[Illustration: U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR · March 3, 1849]
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
Stewart L. Udall, _Secretary_
NATIONAL PARK SERVICE
Conrad L. Wirth, _Director_
_HISTORICAL HANDBOOK NUMBER FOURTEEN_
This publication is one of a series of handbooks describing the
historical and archeological areas in the National Park System,
administered by the National Park Service of the United States
Department of the Interior. It is printed by the Government Printing
Office and may be purchased from the Superintendent of Documents,
Washington 25, D. C. Price 25 cents
YORKTOWN
and the Siege of 1781
_by Charles E. Hatch, Jr._
[Illustration: Quill pen, inkwell, and paper]
NATIONAL PARK SERVICE HISTORICAL HANDBOOK SERIES No. 14
Washington, D. C., 1954 (Revised 1957)
_The National Park System, of which Colonial National Historical Park is
a unit, is dedicated to conserving the scenic, scientific, and historic
heritage of the United States for the benefit and inspiration of its
people._
[Illustration: NATIONAL PARK SERVICE · DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR]
_Contents_
_Page_
THE VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN 1
Battle of Green Spring 6
The British Move to Yorktown 7
SIEGE OF YORKTOWN 9
Strategy of the Siege 9
Battle of the Virginia Capes 11
Assembly of the Allied Armies 15
Investment of Yorktown 18
British Position 18
Opening of the Siege 21
Gloucester Side 22
First Allied Siege Line 23
Second Allied Siege Line 25
Capture of Redoubts No. 9 and No. 10 25
Last Days of the Siege 27
Negotiation and Surrender 30
The Sequel 31
THE “TOWN OF YORK” 32
GUIDE TO THE AREA 39
Battlefield Tour 40
“Town of York” 47
HOW TO REACH YORKTOWN 50
COLONIAL PARKWAY 51
ABOUT YOUR VISIT 51
ADMINISTRATION 52
CLOSELY RELATED AREAS 52
SUGGESTED READINGS 53
Appendix 1—CORNWALLIS’ PAROLE 55
Appendix 2—ARTICLES OF CAPITULATION 56
[Illustration: _The reconstructed Grand French Battery—a strong link
in the First Allied Siege Line._]
[Illustration: Colonial home]
_On the level fields outside the small colonial village of Yorktown
occurred one of the great decisive battles of world history and one of
the most momentous events in American history. Here, on October 19,
1781, after a prolonged siege, Lord Cornwallis surrendered his British
Army to an allied French and American Army force under George
Washington, virtually ending the American Revolution and assuring
American independence. While hostilities did not formally end until 2
years later—on September 3, 1783, when the treaty was signed—in reality
the dramatic victory at Yorktown had ended forever the subservience of
the American colonies to England. Because of this victory the United
States became truly a free and independent nation._
_The Virginia Campaign_
At Yorktown, in the early autumn of 1781, Gen. George Washington, ably
assisted by the Count de Rochambeau of the French Army and supported by
the Count de Grasse of the French Navy, forced the capitulation of
Lieutenant General Earl Cornwallis. On October 19, the allied French and
American forces accepted the surrender of the British troops in what was
the climax of the last major British field operation of the American
Revolution—the Virginia Campaign.
The early campaigns, except the decisive repulse of British arms in the
Carolinas in 1776, were fought mostly in the New England and Middle
Atlantic colonies. After 1778, most activity was to the south. In 1780
and early 1781, Lord Cornwallis led his victorious British Army out of
Charleston and through the Carolinas; not, however, without feeling the
effective use of American arms at Kings Mountain (October 7, 1780) and
at Cowpens (January 17, 1781). On March 15, 1781, he was at Guilford
Courthouse in north-central North Carolina and there Gen. Nathanael
Greene accepted his challenge to battle.
The battle of Guilford Courthouse was a British victory which left the
victor weakened to the extent that he was unable to capitalize on his
success. Cornwallis’ loss in officers and men was so heavy that his army
was “crippled beyond measure.” In April, he decided to move to
Wilmington, N. C., on the coast, for the avowed purpose of recruiting
and refitting his exhausted force. Thus the stage was set for the final
campaign of the war.
Cornwallis’ next move changed the strategy of the Southern Campaign. He
did not believe himself strong enough for field action out of Wilmington
and declined to return to Charleston and South Carolina. According to
his own statement, “I was most firmly persuaded, that, _until_ Virginia
was reduced, we could not hold the more southern provinces, and that
after its reduction, they would fall without much difficulty.” He made
this decision alone, and Commanding General Sir Henry Clinton in New
York never approved. On April 25, he marched from Wilmington, reaching
Petersburg, Va., on May 20, where he formed a junction with Gen. William
Phillips who commanded the British forces already in the State.
By this time there was already a considerable concentration of troops in
Virginia. Gen. Alexander Leslie had been sent there with a detachment of
troops in October 1780, but he had gone on to join Cornwallis in South
Carolina. Shortly thereafter, another British force under Benedict
Arnold was sent to operate in the area. To contain Arnold’s force, or at
least to watch it, Washington had dispatched the Marquis de Lafayette to
Virginia to work in conjunction with the Baron von Steuben, and later
with Greene. Clinton then countered by sending Phillips with a large
detachment to join Arnold. As a result of these and other moves, but by
no prearranged plan, the stage was set in May 1781, for Virginia to be
the battleground. From the British point of view the subjugation of the
province was the tempting prize. For the Americans, the goal was to
prevent this, and prevent it they did. The strategy of Yorktown was in
the making, but had not yet taken form.
