_The Principle of, and Testimony for, Defensive Arms Vindicated._
This truth is of that sort, that can hardly be illustrated by
demonstration; not for the darkness thereof, but for its self-evidencing
clearness, being scarcely capable of any further elucidation, than what
is offered to the rational understanding by its simple proposition. As
first principles can hardly be proven because they need no probation,
and cannot be made clearer than they are, and such as cannot consent to
them, are incapable of conceiving any probation of them; so this truth
of self preservation being lawful, because it is congenite with and
irradicated in every nature, that hath a self which it can preserve, can
scarcely be more illustrated that it may do so, than that it can do so.
And therefore to all who have a true respect to their own, as well as a
due concern in the interest of mankind, and zeal for the interest of
Christ, it might seem superfluous to make a doubt or debate of this:
were it not that a generation of men is now prevailing, that are as
great monsters in nature, as they are malignant in religion, and as
great perverters of the law of nature, as they are subverters of
municipal laws, and everters of the laws of God: who for owning this
principle, as well as using the practice of defensive resistance for
self-preservation against tyrannical violence, have set up such
monuments of rage and cruelty, in the murder of many innocent people, as
was never read nor heard of before. It hath been indeed the practice of
all nations in the world, and the greatest of men have maintained this
principle in all ages; but the bare asserting the principle, when
extorted by severe inquisitions, was never a cause of taking the lives
of any, before this was imposed on the poor sufferers in Scotland, to
give their judgment, whether or not such appearances for defence (as the
tyranny of rulers had forced people to) were rebellion, and a sin
against God, which they could not in conscience assert; and therefore,
though many that have suffered upon this head, have been as free of the
practice of such resistance as any; yet because they would not condemn
the principle, they have been criminally processed, arraigned, and
condemned to the death. And against this truth they have been observed
to have a special kind of indignation, either because the light of it,
which cannot be hid, hath some heat with it to scorch them; or because
they fear the impression of this in the hearts of people more than
others, knowing that they deserve the practical expression of it by the
hands of all. But the reason they give why they are so offended at it,
is, that they look upon it as the spring of all the errors of
presbyterians, and a notion that destroys them; which indeed will be
found to have a necessary connexion with many of the truths that they
contend for this day, as it hath been the necessary method of defending
them. What practices of this kind hath been, and what were the occasions
inducing, or rather enforcing to these defensive resistances, here to be
vindicated as to the principle of them, is manifested in the historical
representation, shewing, that after the whole body of the land was
engaged under the bond of a solemn covenant, several times renewed, to
defend religion and liberty; and in special manner the magistrates of
all ranks, the supreme whereof was formally admitted to the government
upon these terms; he, with his associates, conspiring with the nobles,
to involve the whole land in perjury and apostasy, overturned the whole
covenanted work of reformation; and thereby not only encroached upon the
interest of Christ and the church's privileges, but subverted the
fundamental constitution of the kingdom's government, and pressed all to
a submission unto, and compliance with that tyranny and apostasy,
erected upon the ruins thereof; yet the godly and faithful in the land,
sensible of the indispensible obligation of these covenants, resolved to
adhere thereunto, and suffered long patiently for adherence unto the
same, until being quite wearied by a continued tract of tyrannical
oppressions, arbitrarily enacted by wicked laws, and illegally executed
against their own laws, and cruelly prosecuted even without all colour
of law, in many unheard of barbarities, when there could be no access
for, or success in complaining, or getting redress by law, all petitions
and remonstrances of grievances being declared seditious and
treasonable, and interdicted as such: they were forced to betake
themselves to this last remedy of defensive resistance, intending only
the preservation of their lives, religion and liberties; which many
times hath been blessed with success, and therefore zealously contended
for, as an inadmissible privilege, by all well affected to the cause of
Christ, and interest of their country, because they found it always
countenanced of the Lord; until the cause was betrayed by the treachery,
and abandoned by the cowardice of such, as were more loyal for the
king's interests, than zealous for Christ's and the country's; for which
the Lord in his holy jealousy discountenanced many repeated endeavours
of this nature, cutting us off, and putting us to shame, and would not
go forth with our armies. But because the duty is not to be measured by,
and hath a more fixed rule to be founded upon than providence; therefore
the godly did not only maintain the principle in their confessions and
testimonies, but prosecute the practice in carrying arms, and making use
of them in the defence of the gospel and of themselves, at field
meetings; which were always successfully prosperous, by the power and
presence of God. This question is sufficiently discussed, by our famous
and learned invincible patrons and champions for this excellent
privilege of mankind, the unanswerable authors of Lex Rex, the
Apologetical Relation, Naphtali, and Jus populi vindicatum. But because
it is easy to add to what is found, I shall subjoin my mite; and their
arguments being various and voluminously prosecute, and scattered at
large through their books, I shall endeavour to collect a compend of
them in some order. The two first speak of a defensive war, managed in a
parliamentary way: and the two last, of resistance against the abuse of
a lawful power, when there is no access to maintain religion and liberty
any other way; which does not come up so close to our case, nor is an
antithesis to the assertions of our adversaries, who say, that it is no
ways lawful, in any case, or upon any pretence whatsoever, to resist the
sovereign power of a nation, in whomsoever it be resident, or which way
soever it be erected. I shall consider it more complexly and
extensively, and plead both for resistance against the abuse of a lawful
power, and against the use and usurpation of a tyrannical power, and
infer not only the lawfulness of resisting kings, when they abuse their
power (as is demonstrate unanswerably by these authors) but the
expediency and necessity of the duty of resisting this tyrannical power,
whensoever we are in a capacity, if we would not be found treacherous
covenant-breakers, and betrayers of the interest of God, and the
liberties of the nation, and of our brethren, together with the
posterity, into the hands of this popish and implacable enemy, and so
bring on us the curse of Meroz, and the curse of our brethren's blood,
crying for vengeance on the heads of the shedders thereof, and upon all,
who being in case, came not to their rescue; and the curse of posterity,
for not transmitting that reformation and liberty, whereof we were by
the valour of our forefathers put and left in possession. I shall not
therefore restrict myself to the state of the question, as propounded
ordinarily, to wit, Whether or not, when a covenanted king doth really
injure, oppress and invade his subjects civil and religious rights, or
unavoidably threatens to deprive their dearest and nearest liberties,
and sends out his emissaries with armed violence against them; and when
all redress to be had, or hope by any address or petition, is rendered
void or inaccessible, yea addressing interdicted under severe penalties,
as treasonable; then, and in that case, may a community of these
subjects defend themselves, and their religion and liberties, by arms,
in resisting his bloody emissaries? But, to bring it home to our present
case, and answer the laxness of the adversaries position of the
uncontroulableness of every one that wears a crown, I shall state it
thus: Whether or not is it a necessary duty for a community (whether
they have the concurrence of the primores or nobles, or not) to
endeavour, in the defence of their lives, religion, laws and liberties,
to resist and repress the usurpation and tyranny of prevailing
dominators, using or abusing their power for subverting religion,
invading the liberties, and overturning the fundamental laws of their
country? I hold the affirmative, and shall essay to prove it, by the
same arguments that conclude this question, as usually stated; which
will more than evince the justifiableness of the sufferings upon this
head. In prosecuting of this subject, I shall first premit some
concessory considerations to clear it. And secondly, bring reasons to
prove it.
