custom, and not because it is reasonable or just; but most men follow
it for the simple reason that they think it just. Otherwise they
would not follow it though it were the custom, for our only desire is
to be subjected to reason or to justice. Without this, custom would
pass for tyranny, but the empire of reason and justice is no more
tyrannical than that of choice. These are principles natural to man.
It is then good to obey laws and customs because they are laws, but
we ought to know that there is neither truth nor justice to introduce
into them, that we know nothing about these, and can therefore only
follow what is recognised, and thus we should never transgress them.
But most men cannot receive this doctrine, and since they believe
that truth can be found, and that it resides in law and custom, they
believe these laws, and take their antiquity as a proof of their
truth, and not merely of their authority apart from truth. Thus they
obey the laws, but are liable to revolt when these are shown to be
of no value; and this may be proved of all of them, looked at from a
certain point of view.
_Injustice._--The authority of the judge is not given him for his
sake, but for that of the judged. It is dangerous to say this to the
people, but the people have too much faith in you; that will not harm
them, and may serve you. You must then say it openly. _Pasce oves
meas_, not _tuas_. You owe me pasturage.
_Injustice._--It is dangerous to say to the people that the laws
are not just, for men obey them only because they think them just.
Therefore it is necessary to say at the same time that they must
be obeyed because they are laws, as superiors must be obeyed, not
because they are just, but because they are superiors. All sedition
is averted, if this principle be established and it be understood
what is rightly the definition of justice.
If God gave us masters direct from himself, how heartily ought we to
obey them! Circumstances and necessity are infallible masters.
Custom is our nature. Whoever is accustomed to the faith believes
in it, can no longer even fear hell, and believes in nothing else.
Whoever accustoms himself to believe that the king is terrible ...
etc. Who doubts then that our soul, being accustomed to see number,
space, and motion, believes that and nothing else?
_Veri juris_; we have it no longer; had we it, we should not take the
manners of our country as our rule of justice.
Here, not finding justice, we fall back on force, etc.
It is a ridiculous thing to consider that there are people in the
world who, having renounced all the laws of God and nature, have
yet made laws for themselves which they exactly obey, as, for
instance, the soldiers of Mahomet, thieves, heretics, etc., and thus
logicians....
It seems as though their licence must be without limit or barrier,
since they have broken down so many that are just and holy.
_Weakness._--The whole employment of men is to gain wealth; yet
they have no title to show that they justly possess it but human
caprice, nor have they power to hold it securely. It is the same with
knowledge, of which disease deprives us. We are incapable both of
truth and of goodness.
The Swiss are offended if they are called noble, and bring proof of
their plebeian race that they may be judged worthy of office.
When the question is of judging whether we ought to make war and kill
so many men, condemning so many Spaniards to death, there is only one
man who is the judge, and he an interested party; there ought to be a
third, and he disinterested.
"Why do you kill me?--What! Do not you live on the other side of the
stream, my friend? If you lived on this side I should be an assassin,
and it were unjust to kill you in this fashion, but since you live on
the other side, I am a brave soldier, and it is just."
_Justice, Power._--It is just that what is just should be obeyed, it
is of necessity that what is strongest should be obeyed.
Justice without power is unavailing, power without justice is
tyrannical. Justice without power is gainsaid, because the wicked
always exist, power without justice is condemned. We must therefore
combine justice and power, making what is just strong, and what is
strong just.
Justice is subject to dispute, power is easily recognised and cannot
be disputed. Thus we cannot give power to justice, because power has
arraigned justice, saying that justice is unjust, and she herself
truly just; so since we are unable to bring about that what is just
should be strong, we have made the strong just.
The sole universal rules are the laws of the country in ordinary
affairs, and the law of the majority in others. And this comes from
the power which is in them.
Thus it comes that kings, whose power is of another kind, do not
follow the majority of their ministers.
No doubt equality of goods is just, but since they are unable to
bring about that power should obey justice, people have judged it
right to obey power; not being able to add power to justice they
have justified power, so that justice and power should coalesce, and
peace, the sovereign good, result.
