It is clear from the occurrences in Berlin in 1848 that while the

Prussian idea of monarchy is deeply rooted in the German mind, the

possibility of a sudden change in public sentiment and a radical

alteration of the relations between Crown and people are never at any

time to be wholly disregarded. Hence it is that the Emperor and his

Government are so insistent on the doctrine of Heaven-granted

sovereignty, so ready to support more or less autocratic monarchies in

other parts of the world, and so sensitive to popular movements like

Anarchism and Nihilism in Russia, or the always-smouldering Polish

agitation and the propaganda of the Social Democracy in Germany. When

King Frederick William IV said to his assembled generals at Potsdam a

week after the "March Days," "Never have I felt more free or more

secure than when under the protection of my burghers," his words were

drowned in the buzz of murmurs and the angry clanking of swords. The

Emperor to-day might, or might not, endorse the words of his ancestor.

Most probably he would not; for, judging by his speeches, his care for

the army, the military state with which he surrounds himself, and his

habitual appearance in uniform, he, though in truth far more a civil

monarch than the War Lord foreign writers delight in painting him, is

evidently determined to rely only on his soldiers for every

eventuality at home as well as abroad.

Perhaps the best German authorities on Bismarck's falling-out with the

young Emperor are the statements regarding it to be found in the

memoranda supplied at the time by Prince Bismarck himself to Dr.

Moritz Busch; the Memoirs of Prince Hohenlohe-Schillingsfürst,

subsequently Imperial Chancellor; and the monograph on Bismarck by Dr.

Hans Blum, one of the Chancellor's confidants. The memoranda supplied

to Busch make regrettably few references to the subject, beyond giving

the terms of the official resignation and some scanty addenda thereto;

but enough is said generally by Busch concerning Bismarck's

conversations to show that the Chancellor was deeply mortified by his

dismissal. Bismarck indeed expressly denies this in a conversational

statement quoted by an able Bismarckian writer of our own time, Dr.

Paul Liman; but in view of subsequent events and statements the denial

can hardly be taken as sincere. The passage referred to is as

follows:--

"I bear no grudge against my young master, who is fiery and

lively. He wishes to make all men happy, and that is very

natural at his age. I, for my part, believe perhaps less in

this possibility, and have told him so too. It is very

natural that a mentor like myself does not please him, and

that he therefore rejects my advice. An old carthorse and a

young courser go ill in harness together. Only politics are

not so easy as a chemical combination: they deal with human

beings. I wish certainly that his experiments may succeed,

and am not in the least angry with him. I stand towards him

like a father whom a son has grieved; the father may suffer

thereby, but all the same he says to himself, 'He is a fine

young fellow.' When I was young I followed my King

everywhere: now that I am old I can no longer accompany my

master when he travels so far. Accordingly it is unavoidable

that counsellors who remained closer to him should win his

confidence at my expense. He is very easily influenced when

one puts before him ideas which he supposes will happily

affect the condition of the people, and he can hardly wait

to put them into operation. The Kaiser will achieve

reputation at once: I have my own to watch over, to defend.

I have sacrificed myself for renown and will not place it in

jeopardy."

Prince Hohenlohe's Memoirs are much more valuable in respect of

positive information, and especially in supplying an account of the

incident taken from the lips of the Emperor himself. The Prince was

without his great predecessor's ability, but was much more amiable and

sincere. He was, moreover, a friend of both the parties concerned, and

he impartially jotted down events at the time they occurred. Lastly,

if he was a courtier at heart, he was that not wholly unknown thing,

an honest one. Dr. Hans Blum is obviously a partisan of the great

Chancellor's, but he may also be referred to for a fairly connected

account of the fall and the events that succeeded it up to the time of

Bismarck's death on July 30, 1898.