First, For clearing of this truth, and taking off mistakes, these
concessions may be considered.
1. The ordinance of magistracy, which is of God, is not to be resisted,
no, not so much as by disobedience or non obedience, nay, not so much as
mentally, by cursing in the heart, Eccles. x. 20. but a person clothed
therewith, abusing his power, may be in so far resisted. But tyrants, or
magistrates turning tyrants, are not God's ordinance; and there is no
hazard of damnation, for refusing to obey their unjust commands, but
rather the hazard of that is in walking willingly after the commandment,
when the statutes of Omri are kept. So that what is objected from Eccl.
viii. 2-4. "I counsel thee to keep the king's commandment," &c. is
answered on Head II. and is to be understood only of the lawful commands
of lawful kings.
2. Rebellion is a damnable sin, except where the word is taken in a lax
sense, as Israel is said to have rebelled against Rehoboam, and Hezekiah
against Sennacherib, which was a good rebellion, and clear duty, being
taken there for resistance and revolt. In that sense indeed some of our
risings in arms might be called rebellion; for it is lawful to rebel
against tyrants. But because the word is usually taken in an evil sense,
therefore it would have been offensive to acknowledge that before the
inquisitors, except it had been explained. But rebellion against lawful
magistrates, is a damnable sin, exemplarily punished in Korah and his
company, who rebelled against Moses; and in Sheba and Absalom, who
rebelled against David. For to punish the just is not good, nor to
strike princes for equity, Prov. xvii. 26. and they that resist shall
receive to themselves damnation, Rom. xiii. 2. So that this objection
brought from this place, as if the apostle were commanding their
subjection without resistance to Nero, and such tyrants; as it is very
impertinent, it is fully answered above, Head II. Here it will be
sufficient to reply, 1. He is hereby vindicating Christianity from that
reproach, of casting off or refusing subjection to magistrates for
conscience sake in general. And it is very considerable, what Buchanan
says in his book de juri regni, that Paul did not write to the kings
themselves, because they were not Christians, and therefore the more
might be born with from them, though they should not understand the duty
of magistrates; but imagine, that there had been some Christian king who
had turned tyrant and apostate, 'to the scandal of religion: what would
he have written then? Sure if he had been like himself, he would have
denied that he should be owned for a king, and would have interdicted
all Christians communion with him, and that they should account him no
king, but such as they were to have no fellowship with, according to the
law of the gospel.' 2. He speaks of lawful rulers here, not tyrants, but
of all such as are defined and qualified here, being powers ordained of
God, terrors to evil works, ministers of God for good. Yea, but say
prelates, and their malignant adherents, these are only motives of
subjection to all powers, not qualifications of the powers. I answer,
they are indeed motives, but such as can be extended to none but to
these powers that are so qualified. 3. He speaks of lawful powers
indefinitely in the plural number, not specifying any kind or degree of
them, as if only kings and emperors were here meant. It cannot be
proven, that the power of the sword is only in them. Neither was there a
plurality of kings or emperors at Rome to be subject to: if he meant the
Roman emperor, he would have designed him in the singular number. All
the reasons of the text agree to inferior judges also, for they are
ordained of God, they are called rulers in scripture, and God's
ministers, revengers by office, who judge not for man, but for the Lord:
and inferior magistrates also are not to be resisted, when doing their
duty, 1 Pet. ii. 13. yet all will grant, when they go beyond their
bounds, and turn little tyrants, they may be withstood. 4. He does not
speak of Nero, concerning whom it cannot be proven, that at this time he
had the soverereign power as the learned Mr. Prin shews: or if he had,
that he was a tyrant at this time; and if he meant him at all, it was
only as he was obliged to be by right, nor as he was in deed. All men
know, and none condemns the fact of the senate, that resisted Nero at
length, without transgressing this precept. Yea I should rather think,
the senate is the power that the apostle applies this text to, if he
applied it to any in particular. 5. The subjection here required, is the
same with the honour in the fifth command, whereof this is an
exposition, and is opposite to the contraordinateness here condemned.
Now, subjection takes in all the duties we owe to magistrates, and
resistance all the contraries forbidden; but unlimited obedience is not
here required: so neither unlimited subjection.
3. We may allow passive subjection in some cases, even to tyrants, when
the Lord lays on that yoke, and in effect says, he will have us to lie
under it a while, as he commanded the Jews to be subject to
Nebuchadnezzar: of which passage, adduced to prove subjection to tyrants
universally, Buchanan, as above, infers, that if all tyrants be to be
subjected to, because God by his prophet commanded his people to be
subject to one tyrant; then it must be likewise concluded, that all
tyrants ought, to be killed, because Ahab's house was commanded to be
destroyed by Jehu. But passive subjection, when people are not in
capacity to resist, is necessary. I do not say passive obedience, which
is a mere chimera, invented in the brains of such sycophants, as would
make the world slaves to tyrants. Whosoever suffereth, if he can shun
it, is an enemy to his own being: for every natural thing must strive to
preserve itself against what annoyeth it; and also he sins against the
order of God, who in vain hath ordained so many lawful means for
preservation of our being, if we must suffer it to be destroyed, having
power to help it.