Do we follow the majority because they have more reason? No; but
because they have more power.
Do we follow ancient laws and opinions because they are more sound?
No; but because they stand alone and take from us the root of
diversity.
_Summum jus, summa injuria._
The way of the majority is the best way, because it is plain, and has
power to make itself obeyed; yet it is the opinion of the least able.
If men could have done so, they would have placed power in the hands
of justice, since we cannot deal with power as we please, because it
is a tangible quality, while justice is a spiritual quality of which
we dispose as we please, they have placed justice in the hands of
power, and thus that is called just which we are forced to obey.
Thence arises the right of the sword, for the sword gives a true
right.
Otherwise we should see violence on one side and justice on the
other. The end of the twelfth _Provincial_.
Thence the injustice of the Fronde, which raises its so-called
justice against power.
It is not the same in the Church, for there is true justice and no
violence.
_Injustice._--That presumption should be joined to insignificance is
extreme injustice.
Tyranny consists in the desire of universal rule outside its sphere.
There are different societies, in which are the strong, the fair,
the judicious, the devout, in which each man rules at home, not
elsewhere. Sometimes they meet, and the strong and the fair contend
for the mastery, foolishly, for their mastery is each in a different
kind. They do not agree, and their fault is that each aims at
universal dominion. None can obtain this, not even power, which is
of no avail in the realm of the wise; she is only mistress of our
external actions.
_Tyranny._--Thus the following expressions are false and tyrannical:
"I am beautiful, therefore I should be feared; I am strong, therefore
I should be loved. I am...."
Tyranny is the wishing to have in one way what can only be had in
another. Divers duties are owing to divers merits, the duty of love
to the pleasant, of fear to the strong, of belief to the wise.
These duties should be paid, it is unjust to refuse them, unjust also
to require others. In the same way it is false and tyrannous to say,
"He is not strong, therefore I will not esteem him; he is not clever,
therefore I will not fear him."
It is necessary that men should be unequal. True; but that being
granted, the door is open, not only to the greatest domination, but
to the greatest tyranny.
It is necessary to relax the mind a little, but that opens the door
to extreme dissipation.
We must mark the limits.--There are no fixed boundaries in these
matters, law wishes to impose them, but the mind will not bear them.
_Mine, Thine._--"This is my dog," say poor children, "that is my
place in the sunshine." Here is the beginning and the image of the
usurpation of the whole earth.
Good birth is a great advantage, for it gives a man a chance at the
age of eighteen, making him known and respected as an ordinary man is
on his merits at fifty. Here are thirty years gained at a stroke.
It is the result of power and not of custom. For those who are able
to originate are few, the greater number will only follow, and refuse
glory to those inventors who seek it by their inventions. And if they
persist in wishing to gain glory, and in despising those who do not
originate, the others will give them ridicule and would fain give
them blows. Let no one then pride himself on this subtle capacity, or
else let him keep his content to himself.
_The reason of effects._--It is strange that men would not have me
honour a man clothed in brocade, and followed by seven or eight
footmen! Yet he will have them give me the strap if I do not salute
him. This custom is a power. It is the same with a horse in fine
trappings compared with another. It is odd that Montaigne does not
see what difference there is, wonders that we find any, and asks the
reason. "Indeed," he says, "how comes it," etc....
When power attacks craft, when a mere soldier takes the square cap of
a first president, and flings it out of the window.
_Injustice_.--Men have found no means to gratify their sensuality
without wrong to others.
The greatness of man even in his sensuality, to have known how to
extract from it an admirable code, and to have drawn from it a
picture of love to others.
_Greatness._--The reasons of effects mark the greatness of man, in
having formed so fair an order out of sensuality.
_The reason of effects._--Sensuality and power are the source of all
our actions; sensuality causes those which are voluntary, power the
involuntary.
From sensuality men have found and drawn excellent rules of policy,
of morals, and of justice.
But after all, this evil root of man, this _figmentum malum_, is only
hidden, it is not removed.
