(1) The word law, taken in the abstract, means that by which an individual,
or all things, or as many things as belong to a particular species, act in
one and the same fixed and definite manner, which manner depends either on
natural necessity or on human decree. (2) A law which depends on natural
necessity is one which necessarily follows from the nature, or from the
definition of the thing in question; a law which depends on human decree,
and which is more correctly called an ordinance, is one which men have laid
down for themselves and others in order to live more safely or conveniently,
or from some similar reason.
(3) For example, the law that all bodies impinging on lesser bodies, lose as
much of their own motion as they communicate to the latter is a universal
law of all bodies, and depends on natural necessity. (4) So, too, the law
that a man in remembering one thing, straightway remembers another either
like it, or which he had perceived simultaneously with it, is a law which
necessarily follows from the nature of man. (5) But the law that men must
yield, or be compelled to yield, somewhat of their natural right, and that
they bind themselves to live in a certain way, depends on human decree. (6)
Now, though I freely admit that all things are predetermined by universal
natural laws to exist and operate in a given, fixed, and definite
manner, I still assert that the laws I have just mentioned depend on human
decree.
(1.) (7) Because man, in so far as he is a part of nature, constitutes a
part of the power of nature. (8) Whatever, therefore, follows necessarily
from the necessity of human nature (that is, from nature herself, in so far
as we conceive of her as acting through man) follows, even though it be
necessarily, from human power. (9) Hence the sanction of such laws may very
well be said to depend on man's decree, for it principally depends on the
power of the human mind; so that the human mind in respect to its perception
of things as true and false, can readily be conceived as without such laws,
but not without necessary law as we have just defined it.
(2.) (10) I have stated that these laws depend on human decree because it is
well to define and explain things by their proximate causes. (11) The
general consideration of fate and the concatenation of causes would aid us
very little in forming and arranging our ideas concerning particular
questions. (12) Let us add that as to the actual coordination and
concatenation of things, that is how things are ordained and linked
together, we are obviously ignorant; therefore, it is more profitable for
right living, nay, it is necessary for us to consider things as contingent.
(13) So much about law in the abstract.
(14) Now the word law seems to be only applied to natural phenomena by
analogy, and is commonly taken to signify a command which men can either
obey or neglect, inasmuch as it restrains human nature within certain
originally exceeded limits, and therefore lays down no rule beyond human
strength. (15) Thus it is expedient to define law more particularly as a
plan of life laid down by man for himself or others with a certain object.
(16) However, as the true object of legislation is only perceived by a few,
and most men are almost incapable of grasping it, though they live under its
conditions, legislators, with a view to exacting general obedience, have
wisely put forward another object, very different from that which
necessarily follows from the nature of law: they promise to the observers of
the law that which the masses chiefly desire, and threaten its violators
with that which they chiefly fear: thus endeavouring to restrain the masses,
as far as may be, like a horse with a curb; whence it follows that the word
law is chiefly applied to the modes of life enjoined on men by the sway of
others; hence those who obey the law are said to live under it and to be
under compulsion. (17) In truth, a man who renders everyone their due
because he fears the gallows, acts under the sway and compulsion of others,
and cannot be called just. (18) But a man who does the same from a knowledge
of the true reason for laws and their necessity, acts from a firm purpose
and of his own accord, and is therefore properly called just. (19) This, I
take it, is Paul's meaning when he says, that those who live under the law
cannot be justified through the law, for justice, as commonly defined, is
the constant and perpetual will to render every man his due. (20) Thus
Solomon says (Prov. xxi:15), "It is a joy to the just to do judgment," but
the wicked fear.
(21) Law, then, being a plan of living which men have for a certain object
laid down for themselves or others, may, as it seems, be divided into human
law and Divine law.
(22) By human law I mean a plan of living which serves only to render life
and the state secure. (23) By Divine law I mean that which only regards the
highest good, in other words, the true knowledge of God and love.
(24) I call this law Divine because of the nature of the highest good, which
I will here shortly explain as clearly as I can.