4. We abhor all war of subjects, professedly declared against a lawful
king, as such; all war against lawful authority, founded upon, or
designed for maintaining principles inconsistent with government, or
against policy and piety; yea, all war without authority. Yet, when all
authority of magistrates, supreme and subordinate, is perverted and
abused, contrary to the ends thereof, to the oppressing of the people,
and overturning of their laws and liberties, people must not suspend
their resistance upon the concurrence of men of authority, and forbear
the duty in case of necessity, because they have not the peers or nobles
to lead them: for if the ground be lawful, the call clear, the necessity
cogent, the capacity probable, they that have the law of nature, the law
of God, and the fundamental laws of the land on their side, cannot want
authority though they may want parliaments to espouse their quarrel.
This is cleared above, Head 2. yet here I shall add, 1. The people have
this privilege of nature, to defend themselves and their rights and
liberties, as well as peers; and had it, before they erected and
constituted peers or nobles. There is no distinction of quality in
interests of nature, though there be in civil order: but self defence is
not an act of civil order. In such interests, people must not depend
upon the priority of their superiors, nor suspend the duties they owe to
themselves and their neighbours, upon the manuduction of other mens
greatness. The law of nature allowing self-defence, or the defence of
our brethren, against unjust violence, addeth no such restriction, that
it must only be done by the conduit or concurrence of the nobles or
parliaments. 2. The people have as great interest to defend their
religion as the peers, and more, because they have more souls to care
for than they, who are fewer. And to be violented in their consciences,
which are as free to them as to the peers, is as insupportable to them:
yea, both are equally concerned to maintain truth, and rescue their
brethren suffering for it, which are the chief grounds of war; and if
the ground of the defensive war be the same with them and without them,
what reason can be given, making their resistance in one case lawful,
and not in the other? Both are alike obliged to concur, and both are
equally, obnoxious to God's threatened judgments, for suffering religion
to be ruined, and not relieving and rescuing innocents. It will be but
a poor excuse for people to plead, they had no peers to head them. What
if both king and nobles turn enemies to religion, (as they are at this
day) shall people do nothing for the defence of it then? Many times the
Lord hath begun a work of reformation by foolish things, and hath made
the least of the flock to draw them out, Jer. xlix. 2. and l. 45. and
did not think fit to begin with nobles, but began it, when powers and
peers were in opposition to it; and when he blessed it so at length, as
to engage the public representatives to own it, what was done by private
persons before, they never condemned. 3. The people are injured without
the nobles, therefore they may resist without them, if they be able: for
there can be no argument adduced, to make it unlawful to do it with
them. 4. It is true the nobles are obliged beyond others, and have
authority more than others to concur; but separately they cannot act as
representatives judicially: they have a magistratical power, but limited
to their particular precincts where they have interest, and cannot
extend it beyond these bounds; and so if they should concur, they are
still in the capacity of subjects; for out of a parliamentary capacity
they are not representatives. 5. All the power they can have is
cumulative, not privative; for the worse condition of a ruler ought not
to be by procuring. Why then shall the representatives, betraying their
trust, wrong the cause of the people, whose trustees they are? Nay, if
it were not lawful for people to defend their religion, lives, and
liberties without the concurrence of parliaments, then their case should
be worse with them than without them; for they have done it before they
had them, and so they had better be without them still. 6. People may
defend themselves against the tyranny of a parliament, or primores, or
nobles: therefore, they may do it without them; for if it be lawful to
resist them, it is lawful to wave them, when they are in a conspiracy
with the king against them.
5. We disallow all war without real undeclinable necessity, and great
and grievous wrongs sustained: and do not maintain it is to be declared
or undertaken upon supposed grounds, or pretended causes: and so the
question is impertinently stated by our adversaries, 'Whether or not it
be lawful for subjects, or a party of them, when they think themselves
injured, or to be in a capacity, to resist or oppose the supreme power
of a nation.' For the question is not, if when they think themselves
injured they may resist? But when the injuries are real: neither is it
every reality of injuries will justify their resistance, but when their
dearest and nearest liberties are invaded, especially when such an
invasion is made, as threatens ineluctable subversion of them. Next, we
do not say, That a party's esteeming themselves in a capacity, or their
being really in a capacity, doth make resistance a duty; except, all
alike, they have a call as well as a capacity, which requires real
necessity, and a right to the action, and the things contended for to be
real and legal rights, really and illegally encroached upon: their
capacity gives them only a conveniency to go about the duty, that is,
previously lawful upon a moral ground. No man needs to say, Who shall be
judge? the magistrate or people? For, 1. All who have eyes in their head
may judge whether the sun shine or not; and all who have common sense
may judge in this case. For when it comes to a necessity of resistance,
it is to be supposed, that the grievances complained of, and sought to
be redressed by arms, are not hid, but manifest; it cannot be so with
any party only pretending their suffering wrong. 2. There is no need of
the formality of a judge, in things evident to nature's eye, as grassant
tyranny undermining and overturning religion and liberty must be.
Nature, in the acts of necessitated ressistance, in such a case, is
judge, party, accuser, witness, and all. Neither is it an act of
judgment, for people to defend their own: defence is no act of
jurisdiction, but a privilege of nature. Hence, these common sayings,
all laws permit force to be repelled by force; and the law of nature
allows self defence: the defence of life is necessary, and flows from
the law of nature. 3. Be judge who will, the tyrant cannot be judge in
the case: for, in these tyrannical acts, that force the people to that
resistance, he cannot be acknowledged as king, and therefore no judge:
for it is supposed, the judge is absent, when he is the party that does
the wrong. And he that does the wrong, as such, is inferior to the
innocent. 4. Let God be judge, and all the world, taking cognizance of
the evidence of their respective manifestos of the state of their cause.