All men by nature hate each other. They have used sensuality as best
they could to make it serve the public weal, but this is only a
feint, and a false image of charity, for at bottom it is but hate.
To pity the unfortunate is not contrary to sensuality, rather is
it easy to render this evidence of friendship, and to gain the
reputation of a tender heart, without giving.
The people have very sound opinions, for instance:
1. In having preferred diversion and hunting to poetry. The half
educated deride this, and are triumphant over the folly of the
world, but the people are right by a reason which the others do not
understand.
2. In distinguishing men by outward marks, as birth or wealth. The
world is again triumphant in showing how unreasonable this is, yet it
is thoroughly reasonable. Savages laugh at an infant king.
3. In taking offence at a blow, or in desiring glory so strongly.
But it is very desirable, on account of the other essential goods
which are joined to it, and a man who has received a blow without
resenting it is overwhelmed with abuse and indignity.
4. In working for an uncertainty, in going on a sea voyage, in
walking over a plank.
_Sound opinions of the people._--Civil wars are the greatest of all
evils. They are certain, if we try to reward desert, for all will say
they deserve. The evil to fear from a fool who succeeds by right of
birth, is neither so great nor so certain.
_Sound opinions of the people._--To be well dressed is not altogether
foolish, for it proves that a great number of people work for us. It
shows by our hair, that we have a valet, a perfumer, etc.; by our
band, our thread, our trimming, etc. Now it is not merely superficial
nor simply outward show to have many arms at our disposal.
The more arms we have the stronger we are. To be well dressed is to
show our power.
_The reason of effects._--Continual alternation of _pro_ and _con._
We have then shown that man is frivolous, by the estimation he has of
non-essentials. And all these opinions are destroyed. We have next
shown that all these opinions were perfectly sound, and that thus all
these frivolities being well founded, the people are not so frivolous
as is said. And thus we have destroyed the opinion which destroyed
that of the people.
But we must now destroy this last proposition, and show that it
remains always true that the people are frivolous, though its opinions
are sound, because it does not feel the truth where it is, and
placing it where it is not, its opinions are always very false and
very unsound.
_The reason of effects._--It is, then, true to say that all men are
under an illusion, for even though the opinions of the people be
sound, they are not so as they hold them, for they think that truth
is where it is not. Truth is indeed in their opinions, but not at the
point where they imagine it.
Thus, it is true that we should honour men of birth, but not because
good birth is in itself an advantage, etc.
_The reason of effects._--Gradation. The people honours persons of
high birth. The half-educated despise them, saying that birth is
not a personal, but a chance advantage. The educated honour them,
not from the motives of the people, but from another motive. Devout
persons of more zeal than knowledge despise them, in spite of that
consideration which makes them honoured by the educated, because they
judge by a new light arising from their piety. But true Christians
honour them by a still higher light. So there is a succession of
opinions for and against, according to the measure of our light.
How rightly do men distinguish by exterior rather than by interior
qualities! Which of us twain shall take the lead? Who will give place
to the other? The least able? But I am as able as he is. We should
have to fight about that. He has four footmen, and I have but one;
that is something which can be seen; there is nothing to do but to
count; it is my place to yield, and I am a fool if I contest it. So
by this means we remain at peace, the greatest of all blessings.
Deference is shown by submitting to personal inconvenience. This
is apparently foolish but really just, for it is to say, "I would
certainly put myself to inconvenience did you need it, since I do so
when it can be of no service to you." Respect, moreover, is for the
purpose of marking distinctions of rank. Now if it showed respect to
be seated in an arm-chair, we should pay respect to every body, and
thus no distinction would be made, but being put to inconvenience we
distinguish very well.
_The reason of effects._--We should keep our own secret thoughts, and
judge of all by those, while speaking like every one else.
_King and tyrant._--I too will have my secret thoughts. I will take
care on every journey.
_The reason of effects._--Epictetus. Those who say "You have a
headache," this is not the same thing. We are assured of health, and
not of justice, and indeed his own was folly.