Cornwallis, leading a reasonably well-supplied and able field force of
more than 5,300 troops, was opposed by Lafayette, commanding a small
force not strong enough to risk battle. Lafayette had been ordered by
Greene to remain in Virginia, take command of the troops there, and
defend the State. Even though Lafayette expected reinforcements from the
Pennsylvania Line under Gen. Anthony Wayne, it would not give him battle
strength or even enable him to resist seriously the progress of the
enemy. Consequently, the young general’s first move was to apply in
every direction for more men and supplies.
In the meantime, Cornwallis prepared to force the issue. He selected his
field force and dispatched the remaining units to the British base at
Portsmouth. After assuring the commander there that he would reinforce
him further should a French fleet appear in Chesapeake Bay, he put his
army in motion toward that of Lafayette. On May 24, he reached a point
on the James River opposite Westover, about 24 miles below Richmond, and
began to cross the river. At this point General Leslie arrived with
reinforcements, further augmenting British strength. With these men,
Cornwallis planned first to dislodge Lafayette from Richmond and then to
employ his light troops in the destruction of magazines and stores
destined for use by American forces in Virginia and farther south.
[Illustration: _The Marquis de Lafayette (Gilbert du Mortier)
commanded a division of Continental troops at Yorktown._]
Lafayette, with his small army of about 3,250 men, did not attempt a
stand at Richmond, but withdrew northward. The role of this youthful
commander was “that of a terrier baiting a bull.” He had a heavy
responsibility and was faced by an experienced commander in the person
of Cornwallis. In the weeks that followed, Lafayette distinguished
himself. He continually repeated a series of harassing, threatening,
feinting, and retiring tactics. He retreated, usually northward, always
maintaining a position higher up the river and nearer the Potomac, thus
insuring that Cornwallis would not get between him and Philadelphia.
While encamped in Hanover County, Cornwallis learned that Wayne was only
a few days away from a junction with Lafayette. Consequently, he
hesitated to move further from his base at Portsmouth, but decided on a
quick dash westward before withdrawing. With this in mind he dispatched
Banastre Tarleton to Charlottesville to break up the Virginia
Legislature then in session—a move that disrupted the assembly and might
have led to the capture of Governor Jefferson but for the ride of Capt.
“Jack” (John) Jouett to warn him—a ride which is reminiscent of the
better-known ride of Paul Revere. At the same time, Cornwallis sent
Simcoe to harass Von Steuben who was then at Point-of-Fork on the James
River. Von Steuben withdrew, but Simcoe was able to destroy a quantity
of arms, powder, and supplies, which had been assembled there, before he
rejoined Cornwallis.
About June 15, with the season hot, his troops tired, and Lafayette
still evading him, Cornwallis decided that it was time to return to the
coast. He had accomplished as much as possible in the destruction of
supplies, he had found no great body of Loyalists to join him, and his
opponent was gaining strength daily. He moved east through Richmond and
proceeded down the Peninsula toward Williamsburg. Lafayette followed,
venturing closer to him all the while.
On June 10, Wayne joined the American force with 1,000 men, and 2 days
later Col. William Campbell—one of the famous American leaders at Kings
Mountain—provided an additional 600 “mountain men.” On the 19th, Von
Steuben appeared with his detachment. These reinforcements made
Lafayette’s corps strong enough for more aggressive action. His strength
was now about 4,500, but heavily weighted with untrained militia and
short of arms, artillery, and cavalry.
[Illustration: _Lieutenant General Earl Cornwallis, Commander of the
British forces which surrendered at Yorktown._]
On June 26, there was “a smart action” at “Hot Water Plantation”
(Spencer’s Ordinary), 7 miles northeast of Williamsburg, where Col.
Richard Butler with a detachment of the Pennsylvania Line engaged
Simcoe’s Queen’s Rangers. Following this, the British Army came to a
halt at Williamsburg, sending out patrols to various points on the York
and James Rivers, including Yorktown.
[Illustration: THE VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN OF 1781]
By this time, the controversy, or misunderstanding, between Cornwallis,
in Virginia, and Clinton, his superior, in New York, which involved
matters of strategy, the theater of operations, and troop deployment,
began to shape the direction of affairs in Virginia. Cornwallis received
instructions to take a defensive station at Williamsburg, or Yorktown,
reserve the troops needed for his protection, and send the remainder of
his army by transport to New York to help Clinton in the siege that he
expected there. In the execution of these orders Cornwallis readied his
army for a move across the James (a move for which Clinton severely
criticized him) and a march towards Portsmouth, where he could direct
the dispatch of troops to New York.
BATTLE OF GREEN SPRING.
On July 4, Cornwallis broke camp at Williamsburg and moved toward
Jamestown Island, the most convenient point for crossing the James. He
sent some troops immediately across the river, but ordered the bulk of
the army to encamp on the “Main” a little beyond Glasshouse Point,
within sight of Jamestown, as a precaution in the event Lafayette should
attempt to hinder the crossing.