6. We condemn rising to revenge private injuries; whereby the land may
be involved in blood for some petty wrongs done to some persons, great
or small; and abhor revengeful usurping of the magistrate's sword, to
avenge ourselves for personal injuries. As David's killing of Saul would
have been, 1 Sam. xxiv. 10. 12. 13, 1 Sam. xxvi. 9, 10. To object which,
in this case, were very impertinent: for it would have been an act of
offence in a remote defence: if Saul had been immediately assaulting
him, it could not be denied to be lawful: and it would have been an act
of private revenge for a personal injury, and a sinful preventing of
God's promise of David's succession, by a scandalous assassination. But
it is clear, then David was resisting him, and that is enough for us;
and he supposes he might descend into battle, and perish, 1 Sam. xxvi.
10. not excluding, but that he might perish in battle against himself
resisting him. We are commanded indeed not to resist evil, but whosoever
shall smite us on the one cheek, to turn to him the other also, Matth.
v. 39. and to recompence to no man evil for evil, Rom. xii. 17. But this
doth not condemn self defence, or resisting tyrants violently,
endangering our lives, laws, religion, and liberties, but only
resistance by way of private revenge and retaliation, and enjoin
patience, when the clear call and dispensation do inevitably call unto
suffering; but not to give way to all violence and sacrilege, to the
subverting of religion and righteousness. These texts do no more condemn
private persons retaliating the magistrate, than magistrates retaliating
private persons, unless magistrates be exempted from this precept, and
consequently be not among Christ's followers: yea, they do no more
forbid private persons, to resist the unjust violence of magistrates,
than to resist the unjust violence of private persons. That objection
from our Lord's reproving Peter, Matth. xxvi. 52. Put up thy sword, for
all they that take the sword, shall perish by the sword, hath no weight
here: for this condemns only making use of the sword, either by way of
private revenge, or usurping the use of it without authority, (and so
condemns all tyrants) which private subjects do not want to defend
themselves, their religion and liberty; or using it without necessity,
which was not in Peter's case, both because Christ was able to defend
himself, and because he was willing to deliver up himself. Pool's
Synops. Critic. in Locum. Christ could easily have defended himself, but
he would not; and therefore there was no necessity for Peter's rashness;
it condemns also a rash precipitating and preventing the call of God to
acts of resistance; but otherwise it is plain, it was not Peter's fault
to defend his master, but a necessary duty. The reason, our Lord gives
for that inhibition at that time, was twofold; one expressed Matth.
xixvi. 52. For they that take the sword, &c. Which do not belong to
Peter, as if Peter were hereby threatened; but to those that were coming
to take Christ, they usurped the sword of tyranical violence, and
therefore are threatened with destruction, by the sword of the Romans:
so is that commination to be understood of antichrist, and the tyrants
that serve him, Rev. xiii. 13. He that killeth with the sword must be
killed with the sword, which is a terrible word against persecutors. The
reason is, John xviii. 11.----The cup which my Father hath given me,
shall I not drink? Which clearly refels that objection of Christ's
non-resistance. To which it is answered, That suffering was the end of
his voluntary suscepted humiliation, and his errand to the world,
appointed by the Father, and undertaken by himself, which is not our
practice: though it be true, that even in his sufferings he left us an
ensample that we should follow his steps, 1 Pet. ii. 21. In many things,
as he was a martyr, his sufferings were the purest rule and example for
us to follow, both for the matter, and frame of spirit, submission,
patience, constancy, meekness, &c. but not as he was our sponsor, and
after the same manner, for then it were unlawful for us to flee, as well
as to resist, because he would not flee at that time.
7. As we are not for rising in arms for trifles of our own things, or
small injuries done to ourselves, but in a case of necessity for the
preservation of our lives, religion, laws, and liberties, when all that
are dear to us, as men and as Christians, are in hazard: so we are not
for rising up in arms, to force the magistrates to be of our religion,
but to defend our religion against his force. We do not think it the way
that Christ hath appointed, to propagate religion by arms: let
persecutors and limbs of antichrist take that to them; but we think it a
privilege which Christ hath allowed us to defend and preserve our
religion by arms: especially, when it hath been established by the laws
of the land, and become a land right, and the dearest and most precious
right and interest we have to contend for. It is true faith Christ, John
xviii. 36. 'My kingdom is not of this world; if my kingdom were of this
world, then would my servants fight that I should not be delivered to
the Jews.' But this objection will not conclude, that Christ's kingdom
is not to be defended and preserved by resistance, of all that would
impiously and sacrilegiously spoil us of it in this world, because it is
not of this world: for then all were obliged to suffer it to be run
down, by slaves of hell and satan, and antichrist's vassals, papists and
malignants: yea, magistrates were not to fight for it, for they are
among his servants, if they be Christians. But the good confession he
witnesses here before Pilate, is, that he hath a kingdom, which, as it
is not in opposition to any cesarean majesty; so it must not be usurped
upon by any king of clay, but is specially distinct from all the
kingdoms of the world, and subordinate to no earthly power, being of a
spiritual nature; whereof this is a demonstration, and sufficient
security for earthly kingdoms, that his servants, as such, that is, as
Christians, and as ministers, were not appointed by him to propagate it
by arms, nor to deliver him their king at that time, because he would
not suffer his glorious design of redemption to be any longer retarded:
but this doth not say, but though they are not to propagate it as
Christians, and as ministers, by carnal weapons, yet they may preserve
it with such weapons as men. Hence that old saying may be vindicated,
prayers and tears are the arms of the church. I grant they are so, the
only best prevailing arms, and without which all others would be
ineffectual, and that they (together with preaching and church
discipline, &c.) are the only ecclesiastical or spiritual arms of a
church as a church; but the members thereof are also men, and as men
they may use the same weapons that others do, and ye my flock, the flock
of my pasture, are men, saith the Lord, Ezek. xxxiii. 31. Yea, from this
I shall take an argument; if it be lawful for private subjects, without
the concurrence of parliaments, to resist a tyrant by prayers and tears;
then it is lawful also to resist him by violence, but the former is
true, as our adversaries grant by this objection, and I have proved it
to be duty to pray against tyrants, Head 2. Ergo--. The connection is
founded upon these reasons, 1. This personal resistance by violence, is
as consistent with that command, Rom. xiii. 1. 2. 'Let every soul be
subject unto the higher powers--whosoever therefore resisteth the power,
resisteth the ordinance of God;' as resistance by prayer is with that, 1
Tim. ii. 1, 2. I exhort--that--supplications--be made--for kings, and
for all that are in authority. If the prince be good, the one is as
unlawful as the other; and a sinful resistance of the ordinance of God
(to pray against him) no less than the other (to fight against him.)