Apart from the differences in the ages and temperaments of the Emperor

and the Chancellor, there were differences in their views as to

certain measures of policy. There was a difference of opinion as to

German policy regarding Russia. Friendship with that country had been

the policy of both Emperor William I and Bismarck, and the latter had

effected a reinsurance treaty with Russia, stipulating for Russian

neutrality in case of a war between Germany and France,

notwithstanding the subsistence of the Triple Alliance between

Germany, Austria, and Italy. The reinsurance treaty, which had been

made for a period of three years, was now about to expire, and while

Bismarck desired its renewal, the Emperor, in a spirit of loyalty to

Austria, was against the renewal, and the treaty was not renewed. This

was the "new course" as it regarded Russia. The difference with regard

to the anti-Socialist Laws has been referred to in our chapter on the

accession.

The Royal Order of September, 1852, which has been mentioned as

leading immediately to the resignation, regulated intercourse between

the Prussian Ministers and the Crown, its chief provision being that

only the Minister President, and not individual Ministers, should have

audience of the Emperor regarding matters of home and foreign policy.

The Emperor desired the abrogation of the Order, for he wished to

consult with the Ministers individually. The text of Bismarck's

official resignation, after describing the origin of the Order,

continues:

"If each individual Minister can receive commands from his

Sovereign without previous arrangement with his colleagues,

a coherent policy, for which some one is to be responsible,

is an impossibility. It would be impossible for any of the

Ministers, and especially for the Minister President, to

bear the constitutional responsibility for the Cabinet as a

whole. Such a provision as that contained in the Order of

1852 could be dispensed with under the absolute monarchy and

could also be dispensed with to-day if we returned to

absolutism without ministerial responsibility. But according

to the constitutional arrangements now legally in force the

control of the Cabinet by a President under the Order of

1852 is indispensable."

The Emperor replied to Prince Bismarck's resignation in a

communication which the reader, according to his disposition, will

regard as an effusion of the heart, immensely creditable to its

composer, a model of an official reply as demanded by circumstances, a

striking example of the art of throwing dust in the public eye, or an

equally striking contribution to the literature of excusable

hypocrisy. It was as follows:--

"MY DEAR PRINCE,--With deep emotion I learn from your

request of the 18th instant that you have decided to retire

from the offices which you have filled for long years with

incomparable success. I had hoped not to have been compelled

to entertain the thought of separation during our lives.

While, however, in full consciousness of the important

consequences of your retirement, I am forced to accustom

myself to the thought. I do so, it is true, with a heavy

heart, but in the strong confidence that the grant of your

request will contribute as much as possible to the

protection and preservation for as long as possible of a

life and strength of unreplaceable value to the Fatherland.

"The grounds you offer for your resignation convince me that

any further attempt to induce you to reconsider your

determination would have no prospect of success. I

acquiesce, therefore, in your wish by hereby graciously

releasing you from your offices as Imperial Chancellor,

President of my State Ministry, and Minister of Foreign

Affairs, and trust that your counsels and energy, your

loyalty and devotion, will not be wanting to me and the

country in the future also.

"I have considered it as one of the most valued privileges

in my life that at the commencement of my reign I had you at

my side as my first counsellor. What you have done and

achieved for Prussia and Germany, what you have done for my

House, my ancestors, and me, will remain to me and the

German people in grateful and imperishable memory. But also

in foreign countries your wise and energetic peace policy,

which I, too, in the future also, as a result of sincere

conviction, decide to take as the guiding line of my

conduct, will be always gloriously recognized. It is not in

my power to requite your services as they deserve. I must

rest satisfied with assuring you of my own and the country's

ineffaceable thanks. As a sign of this thanks I confer on

you the rank of a Duke of Lauenburg. I will also send you a

life-sized picture of myself.

"God bless you, my dear Prince, and grant you still many

years of an old age undisturbed and blessed with the

consciousness of duty faithfully done.

"In this disposition I remain to you and yours in the future

also your sincere, obliged, and grateful Emperor and King,

"WILLIAM I.R."

