signalled by Haig, who appeared to hold the view that he had the
arch-guerilla hemmed in against the unfordable flood of the Orange
River in the immediate neighbourhood of the Colesberg waggon-bridge.
Now the brigadier, as has already been shown, did not believe in the
unfordability of rivers. Moreover, the Orange River in front of us was
falling, and further information, which had been arrived at through a
rather peculiar channel, furnished us with the details of a letter of
instruction which had been sent by De Wet when at Strydenburg to
Field-cornet Botmann, then commanding the local commando in the
Fauresmith district, instructing him to collect as many horses and
Cape-carts as possible, and to keep them in readiness at Philippolis
in order to expedite his (De Wet's) journey north. Basing his plans
upon this information, the brigadier determined to place himself on
the line Jagersfontein-Fauresmith just at the moment when De Wet
halted to catch his breath at Philippolis. He would then detach half
his force to cover his right, facing south, leaving it to Plumer or
other troops despatched from the railway at Jagersfontein Road to
cover and close his left flank. To frustrate the vigilance of
Botmann's observation-posts it was the brigadier's intention to make
Fauresmith by forced marches. It had to be considered that there was
only a small margin in which it would be possible to arrive at
Fauresmith with advantage. Too early an arrival would have warned and
headed De Wet before the flank-detached column was in position to
effectually co-operate; while dalliance on the line of march would
have missed him altogether. It was a manoeuvre which could not have
been successful without some element of luck, but which was destined
to be rendered still more difficult by the co-operation of the local
guide.
As it was, the man was not taken into the brigadier's confidence until
he issued his marching orders to his force, a bare two hours before
the column was destined to take the road. The guide had joined the
command with all the pomp and dignity attaching to a following of five
mounted native retainers. He was an Africander of a most marked type,
and opened his connection with the Intelligence officer with the
information that he was not an ordinary guide, that he only took his
instructions from the officer commanding the column, and that he
reported alone to him. The brigadier smiled at his pedantry, remarking
that if he did his job it did not matter much to whom and by whom he
made his reports.
In order to facilitate the early movement of the brigade, it had moved
across the now historic railway-bridge at Orange River and camped in
the Herbert district, with the report that Kimberley was its
destination. For the sake of precaution the brigadier had thrown out
a strong outpost into the hilly country covering the road to Ramah.
Shortly after midnight, the Intelligence officer was sent out with the
final instructions to this outpost. As he stumbled amongst the rocks
he saw in the dim light which the young moon diffused a mounted native
moving along a track below him. The native would have remained
unrecognised, as the distance was considerable, if his horse had not
been a piebald of peculiar marking. The mounted native "had the legs
of" the Intelligence officer; but as he disappeared in the shadows of
night the Intelligence officer's apprehensions were allayed by hearing
the man challenged by a picket from the outpost. In five minutes the
Intelligence officer reached the picket to find the native gone, and
the corporal in charge stated that the man had shown a pass signed by
the Intelligence officer, Orange River Station. This hardly appeared
to be satisfactory; but the corporal, like so many young British
non-commissioned officers, had had no directions concerning native
scouts and passes, and not being trained to take upon himself
precautionary responsibility, had been duly frightened and coerced by
the scrawl of a hieroglyphic on a remnant of blue paper.
The Intelligence officer considered the whole affair with great
suspicion, and when he returned to the headquarters bivouac he walked
down to the new guide's _entourage_ and took stock of his "boys" and
animals. One of the five "boys" was missing, also a piebald pony which
had caught his eye earlier in the day. The Intelligence officer held
his peace, but, armed with this information, determined to watch
future developments, and flung himself down on the roadside to snatch
half an hour's sleep before the forward march should commence.
It was the brigadier's intention to seize Luckhoff--a little hamlet
situated half-way between Orange River and Fauresmith--that morning by
a _coup de main_. To accomplish this he detached half his force
without baggage, under the command of the colonel of the 21st, to move
as rapidly as circumstances would permit, and to occupy and hold the
town until he himself arrived with the main body later in the day.
The newly acquired guide was detailed to accompany the advance column.
By nine o'clock in the morning this advanced column was in position to
bear down upon the little prairie township. The colonel of the 21st,
well versed in the tactics best suited to surprise a village on the
open plain, extended a squadron into a horn-like formation, and
galloped, as he imagined, to the surprise of the inhabitants. The
sequel was very different to what had been expected. Save for women,
the village was deserted, while from the high ground and hills to the
north-east, a fully prepared posse from Botmann's commando opened a
heavy rifle-fire on those cavalrymen who had been detached to occupy
the farther approaches. Our Intelligence guide, who by some means had
disappeared during the later progress of the advance, was at once in
evidence as soon as the town was entered. He rode straight as a die to
a small store which ornamented the main street. Ultimately it proved
that he was the owner of this store.