Cornwallis was right—Lafayette did intend to strike the British at this
unfavorable moment. On July 6, Wayne, commanding the American advance
unit, made his way slowly toward the British encampment. Lafayette,
cautious and not wanting to be deceived about the enemy strength, went
with him to make personal observations. The young general quickly
decided that Cornwallis was laying a trap, as indeed he was, but before
he could call in his scouts and advance units, action had been joined.
Wayne, with only about 800 men and 3 field pieces, came face to face
with the major part of the British Army. To halt the advancing enemy,
Wayne called for a charge against a seemingly overwhelming force—a brave
and daring action by a leader already marked as a man of courage. Both
American and British troops fought well, but the charge stopped the
British advance momentarily. At this point Wayne called for a retreat,
which was effected with reasonable success. Marshy terrain and the
approach of darkness prevented effective pursuit by Cornwallis’ units.
The British losses, killed and wounded, apparently numbered about 70
rank and file and 5 officers. American losses approached 140 killed,
wounded, and missing.
The engagement at Green Spring, sometimes called the “Affair Near James
Island,” was a direct prelude to the struggle at Yorktown. The same
forces later faced each other over the parapets on the York. Actual
military victory, as at Guilford Courthouse, rested with the British.
The most significant result of the encounter, however, may have been the
stimulating effect on the Americans of the bravery and courage displayed
by soldiers and officers alike. It was another good test of training and
discipline—a detachment of American troops had confronted Cornwallis’
main force and again they had fought well.
THE BRITISH MOVE TO YORKTOWN.
Following the action at Green Spring, Cornwallis continued his move
across the James River, and, on July 17, he was able to report by letter
to Clinton that the troops which the latter had requested were about
ready to sail from Portsmouth. Three days later, Cornwallis learned that
all plans had been drastically changed. Clinton now instructed him to
hold all of his troops and await further orders. More detailed
instructions reached Cornwallis on July 21, including strong words about
the necessity for holding a position on the peninsula—the area between
the York and James Rivers. Clinton, it seems, now thought that Yorktown
was a good location for a naval station, offering protection for large
and small ships—a vital necessity.
In compliance with his new orders, Cornwallis ordered a careful survey
of Old Point Comfort and Hampton Roads to find the best location for
such a naval station. This was done by Lt. Alexander Sutherland, of the
Royal Engineers, who recommended against Old Point Comfort, which had
been mentioned at length in the more recent correspondence between the
British commanders in Virginia and New York as a possible location for a
base to replace Portsmouth. Cornwallis wrote to Clinton: “This being the
case, I shall, in obedience to the spirit of your Excellency’s orders,
take measures with as much dispatch as possible, to seize and fortify
York and Gloucester, being the only harbour in which we can hope to be
able to give effectual protection to line of battle ships. I shall,
likewise, use all the expedition in my power to evacuate Portsmouth and
the posts belonging to it....”
Having stated his intentions, Cornwallis began to take action. On July
30, the British transports, loaded with about 4,500 men, left Portsmouth
and set sail for Yorktown, where they arrived on the night of August 1.
On August 2, landings were made at both Yorktown and Gloucester.
Banastre Tarleton, with his men and horses, crossed Hampton Roads in
small boats and proceeded to Yorktown by road, arriving on August 7. By
the 22d, the detachment which remained at Portsmouth to level the works
completed its assignment and joined the main army. The construction of
defenses was begun immediately at Yorktown and Gloucester, a job that
Cornwallis estimated would require 6 weeks. On August 31, one of the
British soldiers wrote from “Camp Yorktown” that “Nothing but hard
labour goes on here at present in constructing & making Batteries
towards the River, & Redoubts toward the Land.” Actually, the siege of
Yorktown began before this task was completed.
[Illustration: STRATEGY OF THE SIEGE]
—Cornwallis entrenched with an army of approximately 7,500 (British,
German, and American Loyalist forces).
—About 4,500 troops with Lafayette, including over 3,000 militia under
Thomas Nelson, Jr.
—Approximately 8,000 troops under General Washington including a French
force of more than 4,500 commanded by the Count de Rochambeau.
—The French fleet under the Count de Grasse which blockaded the sea
approaches to Yorktown. With de Grasse were 3,200 troops under St.
Simon.
Meanwhile, the Americans were still keeping watch on the British. When
the British Army moved south toward Portsmouth after the engagement at
Green Spring, Lafayette dispatched Wayne to the south side of the James
to follow Cornwallis and to attempt to check Tarleton’s raiding parties
in this area. The Marquis himself took position at Malvern Hill. When
Cornwallis left Portsmouth, Lafayette supposed that his destination was
Baltimore. Acting quickly, he broke camp at Malvern Hill, and, with his
Light Infantry, moved toward Fredericksburg. When he learned that the
British were actually “digging in” at Yorktown and Gloucester, he took
position on the Pamunkey River near West Point, Va., about 30 miles
northwest of Cornwallis’ position. Wayne, with the Pennsylvania Line,
remained south of the James. From this point Wayne was to have begun his
march toward Greene in the Carolinas. On August 25, however, Lafayette
learned that the Count de Grasse, with a sizeable fleet, was expected in
Virginia, and he immediately cancelled Wayne’s orders for leaving the
State, requesting instead that he remain where he was pending further
instructions.