The Emperor has never, so far as is publicly known, issued, or caused

to be issued, an official account of the episode and its _péripéties_,

but the story he poured, evidently out of a full heart, into the ears

of Prince Hohenlohe, then Statthalter of Alsace-Lorraine, during a

midnight drive from the railway station at Hagenau to the hunting

lodge at Sufflenheim, is an historical document of practically

official authenticity. It appears as follows in the Prince's

Memoirs:--

"STRASBURG, 26 _April_, 1890.

"On the evening of the 23rd, nine o'clock, I drove with

Thaden and Moritz to Hagenau, there to await the arrival of

the Emperor. We spent the evening with circle-officer Klemm.

I went to bed at eleven o'clock in the guest-room, and slept

until half-past twelve. Moritz and Thaden drove to the

station with a view to changing their clothes in the train.

At one o'clock I was again at the station, when the Emperor

punctually arrived. I presented the gentlemen to him, and

turned over General Hahnke to Baron Charpentier and

Lieutenant Cramer, for them to conduct him to the hunting

ground. Our journey lasted about an hour, during which the

Emperor related without a pause the whole story of his

quarrel with Bismarck. According to this the coolness had

already begun in December. The Emperor then demanded that

something should be done about the Working Class Question.

The Chancellor was against doing anything. The Emperor held

the view that if the Government did not take the initiative,

the Reichstag, _i.e_. the Socialists, Centre and

Progressives, would take the matter in hand, and then the

Government would lag behind. The Chancellor wanted to lay

the anti-Socialist Bill with the expulsion paragraph again

before the Reichstag, dissolving the chamber if it did not

accept the Bill, and then, if it came to disturbances, to

take energetic measures. The Emperor objected, saying that

if his grandfather, after a long and glorious reign, were

forced to repress disturbances no one would think ill of

him. It was different in his case, who had as yet

accomplished nothing. People would reproach him with

beginning his reign by shooting down his subjects. He was

ready to act, but he wished to do it with a good conscience

after endeavouring to redress the well-founded grievances of

the workmen, or at least after doing everything to meet

their justifiable claims.

"The Emperor therefore demanded at a ministerial conference

the submission of ministerial edicts which should contain

what subsequently they in fact did contain. Bismarck would

not hear of it. The Emperor then laid the question before

the Council of State, and eventually obtained the edicts in

spite of Bismarck's opposition. Bismarck, however, secretly

continued his opposition, and tried to persuade Switzerland

to persevere with its idea of an International Labour

Conference. The attempt was rendered nugatory by the loyal

attitude of the Swiss Minister in Berlin, Roth. At the very

same time Bismarck was trying to influence the diplomatists

against the conference.

"The relations between the Emperor and Bismarck, already

shaken by these dissensions, were still further embittered

by the question of the Cabinet Order of 1852. Bismarck had

often advised the Emperor to summon the Ministers to him.

This the Emperor did, and as the intercourse became more

frequent Bismarck took it ill, was jealous, and dragged out

the Order of 1852 so as to keep Ministers from the Emperor.

The Emperor resisted and acquired the abrogation of the

Cabinet Order. Bismarck at first agreed, but gave no further

sign in the matter. The Emperor now demanded either that the

recission of the Order should be laid before him, or that

Bismarck should resign--a demand which the Emperor

communicated to Bismarck through General von Hahnke. The

Chancellor delayed, but at length gave in the resignation on

March 18th. It should be added that already, at the

beginning of February, Bismarck had told the Emperor that he

would retire. Afterwards, however, he declared that he had

thought the position over and would remain--a thing not

agreeable to the Emperor, though he made no remonstrance

until the affair of the Cabinet Order came in addition. The

visit of Windthorst to the Chancellor also gave rise to

unpleasantness, though it was not the deciding factor. In

any case the last three weeks were filled with disagreeable

conversations between the Emperor and the Chancellor. It

was, as the Emperor expressed it, a 'devil of a time,' and

the question was, as the Emperor himself said, whether the

dynasty Bismarck or the dynasty Hohenzollern should reign.

