On getting into touch with these gentry, I was informed of one of the
intended plans by which the Germans proposed to invade our country,
and incidentally it throws some light on their present methods
of dealing with the inhabitants as apart from the actual tactical
movements of the troops.
The German idea then--some six years ago--was that they could, by
means of mines and submarines, at any time block the traffic in the
British Channel in the space of a few hours, thus holding our home
fleets in their stations at Spithead and Portland.
With the Straits of Dover so blocked, they could then rush a fleet
of transports across the North Sea from Germany, to the East Coast of
England, either East Anglia or, as in this plan, in Yorkshire. They
had in Germany nine embarking stations, with piers and platforms,
all ready made, and steel lighters for disembarkation purposes or for
actual traversing of the ocean in case of fine weather.
They had taken the average of the weather for years past, and had come
to the conclusion that July 13th is, on an average, the finest day
in the year; but their attempt would be timed, if possible, to fall
on a Bank Holiday when communications were temporarily disorganised.
Therefore the nearest Bank Holiday to July 13th would probably be that
at the beginning of August; it was a coincidence that the present war
broke out on that day.
The spies stationed in England were to cut all telephone and telegraph
wires, and, where possible, to blow down important bridges and
tunnels, and thus to interrupt communications and create confusion.
Their idea of landing on the coast of Yorkshire was based on the
following reasons:--
They do not look upon London as strategically the capital of England,
but rather upon the great industrial centres of the north Midlands,
where, instead of six millions, there are more like fourteen millions
of people assembled in the numerous cities and towns, which now almost
adjoin each other across that part of the country.
Their theory was that if they could rush an army of even 90,000 men
into Leeds, Sheffield, Halifax, Manchester, and Liverpool without
encountering great opposition in the first few hours, they could there
establish themselves in such strength that it would require a powerful
army to drive them out again.
Bringing a week's provisions with them, and seizing all the local
provisions, they would have enough to sustain them for a considerable
time, and the first step of their occupation would be to expel every
inhabitant--man, woman, and child--from the neighbourhood and destroy
the towns. Thus, within a few hours, some fourteen millions of people
would be starving, and wandering without shelter over the face of the
country--a disaster which would need a large force to deal with, and
would cause entire disruption of our food supplies and of business in
the country.
The East Coast of Yorkshire between the Humber and Scarborough lends
itself to such an adventure, by providing a good open beach for miles,
with open country in front of it, which, in its turn, is protected
by a semi-circle of wolds, which could be easily held by the German
covering force. Its left would be protected by the Humber and the
right by the Tees, so that the landing could be carried out without
interruption.
That was their plan--based on careful investigation by a small army
of spies--some five or six years ago, before our naval bases had been
established in the north. If they had declared war then, they, might
have had no serious interference from our Navy during the passage of
their transports, which, of course, would be protected on that flank
by their entire fleet of warships.
At first glance, it seems too fanciful a plan to commend itself to
belief, but in talking it over with German officers, I found they
fully believed in it as a practical proposition. They themselves
enlarged on the idea of the use that they would thus make of the civil
population, and foreshadowed their present brutality by explaining
that when war came, it would not be made with kid gloves. The meaning
of their commands would be brought home to the people by shooting down
civilians if necessary, in order to prove that they were in earnest,
and to force the inhabitants through terror to comply with their
requirements.
Further investigations on the subject proved that the embarkation
arrangements were all planned and prepared for. At any time in the
ordinary way of commerce there were numerous large mail steamers
always available in their ports to transport numbers even largely in
excess of those that would be assembled for such an expedition. Troops
could be mobilised in the neighbourhood of the ports, ostensibly for
manoeuvres, without suspicion being aroused.
It is laid down in German strategical textbooks that the time for
making war is not when you have a political cause for it, but when
your troops are ready and the enemy is unready; and that to strike the
first blow is the best way to declare war.
I recounted all this at the time in a private lecture to officers,
illustrated with lantern slides and maps, as a military problem which
would be interesting to work out on the actual ground, and it was not
really until the report of this leaked into the papers that I realised
how nearly I had "touched the spot." For, apart from the various
indignant questions with which the Secretary of State for War was
badgered in the House of Commons on my account, I was assailed with
letters from Germany of most violent abuse from various quarters, high
and low, which showed me that I had gone nearer the truth than I had
even suspected.
"You are but a brown-paper general," said one, "and if you think that
by your foolish talk you are to frighten us from coming, you are not
right."