_Siege of Yorktown_
STRATEGY OF THE SIEGE.
As the year 1781 opened, Clinton continued to hold New York with a
strong force of about 10,000. Washington’s force opposing him numbered
some 3,500. American leaders saw that recruiting was poor and supplies
were low. The whole civilian system on which the army depended had
proved loose and difficult, and apathy had come with a long period of
inactivity. As the year progressed, change was in the air. There was
thought of action and a plan. The commander in chief continued to be
troubled, however, by the lack of assistance to the South and the now
long-standing inability to achieve anything decisive in the North.
New hope came when the French Government approved additional assistance
for the struggling colonies. Already a sizeable naval force was being
organized for operations in American waters. The excellent French army
corps under the Count de Rochambeau was then at Newport, R. I., to
cooperate with Washington. From February 10 to August 14, Washington was
engaged with the French in working out a plan of operations. His initial
thought, perhaps, was to invest New York should Clinton’s position be
deemed vulnerable and the expected French fleet move inside Sandy Hook
for action. An alternate plan was to attempt the capture of the British
force in Virginia or to project an operation elsewhere in the South.
On May 22, 1781, a planning conference was held at Wethersfield, Conn.,
between Washington and Rochambeau and members of their staffs. A general
outline of movement was laid down; but not knowing that Cornwallis was
in Virginia or when or where to expect the French fleet under the Count
de Grasse, it was necessarily fluid. The plan called for a union of
French and American armies for a demonstration against New
York—something that might induce Clinton to call troops from the South,
thereby relieving, to some extent, the pressure there. This move,
executed in July, actually did cause Clinton to ask for troops then in
Virginia and resulted in the removal of Cornwallis to Portsmouth,
already described.
It was early in June that Washington learned of Cornwallis’ move into
Virginia. Shortly afterwards, there was more definite word of the plans
of De Grasse, although the point at which he would support military
operations was not fixed. It was during the first week in July that
Rochambeau and his army joined Washington on the Hudson, and some
opening moves were made against Clinton in New York. On July 20
Washington entered in his diary that the uncertainties of the situation
“rendered it impracticable for me to do more than to prepare, first, for
the enterprize against New York as agreed to at Weathersfield and
secondly for the relief of the Southern States if after all my efforts,
and earnest application to these States it should be found at the
arrivl. of Count de Grasse that I had neither Men, nor means adequate to
the first object....”
At last, on August 14, Washington received dispatches telling him that
the Count de Grasse was to sail from the West Indies with a substantial
fleet and 3,200 troops. These troops had been requested by Rochambeau in
previous dispatches to Admiral de Grasse. His destination was the
Chesapeake; he could be in the area only a short time; and he hoped
everything would be in readiness upon his arrival. Washington saw
immediately that a combined land and naval operation in Virginia was the
only possible plan, and he moved quickly to effect this insofar as he
could.
In preliminary maneuvers every attempt was made to deceive Clinton as to
the real destination of the units that were now scheduled for operations
at Yorktown. These troops included the French Army and units from the
American Army, totaling some 8,000 men. The remainder of Washington’s
force, less than 4,000, under Maj. Gen. William Heath, was left before
New York to guard West Point, N. Y., and the Highlands.
The movement toward Virginia began on August 19, 4 days after receipt of
definite news from De Grasse. The troops used three distinct and
separate routes as far as Princeton, N. J. This was partly to confuse
Clinton, who did not fully understand what was happening, until
Washington was well under way. Few in the French and Americans camps
actually knew the objective. Jonathan Trumbull, Washington’s secretary,
wrote: “By these maneuvers and the correspondent march of the Troops,
our own army no less than the Enemy are completely deceived. No movement
perhaps was ever attended with more conjectures, or such as were more
curious than this ... not one I believe penetrated the real design.”
From Princeton, the march continued to Trenton where they found there
were not enough ships available to transport the men and stores. The
decision was to continue on foot to the head of Chesapeake Bay. The
passage of the French and American troops through Philadelphia early in
September became almost a festive occasion. With the American units
leading the way, the trek continued through Chester, Pa., and
Wilmington, Del., to Head-of-Elk. It was at Chester, on September 5,
that Washington learned that the Count de Grasse had arrived in the
Chesapeake Bay with 28 ships of the line, a number of frigates and
sloops, and 3,200 troops. At that time these troops, under the Marquis
de St. Simon, had already debarked at Jamestown for union with
Lafayette’s growing force.
On September 8, Washington, Rochambeau, and the Chevalier de Chastellux
left to subordinates the task of preparing the allied armies for
transport down the bay by ship. They, themselves, proceeded overland to
Williamsburg, stopping en route for several days at Mount Vernon. This
was Washington’s first visit to his home in 6 years. The party reached
Williamsburg on September 14, and there was “great joy among troops and
people” as Washington assumed active command of the growing American and
French forces.
BATTLE OF THE VIRGINIA CAPES.