The first comment of the intelligent reader will be that the action of
the guide was clumsy, both in design and execution, and that a column
thus duped deserves to meet with ill success. The guide's action was
undoubtedly clumsy, but it must be remembered that he had had long
experience of the British: he knew as well as every other man of
similar calibre in South Africa how far he could afford to play with
their forbearance. As far as the staff of the New Cavalry Brigade was
concerned, once the guide was admitted to the confidence of the
general the possibility of checking his further machinations was
beyond their reach. The fault lay with those who had given him his
credentials. Yet there was no proof against the man: he allowed that
the store was his, he admitted that he had sent one of his natives on
ahead of the column, claimed that he had permission thus to use the
native, who, he assured us, was one of the most trusted and loyal
scouts that the British had. For what reason had he sent him? The
answer was simple enough. He had only sent him with a message to the
man who was looking after his store, with instructions not to open it
after daybreak lest it should be looted by friend and foe alike. It
was a pity, as it subsequently proved, that we failed to make him
produce this loyal boy.
The only remark in the way of comment made by the brigadier was to the
effect that "One only learns by experience." He refused, and doubtless
rightly, to accede to the wishes of others on his staff that the man
should be executed out of hand. He promised to send him back to Cape
Colony, where, doubtless, he would give a satisfactory explanation,
and return again to some position of trust and honour in the British
service.
People in England, and those who have had experience of this
extraordinary campaign, will never realise the extent to which the
British army in South Africa has reposed confidence in knaves and
scoundrels. For one man that may have been shot or hanged, there will
have been a hundred who have gained the confidence of the British to
betray it either to their own use or that of the enemy. No one could
ever know or assess the extent of the knavery which has arisen,
flourished, and grown fat in this long-protracted war. And what a
field for sharps and knaves! Was not the control of the whole country
in the hands of straightforward and fair-thinking English
officers,--men whose word was their bond, and who never thought to
distrust their fellow-men, until their fellow-men thrust their
barefaced iniquities upon them. Believe me, that under the Southern
Cross it is not the Dutch who are vile.
But although we could not hope now to fall upon the arch-guerilla with
the full weight of first surprise, yet from the nature of the
situation in which he had been engaged during the last three weeks his
theatre and resources were of necessity circumscribed. The situation
even yet presented possibilities, and the brigadier settled to remain
longer in Luckhoff than he had originally intended, sending a patrol
to reconnoitre the Orange River. This patrol met with some success. It
was commanded by the same pessimistic subaltern who had commanded the
advance-guard from Richmond Road. Again it was his fortune to chaperon
the Intelligence officer in a quest for information. It was a
fifteen-mile ride to the nearest portion of the river, consequently it
was late in the afternoon when the patrol entered the hilly tracts of
country which covered the immediate approaches to the yellow stream.
As the advance-guard of the party topped a little nek, they rode into
a group of five burghers. The British dragoons had the advantage, as
the burghers had only that moment emerged from the river, which they
had crossed with the aid of rafts manufactured from drift-wood and
rushes. Not a shot was fired, and the men surrendered gladly the only
two rifles remaining to them.
One of the most curious traits in the burgher character has been
displayed in the manner of his capitulation. He will always tell you
that he is pleased to surrender, that it is an end he has been longing
and praying for for months, and yet until the actual moment which
necessitates surrender he will strain every nerve to avoid capture,
will suffer every privation and hardship; endure hunger, thirst,
disease, and sickness, rather than walk the few miles which separate
him from the British outposts. Take the case of these men who were
just captured: after a most harassing campaign, they had gone to the
risk and pain of crossing a rapid river in full flood; having crossed
at infinite peril, they welcomed the advent of the hostile patrol
which deprived them of their liberty, and far from making expression
of resentment, availed themselves of the opportunity to surrender, in
an attitude which ill disguised their eagerness.
Moreover, they were loquacious. They had crossed the railway at
Paauwpan with the remnant of De Wet's fugitive commando. In the
neighbourhood of Philipstown the guerilla had ordered a general
break-up of the whole of his remaining commando. At certain points
along the Orange River it was said that boats were hidden for the
purpose of effecting a crossing. But this particular party, having
been unable to find one of these boats, and having been shot at by
various patrols from pursuing columns, had effected the passage of the
river in their own original way but to fall into our hands. As far as
De Wet and President Steyn were concerned, these men professed to be
able to speak with authority. Reduced to a single Cape cart, they had
determined to cross at Botha's Drift. Their crossing was to have been
covered by a commando collected by Botmann at Philippolis, and they
themselves, in common with all the dispersed burghers, had orders to
concentrate within four days at Philippolis, where supplies, horses,
and ammunition would be awaiting them. All this, as it coincided with
previous knowledge, was valuable information, and the patrol hurried
to make the return journey to Luckhoff.