Therefore when he becomes a tyrant, and destroyer of the Lord's
inheritance, and an apostate, as I may not pray for him except
conditionally, but against him as an enemy of Christ; so I may also
fight against him as such. 2. As adversaries themselves will grant, that
resistance by prayers and tears is more powerful and effectual than the
other; so the laws of the land make the one treasonable as well as the
other; and that deservedly, when the prince is doing his duty; but when
he turneth tyrant, neither can justly be condemned.
These things being permitted, I shall come shortly to the purpose, and
endeavour to prove this truth, That it is a necessary duty for a
community (whether they have the concurrence of the primores, nobles,
and representatives or not) to endeavour, in the defence of their
religion, lives, laws, and liberties, to resist and repress the
usurpation and tyranny of prevailing dominators, using or abusing their
power, for subverting religion, invading the liberties, and overturning
the fundamental laws of the country. Wherein I shall be but short,
because this truth is sufficiently confirmed by all the arguments of the
second head; yet I may only hint at many others, and prosecute them in
this order. First, I shall produce some arguments from the law of nature
and nations. 2dly, From the common practice of all Christian people.
3dly, From express scriptures.
I. The arguments of the first class are very multifarious: I shall
reduce them to a few, as compendiously as may be, and only give the
strength of them in a syllogistical form, without expatiating, save
where the matter requires.
1. The great antagonists of this truth, through the clearness thereof,
are forced to assert and grant such particulars, as will by consequence
justify this plea. 1. Barclay contra Monarchum, is cited by the Apol.
Relat. and Jus Populi asserting 'That if a king will alienate and
subject his kingdom, without his subjects consent, or be carried with a
hostile mind to the destruction of his people, his kingdom is actually
lost, and the people may not only lawfully resist, but also depose him.'
Grotius de jure belli, lib. 1. cap. 4. asserts the same, and adds, 'If
he but attempt to do so he may be resisted.' The surveyor of Naphtali
grants the same, pag. 23, 24. Yea, this hath been granted in open court,
by the council of Scotland, That in case of the king's alienating his
kingdoms he may be resisted. Hence, 1. If vendition or alienation of
kingdoms, or attempts of it, do annul a king's authority, then an
alienation of them from Christ, to whom they are devoted by covenant,
and selling to antichrist, as is attempted by this king, gives the
people a right to resist him; but the former is here conceded:
Ergo--(2.) We need say no more to apply the other, that carrying a
hostile mind to the destruction of the people does forfeit his kingdom,
and gives the people right to resist, than that a papist is always known
to carry a hostile mind to the destruction of protestants, and all the
designs declared these 27 years have been demonstrative efforts of it.
2. Dr. Ferne acknowledgeth, 'That personal defence is lawful against the
sudden, illegal, and inevitable assaults of the king's messengers, or
of himself, in so far as to ward off his blows, or hold his hands. As
also, he alloweth private persons liberty to deny subsidies and tribute
to the prince, when he employeth it to the destruction of the
commonwealth.' Hence, (1.) If one may defend himself against the sudden,
illegal, and inevitable assaults of the king or his messengers; then may
many men, in defence of their lives and liberties, defend themselves
against the surprising massacres, the sudden assaults, and much more the
devised and deliberate assaults of a tyrant's bloody emissaries, which
are illegal and inevitable, as all their furious and bloody onsets have
been; but the former is here allowed: therefore,--3. Bodin de Repub.
lib. 2. cap. 5. granteth, 'If a king turn tyrant, he may lawfully, at
his subjects request, be invaded, resisted, condemned, or slain by a
foreign prince.' Hence, if foreign princes may lawfully help a people
oppressed by their own sovereign; then people may resist themselves, if
they be able and hold in their pains; but the former is here granted:
therefore----The consequence cannot be denied, for foreigners have no
more power or authority over another sovereign, than the people have
themselves. 4. Arnisaeus de Author. Princip. c. 2. n. 10. granteth, 'That
if the prince proceed extrajudicially, without order of law, by
violence, every private man hath power to resist.' So the surveyor of
Naphtali, as above, 'Grants so much of a woman's violent resisting
attempts against the honour of her chastity, and tending to ensnare her
in sin, whereof, her non-resistance makes her guilty.' Hence, (1.) If
every extrajudicial violence of a prince may be resisted; then also all
contrajudicial violence against law or reason must be opposed, for that
is more grievous, and all their violences, wherein they do not act as
judges, must be resisted, and that is all together, for in none of them
they can act as judges; but the former is here granted: therefore--2.
