1. No necessity nor circumstance supposible whatsoever, can justify the
murder of the righteous or innocent, or vindicate the unlawful taking
away of their lives directly, or indirectly, immediately, or mediately,
which in thought as well as deed we must abhor, as a horrid breach of
the sixth command. The guilt whereof may be incurred several ways; as by
killing them immediately, as Cain did his brother Abel; or commanded
them to be killed, as Saul commanded Doeg to kill the Lord's priests; or
contriving their murder, as David did Uriah's, and Jezabel Naboth's; or
counselling thereunto, as the people advised the princes to the murder
of Jeremiah, and all that cried crucify Jesus were murderers of Christ;
or by procuring it, as Haman was guilty of the intended murder of the
Jews; or concurring therein, as Joab was guilty of Uriah's death as well
as David, and Judas of Christ's by betraying him; or by the patrociny
thereof, defending and sparing the murderers when called, by office, to
punish them, as David was guilty in not punishing Joab, Ahab in
patronizing the murder of Naboth; or by consenting thereunto, as Saul
consented to the death of Stephen; or by knowing and permitting, and
conniving at it, as is condemned, Prov. xxiv. 11, 12. Whether this be
done under colour of law, as Pilate murdered our Lord, Herod killed
James; or without all colour, by absolute power, Herod the Ascalonite
murdered the infants; or whether it be done by purpose, as Joab murdered
Abner and Amasa; or without previous purpose yet with knowledge of the
action in the perpetrating of it, as men may do in passion, when
provoked beside their purpose, or in a tumult, without intending it
beforehand; yet that is murder; Barrabas committed murder in the
insurrection. For, as for casual killing, contrary to intention, without
knowledge, that's no breach of the command. And, whatever may be said of
necessitated delivering up the innocent, pursued by a potent enemy, to
deliver the city from his fury; or of preferring our own life to our
innocent neighbour, in a case when both cannot be preserved, and by
preserving the one lawfully, the other happens to lose his life; I do
not meddle with these cases. But since this is taken for granted by
casuists, I infer, If it be lawful that an innocent man die in case of
necessity, that others may be preserved; then much more is it lawful,
that the nocent, who are guilty of murdering the righteous all these
ways above specified, and actually prosecuting their murdering designs
by these methods, should rather be made to die, than the righteous be
destroyed. But of this sort of murder, taking away the life of the
righteous, none hath the impudence to accuse that reproached people.
2. though a man kill an innocent unwittingly and willingly, besides his
knowledge and against his will; yet he may be guilty of sinful homicide,
if he was obliged to know that he was in hazard of it, and neglected to
consider, lest a man might be killed by what he was doing: as if a man
should shoot at random, when he doth not know but some may be killed
thereby: or if one were hewing with an ax, which he either knew or might
have known to be loose, and the head not well fastened to the helve, did
not advertise those about him of it; if by flying off it happened to
kill any person, he were not innocent, but if he knew not without any
inadvertency, then he were guiltless, Deut. xix. 5. See Durham on 6.
Com. So if a man built a house without battlements, he should bring
blood upon his house, if any man fell from thence, Deut. xxii. 8. But of
this the question is not.
3. Though a person be not altogether innocent, nor to be reckoned among
the righteous; but suppose him wicked and profane, and engaged in an
evil course, dishonourable to God, prejudicial to the church and
kingdom, and very injurious to us; yet it may be murder to kill him, if
he be not guilty of crimes that deserve death by the law of God: for the
life of man is not subjected to the arbitrement of any, but his who is
the author of life and death; it is necessary to all to obey the law,
Thou shalt not kill, without exception, but such killing as is approven
by the author of the law, as saith Ames. De Conscientia, cap. 31. quest.
2. Hence, this people so much reproached with extravagant actions, do
abundantly clear themselves of that imputation of being of the mind to
kill all that differ from them, which was the impudent forgery of the
father of lies, in their informatory vindication, Head 3. 'We positively
disown (say they) as horrid murder, the killing of any because of a
different persuasion or opinion from us, albeit some have invidiously
cast this odious calumny upon us.' And it is as clear, they that took
the oath of abjuration swore a lie, when they abjured the apologetical
declaration, in so far as it is asserted it was lawful to kill all
employed in the king's service, when it asserted no such thing, as is
shewed above Head 3. To think so much, let be to declare it, far more to
practise such a thing against all that served the king, or any merely,
because they served him, or because they are in a wicked course, or
because they have oppressed us, were abominable: for these things simply
do not make men guilty of death, to be punished capitally by men
according to the law of God. But when they are stated in such opposition
to us, and serve the tyrant's murdering mandates by all those ways
above specified; then we may by the law of God and nature and nations,
destroy, slay, and cause to perish, and avenge ourselves on them that
would assault us, and are seeking our destruction: as it was lawful for
the Jews to do with Haman's emissaries, Esth. viii. 11. 13. and ix. 1,
2. 5. This charge then cannot reach the case.
4. Though murderers, and such as are guilty of death by the law of God,
must be punished by death; for, "he that sheddeth man's blood," &c. yet
it may be murder for a man to kill another, because he thought him so
criminal, and because he thought it his duty, being moved by a pretended
enthusiastical impulse, in imitation of the extraordinary actions of
such as were really moved by the Spirit of God. As when James and John
would have commanded fire to come down to consume the Samaritans, the
Lord rebuked them, saying, "Ye know not what manner of spirit ye are of,
for the Son of man is not come to destroy men's lives, but to save
them," Luke ix. 54,--56. Such impulses had need to be well examined, for
ordinarily they will be found not consistent with a gospel spirit, which
is always averse from acts of cruelty. Blind zeal sometimes may incite
men to fearful work: yea the persecutors have often most of that spirit,
as our Lord foretels, "The time cometh, that whosoever killeth you shall
think that he doth God service," John xvi. 2. Paul, in his pharisaical
zeal, breathed out slaughter against the disciples. And Satan can drive
men under several colours, to act such things, as he did the Boors in
Germany, and John of Leyden and his followers, whose practices are
deservedly detested by all that have any spark of Christianity or
humanity: for if this were espoused as a principle, there would be no
security for men's lives. But hence it cannot be concluded, that God may
not animate some to some rare enterprizes, for the cutting off of
tyrants and their bloody emissaries, incendiaries, destroyers of
innocent people, and putting an end to, and stopping the career of
their murders, in a time of real extreme necessity, the matter of the
action being unquestionably lawful, their ends and intentions really
good and commendable, there being also a deficiency of others to do the
work, and themselves in some probable capacity for it. See Jus Popul.
cap. 20. pag. 410. Neither can it be denied, but true zeal may sometimes
incite people to such exploits for the preservation of religion and
liberty, their own lives and brethren, all like to be destroyed by the
impunity of beasts of prey. This will be found very consistent with a
gospel spirit: and though this principle be asserted, and also put in
practice; all persons, notwithstanding thereof would have sufficient
security for their lives, except such as have really forfeited their
lives by all law of God and man. Those that are led by impulses, may
pretend the imitation of extraordinary examples, and abuse them; yet
hence it will not follow, that in no case these extraordinary examples
may be imitated. Shall the examples of good magistrates, executing
justice on idolaters and murderers, be altogether unimitable, because
tyrants abuse them; in persecuting the innocent? If this arguing were
good, it would make all virtuous actions in the world unimitable; for
these may be abused by pretenders. See Jus Popul. ubi supra, pag. 412.