(25) Inasmuch as the intellect is the best part of our being, it is evident
that we should make every effort to perfect it as far as possible if we
desire to search for what is really profitable to us. (26) For in
intellectual perfection the highest good should consist. (27) Now, since all
our knowledge, and the certainty which removes every doubt, depend solely on
the knowledge of God;- firstly, because without God nothing can exist or be
conceived; secondly, because so long as we have no clear and distinct idea
of God we may remain in universal doubt - it follows that our highest good
and perfection also depend solely on the knowledge of God. (28) Further,
since without God nothing can exist or be conceived, it is evident that all
natural phenomena involve and express the conception of God as far as their
essence and perfection extend, so that we have greater and more perfect
knowledge of God in proportion to our knowledge of natural phenomena:
conversely (since the knowledge of an effect through its cause is the same
thing as the knowledge of a particular property of a cause) the greater our
knowledge of natural phenomena, the more perfect is our knowledge of the
essence of God (which is the cause of all things). (29) So, then, our
highest good not only depends on the knowledge of God, but wholly consists
therein; and it further follows that man is perfect or the reverse in
proportion to the nature and perfection of the object of his special desire;
hence the most perfect and the chief sharer in the highest blessedness is he
who prizes above all else, and takes especial delight in, the intellectual
knowledge of God, the most perfect Being.
(30) Hither, then, our highest good and our highest blessedness aim -
namely, to the knowledge and love of God; therefore the means demanded by
this aim of all human actions, that is, by God in so far as the idea of him
is in us, may be called the commands of God, because they proceed, as it
were, from God Himself, inasmuch as He exists in our minds, and the plan of
life which has regard to this aim may be fitly called the law of God.
(31) The nature of the means, and the plan of life which this aim demands,
how the foundations of the best states follow its lines, and how men's life
is conducted, are questions pertaining to general ethics. (32) Here I only
proceed to treat of the Divine law in a particular application.
(33) As the love of God is man's highest happiness and blessedness, and the
ultimate end and aim of all human actions, it follows that he alone lives by
the Divine law who loves God not from fear of punishment, or from love of
any other object, such as sensual pleasure, fame, or the like; but solely
because he has knowledge of God, or is convinced that the knowledge and love
of God is the highest good. (34) The sum and chief precept, then, of the
Divine law is to love God as the highest good, namely, as we have said, not
from fear of any pains and penalties, or from the love of any other object
in which we desire to take pleasure. (35) The idea of God lays down
the rule that God is our highest good - in other words, that the knowledge
and love of God is the ultimate aim to which all our actions should be
directed. (36) The worldling cannot understand these things, they appear
foolishness to him, because he has too meager a knowledge of God, and also
because in this highest good he can discover nothing which he can handle or
eat, or which affects the fleshly appetites wherein he chiefly delights, for
it consists solely in thought and the pure reason. (37) They, on the other
hand, who know that they possess no greater gift than intellect and sound
reason, will doubtless accept what I have said without question.
(38) We have now explained that wherein the Divine law chiefly consists, and
what are human laws, namely, all those which have a different aim
unless they have been ratified by revelation, for in this respect also
things are referred to God (as we have shown above) and in this sense the
law of Moses, although it was not universal, but entirely adapted to the
disposition and particular preservation of a single people, may yet be
called a law of God or Divine law, inasmuch as we believe that it was
ratified by prophetic insight. (39) If we consider the nature of natural
Divine law as we have just explained it, we shall see:
(40) I.- That it is universal or common to all men, for we have deduced it
from universal human nature.
(41) II. That it does not depend on the truth of any historical narrative
whatsoever, for inasmuch as this natural Divine law is comprehended solely
by the consideration of human nature, it is plain that we can conceive it as
existing as well in Adam as in any other man, as well in a man living among
his fellows, as in a man who lives by himself.
(42) The truth of a historical narrative, however assured, cannot give us
the knowledge nor consequently the love of God, for love of God springs from
knowledge of Him, and knowledge of Him should be derived from general ideas,
in themselves certain and known, so that the truth of a historical narrative
is very far from being a necessary requisite for our attaining our highest
good.
(43) Still, though the truth of histories cannot give us the knowledge and
love of God, I do not deny that reading them is very useful with a view to
life in the world, for the more we have observed and known of men's customs
and circumstances, which are best revealed by their actions, the more warily
we shall be able to order our lives among them, and so far as reason
dictates to adapt our actions to their dispositions.