The Count de Grasse left Cape Français, on the northern coast of Haiti
in the West Indies, for the Atlantic coast and Chesapeake Bay on August
5. He had reached the West Indies in April, after a 38 days’ crossing of
the Atlantic from Brest, France. There had been some contact with the
sizeable British fleet under Rear Adm. Sir Samuel Hood who, with his
superior in this theater, Sir George Rodney, did not seem willing to
bring on a general action at this time. De Grasse had moved on against
Tobago, proceeded to Santo Domingo, and reached Cape Français on July
16.
At Santo Domingo, negotiations for land forces for use in Virginia were
completed with M. de Lillancourt, the new commander there, who agreed to
supply from the West Indies garrison a detachment from the Gatinois,
Agenois, and Touraine regiments, as well as some artillery, dragoons,
and field and siege ordnance. It was further agreed that the troops
could be maintained on the continent only until October 15, as they
might be needed in the West Indies after that time. In Havana, De
Grasse, as had been requested of him, concluded arrangements for
financial aid—a virtual necessity at this point.
De Grasse approached the Virginia Capes on August 30, encountering the
British frigate _Guadaloupe_ and the corvette _Loyalist_ which had been
posted as lookouts. Both were pursued, the corvette being taken and the
frigate forced into the York River. The next day, the French fleet moved
into Chesapeake Bay for anchorage, individual ships having been
delegated to block the mouths of the York and the James. On September 2,
the land forces under the Marquis de St. Simon were sent up the James in
long boats for landing at Jamestown.
Dispatches telling of the arrival of De Grasse were sent to Washington
and Rochambeau, contact having already been established with Lafayette.
De Grasse felt that there was urgent need for action, but Lafayette,
even with the reinforcements of St. Simon, thought that it would not be
wise to attack before Washington and the army under his command reached
the area. He wrote “... having so sure a game to play, it would be
madness, by the risk of attack, to give any thing to chance.” Perhaps De
Grasse was wondering how he had been able to reach Virginia and
establish a blockade of Cornwallis’ position without interference from
the British fleet. Such good fortune might not continue.
The undisturbed voyage had indeed been a stroke of luck. In July, word
had been received by Rear Adm. Thomas Graves, in command of the British
naval units at New York, that a convoy, with valuable aid for the
American cause, had sailed for America and that it was important that it
be intercepted. This led him to put to sea, believing that Rodney, in
the West Indies, would take steps to cover any movement of the French
fleet of De Grasse which was known to be in that area. As a
precautionary measure, however, he sent some light craft on
reconnaissance south along the Atlantic coast.
[Illustration: _Count de Grasse, Admiral of the French fleet in the
Battle of the Virginia Capes and in the blockade of Yorktown in
September-October 1781. (From a painting in the U. S. Naval Academy,
Annapolis, Md.)_]
Graves left Sandy Hook, off New York harbor, on July 6. He was still at
sea when a sloop reached New York with dispatches from Rodney telling of
De Grasse’s fleet and the fact that at least a part of it was destined
for North America. Rodney further reported that if the situation should
require him to send a squadron to contact the French that he would order
it to “make the Capes of Virginia,” proceed along the Capes of the
Delaware, and move on to Sandy Hook. Not finding Graves, the commander
of the sloop put to sea to locate him, but was attacked by a privateer
and forced ashore. Thus, Graves did not get word of De Grasse from
Rodney until he himself returned to New York on August 18.
Needing repairs, Graves did not want to sail again until his fleet was
in readiness. Another matter that was troubling him was the French
squadron of eight ships under Admiral De Barras at Newport; and it was
tentatively agreed that when he was at full strength joint operations
would be undertaken against that station. Then, on August 28, Rear Adm.
Samuel Hood anchored off Sandy Hook with the greater part of the West
Indies fleet. Rodney, suffering from poor health, had turned over his
command to Hood and sailed for home, but one of his last acts had been
to dispatch Hood northward along the Atlantic coast with comprehensive
instructions to act against, or to head off, De Grasse. Hood, on August
25, had entered the Chesapeake and found no enemy, since he had sailed
in advance of De Grasse. From Virginia he had continued on to New York.
Thus Hood had missed De Grasse, and the latter was now in the
Chesapeake.
[Illustration: _The_ VILLE DE PARIS.
_A model of the flagship of the Count de Grasse during his
operations in Virginia waters in the autumn of 1781._]
An intelligence report was received about this time by the British that
De Barras had sailed from Newport with his entire squadron and that he,
too, was headed for Virginia. Immediate action was imperative. Graves
assumed command of the entire British fleet, now made up of Hood’s ships
and all of his own that were ready for duty. On August 31, he sailed
south, hoping to intercept either De Barras or De Grasse, or of engaging
them both.
On the morning of September 5, Graves approached the capes of the
Chesapeake. The French fleet was sighted and a signal was made to form a
line of battle. By noon, his ships were getting to their stations. The
fleet was divided into three divisions, with Graves directing operations
from his flagship, the _London_, of 98 guns. Division commanders were
Rear Adm. Samuel Hood and Rear Adm. Francis Samuel Drake.