FOOTNOTES:
[35] Jocular term borrowed from the Dutch for small British columns.
[36] Dutch village.
[37] It is interesting to note that eventually this reasoning was
brought home to the direction of operations in South Africa. After
practically a year of the unsatisfactory groping referred to in the
text, the conception of the blockhouse system enabled mounted troops to
operate far into the vital interior of the country without returning to
the railway. It must be understood that the main use of the
blockhouse-line was not to stretch an impassable _chevaux-de-frise_
from point to point, but to furnish a series of posts, which ensured
the safety of the convoys that followed their trend. By this means it
was possible to keep columns operating in the interior supplied with
food and forage. So much so, that towards the end many columns had not
been near a town or railway for weeks. The conception of the "drives,"
which ultimately brought the peace movement to a head, was an
afterthought, which is commonly attributed in South Africa to the
sagacity of that intrepid and versatile young cavalry leader, Colonel
Mike Rimington.
[38] Dutch mounted columns.
[39] This very contingent continued to serve with distinction for quite
a considerable period after the little episode narrated above.
XI.
FULL CRY.
Luckhoff, in normal circumstances, has little to distinguish it from
the many rural villages scattered over the South African veldt. If
anything, it is more squalid than the general run of fourth-rate
hamlets. But when the New Cavalry Brigade went into billet there, it
was more or less a deserted and plundered village. The inhabitants may
have totalled a hundred souls, the large majority of whom were women
and children; and we should not have found these in possession if our
Intelligence guide had been able to give earlier notice of our coming.
As is the case with all these hamlets, the inhabitants who had escaped
the clutches of the "clearing-up" columns were in the possession of
_caches_ in the neighbourhood, where they hid away as soon as the
dust-clouds on the horizon forewarned them of the near approach of a
British column. Many columns had already "been through" Luckhoff, from
Clements in the early days, to Settle moving in stately magnificence
with thousands of cattle and hundreds of women in the preceding
spring. Each marauder in turn had left something of a mark, but none
had left so bare a skeleton or had stamped so plainly the impress of
horrid war as a column of somebody's bushmen. The brigadier had
planted his little red pennant in front of the villa of the absconded
Predikant. It was the only house in the place which had any pretension
to decorative finish. But when the staff took possession it was a
sorry pigsty. In its halcyon days a part of the house had evidently
been in the possession of a young mother, for two of the apartments
were knee-deep in a disordered heap of female apparel, intermingled
with the tiny garments which mothers store away--small socks and
bonnets tied with pink and blue. The ruthless hand of man had
ransacked each drawer and crevice, and all that calls forth the
sacred care of women lay tossed and tumbled in the dirt of floor and
passage. To those who had time to think, a sad, heart-rending sight,
pitiful evidence of the degrading influence of war. During the first
year of the struggle there was not a man in the British army who would
have pushed a woman aside to ransack the sacred corners of her
chamber. But war's brutal influence in time blunted the finer
instincts. How could it be otherwise? The longer a struggle is
protracted the fiercer and more bestial it will become, until at last
familiarity with the final arbitration of the beast deadens the better
influences of human reasoning. As one saw upon every hand the ruin of
these homes--many of which showed evidence of refinement bred of
wealth and education--one felt the pity of it all, and cursed the
leaders who in their spirit of tin-pot patriotism had pushed a
struggle, already hopeless, to its most barbarous issue.
Looting was not allowed. That is true, but how was it to be
prevented?--where can you draw the line between legitimate requisition
in war and brutal plunder? Can you punish the men who in the morning
followed you without flinching in the face of death, because in the
evening you find them searching in a deserted house for a 'kerchief,
waist-band, or baby's sock to send as a memento to the mother or
sweetheart waiting patiently at home? Is there not some extenuation
for the man whose "pal" has been ambushed and butchered, when he
gleefully places a match to the murderer's byre or dwelling? Place
yourselves in the position of the fighting man before you consider
actions which are inseparable from partisan warfare, and bear in mind
that if the leaders of the enemy had capitulated when it was first
evident that they were a beaten people, there would not have been a
tithe of the brutality and suffering which marked the final phases of
the struggle. The story of the Predikant was strange. Himself a
firebrand of the most dangerous nature, he had preached an
anti-British _jehad_ with all the force of his ecclesiastical
rhetoric. Yet his three sons were of other clay. One, a staunch
trooper of Thorneycroft's, had died a soldier's death on Spion Kop's
shell-swept summit; another, an athlete of no mean order, had served
in Lord Robert's bodyguard; while the third was still fighting against
the people of his kind as an officer in some other British corps. The
two daughters, both married to _veldt kornets_, were already widows it
may be, for the irony of fate is infinite, by their brothers' rifles.