(44) III. We see that this natural Divine law does not demand the
performance of ceremonies - that is, actions in themselves indifferent,
which are called good from the fact of their institution, or actions
symbolizing something profitable for salvation, or (if one prefers this
definition) actions of which the meaning surpasses human understanding. (45)
The natural light of reason does not demand anything which it is itself
unable to supply, but only such as it can very clearly show to be good, or a
means to our blessedness. (46) Such things as are good simply because they
have been commanded or instituted, or as being symbols of something good,
are mere shadows which cannot be reckoned among actions that are the
offsprings as it were, or fruit of a sound mind and of intellect. (47) There
is no need for me to go into this now in more detail.
(48) IV. Lastly, we see that the highest reward of the Divine law is the law
itself, namely, to know God and to love Him of our free choice, and with an
undivided and fruitful spirit; while its penalty is the absence of these
things, and being in bondage to the flesh - that is, having an inconstant
and wavering spirit.
(49) These points being noted, I must now inquire:
(50) I. Whether by the natural light of reason we can conceive of
God as a law-giver or potentate ordaining laws for men?
(51) II. What is the teaching of Holy Writ concerning this
natural light of reason and natural law?
(52) III. With what objects were ceremonies formerly instituted?
(53) IV. Lastly, what is the good gained by knowing the
sacred histories and believing them?
(54) Of the first two I will treat in this chapter, of the remaining two
in the following one.
(55) Our conclusion about the first is easily deduced from the nature of
God's will, which is only distinguished from His understanding in relation
to our intellect - that is, the will and the understanding of God are in
reality one and the same, and are only distinguished in relation to
our thoughts which we form concerning God's understanding. (56) For
instance, if we are only looking to the fact that the nature of a triangle
is from eternity contained in the Divine nature as an eternal verity, we say
that God possesses the idea of a triangle, or that He understands the
nature of a triangle; but if afterwards we look to the fact that the nature
of a triangle is thus contained in the Divine nature, solely by the
necessity of the Divine nature, and not by the necessity of the nature and
essence of a triangle - in fact, that the necessity of a triangle's essence
and nature, in so far as they are conceived of as eternal verities, depends
solely on the necessity of the Divine nature and intellect, we then style
God's will or decree, that which before we styled His intellect. (57)
Wherefore we make one and the same affirmation concerning God when we say
that He has from eternity decreed that three angles of a triangle are equal
to two right angles, as when we say that He has understood it.
(58) Hence the affirmations and the negations of God always involve
necessity or truth; so that, for example, if God said to Adam that He did
not wish him to eat of the tree of knowledge of good and evil, it would have
involved a contradiction that Adam should have been able to eat of it, and
would therefore have been impossible that he should have so eaten, for the
Divine command would have involved an eternal necessity and truth. (59) But
since Scripture nevertheless narrates that God did give this command to
Adam, and yet that none the less Adam ate of the tree, we must perforce say
that God revealed to Adam the evil which would surely follow if he should
eat of the tree, but did not disclose that such evil would of necessity
come to pass. (60) Thus it was that Adam took the revelation to be not an
eternal and necessary truth, but a law - that is, an ordinance followed by
gain or loss, not depending necessarily on the nature of the act performed,
but solely on the will and absolute power of some potentate, so that the
revelation in question was solely in relation to Adam, and solely through
his lack of knowledge a law, and God was, as it were, a lawgiver and
potentate. (61) From the same cause, namely, from lack of knowledge, the
Decalogue in relation to the Hebrews was a law, for since they knew not the
existence of God as an eternal truth, they must have taken as a law that
which was revealed to them in the Decalogue, namely, that God exists, and
that God only should be worshipped. (62) But if God had spoken to them
without the intervention of any bodily means, immediately they would have
perceived it not as a law, but as an eternal truth.
(63) What we have said about the Israelites and Adam, applies also to all
the prophets who wrote laws in God's name - they did not adequately conceive
God's decrees as eternal truths. (64) For instance, we must say of Moses
that from revelation, from the basis of what was revealed to him, he
perceived the method by which the Israelitish nation could best be united in
a particular territory, and could form a body politic or state, and further
that he perceived the method by which that nation could best be constrained
to obedience; but he did not perceive, nor was it revealed to him, that this
method was absolutely the best, nor that the obedience of the people in a
certain strip of territory would necessarily imply the end he had in view.