But it cannot be charged upon the sufferers upon this head, that they
had nothing to give as the reasons of their actions, but pretexts of
enthusiasms.
5. Though a man be really so criminal, as that he deserves death by the
law of God and man; yet it may be murder to kill him, if we do not
certainly know it, and can prove it, and convict him of it upon trial:
for no man must be killed not indicted, or the cause unknown. Thus even
magistrates may murder murderers, when they proceed against them without
probation or cognition according to law, far more private persons. Thus
the Abiezrites would have murdered Gideon, not only unjustly, for his
duty of throwing down the altar of Baal, but illegally; because they
would have had him brought out that he might die without any further
trial, Judg. vi. 29, 30. So likewise the Jews that banded and bound
themselves under a curse to kill Paul before he was tried, would have
murdered him, not only unjustly for his duty, but illegally before he
was tried, Acts xxiii. 12. But this doth not condemn the actions of
those sufferers, in maintaining the necessary execution of judgment,
upon persons who are notorious murderers, yea, professing a trade and
prosecuting habitually a tract of continued murdering the people of the
Lord.
6. Though it should be certainly known, and sufficiently proven that a
man is a murderer, &c. yet it were murder for an inferior, under a
relation of subjection to him, to kill him, as long as that subjection
were acknowledged; for, whensoever the common and mutual right or
relation, either natural, moral, civil, or religious, to the prejudice
or scandal of the church, or state, or particular persons, is broken by
killing any person, that is murder, though the person killed deserve to
die. As if a subject should kill an acknowledged king, a son by nature
or in law should kill his natural or legal father, a servant should kill
his master, breaking these relations, while their right and tie were
acknowledged, (as some of them must still be acknowledged as long as the
correlates continue in being, to wit, that of a father is not broken by
his becoming a murderer) and to the danger, detriment, and scandal of
the church and state; that were properly assassination: for assassins
are they, who being subject to others, either out of their own head, for
their own ends, or by command of their superiors, kill their superiors,
or such as they command them to kill, as Alstedius describes them,
Theol. Caf. cap. 18. de homicid. reg. 55. Therefore David would not kill
Saul, because he acknowledged him to be the Lord's anointed, to whom he
was under a relation of subjection, and because he was his master and
father in law, and because it would have tended to the hurt of the
kingdom, and involved it in combustions and contentions about the
succession, and prejudged his own right, as well as to the scandal of
the people of God, though Saul deserved otherwise to be capitally
punished. So Ishbosheth was killed by Baanah and Rechab, 2 Sam. iv. 7.
so Jozachar and Jehozabad, who killed Joash, 2 Kings xii. 21. were
punished as murderers, chap. xiv. 6. because they were his servants, and
did assassinate him to whom they were subject: so the servants of Amon
were punished by the people, as conspirators against their king and
master, 2 Kings xxi. 23, 24. though Amon deserved to have been punished
as well as Amaziah was. Hence generally it is observed by some; that
though right be given to equals or superiors, to bring their nearest
relations to condign punishment, when they turn enticers to idolatry,
Deut. xiii. 6. Yet no right or law, upon any cause or occasion
whatsoever, is given to inferiors, as children, &c. to punish their
fathers. See Pool. Synop. Critic. in locum. However it be, this cannot
condemn the taking off of notorious murderers, by the hand of such as
were no way subject nor related to them; but as enemies, who, in extreme
necessity, executed righteous judgment upon them, without prejudice of
the true, necessary, and chief good of the church and commonwealth, or
of any particular person's just right and security, as Naphtali
qualifies it, pag. 12, 23. first edition.
7. Though the matter of the action were just, and the murderer such a
person as we might punish without any breach of relative obligations, or
duties; yet the manner may aggravate it to some degree of murder; if it
be done secretly, when it may be execute publicly, or suddenly and
precipitantly, when it may be done deliberately, without rushing upon
such an action, or hurrying the murderer to eternity; as this also might
have had some weight with David not to murder Saul secretly and
suddenly in the cave, or when he was sleeping; so Ishbosheth, and Joash,
and Amon were murdered; or if it be done subtilly, when it may be
performed in more plain and fair dealing; or treacherously, under colour
of friendship; or cruelly without regard to humanity; and especially
when the actors are at peace with the person, whose blood they shed, as
Joab shed the blood of war in peace, 1 Kings ii. 5. in killing Abner and
Amasa so craftily and cruelly; and Absalom made his servants assassinate
Amnon, 2 Sam. xiii. 28, 29. But this cannot be changed upon them who
executed righteous judgment, as publicly, deliberately, and calmly, as
the extraordinary exigence of pressing necessity, in extremity of
danger, could allow, upon notorious murderers, with whom they were in
open and avowed terms of hostility.
8. Though the manner also be inculpable; yet if the principle and motive
of killing, even those that deserve to die, be out of malice, hatred,
rage, or revenge, for private or personal injuries, it is murder. For
the affection and intention doth make one and the same action of taking
away the life, homicide or no homicide: Lex Rex faith, Quest. 31. Pag.
338. If a man out of hatred deliberately take away another man's life,
he is in so far a murderer, but if that same man had taken away the
other's life, by the flying off of his ax head, he neither hating him
before, nor intending to hurt him, he is no murderer by God's express
law, allowing cities of refuge for the one, and not for the other, Deut.
iv. 42. Deut. xix. 4, &c. private revenge is indignity to God, whose it
is to take vengeance, Deut. xxxii. 35. Rom. xii. 19. "Dearly beloved
avenge not yourselves, for vengeance is the Lord's." For which cause
Jacob curses Simeon and Levi their murder of the Shechemites: for in
their anger they slew a man, Gen. xlix. 6, 7. So David would not put
forth his hand against Saul, for his own private and personal quarrel.
So Joab killed Abner, and Absalom Amnon. But this doth not make the
execution of judgment, out of zeal for God, respect to righteousness,
love to the nations interest, and care to preserve the persecuted people
of God from imminent destruction, upon public enemies, incendiaries,
that are trampling upon all these precious interests, and threatening
the utter ruin of them, and in a particular manner their destruction who
thus prevent them.