The Emperor spoke very angrily, too, about the article in

the _Hamburg News_. In foreign policy Bismarck, according to

the Emperor, went his own way, and kept back from the

Emperor much of what he did. 'Yes,' he said, 'Bismarck had

it conveyed to St. Petersburg that I wanted to adopt an

anti-Russian policy. But for that,' the Emperor added, 'he

had no proofs.'

"This conversation," concludes Prince Hohenlohe, "between

the Emperor and myself was told partly on the way to the

lodge and partly on the way back. Between came the shooting;

but there was no sport, as the Emperor took his stand in the

dark under a tree on which was a cock that did not 'call.'"

The following further extracts from the Hohenlohe Memoirs are given

rather with the object of showing the state of the political and

social atmosphere in which the quarrel took place than as throwing any

fresh light on its course. In June of the preceding year (1889) occurs

an entry which registers the first signs of the coming storm. Prince

Hohenlohe is telling of a visit he made in June to the Grand Duke of

Baden, whom he found irritated by Bismarck's proposal, made in

connection with the arrest of a Prussian police officer by the Swiss,

to close the frontier against the canton Aargau. The Grand Duke, the

Prince relates, quoted Herbert Bismarck as saying he "could not

understand his father any longer and that people were beginning to

believe he was not right in his head."

The next entry in the Journal is dated Strasburg, August 24th. It

concerns another meeting with the Grand Duke, who now told him that

Bismarck had changed his views and that these oscillations had puzzled

the Emperor and at the same time heightened his self-consciousness;

moreover, that the Emperor noticed that things were being kept back

from him and was becoming suspicious. There had already been a

collision between the Emperor and the Chancellor and the latter might

have to go. What then? Probably the Emperor thought of conducting

foreign policy himself--but that, added the Grand Duke, would be very

dangerous.

The feeling at Court regarding Bismarck's fall is shown by a passage

in the Memoirs about this time. It runs:

"At 1.30 p.m. dinner (at the palace) at which I sat between

Stosch and Kameke. The former told me much about his own

quarrel with Bismarck, and was as gay as a snow-king that he

can now speak freely and that the great man is no longer to

be feared. This comfortable sentiment is obvious here on all

sides."

The anecdote still current in Berlin, that Bismarck actually threw an

inkstand at the Emperor's head is reduced to its proper proportions by

the following entry:

"The Grand Duke of Baden, with whom I was yesterday, knows a

good deal about the recent crisis. He says the cause of the

breach between the Emperor and Chancellor was a question of

power, and that all other differences of opinion about

social legislation and other things were only secondary. The

chief ground was the Cabinet Order of 1852, which Bismarck

pressed on the attention of the Ministers without the

Emperor's knowledge, and so hindered them from going to make

their reports to the Emperor. The Emperor wanted the Order

rescinded, while Bismarck was against it. Nor had the

conversation with Windthorst led to the breach. A talk

between the Emperor and Bismarck about this conversation is

said to have been so tempestuous that the Emperor

subsequently said when describing it, 'He (Bismarck) all but

threw the inkstand at me.'" To Hohenlohe Bismarck said, as

Hohenlohe remarked that the resignation had surprised him,

"Me also," and that three weeks before he did not think

things would end as they had. Bismarck added: "However, it

was to be expected, for the Emperor is now quite determined

to rule alone."

Finally the Prince's Journal has the following:

"Two things struck me in these last three days: one that no

one has any time and every one is in a greater hurry than

before; and secondly, that individualities have expanded.

Every individual is conscious of himself, while before,

under the predominating influence of Prince Bismarck,

individualities shrank and were kept down. Now they are all

swollen like sponges placed in water. That has its

advantages, but also its dangers. The single-minded will is

lacking."