Meanwhile, in the French fleet, De Grasse ordered all hands to prepare
for action. The tide was right by noon, and, even though 90 officers and
1,800 men were not aboard, his ships got under way and moved out into
the Atlantic to allow more room for maneuver. De Grasse commanded from
his flagship, the _Ville de Paris_, a 110-gun ship, and deployed his
fleet in three sections, commanded respectively by Le Sieur de
Bougainville, De Latouche-Treville, and Le Sieur de Monteil. Action
began about 4 o’clock in the afternoon and continued for 2½ hours, when
darkness necessitated a cease-fire order. A French account of the battle
related that:
At four o’clock the van, commanded by M. de Bougainville, began the
action with a very brisk fire and successively the ships of the line
of battle took part. Only the eight leading ships of the English line
took any great part in the fight. The combat was violent here. For the
most part the center of their fleet and their rear held themselves at
half a cannon shot without inclining to engage. The wind failed the
nine last vessels of our line entirely.... At five o’clock the winds
having continued to vary up to four points placed again the French van
too much to windward. Count de Grasse desired ardently that the action
be general, and in order to have the enemy at command there he ordered
his van to bear down a second time. That of Admiral Graves was very
abused, and that admiral profited by the advantage of the wind which
rendered him master of distance, in order to avoid being attacked by
the French rear-division which was making every effort to reach him
and his center. Sunset ended this battle.... The first fifteen ships
in the French line were the only ones to participate in the battle....
It was later learned that the “ship London commanded by Admiral Graves
had been so well raked by the Ville de Paris that they [the English] had
been obliged to change all its masts.”
In the action, 24 French ships of the line, carrying approximately 1,700
guns and 19,000 seamen, were opposed by 19 British ships of the line,
having about 1,400 guns and 13,000 seamen. Casualties for the British
were 90 killed and 246 wounded. The French counted about 200 in killed
and wounded. Several English ships were damaged, and one, the
_Terrible_, had to be sunk several days after the engagement.
During the night of September 5-6, the two fleets remained close
together. At a conference on the _London_, on the 6th, Graves decided
that with a number of his ships disabled it would be too hazardous to
renew the action. He also declined Hood’s suggestion to try to slip into
the Chesapeake. De Grasse, having stopped the British and having
inflicted considerable damage, likewise hesitated to renew the
engagement. On the 7th and 8th, the two fleets remained from 2 to 5
leagues apart. Meanwhile, a northeast wind was carrying them south. On
the 9th, they were below Albemarle Sound, and by the next day the
British fleet was off Cape Hatteras. It was on the 9th that De Grasse
lost sight of the British and, fearing that a change of wind might
prevent it, sailed toward the Chesapeake Bay, which he reached on the
11th. On the 10th, De Barras reached Virginia with his squadron from
Newport, R. I., and entered the bay, later to join De Grasse. Admiral
Graves followed De Grasse northward, realizing that the situation was
now out of hand. On September 14, he sailed from the Virginia coast for
New York, where he intended to “... use every possible means for putting
the Squadron into the best state for service....” His departure had
momentous consequences for Cornwallis.
The Battle of the Virginia Capes, as the action of September 5 has come
to be called, was a most important phase of the siege of Yorktown. At a
critical point the French had seized control of the sea and had sealed
in the British at Yorktown. This prevented the evacuation of Cornwallis
and ended his hopes of reinforcement and supply. The next phase of the
combined operation against Cornwallis was encirclement by land. Already
this was being accomplished.
ASSEMBLY OF THE ALLIED ARMIES.
On September 7, Lafayette moved his force from the Pamunkey River to
Williamsburg where he could at least temporarily block any movement that
Cornwallis might make up the peninsula. His army was substantially
enlarged the next day by the more than 3,000 troops under St. Simon, who
had arrived with De Grasse and landed at Jamestown. On September 14,
Washington arrived at Lafayette’s headquarters in Williamsburg for a
“joyful reunion” with the young French general and to assume direct
command of the operations in the Virginia theater.
The combined French and American forces, which Washington had left at
the head of the Chesapeake early in September, found a shortage of
shipping also at Head-of-Elk. It was necessary to use most of the
vessels available for the transport of ordnance and stores, with the
result that the bulk of the troops had to march on to Baltimore and
Annapolis to embark. On September 15, Washington wrote to De Grasse
about the transport of his army. The French admiral had anticipated this
need, and had already dispatched the transports brought to the area from
Newport by De Barras plus some frigates which had been seized—enough to
accommodate about 4,000 troops.
[Illustration: _Count de Rochambeau, Commander of the French wing of
the allied armies which besieged Yorktown._]
On September 17, Washington, with Rochambeau, Chastellux, Henry Knox,
and the Chevalier Duportail, visited De Grasse aboard the _Ville de
Paris_ to pay their respects and to confer on the joint operation now in
progress against Cornwallis. In the discussion, Washington was able to
prevail on De Grasse to extend his stay in Virginia waters past the
October 15 deadline which he had originally set. He agreed to remain at
least through the month of October. He did not, however, approve plans
to move ships into the York River.
By September 22, when Washington returned to Williamsburg, parts of the
allied armies from the North had arrived, having landed along College
Creek and at other points on the James. Included among the troops, too,
was a force under M. de Choisy which had come down from Newport with De
Barras. Late in the same day other parts of the convoy, which De Grasse
had sent up the bay, began to arrive, and De Grasse was able to write:
“Everything is entering the river today, even your artillery.” Landing
operations continued for several days with much of the artillery being
put ashore at Trebell’s Landing below College Creek.