9. Though the motive or cause were upon a public account, yet it may be
murder to have a wrong end in it; as either to intend simply the
destruction of the person on whom they execute judgment, as the end to
which all their action is directed, or to make their own advantage or
honour the end of the action. Thus David would not kill Saul, because it
might have been thought he did it to obtain the kingdom, of which he was
rightful successor: and deservedly he punished the Amalekite, that
brought news of his killing Saul; and Baanah and Rechab, for their
killing Ishbosheth, thinking thereby to advance themselves at David's
court. So also Joab murdered Amasa to secure himself in the general's
place. And Jehu, though upon the matter he executed righteous judgment,
his end was only himself, it is condemned as murder. But when the
execution of righteous judgment is both formally intended by the actors,
and natively and really doth conduce to the glory of God, the
preservation of the remnant threatened to be destroyed by these
murderers, the suppressing of impiety, doing of justice, turning away
wrath and removing of present, and preventing of future judgments, then
it may be duty, Napthtali, pag. 23. first edition.
10. Though the end also were not culpable; yet it may be murder to kill
criminals by transgressing the sphere of our vocation, and usurping upon
the magistrate's sword: for he, by office, is a revenger, to execute
wrath upon him that doth evil, Rom. xiii. 4. none must make use of the
sword of vindictive justice, but he to whom the Lord giveth it;
therefore they that came to take Christ are condemned and threatened for
this, Matth. xxvi. 52. "All they that take the sword, shall perish with
the sword." The God of order hath assigned to every man his station and
calling, within the bounds whereof he should keep, without transgressing
by defect or excess, let every man abide in the same calling wherein he
was called, 1 Cor. vii. 20. and study to be quiet, and do his own
business, 1 Thess. iv. 11. Therefore David would not kill Saul, because
he would have done it beside his calling. And therefore the killing of
Joash and Amon was murder, because the assassins did transgress their
vocation. But when notorious incendiaries do not only transgress their
vocation, but the limits of human society, and turn open enemies to God
and man, destroying the innocent, making havoc of the Lord's heritage,
and vaunting of their villanies, and boasting of their wickedness, and
thereby bringing wrath upon the land if such effrontries of insolence
should pass unpunished, and when there is no magistrate to do that work
of justice, but all in that place are art and part with them, patrons
and defenders of them; yea, no magistrate that can be acknowledged as a
minister of God to be applied unto; in that case, it is not a
transgression of our vocation, nor an usurpation upon the magistrates,
where there is none, to endeavour to avert wrath, by executing righteous
judgment. Otherwise, if for fear, or suspicion of the accidental hazard
of private men's usurping the office, or doing of the duty of public
persons, every virtuous action which may be abused, shall be utterly
neglected, impiety shall quickly gain universal empire, to the
extermination or all goodness, Naphtali, pag. 24. first edition. To
clear this, it must be considered, that a man's calling is twofold; his
particular calling, whereunto in the ordinary course of things he is
regularly confined: and his general calling, not circumscribed by
particular rules, which from the common obligation of the end for which
all callings are institute, in the clear exigence of an extraordinary
emergent, according to the general rules of righteousness, bind to an
agreeable practice; therefore circumstances may sometimes so diversify
actions, that what in the ordinary and undisturbed state of things would
be accounted an excess of our particular calling, and an usurpation, in
an extraordinary occurrence may become a necessary duty of our general
calling.
11. Though it were no usurpation beyond our calling; yet it may be
murder, to kill any without the call of God in a case of necessity,
either in the immediate defence of life, or though it be in the remote
when the hazard is unavoidable. Every thing must have God's call in its
season to make it duty, so also the time of killing, Eccles. iii. 3. For
want of this David would not kill Saul. Lex Rex saith excellently to
this, quest. 31. pag. 329, 330. 'David might have killed Saul when he
was sleeping, and when he cut off the lap of his garment, but it was
unlawful for him to kill the Lord's anointed, as it is unlawful for him
to kill a man because he is the image of God, Gen. ix. 6. except in case
of necessity,----David having Saul in his hand, was in a remote posture
of defence, the unjust invasion then was not actual, nor unavoidable,
nor a necessary mean in human prudence for self preservation; for king
Saul was not in an actual pursuit of the whole princes, elders,
community of Israel: Saul did but seek the life of one man David, and
that not for religion, or a national pretended offence, and therefore he
could not, in conscience, put hands on the Lord's anointed: but if Saul
had actually invaded David for his life, David might, in that case, make
use of Goliah's sword, (for he took not that weapon as a cypher to boast
Saul) and rather kill than be killed.' Thus he. By a call here, we do
not mean an express or immediate call from God, such as the prophets
might have to their extraordinary executions of judgments, as Samuel
and Elijah had to kill Agag and Baal's prophets; but either the
allowance of man, then there is no question about it; or if that cannot
be had, as in the case circumstantiate it cannot, then the providential
and moral call of extreme necessity, for preservation of our lives, and
preventing the murder of our brethren, may warrant an extraordinary
executing of righteous judgment upon the murderers. Men may have a call
to a necessary duty, neither every way mediate nor immediate, as the
call of running together to quench a fire in a city, when magistrates
through wickedness or negligence, will not, or do not, call people forth
unto that work; they have not man's call, nor an immediate call from
heaven, yet they have a lawful call from God; so they do not intrude
upon the magistrates office, nor want they a call to this execution of
judgment, who did materially that work for that exigent which
magistrates, by office, were bound to do, being called thereto by God,
by nature, and the call of inevitable necessity, which knoweth no human
law, and to which some divine positive laws will cede. Jus populi. chap.
20. pag. 423.
12. Though this be a principle of reason and natural justice, when all
the fore mentioned circumstances are clear, that it is lawful for
private persons to execute righteous judgment, upon notorious
incendiaries, and murdering public enemies, in cases of necessity; yet
it might be a sinful breach of the sixth command, to draw extraordinary
examples of it to an ordinary practice in killing all who might be found
criminal, and would deserve death by the law, as all that have served
under a banner of tyranny and violence, displayed against God and his
people, to the ruin of the reformation, wasting of the country,
oppression of many honest families, and destruction of many innocent
people, are and would be found guilty of murder; as the chief captain
would have truly alledged Paul to have been a murderer, if he had been
the Egyptian which made an uproar, and led out four thousand men that
were murderers, Acts xxi. 58. As for the vulgar and ordinary sort of
those vermine of varlets, it is of no advantage for oppressed people to
foul their fingers upon them, when their slaughter would not put a stop
to, but rather increase the destruction of the people of God; and were
unlawful to prevent and anticipate the due and legal execution of
justice, where there is any prospect or expectation of its running in
its right channel. But for the chief and principal ring leaders, and
common public and habitual incendiaries, and masters of the trade of
murdering the Lord's people, when there is no other way of being rid of
their rage, and preserving ourselves, and preventing the destruction of
our brethren, we may in that case of necessity make public examples of
them, in an extraordinary procedure against them, that may be most
answerable to the rules of the ordinary procedure of justice, and in
imitation of the heroic actions recorded and justified in the word of
God, in the like extraordinary cases; which are imitable, when the
matter of their actions is ordinary, that is, neither preternatural nor
supernatural though the occasion was singular, just and necessary, both
by divine precept, and as a mean to good and necessary ends, and when
there is no other to do the work, nor any prospect of access to justice
in its ordinary and orderly course, nor possibility of suspending it
till that can be obtained. We need not then any other call than a spirit
of holy zeal for God, and for our own and our brethrens preservation, in
that pinch of extremity. We do not hold these extraordinary actions for
regular and ordinary precedents, for all times and persons universally:
which if people should fancy, and heed more the glory and fame of the
action, than the sound and solid rule of the scriptures, they may be
tempted and carried to fearful extravagancies. But they may be warrants
for private persons in their doing of these things, in an extreme
necessity, to which at other times they are not called. And when the
Lord, with whom is the residue of the spirit, doth breathe upon his
people, more or fewer, to the exciting of more than ordinary zeal, for
the execution of justice upon such adversaries, we should rather ascribe
glory and praise to him, whose hand is not shortened, but many times
chooseth the weak and foolish things of the world to confound the mighty
and the wise, than condemn his instruments for doing such things, Naph.