If a woman may defend her chastity against the king, lest her
non-resistance make her guilty, (oh, if all women had been of this mind,
the country would not have been pestered so with the king's bastards);
then may a nation, or any part of it, resist a tyrant's attempt upon the
honour of their religion, enticing them to fornication with the mother
of harlots, lest their non-resistance make them guilty; but the former
is here yielded: therefore,--5. That same Arnisaeus, cap. 4. saith, 'Of
the former (to wit, he who is called a tyrant in title) it is determined
by all without any difficulty, that he may be lawfully repulsed, or if
by force he be gotten into the throne, he may warrantably be thence
removed, because he hath not any jot of power which is not illegitimate,
and unto which resistance is forbidden for the fear of God and for
conscience sake, and therefore he is no further to be looked at than as
an enemy.' This is so pat and pertinent to the present possessor of the
government, that no words can more particularly apply it. 6. Grotius de
jure belli, lib. 1. cap. 4. granteth, the law of not resisting does not
bind when the danger is most weighty and certain, 'And we do not plead
for it in any other case.' And further he says, 'The law of
non-resistance seemeth to have flowed from them, who first combined
together into society, and from whom such as did command did derive
their power: now, if it had been asked of such, whether they would
choose to die, rather than in any case to resist the superior by arms? I
know not if they would have yielded thereto, unless with this addition,
if they could not be resisted but with the greatest perturbation of the
commonwealth, and destruction of many innocents. And afterwards he hath
these words, nevertheless I scarce dare condemn every one or the lesser
part, which may only be done at utmost extremity, notwithstanding
respect is to be had to the common good.' From which we need make no
inference, the concession is so large, that it answers our case. 7. The
surveyor of Naphtali, in the place above cited, 'Grants legal
self-defence against the sovereign, by way of plea in court, for safety
of a man's person or estate,--as also is the case of most habited,
notour and complete tyranny against law, to the destruction of the body
of a people, and of all known legal liberties, and the being of religion
according to law.--And in case of his not being in his natural and right
wits.'--Hence, (1.) If it be lawful to resist the king by a plea in law,
for an estate, (yea the law will allow), by actual force, if he come to
take possession of it illegally: then it must be lawful for their lives
and estates, liberties and religion, to resist him by force, when the
legal resistance is not admitted; but the former is yielded here:
therefore.--The reason of the connexion is, the municipal law permits
the one, and the law of nature and nations (which no municipal law can
infringe) will warrant the other: he hath no more right to be both judge
and party in this case, more than in the other: and he can no more act
as a sovereign in this case, than in the other. (2.) If it be lawful to
resist habited, notour, and complete tyranny against law, to the
destruction of the body of a people, and of all known legal liberties,
and the being of religion, according to law: then we desire no more to
conclude the duty of resisting this tyranny exercised this 27 years
habitually, which the desolation of many hundred families, the
banishment of many hundreds to slavery, the rivers of blood, &c. have
made notour to all Scotland at least, and the perversion of all the
fundamental laws, and all civil and religious liberties, yea the
subversion of every remaining model of our religion, as reformed and
covenanted to be preserved, in doctrine, worship, discipline and
government, and designs to introduce popery and establish arbitrary
government, have made complete; but the former is here granted:
therefore--3. If in case of his being out of his wits, he should run
upon an innocent man to kill him, or attempt to cut his own throat, it
were then lawful to resist him, yea, a sin not to do it; then when in a
rage, or deliberately, he is seeking to destroy many hundreds of the
people of God, he may be resisted; but the former is clear: therefore--.
4. King James the VI. in his remonstance for the right of kings, against
the oration of Cardinal Perron, hath these words, The public laws make
it lawful, and free for any private person, to enterprize against an
usurper of the kingdom. Then shall it not be duty, to enterprize against
a man, who by the laws of the land is not capable of a right to reign,
who hath got into the throne by the means of murder, and can pretend no
right but that of succession, which I proved to be, none, Head 2.
However, we see by these concessions of adversaries, that the absolute
subjection they talk of will not hold, nor the prerogative be so
uncontroulable in every case, as they would pretend, and that in many
cases, the safety of the people hath the supremacy above it; and that
also in these cases the people must be judges, whether they may resist
or not.
2. From the law of nature I may argue, 1. If God, the fountain of all
power, and author of all right, hath given unto man both the power and
the right, of, and reason to manage self-defence, and hath noways
interdicted it in his word to be put forth against tyrants; then it is
duty to use it against them upon occasion; but the former is true:
therefore,--2. If this power and right were restrained in man against
the unjust violence of any, it would either be by policy, or grace, or
some express prohibition in the word of God; but none of these can be
said: therefore.--Policy cannot destroy nature, but is rather cumulative
to it; a man entering into a politic incorporation, does not lose the
privilege of nature: if one particular nature may defend itself against
destroying violence out of society, then must many of these natures
combined in society have the same right, and so much the more that their
relative duties super-add an obligation of mutual assistance. Grace does
not restrain the right of sinless nature, though it restrains
corruption: but self-defence is no corruption: Grace makes a man more a
man than he was. And nothing can be more dishonourable to the gospel,
than that by the law of nature it is lawful to resist tyrants, but we
are bound by religion from withstanding their cruelty: the laws of God
do not interfere one with another. 3. That law which alloweth
comparative re-offending, so as to kill rather than be killed, teacheth
resistance: but so the law of nature alloweth, except we be guilty of
murder in the culpable omission of self defence. The reason is, because
the love of self is nearer and greater, as to temporal life, than the
love of our neighbour: that being the measure of this: therefore it
obliges rather to kill than be killed, the exigence of necessity so
requiring. 4. If nature put no difference between the violence of a
tyrant than of another man: then it teaches to resist both alike: but it
putteth no difference, but rather aggravates that of a tyrant; being the
violence of a man, the injustice of a member of the commonwealth, and
the cruelty of a tyrant. And it were absurd to say, we might defend
ourselves from the lesser violence, and not from the greater. 5. If
particular nature must yield to the good of universal nature; then must
one man, though in greatest power, be resisted, rather than the
universal commonwealth suffer hurt: but the former is true; for that
dictates the necessity of the distracted father to be bound by his own
sons, lest all the family be hurt: Ergo the greatest of men or kings,
when destructive to the commonwealth, must be resisted; for he is but
one man, and so but particular nature. 6. That which is irrational, and
reflects upon Providence, as putting men in a worse condition than
brutes, is absurd and contrary to the law of nature: but to say, that
the brutes have power to defend themselves by resisting what annoys
them, and deny this power to men, is irrational and reflects upon
Providence, as putting men in a worse condition than brutes: therefore
it is absurd, and contrary to the law of nature.
3. From the institution of government I may argue thus: that power and
government which is not of God may be resisted: the tyrants power and
government, in overturning laws, subverting religion, bringing in
idolatry, oppressing subjects, is not of God: Ergo it may be resisted:
the major is clear, because that is only the reason why he is not to be
resisted, because the ordinance of God is not to be resisted, Rom. xiii.
2. But they that resist a man destroying all the interests of mankind,
overturning laws, subverting religion, &c. do not resist the ordinance
of God. And if it were not so, this would tend irremedilessly to
overthrow all policies, and open a gap to all disorder, injustice, and
cruelty, and would give as great encouragement to tyrants to do what
they list, as thieves would be encouraged, if they knew nobody would
resist them or bring them to punishment.