Yet he believed it demonstrable when he said, "it is either in our
power or it is not."
But he did not see that it is not in our power to regulate the heart,
and he was wrong to draw this conclusion from the fact that some were
Christians.
_The reason of effects._--It is owing to the weakness of man that so
many things are esteemed beautiful, as to be well skilled in playing
the lute.
It is only an evil because of our weakness.
_THE WEAKNESS, UNREST, AND DEFECTS OF MAN._
_The Misery of Man._--We care nothing for the present. We anticipate
the future as too slow in coming, as if we could make it move faster;
or we call back the past, to stop its rapid flight. So imprudent
are we that we wander through the times in which we have no part,
unthinking of that which alone is ours; so frivolous are we that
we dream of the days which are not, and pass by without reflection
those which alone exist. For the present generally gives us pain;
we conceal it from our sight because it afflicts us, and if it be
pleasant we regret to see it vanish away. We endeavour to sustain
the present by the future, and think of arranging things not in our
power, for a time at which we have no certainty of arriving.
If we examine our thoughts, we shall find them always occupied with
the past or the future. We scarcely think of the present, and if we
do so, it is only that we may borrow light from it to direct the
future. The present is never our end; the past and the present are
our means, the future alone is our end. Thus we never live, but hope
to live, and while we always lay ourselves out to be happy, it is
inevitable that we can never be so.
We are so unhappy that we cannot take pleasure in a thing, save on
condition of being troubled if it turn out ill, as a thousand things
may do, and do every hour. He who should find the secret of rejoicing
in good without being troubled at its contrary evil, would have hit
the mark. It is perpetual motion.
Our nature exists by motion; perfect rest is death.
When we are well we wonder how we should get on if we were sick,
but when sickness comes we take our medicine cheerfully, into that
the evil resolves itself. We have no longer those passions and that
desire for amusement and gadding abroad, which were ours in health,
but are now incompatible with the necessities of our disease. So then
nature gives us passions and desires in accordance with the immediate
situation. Nothing troubles us but fears, which we, and not nature,
make for ourselves, because fear adds to the condition in which we
are the passions of the condition in which we are not.
Since nature makes us always unhappy in every condition, our desires
paint for us a happy condition, joining to that in which we are, the
pleasures of the condition in which we are not, and were we to gain
these pleasures we should not therefore be happy, because we should
have other desires conformable to this new estate.
We must particularize this general proposition....
What difference in point of obedience is there between a soldier
and a Carthusian? For both are alike under rule and dependent, both
engaged in equally irksome labours. But the soldier always hopes to
bear rule, and though he never does so, for even captains and princes
are always slaves and dependents, he ever hopes and ever works to
attain mastery, whereas the Carthusian makes a vow never to be aught
else than dependent. Thus they do not differ in their perpetual
servitude, which is the same always for both, but in the hope which
one always has, the other never.
The example of Alexander's chastity has not made so many continent
as that of his drunkenness has made intemperate. It is not shameful
to be less virtuous than he, and it seems excusable to be no more
vicious. We do not think ourselves wholly partakers in the vices
of ordinary men, when we see that we share those of the great, not
considering that in such matters the great are but ordinary men. We
hold on to them by the same end by which they hold on to the people,
for at whatsoever height they be, they are yet united at some
point to the lowest of mankind. They are not suspended in the air,
abstracted from our society. No, doubly no; if they are greater than
we, it is because their heads are higher; but their feet are as low
as ours. There all are on the same level, resting on the same earth,
and by the lower extremity are as low as we are, as the meanest men,
as children, and the brutes.
Great men and little have the same accidents, the same tempers, the
same passions, but one is on the felloe of the wheel, the other near
the axle, and so less agitated by the same revolutions.
Would he who had enjoyed the friendship of the King of England, the
King of Poland, and the Queen of Sweden have thought he should come
to want, and need a retreat or shelter in the world?
Man is full of wants, and cares only for those who can satisfy them
all. "Such an one is a good mathematician," it is said. But I have
nothing to do with mathematics, he would take me for a proposition.