pag. 24, 25. prior edit.
All these cases, which are all I can think on at present, comprehending
all that may any way infer the guilt of murder, I have collected; to the
end I may conclude this one argument, and leave it to be considered: If
this extraordinary executing of judgment, upon notorious incendiaries
and murdering public enemies, by private persons, in the circumstances
above declared, cannot be reduced to any case that can infer the guilt
of murder; then it cannot be condemned, but justified; but this
extraordinary executing of judgment, &c. cannot be reduced to any case
that can infer the guilt of murder, (as will appear by the induction of
all of them:) therefore, this extraordinary executing of judgment, &c.
cannot be condemned, but justified.
II. In the next place, What we own may be done warrantably, in taking
away the life of men without breach of the sixth command, will appear by
these propositions and assertions, which will bring the matter to the
present circumstantiate case.
1. It is certain, though the command be indefinitely expressed, it doth
not prohibit all killing, but only that which is condemned in other
explicatory commands. Our Lord Jesus, repeating this command, explains
it by expressing it thus, Matth. xix. 18.--"Thou shalt not murder." And
if any be lawful, it is granted by all, that is, which is unavoidable by
the invincible necessity of providence, when a man following his duty
doth that which beside and contrary his intention, and without any
previous neglect or oversight in him, proveth the hurt and death of
another, in which case he was allowed to flee to the city of refuge by
the law of God. Whence if that physical necessity did justify that kind
of killing, shall not a moral necessity every way inivincibly
unavoidable (except we suffer ourselves and our brethren to be destroyed
by beasts of prey) vindicate this kind, in an extraordinary extremity,
when the murderers are protected under the sconce of pretended
authority? In which case the law of God would allow deliberate murderers
should be pursued by the avenger of blood, and not to have liberty to
flee to these subterfuges and pretexts of authority, (mere tyranny,) but
to be taken from the horns of such altars, and be put to death, as Mr.
Mitchel says in vindicating his own action, in a letter dated Feb. 1674.
2. It is lawful to take the life of known and convicted murderers by
public justice; yea, it is indispensibly necessary by the law of God,
and no mercy nor pardon of the magistrate may interpose to spare them;
for, 'Whoso killeth any person, the murderer shall be put to death by
the mouth of witnesses. '--Ye shall take no satisfaction for the life of
a murderer:--but he shall surely be put to death,' he was not to be
admitted to the benefit of any refuge: and the reason is, 'Blood defiles
the land, and the land cannot be cleansed of the blood that is shed
therein, but by the blood of him that shed it,' Numb. xxxv. 30, 31, 32,
33. Hence, if it be so necessary to cleanse the land, then when the
magistrate is not only negligent in his duty, but turns a patron and
protector of such murderers, and employs them as his emissaries to
murder and destroy, it cannot be expected he should cleanse the land,
for then he should free it of the burden of himself, and begin with
himself: therefore then, there must be more incumbent upon private
persons, touched with the zeal of God, than at another time. And as Mr.
Knox, in his conference with queen Mary, says, 'They that in the fear
of God execute judgment, where God hath commanded, offend not God,
though kings do it not;' and adduces the examples of Samuel killing
Agag, Elias killing the prophets of Baal, and of Phineas killing Zimri
and Cozbi.
3. It is lawful for private persons to kill their unjust assaulters, in
defending themselves against their violence, and that both in the
immediate defence of our life against an immediate assault, in the
instant of the assault, and also in a remote defence of ourselves, when
that is as necessary as the first; and there is no other way of escaping
the destruction intended by murderers, either by flight or resistance;
then it is lawful to preserve ourselves by taking advantages to cut them
off.
4. It is lawful in a just war to kill the enemy; yea in the defensive
war of private subjects, or a part of the commonwealth, against their
oppressing tyrants, as is proven, head 5. Where several of the arguments
used to evince that truth will confirm this; as namely, those arguments
taken from the people's power in reformation, and those taken from the
hazard of partaking of others sin and judgment: for, if all the
magistrates, supreme and subordinate, turn principal patrons and
patterns of all abominations, and persecutors and destroyers of the
people for not complying with them, then the people are not only under
an obligation to resist them; but seeing otherwise they would be liable
to their sin, in suffering them thus to trample on religion, and the
interests of God as well as their own, in order to turn away the wrath
of God, it is incumbent upon them to vindicate religion, and reform the
land from these corruptions, in an endeavour to bring those malignant
enemies of God, and destroyers of the people, to condign punishment,
"that the heads of the people be hanged up before the Lord against the
sun, the fierce anger of the Lord may be turned away from the land,"
Numb. xxv. 4. In this case, as Buchanan says of a tyrant, De jure
regni, 'A lawful war being once undertaken with such an enemy as a
tyrant is, every one out of the whole multitude of mankind may assault,
with all the calamities of war, a tyrant, who is a public enemy, with
whom all good men have a perpetual warfare.' And though the war be not
always actually prosecute in a hostile manner, yet, as long as peace is
not concluded and the war ceased, they that have the just side of the
quarrel may take advantages, in removing and taking off, (not every
single soldier of the contrary side, for that would contribute nothing
to their prevailing in the end) but the principal instruments and
promoters of the war, by whose fall the offending side would suffer
great loss, and the defending would be great gainers. So Jael killing
Sisera, Jabin's captain-general, is greatly commended. Now this was the
case of the sufferers upon this head, as Mr. Mitchel, one of them
represents it in his forecited letter, 'I being (says he) a soldier, not
having laid down my arms, but still upon my own defence, having no other
end or quarrel at any man--besides the prosecution of the ends of the
covenant, particularly the overthrow of prelates and prelacy; and I
being a declared enemy to him (that is Sharp) on that account, and he to
me in like manner, I never found myself obliged--to set a centinel at
his door for his safety; but as he was always to take his advantage, as
it appeareth, so I of him to take any opportunity offered: moreover, we
being in no terms of capitulation, but on the contrary, I, by his
instigation, being excluded from all grace and favour, thought it my
duty to pursue him at all occasions.'