(65) Wherefore he perceived these things not as eternal truths, but as
precepts and ordinances, and he ordained them as laws of God, and thus it
came to be that he conceived God as a ruler, a legislator, a king, as
merciful, just, &c., whereas such qualities are simply attributes of human
nature, and utterly alien from the nature of the Deity. (66)Thus much we may
affirm of the prophets who wrote laws in the name of God; but we must not
affirm it of Christ, for Christ, although He too seems to have written laws
in the name of God, must be taken to have had a clear and adequate
perception, for Christ was not so much a prophet as the mouthpiece of God.
(67) For God made revelations to mankind through Christ as He had before
done through angels - that is, a created voice, visions, &c. (68) It would
be as unreasonable to say that God had accommodated his revelations to the
opinions of Christ as that He had before accommodated them to the opinions
of angels (that is, of a created voice or visions) as matters to be revealed
to the prophets, a wholly absurd hypothesis. (69) Moreover, Christ was sent
to teach not only the Jews but the whole human race, and therefore it was
not enough that His mind should be accommodated to the opinions the Jews
alone, but also to the opinion and fundamental teaching common to the whole
human race - in other words, to ideas universal and true. (70) Inasmuch as
God revealed Himself to Christ, or to Christ's mind immediately, and not as
to the prophets through words and symbols, we must needs suppose that Christ
perceived truly what was revealed, in other words, He understood it, for a
matter is understood when it is perceived simply by the mind without words
or symbols.
(71) Christ, then, perceived (truly and adequately) what was revealed, and
if He ever proclaimed such revelations as laws, He did so because of the
ignorance and obstinacy of the people, acting in this respect the part of
God; inasmuch as He accommodated Himself to the comprehension of the
people, and though He spoke somewhat more clearly than the other prophets,
yet He taught what was revealed obscurely, and generally through parables,
especially when He was speaking to those to whom it was not yet given to
understand the kingdom of heaven. (See Matt. xiii:10, &c.) (72) To those to
whom it was given to understand the mysteries of heaven, He doubtless taught
His doctrines as eternal truths, and did not lay them down as laws, thus
freeing the minds of His hearers from the bondage of that law which He
further confirmed and established. (73) Paul apparently points to this more
than once (e.g. Rom. vii:6, and iii:28), though he never himself seems to
wish to speak openly, but, to quote his own words (Rom. iii:6, and vi:19),
"merely humanly." (74) This he expressly states when he calls God just, and
it was doubtless in concession to human weakness that he attributes mercy,
grace, anger, and similar qualities to God, adapting his language to the
popular mind, or, as he puts it (1 Cor. iii:1, 2), to carnal men. (75) In
Rom. ix:18, he teaches undisguisedly that God's auger and mercy depend not
on the actions of men, but on God's own nature or will; further, that no
one is justified by the works of the law, but only by faith, which he seems
to identify with the full assent of the soul; lastly, that no one is blessed
unless he have in him the mind of Christ (Rom. viii:9), whereby he perceives
the laws of God as eternal truths. (76) We conclude, therefore, that God is
described as a lawgiver or prince, and styled just, merciful, &c., merely in
concession to popular understanding, and the imperfection of popular
knowledge; that in reality God acts and directs all things simply by the
necessity of His nature and perfection, and that His decrees and volitions
are eternal truths, and always involve necessity. (77) So much for the first
point which I wished to explain and demonstrate.