About this time the allied commanders learned that the English fleet in
New York had been augmented by the arrival of a squadron under Adm.
Robert Digby. This led to apprehension on the part of De Grasse and
increased the need for haste in operations against Yorktown. De Grasse
debated the need of putting to sea—a turn of events that caused
Washington moments of “painful anxiety.” In the end, however, De Grasse
was persuaded against this move, and he remained in the bay.
Nevertheless, the need for immediate land action had become imperative.
By September 27, the organization of the allied French and American
armies assembled at Williamsburg had been completed. There were three
parts—American Continentals (approximately 5,200), French auxiliaries
(about 7,500), and American militia (over 3,000). The Continentals were
grouped in three divisions, commanded respectively by Major General
Lafayette, Major General von Steuben, and Major General Lincoln. In
addition to his divisional duties, Lincoln also commanded the American
wing. Detachments of artillery, with siege and field pieces, several
companies of sappers and miners, and other units, were under the command
of Brig. Gen. Henry Knox of Massachusetts. There was a cavalry grouping
too, under Col. Stephen Moylan of Pennsylvania.
The French wing of the allied armies made up approximately one-half of
the total land forces which opposed the British. Commanded by the Count
de Rochambeau, it included 7 infantry regiments grouped in 3 brigades.
The cavalry was under the Duke de Lauzun and the artillery under Colonel
d’Aboville. The French engineers were headed by Colonel Desandrouins and
Lieutenant Colonel Querenet, both of whom were instrumental in the
preparation of an excellent set of siege plans.
[Illustration: _Gen. George Washington, Commander in Chief of the
allied French and American forces at Yorktown. (From the Peale
portrait in the State House, Annapolis, Md.)_]
The third component of the allied armies was the militia, chiefly from
Virginia, commanded by Gen. Thomas Nelson, Jr., a native of Yorktown,
who was supported by Brig. Gen. George Weedon, Brig. Gen. Robert Lawson,
and Brig. Gen. Edward Stevens.
INVESTMENT OF YORKTOWN.
On September 27 all was in readiness for the movement of the allied
armies against the British position at Yorktown and an “Order of Battle”
was drawn up. At 5 o’clock in the morning of September 28 the French and
American units, on instruction from Washington, their commander in
chief, began to move toward Yorktown. The Continentals, followed by the
French troops, formed the left column and the militia, the right. The
route lay over the principal highways down the peninsula. At the
“Halfway House,” midway between Williamsburg and Yorktown, the American
regulars moved off to the right, while the French continued on the more
direct route.
About noon both sections approached Yorktown, and contact was made with
British pickets who fell back. Lt. Col. Robert Abercrombie’s Light
Infantry, covering the British right, first gave the alarm, and some
shots were exchanged with Tarleton’s Legion, which covered the British
left, as the American and French troops reached the approaches to
Yorktown. By nightfall, the allied units reached temporary positions
along Beaverdam Creek within a mile of the main enemy posts. At this
point, orders were issued that “The whole army, officers and soldiers,
will lay on their arms this night.”
The investment of Yorktown, which began so auspiciously on the 28th, was
more securely established during the 2 days that followed. On the 29th,
the American wing moved more to the east (right) and nearer to the
enemy, while both French and American units spread out to their
designated campsites, forming a semicircle around Yorktown from the York
River on the northwest to Wormley Creek, a tributary of the York, on the
south and east. Reconnoitering was extended within cannon range of the
enemy’s works, and several skirmishes developed with British patrols.
There was also some minor action at Moore’s Dam over Wormley Creek,
where the British had thrown up temporary positions.
BRITISH POSITION.
When the British entered Yorktown in August 1781, the town, one of the
most important in the lower Chesapeake region, was described by one of
the soldiers as:
This Yorktown, or Little-York, is a small city of approximately 300
houses; it has, moreover, considerable circumference. It is located on
the bank of the York River, somewhat high on a sandy but level ground.
It has 3 churches, 2 reformed English and 1 German Lutheran, but
without steeples, and 2 Quaker meeting houses, and a beautiful court
or meeting house, which building, like the majority of the houses, is
built of bricks. Here stood many houses which were destroyed and
abandoned by their occupants. There was a garrison of 300 militia men
here, but upon our arrival they marched away without firing a shot
back to Williamsburg, which is 16 English miles from here.
We found few inhabitants here, as they had mostly gone with bag and
baggage into the country beyond.
The task confronting Cornwallis was the fortification of this town and
Gloucester Point, just across the York, as a base. In early August, he
had little reason to expect that 2 months later he would be besieged.
Nevertheless, on arrival in Yorktown he turned to the task at hand with
vigor. As the days passed, Cornwallis began to realize that enemy forces
were assembling around him.
In planning his defense, he established a line of fortifications, close
in about the town, supported by small enclosed earthworks, or redoubts,
and batteries. Just in advance of the main line he constructed two
positions, Redoubts Nos. 9 and 10, to command the high ground in that
sector. Along the York-Hampton Road he strengthened the main line by
extending it outward on the highway in the form of a point, or wedge,
that was called the “Horn-Work.” In the inner and principal line, he had
10 redoubts and 14 batteries in which were mounted some 65 guns, the
largest being 18-pounders. Some of this ordnance came from the British
ships anchored offshore in the York.