5. It is lawful to kill enemies in the rescue of our brethren, when they
are keeping them in bondage, and reserving them for a sacrifice to the
fury of tyrants, or leading them forth to the slaughter, or in the time
of acting their murdering violence upon them: then, to break prisons,
beat up garrisons, surprise the murderers, and kill them in the rescue
of our innocent brethren, is very lawful, according to that command,
Prov. xxiv. 11, 12. and the practice of Moses, who seeing one of his
brethren suffering wrong, he defended him, and avenged him that was
oppressed, and slew the Egyptian, Acts vii. 24. For that is a certain
truth, which Grotius faith in locum, 'the law of nature gives a right to
an innocent, and to the defender of an innocent person, against the
guilty offender.' Hence, It cannot but be lawful also, in a case of
necessity, when both ourselves and our brethren are pursued incessantly
by destroying murderers, to avenge ourselves on them, and slay them,
when there is no other way to be rid of their violence.
6. It is lawful to prevent the murder of ourselves or our brethren, when
no other way is left, by killing the murderers before they accomplish
their wicked design, if they be habitually prosecuting it, and have many
times accomplished it before. This followeth upon the other; and upon
this account it had been duty for Gedaliah to have suffered Johanan to
slay Ishmael, and so prevent the governor's murder, if it had been
certainly known that Ishmael was sent by the king of Ammon to
assassinate him, Jer. xl. 14, 15. for nothing is there objected against
the lawfulness of the thing, but only it was alledged that he spoke
falsely. Alftedius asserts this, Caf. de homicid. reg. 6. p. 331. It is
lawful to prevent him that would assault us, and by preventing to kill
him before his invasion, if it be so necessary, to prevent him, that our
life cannot be otherwise defended but by preventing. And hence he
justifies that saying, 'It is lawful to kill him that lieth in wait to
murder,' ibid. This is all the length that the reproached sufferers,
whom I am vindicating, go, in asserting this principle, as may be seen
in their Informatory Vindication, Head 3. pag. 544. where they say, 'We
maintain it as both righteous and rational, in defence of our lives,
liberties, and religion, after an orderly and Christian manner, to
endeavour, by all means lawful and possible, to defend ourselves, rescue
our brethren, and prevent their murder, in a martial opposition against
wicked persecutors, who are seeking to destroy them and us, and imbrue
their hands in our blood, according to the true import of the
Apologetical Declaration.' Which is very rational; especially
considering.
7. These murderers, who are thus to be prevented, are such whom the law
of God commands to be put to death, and no where allows to be spared,
being public enemies to God and good men, open blasphemers, avowed
idolaters, affronted adulterers, notorious murderers, habitual tyrants,
suppressing religion, oppressing the innocent, and professing a trade of
destroying the Lord's people. Surely, if God hath expressly in his laws
provided, that blasphemers, idolaters, murderers, &c. should not be
suffered to live, he never intended men daily guilty, yea, making
profession of these crimes, should be allowed impunity, either by virtue
of their office, or because there is none in office to execute judgment
upon them; but in a case of extreme necessity, these laws will not only
allow, but oblige people, daily murdered by them, for their own
preservation, for vindication of religion, for purging the land of such
wickedness, for turning away the wrath of God, to prevent their
prosecuting their murdering designs any further, and put a stop to their
persecution, by putting an end to their wicked lives: seeing, as
Buchanan says, De Jure Regni, it is expresly commanded, 'to cut off
wickedness and wicked men, without any exception of rank or degree; and
yet in no place of sacred scripture are tyrants more spared than private
persons.' Much less their bloody emissaries.
Now, seeing all these cases of killing I have collected, are justifiable
in scripture, and none of the sufferers upon this head, whom I am
vindicating, have exceeded in principle or practice the amount of these
assertions, what is said already may have some weight to demur a
censorious condemnation of them. But as the true nonconformist well
observes, in answer to Dial. 7. p. 391. Seeing the consideration
resulting from the concurrence of all circumstances, whereupon the right
dignoscing of such deeds, when actually existent, doth mostly depend,
doth more contribute to the clearing and passing a judgment on a case of
this nature, when the whole contexture is exposed to certain
examination, than to set down general rules directive of such practices
(which yet will all justify this in question) therefore to clear the
case further, all may be resolved into this state of the question.
'Whether or not private persons, incessantly pursued unto death, and
threatened with ineluctable destruction by tyrants and their emissaries,
may, to save themselves from their violence, in case of extreme
necessity, put forth their hand to execute judgment upon the chief and
principal ringleaders, instruments and promoters of all these
destructive mischiefs and miseries, who are open and avowed enemies to
God, apostates, blasphemers, idolaters, tyrants, traitors, notorious
incendiaries, atrocious murderers, and known and convict to be public
enemies, prosecuting their murdering designs notourly and habitually,
and therefore guilty of death by all laws of God and man; and in such an
extraordinary case, put them to death, who have by law forfeited their
lives to justice, when there is no access to public justice, no prospect
of obtaining it in an orderly way, nor any probability of escaping their
intended destruction, either by flight or resistance, if they be past
longer unpunished; and so deliver themselves from their murdering
tyranny, while they are under no acknowledged subjection to them, nor at
peace with them, but maintaining a defensive resistance against them;
and in this extraordinary execution of justice, being not chargeable
with ignorance of matters of fact so manifest, nor mistakes of
circumstances so palpable, nor with malice, rage or revenge against
their persons for private and particular injuries, nor with enthusiastic
impulses pretended as their rule, nor with deceit or treachery in the
manner, nor with any breach of relation or obligation, nor usurpation
upon or prejudice to any lawful right whatsoever in the matter, nor with
any selfish or sinistrous ends in the design; but forced to perform this
work of judgment, when there is none other to do it, out of zeal for the
glory of God, care of the country's good, love to their brethren, sense
of their own danger, and respect to justice; to the end, that by the
removal of these wicked destroyers, their war against the prevailing
faction of their malignant enemies may be more successfully maintained,
their religion, lives, laws, and liberties more securely defended, their
brethren rescued, their murder prevented, impiety suppressed, the land
cleansed from blood, and the wrath of God averted.' That this is the
true state of the question, the preceeding assertions, all comprehended
here, do make it evident. To which I answer in the affirmative, and
shall come to give my reasons.
