CHAPTER XIII.

THE GREAT GERMAN ATTACK OF MARCH 21,

JANUARY, FEBRUARY, MARCH, 1918.

The French relieved on the St. Quentin front.--The calm before the

storm.--A golden age.--The Warwick raid.--The German attack

launched.--Defence of Enghien Redoubt.--Counter-attack by the

Royal Berks.--Holnon Wood lost.--The battle for the Beauvoir line.

--The enemy breaks through.

The Battalion's mid-winter respite was brief. On New Year's Eve, 1917,

the 2/4th Oxfords quitted the wretched Suzanne huts and marched

through Harbonnières to Caix. No 'march past' was necessary or would

have been possible, for so slippery was the road that the men had to

trail along its untrodden sides as best they could. Old 61st

Divisional sign-boards left standing nearly a year ago greeted the

return to an area which was familiar to many. The destination should

have been Vauvillers, but the inhabitants of that village were

stricken with measles. Better billets and freedom from infection

compensated for a longer march. At Caix the Battalion was comfortable

for a week.

The Division's move from the Bray-Suzanne area to south of the Somme

heralded a new relief of the French, whose line was now to be

shortened by the amount on its left flank between St. Quentin and La

Fère. About January 11 the Battalion found itself once more in Holnon

Wood, where a large number of huts and dug-outs had been made by the

French since last spring. The front line, now about to be held between

Favet and Gricourt, was almost in its old position. The outpost line

of nine months ago had crystallised into the usual trench system.

Those courteous preliminaries, so much the feature of a French relief,

were, on this re-introduction to scenes soon to become so famous--and

so tragic--a little marred by an untimely German shell which wounded

Weller, who had accompanied the Colonel to see the new line.

Industrious calm succeeded the relief. Since the Russian break-up and

the consequent liberation from the Eastern Front of fresh German

legions, the British army had been on the defensive. A big effort by

the enemy was expected, and when it came, the St. Quentin front was

not unlikely to receive the brunt of his massed attack. The months of

January and February and the first half of March were ominously quiet.

Shelling was spasmodic. After the artillery activity of the last

summer and autumn our guns seemed lazy. So quiet was it that Abraham

used to ride up to the two small copses that lay behind our front.

For the time being the 'offensive spirit' was in abeyance; our paramount

task was the perfection of our defensive system. By this time in the

war it was acknowledged that against attacks in weight no actual

line could be held intact. Faith in 'lines' became qualified in favour

of the series of 'strong points' or redoubts, which were constructed

to defend 'tactical features.' This policy, founded on our experience

of the German defence during the Third Battle of Ypres, was very

sound. All the redoubts constructed in the area occupied by the 184th

Brigade were so well sited and so strongly wired that the faith seemed

justified that they were part of one impregnable system. But against

loss of one important factor no amount of industry could serve to

insure. 'Strong points' must act in concert and for such mutual action

'on the day' good visibility was essential. As we shall see, this

factor was denied. In rear of these redoubts, which lay along the

ridge west of Fayet, a line known as the 'Battle Line' was fortified,

and in rear again a trench was dug to mark the 'Army Line,' where the

last stand would be made. These lines were strong, but more reliance

was apt to be placed upon their mere existence on the ground than, in

default of any co-existent scheme to fill them at a crisis with

appropriate garrisons, was altogether justified.[10]

[Footnote 10: For the _terrain_ referred to in this

chapter see the maps ante pp. 83 and 95.]

Early in the year the Bucks had been taken from the Brigade (now like

all Infantry Brigades reduced to three Battalions) and went to Nesle

to work as an entrenching Battalion. Many old friends, including

especially Colonel 'Jock' Muir, had to be parted with. The three

Battalions which remained were now arranged in 'depth,' a phrase

explained by stating that while one, say the Berks, held the front

line 'twixt Fayet and Gricourt, the Gloucesters as Support Battalion

would be in Holnon Wood and ourselves, the Oxfords, in reserve and

back at Ugny. When a relief took place the Gloucesters went to the

front line, ourselves to Holnon, and the Berks back to Ugny. The

Battalion holding the line was similarly disposed in 'depth,' for its

headquarters and one company were placed more than a mile behind the

actual front.

After the January frost and snow had gone, a period of fine, clement

weather set in. This, in a military sense, was a golden age. Boxing,

thanks to encouragement from the Colonel and Brown and under the

practical doctrine of 'Benny' Thomas, the Battalion pugilist,

flourished as never before. Each tour some officers, instead of going

to the line, were sent to worship at the shrine of Maxse. The

Battalion reached the zenith of its efficiency. Early in March some

reinforcements from the 6th Oxfords, who had been disbanded, arrived;

they numbered two hundred. Among the new officers who joined were

Foreshew, Rowbotham, and Cunningham. Foreshew received command of C

Company, whose commander Matthews went to England for a six months'

rest. To Hobbs also, our worthy quartermaster, it was necessary to bid

a reluctant farewell. His successor, Murray, a very able officer from

the 4th Gloucesters, arrived in time to check the table of stores

before the opening of the great offensive.