(78) Passing on to the second point, let us search the sacred pages for
their teaching concerning the light of nature and this Divine law. (79) The
first doctrine we find in the history of the first man, where it is narrated
that God commanded Adam not to eat of the fruit of the tree of the
knowledge of good and evil; this seems to mean that God commanded Adam to do
and to seek after righteousness because it was good, not because the
contrary was evil: that is, to seek the good for its own sake, not from fear
of evil. (80) We have seen that he who acts rightly from the true knowledge
and love of right, acts with freedom and constancy, whereas he who acts from
fear of evil, is under the constraint of evil, and acts in bondage under
external control. (81) So that this commandment of God to Adam comprehends
the whole Divine natural law, and absolutely agrees with the dictates of the
light of nature; nay, it would be easy to explain on this basis the whole
history or allegory of the first man. (82) But I prefer to pass over the
subject in silence, because, in the first place, I cannot be absolutely
certain that my explanation would be in accordance with the intention of the
sacred writer; and, secondly, because many do not admit that this history is
an allegory, maintaining it to be a simple narrative of facts. (83) It will
be better, therefore, to adduce other passages of Scripture, especially such
as were written by him, who speaks with all the strength of his natural
understanding, in which he surpassed all his contemporaries, and whose
sayings are accepted by the people as of equal weight with
those of the prophets. (84) I mean Solomon, whose prudence and wisdom are
commended in Scripture rather than his piety and gift of prophecy. (85) Life
being taken to mean the true life (as is evident from Deut. xxx:19), the
fruit of the understanding consists only in the true life, and its
absence constitutes punishment. (86) All this absolutely agrees with what
was set out in our fourth point concerning natural law. (87) Moreover our
position that it is the well-spring of life, and that the intellect alone
lays down laws for the wise, is plainly taught by, the sage, for he says
(Prov. xiii:14): "The law of the wise is a fountain of life" - that is, as
we gather from the preceding text, the understanding. (88) In chap. iii:13,
he expressly teaches that the understanding renders man blessed and happy,
and gives him true peace of mind. "Happy is the man that findeth wisdom, and
the man that getteth understanding," for "Wisdom gives length of days, and
riches and honour; her ways are ways of pleasantness, and all her paths
peace" (xiiii:6, 17). (89) According to Solomon, therefore, it is only,
the wise who live in peace and equanimity, not like the wicked whose minds
drift hither and thither, and (as Isaiah says, chap. lvii:20) "are like the
troubled sea, for them there is no peace."
(90) Lastly, we should especially note the passage in chap. ii. of Solomon's
proverbs which most clearly confirms our contention: "If thou criest after
knowledge, and liftest up thy voice for understanding . . . then shalt thou
understand the fear of the Lord, and find the knowledge of God; for the Lord
giveth wisdom; out of His mouth cometh knowledge and understanding."
(91) These words clearly enunciate (1), that wisdom or intellect alone
teaches us to fear God wisely - that is, to worship Him truly; (2), that
wisdom and knowledge flow from God's mouth, and that God bestows on us this
gift; this we have already shown in proving that our understanding and our
knowledge depend on, spring from, and are perfected by the idea or
knowledge of God, and nothing else. (92) Solomon goes on to say in so many
words that this knowledge contains and involves the true principles of
ethics and politics: "When wisdom entereth into thy heart, and knowledge is
pleasant to thy soul, discretion shall preserve thee, understanding shall
keep thee, then shalt thou understand righteousness, and judgment, and
equity, yea every good path." (93) All of which is in obvious agreement with
natural knowledge: for after we have come to the understanding of things,
and have tasted the excellence of knowledge, she teaches us ethics and true
virtue.
(94) Thus the happiness and the peace of him who cultivates his natural
understanding lies, according to Solomon also, not so much under the
dominion of fortune (or God's external aid) as in inward personal virtue (or
God's internal aid), for the latter can to a great extent be preserved by
vigilance, right action, and thought.
(95) Lastly, we must by no means pass over the passage in Paul's Epistle to
the Romans, i:20, in which he says: "For the invisible things of God from
the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things
that are made, even His eternal power and Godhead; so that they are without
excuse, because, when they knew God, they glorified Him not as God, neither
were they thankful." (96) These words clearly show that everyone can by the
light of nature clearly understand the goodness and the eternal divinity of
God, and can thence know and deduce what they should seek for and what
avoid; wherefore the Apostle says that they are without excuse and cannot
plead ignorance, as they certainly might if it were a question of
supernatural light and the incarnation, passion, and resurrection of Christ.
(97) "Wherefore," he goes on to say (ib. 24), "God gave them up to
uncleanness through the lusts of their own hearts;" and so on, through the
rest of the chapter, he describes the vices of ignorance, and sets them
forth as the punishment of ignorance. (98) This obviously agrees with the
verse of Solomon, already quoted, "The instruction of fools is folly," so
that it is easy to understand why Paul says that the wicked are without
excuse. (99) As every man sows so shall he reap: out of evil, evils
necessarily spring, unless they be wisely counteracted.
(100) Thus we see that Scripture literally approves of the light of natural
reason and the natural Divine law, and I have fulfilled the promises made at
the beginning of this chapter.