Secondly, Then I shall offer some reasons for this, first for some
grounds and hypotheses of reason: then more expresly from
scripture-proofs.
1. There may be some arguments offered from the dictates of natural
reason, which I shall but only glance at.
1. I premit the consideration of the practice of all nations, even such
from whom patterns have been taken for government, and who have had the
most polite and purest policy, and have been the severest animadverters
upon all extravagants and transgressors of their vocation: yet even
among them, for private persons to destroy and rid the commonwealth of
such burdens, and vile vermin so pernicious to it, was thought a virtue
meriting rather commendation, than a thing to be condemned. I shall not
here instance the laudable practices recorded in scripture; these may
be seen in their own place. Neither do I speak of ruder nations, among
whom this is a relict of reason, not of rudeness, as the Oriental
Indians have a custom, whenever any person runs a muck, that is, in a
revengeful fury, takes such a quantity of opium, as distracts them into
such a rage of mad animosity, that they fear not to assault (which is
the common operation of that portion there) and go through destroying
whom they can find in their way: then every man arms against him: and is
ambitious of the honour of first killing him, which is very rational;
for otherwise no man could be safe; and it seems to be as rational, to
take the same course with our mad malignant mucks who are drunk with
hellish fury, and are running in a rage to destroy the people of God
whom they can meet with. But all the nations, where the best policy was
established, have been of his mind. In Greece public rewards were
enacted to be given, and honours appointed for several cities, to those
that should kill tyrants, from the mightiest of them to the meanest;
with whom they thought there was no bond of humanity to be kept. Hence,
Thebe is usually commended for killing her husband, Timoleon for killing
his brother, because they were pernicious and destructive to the
commonwealth: which, though it seem not justifiable, because of the
breach of relation of natural subjection, yet it shews what sentiments
the most politic nations have had of this practice. As also among the
Romans, Cassius is commended for killing his son, and Fulvius for
killing his own son going to Cataline, and Brutus for killing his
kinsmen, having understood they had conspired to introduce tyranny
again. Servilius Ahala is commended for killing even in the court Sep.
Melius, turning his back and refusing to compear in judgment, and for
this was never judged guilty of bloodshed, but thought nobilitate by the
slaughter of a tyrant, and all posterity did affirm the same. Cicero,
speaking of the slaughter of Cesar, stiles it a famous and divine fact,
and put to imitation. Sulpitius Asper, being asked, why he had combined
with others against Nero, and thought to have killed him? made this bold
reply, 'that he knew not any other way to put a stop to his villanies,
and redeem the world from the infection of his example, and the evils
which they groaned under by reason of his crimes.' On the contrary,
Domitius Corbulo is reprehended by all, for neglecting the safety of
mankind, in not putting an end to Nero's cruelty, when he might very
easily have done it: and not only was he by the Romans reprehended, but
by Tyridates the Persian king, being not all afraid lest it should
afterward befal an example unto himself.
When the ministers of Caius Caligula, a most cruel tyrant, were, with
the like cruelty, tumultuating for the slaughter of their master,
requiring them that killed him to be punished, Valerius Asiaticus the
senator cried out aloud, 'I wish I had killed him,' and thereby both
composed their clamour, and stopt their rage. 'For there is so great
force in an honest deed, (saith Buchanan de jure Regni, relating this
passage) that the very lightest shew thereof, being presented to the
minds of men, the most furious assaults are allayed, and fury will
languish, and madness itself must acknowledge the sovereignty of
reason.' The senate of Rome did often approve the fact, tho' done
without their order oftentimes by private hands: as upon the slaughter
of Commodus, instead of revenging it, they decreed that his carcase
should be exposed and torn in pieces. Sometimes they ordered before hand
to have it done; as when they condemned Didimus Julianus, they sent a
tribune to slay him in the palace: nay, they have gone so far, as in
some cases to appoint reward for such as should kill those tyrants that
trampled upon their laws, and murdered virtuous and innocent people; as
that sentence of the senate against the two Maximini doth witness,
Whosoever killeth them deserves a reward. Buchanan as above, rehearsing
many instances of this nature, gives reasons of their approveableness;
and these I find here and there scattered, in his book, de jure Regni,
1. They that make a prey of the commonwealth, are not joined to us by
any civil bond or tie of humanity, but should be accounted the most
capital enemies of God and of all men. 2. They are not to be counted as
within human society, but transgressors of the limits thereof; which
whoso will not enter into, and contain himself within, should be taken
and treated as wolves, or other kinds of noisome beasts, which whosoever
spares, he preserves them to his own destruction, and of others; and
whosoever killeth, doth not only good to himself, but to all others; and
therefore doth merit rather reward than to be condemned for it. For if
any man, divested of humanity, should degenerate into such cruelty, as
he would not meet with other men but for their destruction (as the
monsters I am speaking of, could meet with none of the party here
treated on, but to this effect) he is not to be called a man, no more
than satyrs, apes or bears. 3. It is expressly commanded to cut off
wickedness and wicked men, without any exception of rank or degree; and,
if kings would abandon the counsels of wicked men, and measure their
greatness rather by duties of virtue, than by the impunity of evil
deeds, they would not be grieved for the punishment of tyrants, nor
think that royal majesty is lessened by their destruction, but rather be
glad that it is purged from such a stain of wickedness. 4. What is here
to be reprehended? is it the cause of their punishment? That is
palpable. Is it the law which adjudges them to punishment? All laws were
desired as necessary for repressing tyrants; whosoever doth condemn
this, must likewise condemn all the laws of nations. Is it the person
executing the laws? Where will any other be found to do it in such
circumstances? 5. A lawful war being once undertaken with an enemy for a
just cause, it is lawful not only for the whole people to kill that
enemy, but for every one of them: every one therefore may kill a tyrant,
who is a public enemy, with whom all good men have a perpetual warfare;
meaning, if he be habitually tyrannical, and destructive to the people,
so that there is no living for good people for him; otherwise, though a
man by force or fraud acquire sovereignty, no such violence is to be
done to him, providing he use a moderate way in his government, such as
Vespasian among the Romans, Hiero in Syracuse. 6. Treason cannot be
committed against one who destroys all laws and liberties of the people,
and is a pernicious plague to the commonwealth.
2. Such is the force of this truth in the case of circumstantiate, that
it extorts the acknowledgment of the greatest authors ancient and
modern, domestic and foreign, and even of all rational royalists (as Mr.
Mitchel lays in his postscript to the forecited letter.) That it is
lawful for any private person to kill a tyrant without a title, and to
kill tories or open murderers, as devouring beasts, because the good of
his action doth not only redound to the person himself, but to the whole
commonwealth, and the person acting incurs the danger himself alone.