On the night of 18/19 March the Battalion went into the front line. C

Company was on the right, in front of Fayet; B Company, under the

command of Wallington, was on the left, just south of Gricourt. A went

to Fayet itself and D Company, commanded in Robinson's absence by

Rowbotham, provided the garrison of Enghien Redoubt, which was a

quarry near Selency Château; Battalion Headquarters also were at this

redoubt. During the night of March 20 a raid on the Battalion's right

was carried out near Cepy Farm by the 182nd Brigade. It was successful.

German prisoners from three divisions corroborated our suspicion that

the great enemy offensive was about to be launched. From headquarters

to headquarters throbbed the order to man battle stations. Ere dawn

was due to lighten the sky a dense mist shrouded everything and added

a fresh factor to the suspense.

Early on March 21, only a short time after the Colonel had returned

from visiting the front line posts, the ground shook to a mighty

bombardment. At Amiens windows rattled in their frames. Trench mortars

of all calibres and field guns, brought to closest range in the mist

and darkness, began to pound a pathway through our wire. Back in

artillery dug-outs the light of matches showed the time; it was 4.50

a.m. The hour had struck. Our guns, whose programme in reply was the

fruit of two months' preparation, made a peculiar echo as their shells

crackled through the mist. Some 'silent' guns[11] fired for the first

time.

[Footnote 11: Defensive artillery, whose inactivity

prior to the German attack was intended to ensure

against discovery by enemy sound-rangers and

observers.]

On all headquarters, roads, redoubts, and observation posts the

enemy's howitzer shells were falling with descending swoop, and battery

positions were drenched with gas.

In the back area the fire of long-range guns was brought with uncanny

accuracy to bear against our rest billets, transport lines, and dumps.

Cross-roads, bridges, and all vital spots in our communications, though

never previously shelled, were receiving direct hits within a short

time of the opening of the bombardment. The Berks had casualties at

Ugny. Some English heavy batteries, recent arrivals on the front and

seemingly undiscovered by the enemy, were now knocked out almost as

soon as they had opened fire. The Artillery level crossing was hit by

an early shell which blocked the road there with a huge crater. Never

in the war had the Germans flung their shells so far or furiously as

now.

By daylight all front line wire had been destroyed, and our trenches

everywhere were much damaged. The mist hung thick, but the Germans did

not yet attack. About 9.30 a.m. the barrage was felt to lift westwards

from Fayet and the fitful clatter of Lewis guns, firing in short bursts

with sometimes a long one exhausting a 'drum,' was heard. In the front

line showers of stick bombs announced the enemy's presence. Everywhere

it seemed that quick-moving bodies in grey uniforms were closing in

from either flank and were behind. In the mist our posts were soon

over-run. Few of our men were left to rally at the 'keeps.' A messenger

to A Company's platoons, which had been stationed in support at the

famous 'Sunken Road,' found that place filled with Germans. Before

noon the enemy had passed Fayet and his patrols had reached Selency

and the Cottages.

At Enghien Redoubt Battalion Headquarters had received no news of the

attack having begun; the dense mist limited the view to fifty yards.

The earliest intimation received by Colonel Wetherall of what was

taking place was enemy rifle and machine-gun fire sweeping the

parapet. At one corner of the redoubt some of the enemy broke in but

were driven out by D Company with the bayonet. Outside Headquarters

the first three men to put their heads over were killed by Germans,

who had crept close along the sunken road which leads from Favet to

Selency Château. The rifles and machine guns of the garrison opened up

and gained superiority. The defence, destined to last for many hours,

of Enghien Redoubt proved an important check to the enemy's advance

and helped to save many of our guns.

At 12 noon, after several patrols had failed to find out whether the

enemy had captured Holnon, the Colonel himself went out to see all that

was happening. He did not return, and shortly afterwards Headquarters

were surrounded by the enemy, who had made ground on either flank.

Nevertheless till 4.30 p.m. Cunningham, the officer left in command,

held out most manfully. Of all the companies, Jones and less than

fifty men had escaped capture. They reached the 'Battle Line' of

trenches east of Holnon Wood, and there joined the Gloucesters, who

had not yet been engaged in the fighting. The enemy, having captured

Maissemy, Fayet, and Holnon, paused to reorganise as evening fell.

Towards evening on the 21st the Berks, who were in reserve when the

attack started, were sent to counter-attack against Maissemy, which

had been lost by the division on our left. Near the windmill, which

stands on the high ground west of the village, Dimmer, the Berks V.C.

Colonel, was killed leading his men on horseback. This local attempt

to stem the German onslaught proved of no avail. At 10.30 a.m. on

March 22 the enemy, whose movements were again covered by mist,

pressed the attack against the Battle Line. Almost before the

Gloucesters knew they were attacked in front, they found themselves

beset in flanks and rear.

At noon the enemy from its north side had penetrated Holnon Wood.

Gloucesters and Oxfords fell back to join the garrison of the Beauvoir

Line, all parts of which were heavily engaged by evening. A gallant

resistance, in which the Gloucesters under Colonel Lawson were

specially distinguished, was made by the 184th Infantry Brigade. The

General encouraged the defence in person. But the line was too weakly

manned long to withstand the enemy; though parts of it held till after

8 p.m. on March 22, before midnight the whole of this last Army Line

had been lost. The enemy had 'broken through.'

The Story of the 2/4th Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry · 第 13 / 17 章