The British outer line utilized the protective features of ravines and
creeks. Close on the west of Yorktown was Yorktown Creek. On the east,
but at a greater distance, ran Wormley Creek. These creeks, with their
marshes and irregular terrain, constituted rather formidable barriers to
the rapid advance of troops. The area between the headwaters of these
two creeks, however, was a weak link. This high ground, less than half a
mile wide, carried the road from Yorktown to Hampton. To control this,
British engineers laid out four redoubts and some gun emplacements. On
the west side of Yorktown Creek, near the point where a road to
Williamsburg crossed, a large star-shaped work was built. This, manned
by a part of the Royal Welch Fusiliers (23d) Regiment, was known as the
Fusiliers Redoubt. These positions, some works at Moore’s Mill Dam, and
the two creeks constituted the British outer line at Yorktown.
The village at Gloucester Point, across the river, was fortified with a
single line of entrenchments with 4 redoubts and 3 batteries. In the
York River, between Yorktown and Gloucester, there were British
transports, supply boats, and some armed vessels, notably the _Charon_
and _Guadaloupe_.
Behind his lines, Cornwallis had a force of some 7,500 troops, most of
them seasoned veterans. To aid his gunners, all buildings, trees, and
other obstructions in front of his main line were removed for a distance
of 1,000 yards. All roads were blocked, and the completion of fixed
positions was pushed.
[Illustration: _The Fusiliers Redoubt (reconstructed), a position
which supported the right side of the British main line._]
Cornwallis had begun to feel the pinch of the French fleet blockade even
before the allied armies reached Yorktown. On September 11, one of his
soldiers wrote: “We get terrible provisions now, putrid ship’s meat and
wormy biscuits that have spoiled on the ships. Many of the men have
taken sick here with dysentery or the bloody flux and with diarrhea.
Also the foul fever is spreading, partly on account of the many
hardships from which we have had little rest day or night, and partly on
account of the awful food; but mostly, the nitrebearing water is to
blame for it.” Sickness and also a lack of officers were to remain a
severe handicap for the British.
Cornwallis continued to keep in touch by letter with Clinton in New
York. On September 16, he had received word that Clinton was planning to
move south with a sizeable force to aid him. When he received this word,
Cornwallis decided against any offensive action and so wrote to Clinton.
On September 29, a dispatch from New York, written on the 24th, told of
ship repairs and a strengthened British fleet, as well as the
preparation of reinforcements for Cornwallis’ Virginia garrison. Clinton
continued: “There is every reason to hope we start from hence the 5th
October.”
About 10 o’clock on the night of September 29, Cornwallis made an
important decision which he described in a letter to Clinton: “I have
this evening received your letter of the 24th, which has given me the
greatest satisfaction. I shall retire this night within the works, and
have no doubt, if relief arrives in any reasonable time, York and
Gloucester will be both in possession of his Majesty’s troops.” This
decision to abandon his outer line without a fight definitely shortened
the siege of Yorktown. It was a move for which Cornwallis has been
criticized and an advantage which the allied armies quickly seized.
OPENING OF THE SIEGE.
Washington wrote of the morning of September 30: “... we discovered,
that the Enemy had evacuated all their Exterior Line of Works, and
withdrawn themselves to those near the body of the Town. By this Means
we are in possession of very advantageous Grounds, which command, in a
very near Advance, almost the whole remaining line of their Defence.”
Even before Washington had written, American and French units had moved
into these works. Within the day, the construction of an additional
redoubt and a battery was begun in this sector.
On the morning of the 30th, while these moves were being made on the
south side of Yorktown, on the extreme west a French unit from St.
Simon’s command drove in the British pickets in the vicinity of the
Fusiliers Redoubt. A sharp skirmish resulted, with several casualties—an
action that enabled the allies to take a more advantageous position in
this quarter.
One event only marred the successful moves of the 30th. Col. Alexander
Scammell, of New Hampshire, a well-known soldier with much service, was
wounded during the early morning while reconnoitering with a small party
south of Yorktown. He died from his wound a week later in the base
hospital in Williamsburg.
[Illustration: _American Battery No. 2._]
In the first days of October, the allies completed their surveying and
planning and pushed the construction and collection of siege material
which consisted of gabions (wickerwork-like baskets to be filled with
earth to support embankments); fascines (long bundles of sticks of wood
bound together for use in filling ditches, strengthening ramparts,
etc.); fraises (pointed stakes to be driven into embankments in an
upright or inclined position); and saucissons (large fascines). There
was some delay while the heavy guns were being transported from the
landing points on the James. Perhaps James Thacher penned an accurate
short description when he wrote on October 1-2: “Heavy cannon and
mortars are continually arriving, and the greatest preparations are made
to prosecute the siege in the most effectual manner.” By October 6,
however, the work of reconnoitering the abandoned British positions
south of Yorktown and constructing supporting works there was complete.
All was in readiness for the next move—construction of the First Allied
Siege Line.