Tertullian, though a man loyal to excels, says, every man is a soldier
inrolled to bear arms against all traitors and public enemies. The
ancient ecclesiastical historian, Sozomen, relating the death of Julian,
and intimating that he was supposed to have been slain by a Christian
soldier, adds, Let none be so rash as to condemn the person that did it,
considering he was thus courageous in behalf of God and religion, Sozom.
Hist. lib. 6. cap. 2. Barclaius, a great royalist, faith, all antiquity
agrees, that tyrants, as public enemies, may, most justly, be attacked
and slain, not only by the community but also by every individual person
thereof. Grotius de jure belli, lib. i. cap. 4. saith, If any person
grasp at dominion by unjust war, or hath no title thereto by consent of
the community, and no paction is made with him, nor allegiance granted,
but retains possession by violence only, the right of war remains; and
therefore it is lawful to attack him as an enemy, who may be killed by
any man, and that lawfully. Yea, king James VI. in his remonstrance for
the right of kings, says, the public laws make it lawful and free for
any private persons to enterprise against an usurper. Divines say the
same. Chamier, Tom. 2. lib. 15. cap 12. Sect. 19. All subjects have
right to attack tyrants. Alsted. Theolog. Gaf. cap. 17. reg. 9. p. 321.
Any private man may and ought to cut off a tyrant, who is an invader,
without a title; because in a hostile manner he invades his native
country. And, cap. 1. 18. reg. 14. p. 332. 'It is lawful for every
private man to kill a tyrant, who unjustly invades the government. But
Dr. Ames concerning conscience, Book 3. Chap 31. concerning
manslaughter, asserts all that is here pleaded for in express terms,
Quest. 4. Whether or no is it lawful for a man to kill another by his
own private authority? Ans. Sometimes it is lawful to kill, no public
precognition preceeding; but then only, when the cause evidently
requires that it should be done, and public authority cannot be got: For
in that case, a private man is publicly constitute the minister of
justice, as well by the permission of God, as the consent of all men.
These propositions carry such evidence in them, that the authors thought
it superfluous to confirm them, and sufficient to affirm them. And from
any reason that can be adduced to prove any of these assertions, it will
be as evident that this truth I plead for, is thereby confirmed, as that
itself is thereby strengthened: for it will follow natively, if tyrants,
and tyrants without a title, be to be thus dealt with,; then the
monsters, of whom the question is, those notorious incendiaries and
murdering public enemies, are also to be so served: for either these
authors assert the lawfulness of so treating tyrants without a title,
because they are tyrants, or because they want a title. If the first be
said, then all tyrants are to be so served; and reason would say, and
royalists will subscribe, if tyrants that call themselves kings may be
so animadverted upon, because of their perniciousness to the
commonwealth by their usurped authority, then the subordinate firebrands
that are the immediate instruments of that destruction, the inferior
emissaries that act it, and actually accomplish it, in murdering
innocent people, may be so treated; for their persons are not more
sacred than the other, nor more unpunishable. If the second be said, it
is lawful to kill them, because they want a title; then it is either
because they want a pretended title, or because they want a real and
lawful one. The latter is as good as none, and it is proven, Head 2.
Arg. 7. that no tyrants can have any. The former cannot be said, for all
tyrants will pretend some, at least before they be killed.
3. But though some of these great authors neither give their reasons for
what they assert, nor do they extend it to all tyrants that tyrannize by
virtue of their pretended authority, yet it will not be difficult to
prove, that all, great and small, that murder, destroy, and tyrannize
over poor people, are to be punished, though they pretend authority for
what they do. And hence, if all tyrants, murderers and destroyers of
mankind ought to be punished; then when it cannot be done by public
authority, it may be done by private; but all tyrants, murderers and
destroyers of mankind ought to be punished: Therefore--. The minor is
manifest from the general commands of shedding the blood of every man
that sheds it, Gen. ix. 6. of putting to death whosoever killeth any
person, Numb. xxxv. 30, 31. of respecting no man's person in judgment,
Deut. i. 17. And universally all penal laws are general without
exception of any; for under that reduplication of criminal transgressing
those laws, under that general sanction, they are to be judged; which
admits of no partial respect: for if the greatest of men be murderers,
they are not to be considered as great, but as murderers; just as the
meanest are to be considered as mean or poor, but as murderers. But I
need not insist on this, being sufficiently proved, Head 2. Arg. 9. and
throughout that Head, proving that tyrants can have no authority: and,
if they have no authority, then authority (which they have not) cannot
exempt them from punishment. The connexion of the major proposition may
be thus urged: when this judgment cannot be executed by public
authority, either it must be done by private authority, in case of
extreme necessity, or not at all: for there is no medium, but either to
do it by public authority, or private: if not at all, then the land must
remain still defiled with blood, and cannot be cleansed, Numb. xxxv. 33.
Then the fierce anger of the Lord cannot be averted, Numb. xxxv. 4. for
without this executing of judgment, he will not turn it away, Jer. v. 1.
Then must murderers be encouraged, by their impunity, to make havoc of
all according to their lust, besides that poor handful who cannot escape
their prey, as their case is circumstantiate. Besides, this is point
black contrary to these general commands, which say peremptorily, the
murderer shall be put to death; but this supposed case, when public
authority will not or cannot put them to death, says, they shall not be
put to death. In this case then I demand, whether their impunity is
necessary, because they must not be put to death? or because they cannot
be put to death? To say the latter, were an untruth; for private persons
can do it, when they get access, which is possible: if the former, then
it is clearly contradictory to the commands, which say, they must be put
to death, excepting no case, but when they cannot be put to death. If it
be said, they must not be put to death, because the law obliges only
public authority to execute judgment: to this I reply, 1. I trust to
make the contrary appear from scripture by and by. 2. If the law
obliges none but those in public authority to execute judgment, then
when there is no judgment execute, it must be the sin of none but those
in public authority; and if it be only their sin, how comes others to be
threatened and punished for this, that judgment is not executed? If they
must only stand by, and be spectators of their omissions unconcerned,
what shall they do to evite this wrath? shall they exhort them, or
witness against them? But that more than all this is required, is proved
before several times, where this argument of people's being punished for
the sin of their rulers hath been touched. 3. Then when there is no
authority, it must be no sin at all that judgment is not executed,
because it is the sin of none; it cannot be sin, except it be the sin of
some. 4. What if those in public authority be the murderers? Who shall
put them to death? By what authority shall judgment be execute upon
them? Whether public or private? public it cannot be; for there is no
formal public authority above the supreme, who are supposed the party to
be punished; if it be the radical authority of the people, which is the
thing we plead for, then it is but private, as that of one party against
the other: the people are the party grieved, and so cannot be judges: at
best then, this will be extrajudicial executing of judgment. And if the
people may do it upon the greatest of tyrants, then a part of them who
are in greatest hazard may save themselves from those of lesser note, by
putting them to death: for if all the people have right to punish
universal tyrants, because they are destroyers of all; then a part hath
right to punish particular tyrants, because they are destroyers of them,
when they cannot have access to public authority, nor the concurrence of
the whole body.