"This other is a good soldier." He would treat me as a besieged city.
I need then an honourable man who can lend himself generally to all
my wants.
Men say that eclipses presage misfortune, because misfortunes are
common, so that as evil often happens they often divine it; whereas
to say that they presage happiness would often prove false. They
attribute happiness only to rare planetary conjunctions, and thus
they seldom fail in their divination.
We are fools if we rest content with the society of those like
ourselves; miserable as we are, powerless as we are, they will not
aid us, we shall die alone. We ought therefore to act as though we
were alone, and should we in that case build superb mansions, etc.?
We should search for truth unhesitatingly, and if we refuse it, we
show that we value the esteem of men more than the search for truth.
The last act is tragic, how pleasantly soever the play may have run
through the others. At the end a little earth is flung on our head,
and all is over for ever.
I feel that I might not have been, for the 'I' consists in my
thought; therefore I, who think, had not been had my mother been
killed before I had life. So I am not a necessary being. Neither
am I eternal nor infinite, but I see plainly there is in nature a
necessary being, eternal and infinite.
As duchies, kingships, and magistracies are real and necessary,
because power rules all, these exist every where and always. But
since it is only caprice which makes one or another duke or king, the
rule is not constant, and may vary, etc.
Cromwell was about to ravage the whole of Christendom, the royal
family had been brought to nought, and his own dynasty for ever
established, but for a little grain of sand in his bladder. Rome
herself began to tremble under him, but this scrap of gravel
having got there, he dies, his family falls from power, peace is
established, and the king restored.
_Scepticism._--Excessive or deficient mental powers are alike accused
of madness. Nothing is good but mediocrity. The majority has settled
that, and assails whoever escapes it, no matter by which extreme. I
make no objection, would willingly consent to be in the mean, and
I refuse to be placed at the lower end, not because it is low, but
because it is an extreme, for I would equally refuse to be placed at
the top. To leave the mean is to leave humanity. The greatness of the
human soul consists in knowing how to keep the mean. So little is it
the case that greatness consists in leaving it, that it lies in not
leaving it.
Discourses on humility give occasion for pride to the boastful, and
for humility to the humble. Those on scepticism give occasion for
believers to affirm. Few men speak humbly of humility, chastely
of chastity, few of scepticism doubtingly. We are but falsehood,
duplicity and contradiction, using even to ourselves concealment and
guile.
There are vices which only take hold of us by means of others, and
these, like branches, fall with the removal of the trunk.
For we must not mistake ourselves, we have as much that is automatic
in us as intellectual, and hence it comes that the instrument by
which persuasion is brought about is not demonstration alone. How few
things are demonstrated! Proofs can only convince the mind; custom
makes our strongest proofs and those which we hold most firmly, it
sways the automaton, which draws the unconscious intellect after it.
Who has demonstrated that there will be a to-morrow, or that we shall
die; yet what is more universally believed? It is then custom that
convinces us of it, custom that makes so many men Christians, custom
that makes them Turks, heathen, artisans, soldiers, etc. Lastly, we
must resort to custom when once the mind has seen where truth is,
in order to slake our thirst, and steep ourselves in that belief,
which escapes us at every hour, for to have proofs always at hand
were too onerous. We must acquire a more easy belief, that of custom,
which without violence, without art, without argument, causes our
assent and inclines all our powers to this belief, so that our soul
naturally falls into it. It is not enough to believe only by force
of conviction if the automaton is inclined to believe the contrary.
Both parts of us then must be obliged to believe, the intellect by
arguments which it is enough to have admitted once in our lives,
the automaton by custom, and by not allowing it to incline in the
contrary direction. _Inclina cor meum, Deus._
The intellect believes naturally, and the will loves naturally, so
that for lack of true objects, they must needs attach themselves to
the false.
_Eritis sicut dii, scientes bonum et malum._--Every one plays the god
in judging whether anything be good or bad, and in being too much
afflicted or rejoiced at circumstances.