The period between the great Chancellor's fall and his death nine

years later was marked by so many incidents as to make it almost as

_mouvementé_ as the period of the fall itself. He retired to

Friedrichsruh, all the more immediately as the new Chancellor, General

von Caprivi, showed such indecent haste in taking possession of the

official residence that a portion of Bismarck's furniture was broken

and rendered useless. That Bismarck retired with the angry feelings of

a Coriolanus in his heart, or, as Anglo-Saxon slang would have it, of

a "bear with a sore head," became evident only a few weeks later. He

was visited by the inevitable interviewer, and chose the _Hamburg

News_ as the medium of communicating to the world his opinion of the

new _régime_ and the men who were conducting it; and made use of that

paper with such instant vigour and acerbity that little more than two

months from his retirement elapsed before the new Chancellor thought

it advisable to issue instructions to Germany's diplomatic

representatives warning them carefully to distinguish between the

"present sentiments and views of the Duke of Lauenburg and those of

the erstwhile Prince Bismarck," and to pay no serious attention to the

former. Bismarck replied in the _Hamburg News_ that he would not allow

his mouth to be closed, and set about proving that he meant what he

said. Nothing the men of the "new course" could do met with his

approval. The first thing he fell foul of was the Anglo-German

agreement of July 1, 1890, which gave Germany Heligoland in exchange

for Zanzibar, deploring the badness of the bargain for Germany, and

evidently not foreseeing the importance that island's position,

commanding the approaches to the mouths of the Elbe and the Weser, was

afterwards to possess. Besides the friendliness with England, the

detachment of Germany from Russia in favour of Austria, also a feature

of the "new course," did not please him as tending to drive Russia

into the arms of France.

His prescience, however, in this respect was demonstrated when a year

later the Czar saluted a French squadron in the harbour of Cronstadt

to the strains of the "Marseillaise" and signed a secret agreement

that was alluded to four years later by the French Premier, M. Ribot,

in the French Chamber of Deputies, who spoke of Russia as "our ally,"

and was publicly announced in 1897, on the occasion of President Felix

Faure's visit to St. Petersburg, by the Czar's now famous employment

of the words "_deux nations amies et alliées_."

The ex-Chancellor was as little satisfied with the new tariff treaties

entered into by General Caprivi with Austria, Italy, Belgium, and

other countries, which the Emperor, wiser, as events have shown, than

his former Minister, characterized on their passage by Parliament as

the country's "salvation" (_eine rettende Tat_). The ex-Chancellor's

caustic but mistaken criticism was punished by the calculated neglect

of the Berlin authorities to invite him to the ceremonies attending

the celebration of the ninetieth birthday of his old comrade, General

von Moltke, in October, 1890, and that of his funeral in the following

April: still more publicly punished in connexion with the marriage of

his son Herbert.

The wedding of the latter to Countess Marguerite Hoyos was to take

place in Vienna on June 21, 1892, and on the 18th Prince Bismarck

started with his family to attend it. The journey was a species of

triumphal progress to Vienna, but it was to end in disappointment and

chagrin. As the result of representations from Germany, made doubtless

with the Emperor's assent, if not at his suggestion, Bismarck was met

on his arrival with the news that the German Ambassador, Prince Reuss,

and the Embassy staff had orders to absent themselves from the

wedding, that the widow of the Crown Prince Rudolph, who had accepted

a card of invitation to it, had suddenly left Vienna, and that the

Emperor Franz Joseph would not receive him. The German action was

explained by the publication two months later of the edict,

stigmatized by Bismarck as an "Urias Letter," in which Caprivi warned

foreign Governments against attaching any importance to the utterances

of the Duke of Lauenburg. The Bismarckian and anti-Bismarckian storm

came up afresh in Germany. Bismarck was reproached by the Government

as "injuring monarchical feeling," and by his enemies as a traitor to

his country; while the angry statesman published a statement

expressing the opinion that

"the control of private social intercourse abroad, and the

influencing of dinner invitations, were not tasks for which

high officers of State were selected nor public money for

the payment of diplomatic representatives voted":

doubting, at the same time, "if the foreign archives of any other

country than Germany could show a parallel to the incident."

William of Germany · 第 10 / 30 段