4. Let these murderers and incendiaries be considered, either as a part
of the community with them whom they murder and destroy, or not; if they
be a part, and do belong to the same community (which is not granted in
this case, yet let it be given) then when the safety of the whole, or
better part, cannot consist with the sparing or preserving of a single
man, especially such an one as prejudges all, and destroys that better
part; he is rather to be cut off, than the whole or the better part be
endangered: for the cutting off of a contagious member that destroys the
rest of the body, is well warranted by nature, because the safety of the
whole is to be preferred to the safety of a part, especially a
destructive part: but now, who shall cut it off? since it must be cut
off, otherwise a greater part of the body will be presently consumed,
and the whole endangered. It is sure the physician's duty; but what if
he will not, or cannot, or there be no physician? then any that can may
and must; yea, one member may, in that case, cut off another. So, when
either the magistrate will not, or dare not, or does not, or there is
none to do this necessary work of justice, for the preservation of the
community; any member of it may rather prevent the destruction of the
whole, or a greater part, by destroying the murdering and destructive
member, than suffer himself and others to be unavoidably destroyed by
his being spared. If they be not within, or belonging to that society,
then they may be dealt with, and carried towards as public enemies and
strangers, and all advantages may be taken of them in cases of
necessity, as men would do, if invaded by Turks or Tartars.
5. Let it be considered, what men might have done in such a case before
government was erected, if there had been some public and notour
murderers still preying upon some sort of men. Certainly then private
persons (as all are in that case) might kill them to prevent future
destruction. Hence, if this was lawful before government was
established, it cannot be unlawful when people cannot have the benefit
of the government, when the government that is, instead of giving
redress to the grieved and oppressed, does allow and impower them to
destroy them: otherwise people might be better without government than
with it; for then they might prevent their murderers by cutting them
off. But so it is that this was lawful before government was
established: for let it be adverted, that the scripture seems to
insinuate such a case before the flood. Cain, after he murdered his
brother, feared that every man that found him should slay him. Gen. iv.
14. If he had reason to fear this, as certainly he had, if the Lord had
not removed that, by prorogueing the execution of vengeance upon him,
for his greater punishment, and the world's more lasting instruction,
and by setting a mark upon him, and inhibiting, under a severe
threatning, any to touch him; then every man that should have killed him
was the magistrate, (which were ridiculous) or every man was every, and
any private person universally, which might have killed him, if this
inhibition had not past upon it. Ainsworth upon the place saith, 'That
among the ancient Romans, every one might kill without a challenge, any
man that was cursed for some public crime.' And cites Dionys.
Halicarnas. l. 2. And so Cain spoke this from a dictate of nature and a
guilty conscience.
6. At the erection of government, though the people resign the formal
power of life and death, and punishing criminals, over to the governor
constitute by them; yet, as they retain the radical power and right
virtually, so when either the magistrates neglect their duty of
vindicating the innocent, and punishing their destroyers, or impower
murderers to prey upon them; in that case, they may resume the exercise
of it, to destroy their destroyers, when there is no other way of
preventing or escaping their destructions; because extreme remedies
ought to be applied to extreme diseases. In an extraordinary exigent,
when Ahab and Jezebel did undo the church of God, Elias, with the
people's help, killed all Baal's priests, against and without the king's
will; in this case, it is evident the people resumed their power, as Lex
Rex saith, quest. 9. p. 63. There must be a court of necessity, no less
than a court of justice, when it is in this extremity, as if they had no
ruler, as that same learned author saith, quest. 24. pag. 213. If then
the people may resume that power in cases of necessity, which they
resigned to the magistrate; then a part may resume it, when a part only
is in that necessity, and all may claim an interest in the resumption,
that had an interest in the resignation.
7. Especially upon the dissolution of a government when people are under
a necessity to revolt from it, and so are reduced to their primitive
liberty, they may then resume all that power they had before the
resignation, and exert it in extraordinary exigents of necessity. If
then a people that have no magistrates at all may take order with their
destroyers then must they have the same power under a lawful revolt. As
the ten tribes, if they had not exceeded in severity against Adoram,
Rehoboam's collector, had just cause to take order with that usurper's
emissary, if he came to oppress them; but if he had come to murder them,
then certainly it was duty to put him to death, and could not be
censured at all, as it is not in the history, 1 Kings xii. 18. But so it
is that the people pursued by these murderers, some of which in their
extreme exigencies they put to death; have for these several years
maintained a declared revolt from the present government, and have
denied all subjection to it upon the grounds vindicated, Head 2. And
there they must be considered as reduced to their primeve liberty, and
their pursuers as their public enemies, to whom they are no otherwise
related than if they were Turks, whom none will deny it lawful to kill,
if they invade the land to destroy the inhabitants.
8. Hence, seeing they are no other than public enemies, unjustly
invading, pursuing, and seeking them to destroy them: what arguments
will prove the lawfulness of resistance, and the necessity of
self-defence, in the immediate defence of life, as well as remote, will
also prove the lawfulness of taking all advantages upon them: for if it
be lawful to kill an enemy in his immediate assault, to prevent his
killing of them, when there is no other way of preserving themselves
from his fury; then it must be lawful also in his remote but still
incessant pursuit, to prevent his murdering them by killing him, when
there is no other way to escape in a case of extreme necessity. But that
this was the case of that poor people, witnesses can best prove it; and
I dare appeal to two sorts of them that know it best, that is, all the
pursuers, and all the pursued.
9. This is founded, and follows upon the 4th article of the Solemn
League and covenant: where we are bound with all faithfulness to
endeavour the discovery, of all such as have been, or shall be
incendiaries, malignants or evil instruments,----that they may be
brought to public trial, and receive condign punishment. Now, as this
obliges to the orderly and ordinary way of prosecuting them when there
is access to public judicatories: so when there is none either this
article obliges to no endeavour at all; (which cannot be, for it is
moral duty to endeavour the punishment of such) or else it must oblige
to this extraordinary action and execution of judgment, if to any at
all. Especially considering, how, in the sense of the short comings of
this duty, it is renewed in the solemn acknowledgement of sins, and
engagement to duties, that we shall be so far from conniving at
malignity, injustice, &c., that we shall----take a more effectual
course, than heretofore, in our respective places and callings, for
punishing and suppressing these evils.----Certainly we were called to
one way of prosecuting this obligation then, when it was first engaged
into, and to another now, when our capacity and circumstances are so
materially and formally altered: if the effectual course then was by
public authority; then now when that is wanting, there must be some
obligation to take some effectual course still, that may suit our
places and callings, which will certainly comprehend this extraordinary
way of suppressing those evils, by preventing their growth in curbing
the instruments, and executing judgment upon them, in a case of extreme
necessity, which will suit with all places, and all callings.