4. From the original constitution of government by men, it may be argued
thus: if people at the first erection of government acted rationally,
and did not put themselves in a worse case than before, wherein it was
lawful to defend themselves against all injuries, but devolved their
rights upon the fiduciary tutory of such, as should remain still in the
rank of men, that can do wrong, who had no power but by their gift,
consent, and choice, with whom they associated not to their detriment
but for their advantage, and determined the form of their government,
and time of its continuance, and in what cases they might recur to their
primeve liberty, and settled a succession to have course not _jure
hereditario_ but _jure et vi legis_, for good ends; then they did not
give away their birth-right of self-defence, and power of resistance,
which they had before to withstand the violence, injuries, and
oppressions of the men they set over them, when they pervert the form
and convert it to tyranny, but did retain a power and privilege to
resist and revolt from them, and repel their violence when they should
do violence to the constitution, and pervert the ends thereof: but the
former is true. Ergo--the minor is cleared, Head. 2. And the connexion
is confirmed from this; if the estates of a kingdom give the power to a
king, it is their own power in the fountain, and if they give it for
their own good, they have power to judge when it is used against
themselves, and for their evil; and so power to limit and resist the
power that they gave.
5. From the way and manner of erecting governors by compact, the
necessity whereof is proven Head 2. Many arguments might be deduced; I
shall reduce them to this form: If people must propose conditions unto
princes, to be by them acquiesced in and submitted unto at their
admission to the government, which thereupon becomes the fundamental
laws of the government, and securities for the people's rights and
liberties, giving a law claim to the people to pursue the prince, in
case of failing in the main and principal thing covenanted, as their own
covenanted mandatarius who hath no jus or authority of his own, but what
he hath from them, and no more power but what is contained in the
conditions, upon which he undertaketh the government; Then when either
an usurper will come under no such conditions, or a tyrant doth break
all these conditions, which he once accepted, and so become stricto jure
no prince, and the people be stricto jure liberated from subjection to
him, they may and must defend themselves and their fundamental rights
and privileges, religion and laws, and resist the tyranny overturning
them: but the former is true, Ergo--The connexion is clear: and the
minor is proved Head 2. And at length demonstrated and applied to the
government of Charles the Second by Jus Populi. cap. 6. See Arg. 4, 5.
Head 2.
6. From the nature of magistracy it may be argued thus, That power which
is properly neither parental, nor marital, nor masterly and despotic,
over the subjects, persons, and goods, but only fiduciary, and by way of
trust, is more to be resisted than that which is properly so; but that
power which is properly so, that is parental power, and marital, and
masterly, may be resisted in many cases; Therefore, that power which is
not so properly, but only fiduciary is more to be resisted. That a
king's power over his subjects, is neither parental, nor marital, &c. is
proven Head 2. And the major needs no probation. The minor is clear by
instances, 1. If children may, in case of necessity, resist the fury of
their father, seeking to destroy them; then must private subjects resist
the rage and tyranny of princes, seeking to destroy them, and what is
dearest to them; for there is no stricter obligation moral between king
and people, than between parents and children, nor so strict; and
between tyrants and people there is none at all; but the former cannot
be denied: Therefore,--2. If wives may lawfully defend themselves
against the unjust violence of enraged husbands; then must private
subjects have power to resist the furious assaults of enraged tyrants,
for there is not so great a tye betwixt them and people, as between man
and wife; yea there is none at all; but the former is true: Ergo,--3. If
servants may defend themselves against their masters; then must private
subjects defend themselves against a tyrant or his emissaries; but the
former is true: Ergo,--4. If the king's power be only fiduciary, and by
way of pawn, which he hath got to keep; then when that power is
manifestly abused, to the hurt of them that intrusted him with it, he
ought to be resisted by all whom he undertook to protect; but the
former is true: Therefore the latter.
7. From the limited power of princes it may be thus argued: If princes
be limited by laws and contracts, and may be resisted by pleas in law,
and have no absolute power to do and command what they will, but must be
limited both by the laws of God and man, and cannot make what laws they
will in prejudice of the people's rights, nor execute the laws made
according to their pleasure, nor confer on others a lawless licence to
oppress whom they please; then when they turn tyrants, and arrogate a
lawless absoluteness, and cross the rules, and transgress the bounds
prescribed by God's laws, and man's laws, and make their own lusts a
law, and execute the same arbitrarily, they must be resisted by force,
when a legal resistance cannot be had, in defence of religion and
liberty; but all princes are limited, &c. Therefore,--The minor is
proved, Head 2. And the connexion may be thus confirmed in short: That
power which is not the ordinance of God may be resisted; but an absolute
illimited power, crossing the rules, and transgressing the bounds
prescribed by God's law and man's, is not the ordinance of God;
Therefore it may be resisted.
8. Further from the rule of government, it may be argued several ways,
1. That power which is contrary to law, evil and tyrannical, can ty none
to subjection, but if it oblige to any thing, it ties to resistance; but
the power of a king against law, religion, and the interests of the
subjects, is a power contrary to law, evil and tyrannical:
Therefore,--The major is plain, for wickedness can ty no man, but to
resist it; that power which is contrary to law, evil and tyrannical is
wickedness. 2. That power, and those acts, which neither king can
exercise; nor command, nor others execute, nor any obey, must certainly
be resisted: but such is the power and acts that oppress the subjects,
and overturn religion and liberty; Therefore--The minor is evident from
scriptures condemning oppression and violence, both in them that
command, and in them that execute the same, and also them that obey such
wicked commands. The major is clear from reason; both because such power
and such acts as cannot be commanded, cannot be executed, cannot be
obeyed lawfully, are sinful and wicked: and because it cannot be a
magistratical power, for that may always be exercised and executed
lawfully. And what a man cannot command, the resisting of that he cannot
punish; but acts of oppression against law, religion, and liberty, a man
cannot command; Ergo, the resisting of these he cannot punish. 3. That
government of administration, which is not subordinate to the law and
will of God, who hath appointed it, must be resisted; but that
government or administration, which undermines or overturns religion and
liberty, is not subordinate to the law and will of God; Therefore--The
major is clear; for nothing but what is the ordinance of God,
subordinate to his law and will, is irresistible, Rom. xiii. 2. The
assumption is undeniable.
