favoured me
the 22d of April; and in which you have treated Commodore Fischer
with a severity which, as a brother officer, I cannot but think too
great, indeed, I conceive, that your lordship has felt a certain
degree of displeasure at that incorrectness which you have thought
to find in Commodore Fischer's official report; but your lordship
did not fully consider, at that moment, that he himself might have
received incorrect reports: a fatality to which every commander in
chief is exposed. I flatter myself, from your lordship's well-known
candour and indulgence, that you will not think it presuming in me,
or contrary to the respect I feel for your lordship, if I take the
liberty of offering you some few observations in vindication of the
conduct of Commodore Fischer. But, first, let me have the honour to
assure your lordship, that I have not communicated to that officer
your letter of the 22d of April; and that, what I take the liberty
of offering your lordship, is absolutely my private and individual
opinion.
"Your lordship thinks, that Commodore Fischer has over-rated the
forces by which he was attacked, and under-rated his own; or, that
he wrongly asserts the superiority of numbers on the part of the
British. I must confess, that I am now, as I have always been, of
opinion, that the squadron with which your lordship attacked our
southern line of defence, say all those ships and vessels lying to
the southward of the Crown Battery, was stronger then than that
line. I will say nothing about our not having time sufficient to
man our ships in the manner it was intended: they being badly
manned, both as to number and as to quality of their crews, the
greatest part of which were landmen; people that had been pressed,
and who never before had been on board a ship or used to the
exercise of guns. I will not mention our ships being old and
rotten, and not having one-third of our usual complement of
officers; I will confine myself to the number of guns, and from the
ships named in your lordship's official report: and there I find,
that your squadron carried one thousand and fifty-eight guns, of
much greater calibre than our's; exclusive of carronnades, which
did our ships so much injury; also, exclusive of your gun-brigs and
bomb-vessels.
"Now, I can assure your lordship, upon my honour, that to my
certain knowledge the number of guns on board of those eighteen
ships and vessels of our's which were engaged (including the small
ship the Elbe, which came into the harbour towards the end of the
action) amount to six hundred and thirty-four, I have not included
our eleven gun-boats, carrying each two guns, as a couple of them
only had an opportunity of firing a few shot. Nor need I to
mention the Crown Battery, on which sixty-six guns were mounted, as
that battery did not fairly get into action, and only fired a few
random shot.
"When Commodore Fischer left the Dannebrog, that ship was on fire,
had many killed, several of it's officers wounded, and otherwise
suffered much. It was, I conceive, the duty of the commander, to
remove his broad pendant to another ship; and he went on board the
Holstein, from whence he commanded the line of defence; and where
he remained two hours, his broad pendant flying on board the said
ship. When this ship was mostly disabled, the Commodore went to the
Crown Battery, which also was under his command. He would, in my
humble opinion, have been justified, from the wound he received on
his head, to quit the command altogether, when he left the
Dannebrog; and no blame could ever have attached, for it, to his
character as a soldier. I have given myself every possible pain, to
be informed whether Commodore Fischer's pendant has been removed
before or after the ship struck; and the officers all agree, in
declaring, that the broad pendant has been replaced by a captain's
pendant, both on board the Dannebrog and the Holstein, previous to
those ships hauling down their ensign. It is even remarkable that,
on board the Dannebrog, the man who had taken down the broad
pendant, and hoisted the captain's pendant, was killed when coming
down the shrouds, and fell upon deck with the commodore's pendant
in his hand.
"I do not conceive that Commodore Fischer had the least idea of
claiming as a victory what to every intent and purpose was a
defeat: he has only thought, that this defeat was not an inglorious
one; and, that our officers and men displayed much bravery and
firmness, against force so superior in every respect. Your
lordship's report, and your letter to me, proves it. I confess,
that your lordship took all the vessels opposed to you; except
five, carrying together eighty-six guns. I am of opinion, with your
lordship, that three ships of seventy-four guns each would have
been a hard match for the Three Crowns Battery; but, they certainly
would have been forced to go away.
"As to your lordship's motive for sending a flag of truce to our
government, it can never be misconstrued; and your subsequent
conduct has sufficiently shewn, that humanity is always the
companion of true valour. You have done more; you have shewn
yourself a friend of the re-establishment of peace, and good
harmony, between this country and Great Britain. It is, therefore,
with the sincerest esteem, I shall always feel myself attached to
your lordship; and it is with the greatest respect I have the
honour to subscribe myself, my lord, your lordship's most obedient
and most humble servant,
"H. Lindholm."
On these respective letters, the judicious part of mankind will judge
for themselves. We need not have blushed for a Lindholm, but we have
reason to glory in our Nelson. Olfert Fischer, notwithstanding the
arguments of his able apologist, must always be considered as having
been superabundantly solicitous for the safety of his own person: in
leaving two different ships, by his own confession, while the respective
crews continued fighting; and finally retiring, to continue his command,
under cover of a powerful battery on shore. His roundly asserting, that
we had two ships for one, and that he was told two English ships had
struck; his ungenerous and distorted application of Lord Nelson's noble
acknowledgment of the general bravery of the Danes; and the low source
of solace that he finds in disingenuously limiting the advantage gained
by the victory to the possession of a few wretched wrecks, without at
all appreciating the grand political consequences which it so fully
accomplished; exhibit, in the whole, a disposition meanly selfish,
conspicuously sordid, and deplorably deficient in all the most lofty
qualities of mind. What a contrast to our immortal Nelson! whose single
sentence, in his letter of rebuke for this man--"_God forbid that I
should destroy an unresisting Dane!_ When they became my prisoners,
I became their protector!"--deserves to be charactered with letters
of diamonds on the shrine destined to cover the hero's hallowed remains.
Lord Nelson did not think it necessary to differ with his friend
Lindholm, an undoubted man of honour, about punctilious particulars. To
his own mind, however, or that of an enemy, he would not abate a
particle of what he had asserted. The following statement is copied from
a private memorandum of his lordship's, in which he acutely turns the
scale of superior force against the Danes.
"Lindholm ought to have omitted the guns of the Russell, Bellona,
Agamemnon, Amazon, Alcmene, Blanche, Dart, and Arrow; as the two
first were aground; and, although within random shot, yet unable to
do that service expected from seventy-four gun ships. The Agamemnon
was not within three miles; the others, frigates and sloops, were
exposed to a part of the Crown Battery and the ships in the other
channel, but not fired upon by the eighteen sail drawn up to the
southward of the Crown Islands. Therefore, sixty-six guns are to be
taken from the British, and a hundred and sixty-six guns added to
the Danes: viz. sixty-six, Crown Batteries--(I think, there were
eighty-eight)--and a hundred for the batteries on Amack; besides
random shot from the ships in the other channel, citadel, &c.
Therefore, the account ought to stand thus--
Guns, by Lindholm's account 1058
Deduct, as above 366
----
British force in action 692
----
Danish force, by Lindholm's account 634
Add, I say, at least 166
Danish force 800
British force 692