9. From the ends of government, which must be acknowledged by all to be
the glory of God, and the good of mankind; yea, all that have been
either wise or honest, have always held that the safety of the people is
the supreme law. The argument may run thus, in short, 1. That doctrine
which makes the Holy One to cross his own ends in giving governors, must
be absurd and unchristian as well as irrational; but such is the
doctrine that makes all kings and tyrants irresistible upon any pretence
whatsoever: Ergo--The minor I prove: That doctrine which makes God
intending his own glory and the people's good, to give governors both as
fathers to preserve, and as murderers to destroy them, must make the
Holy One to cross his own ends; for these are contradictory; but the
doctrine that makes all kings and tyrants irresistible, &c. is such:
for, by office, they are fathers to preserve, and, by office also, they
must be murderers, vested with such a power from God, by the first act,
if they be irresistible when they do so; seeing every power that is
irresistible is the ordinance of God. Hence also when a blessing turns a
curse, it is no more the ordinance of God, but to be resisted; but when
a king turns a tyrant, overturning religion and liberty, then a blessing
turns a curse: Therefore--2. Means are to be resisted, when they are not
useful for, but destructive to the ends they were appointed for; but
governors overturning religion and liberty, are means not useful for,
but destructive to the ends for which they were appointed; seeing then
they are neither for the glory of God, nor the good of mankind:
Therefore--3. If all powers and prerogatives of men are only means
appointed for, and should vail unto the supreme law of the people's
safety, and all laws be subordinate to, and corroborative of this law,
and when cross to it are in so far null, and no laws, and all law
formalities in competition with it are to be laid aside, and all
parliamentary privileges must yield to this, and king and parliament
both conspiring have no power against it; and no sovereign power, by
virtue of any resignation from the people can comprize any authority to
act against it; then it is duty to obey this supreme law, in resisting
all powers and prerogatives, all laws, and law formalities, and all
conspiracies whatsoever against this supreme law, the safety of the
people; but the former is true, as was proven Head 2. Therefore--4. That
power which is obliged, and appointed to command and rule justly and
religiously, for the good of the people, and is only set over them on
these conditions, and for that end, cannot ty them to subjection without
resistance, when the power is abused to the destruction of laws,
religion and people; but all power is so obliged and appointed:
therefore, whensoever it is so abused, it cannot ty people to
subjection, but rather oblige them to rejection of it.
10. From the obedience required to government, it may be argued thus. 1.
If we may flee from tyrants, then we may resist them; but we may flee
from tyrants: therefore we may resist them. The connexion I prove, (1.)
If all grounds of justice will warrant the one as well as the other,
then if the one be duty, so is the other; but the former is true; for
the same justice and equity that warrants declining a tyrant's unjust
violence by flight, will warrant resistance when flight will not do it;
the same principle of self-defence, that makes flight duty, when
resistance is not possible, will also make resistance duty, when flight
is not possible; the same principle of charity to wives and children,
that makes flight lawful, when by resistance they cannot avoid tyranny,
will make resistance duty, when by flight they cannot evite it; the same
principle of conscience to keep religion free, that prompts to flight,
when resistance will not save it, will also prompt to resist it, when
flight is not practicable. (2.) If to flee from a just power, when in
justice we are obnoxious to its sword, be to resist the ordinance of
God, and so sin: then to flee from an unjust power, must be also a
resisting of the abusing of it, and so duty, for the one is resistance
as well as the other; but the difference of the power resisted makes the
one lawful; the other not. Again, if royal power may be resisted by
interposing seas and miles, why not also by interposing walls and arms?
Both is resistance, for against a lawful magistrate that would be
resistance. (3.) If a tyrant hath irresistible power to kill and destroy
the people, he hath also irresistible power to cite and summon them
before him; and if it be unlawful to resist his murders, it must be as
unlawful to resist his summons. (4.) For a church or community of
Christians, persecuted for religion, to flee with wives and children,
strong and weak, old and young, to escape tyrannical violence, and
leave the land, were more unlawful than to resist; for what is not
possible as a natural means of preservation is not a lawful mean; but
this were not a possible mean: neither is it warranted in nature's law,
or God's word, for a community or society of Christians, that have God's
right and man's law to the land, and the covenanted privileges thereof,
to leave the country and cause of Christ, and all in the hands of a
tyrant and papist, to set up idolatry upon the ruins of reformation
there. A private man may flee, but flight is not warranted of them as of
a private single man. 2. If it be duty to disobey, it is duty to resist
tyrants, in defence of religion and liberty; but it is duty to disobey
them: Therefore--The connection only will be struck at, which is thus
strengthened: If subjection be no more pressed in scripture than
obedience, then if non-obedience be duty, non-subjection must be so
also, and consequently resistance; but subjection is no more pressed in
scripture than obedience; for all commands of subjection to the higher
powers, as God's ministers, under pain of damnation, do only respect
lawful magistrates, and in lawful things, and do include obedience: and
non-obedience to the power so qualified is a resisting of the ordinance
of God, as well as non-subjection. If then obedience to magistrates be
duty, and non-obedience sin, and obedience to tyrants sin, and
non-obedience duty; then by parity of reason, subjection to magistrates
is duty, and non-subjection is sin, and also subjection to tyrants is
sin, and non-subjection duty.
11. From the resistance allowed in all governments, it may be argued
thus; if it be duty to defend our religion, lives and liberties, against
an invading army of cut-throat papists, Turks or Tartars, without or
against the magistrates warrant; then it must be duty to defend the same
against invading home-bred tyrants, except we would subscribe ourselves
home-born slaves: but the former is true; therefore--The minor cannot
be doubted, because the magistrates power cannot be privative and
destructive to defence of our religion, lives and liberties; nor can it
take away nature's birth-right to defend these, or make it fare the
worse, than if we had no magistrates at all. Now, if we had no
magistrates at all, we might defend these against invaders; and whether
we have magistrates or not, we are under moral obligations of the law of
God to endeavour the defence of these: but this needs not be insisted
on. The connexion of the proposition is clear; if princes be more
tyrannical in invading religion and liberties themselves, than in
suffering others to do it, or hindering them to be opposed: and if their
invasion be more tyrannical, hurtful and dangerous, than the invasion of
strangers, then if it be duty to resist strangers invading their
interests, it is more duty to resist home-bred tyrants invading the
same; but the former is true: therefore the latter. Resisting in the one
case is no more resisting the ordinance of God than in the other.