We found one Britisher in Luckhoff, and he was a Scotsman. His story
was plausible; but though it had satisfied other column commanders, it
did not find the same credence with our brigadier. According to the
man's statement he was neutral. Had been neutral since the outbreak of
war. He was an engineer in the Koffyfontein mines, and since these had
closed down he had come to Luckhoff and made a living by
market-gardening. Two circumstances conspired against the continued
freedom of this so-called Scotsman. The first was the fact that he
quoted our Intelligence guide as a reference for his good conduct; the
second, that we had found a steam flour-mill at work in the vicinity,
and circumstantial evidence pointed to our market-gardener as the
_mechanicien_ in charge. This being given as the real reason for his
presence in the hamlet, there was no need for his sojourn to be
continued, as we had closed down the safety-valve until the boiler
burst, and wrecked the mechanism of the engine. Flour-mills, even when
worked by market-gardeners of doubtful neutrality, can be of service
to a starving enemy.
The brigadier determined to halt a little in Luckhoff to procure if
possible more definite information. About midday this information
came, from both ordinary and extraordinary channels. As the
headquarters sat at lunch a mounted messenger arrived from Orange
River,--a small spare Hottentot or Griqua, who weighed about five
stone, and who had been put upon a horse and told to cover fifteen
miles an hour until he found us. The message he brought was in point
of fact a confirmation of the information which we had gleaned already
from our prisoners of the preceding evening. "De Wet, and with him the
President," ran the message, "crossed the Orange River at Botha's
Drift at three o'clock to-day (yesterday). By mistake gap in circle
let him through. Crossed without transport and with smallest
following. Presumedly will go north. Plumer cannot leave Springfontein
until early day after to-morrow (to-morrow). Must leave you to act
exactly as you think right. Co-operate if possible with Plumer!"
_Brigadier._ "Presumedly will go north! Well, that is the most
ingenuous expression of opinion that I have ever heard. A man crosses
from the south bank of a river to the north, and by an extreme effort
our friends of the Intelligence are able to conjecture that he will go
north. He certainly has the northern field open to him. It is worthy
of the information slips issued by our friend the D.A.A.G. for
Intelligence at Bloemfontein for the guidance of the columns in his
districts: 'Everything in this shop window sixpence halfpenny; take
your choice every time.' As usual, we shall have to work out our own
salvation. Mr Intelligence, the map!"
The map was duly spread upon the Reverend Predikant's mahogany board,
and with the aid of a slip of paper the distances measured off. The
brigadier sat back in his chair, drawing meditatively at the bent
stem of his Boer pipe. When the measuring was over he remained silent
a moment and then gave his opinion of the situation.
_Brigadier._ "They evidently have no one operating down from
Bloemfontein, otherwise they would not quote Plumer. It is just as
evident that De Wet slipped across the river at some spot where it is
not precisely convenient for any of our Colony brigands to pursue him.
That is, we are their only hope and the only mobile people within
reach. De Wet crossed the Orange River yesterday afternoon, therefore,
according to our information, he should have slept at Philippolis last
night. As a rule De Wet never sleeps in the same place on two
consecutive nights. But his arrival at Philippolis was in rather
peculiar circumstances. He didn't arrive a successful swashbuckler
cocking his hat with all his plans made, but a washed-out fugitive
with all his plans to make. Therefore the chances are that he won't
have got very far on his way from Philippolis to-night. Probably he
won't make a start until to-morrow morning. He knows that his right
is clear. He knew last night or early this morning that we had arrived
at Luckhoff. He will have information by this that we have halted this
morning, and that the Riet River is in flood. Therefore it is plain
that he, taking us as an average British commando, can leave
Philippolis at daybreak to-morrow, cross the Riet, and destroy the
Kalabas bridge behind him without inconvenience from us. At least that
is the map reading of this picnic. It is a short fifty miles from
Philippolis to Fauresmith; we are thirty miles from Fauresmith. A
British commando halted to-day would not reach Fauresmith until
evening to-morrow; a Boer _paarde kommando_ will have done its fifty
miles by the time one of our 'crawlers' outspans for breakfast. Now,
old man Baker, get out orders. For public guidance, we march at four
o'clock for Koffyfontein and Kimberley, going d----d slow; for private
information, as soon as it is dark we will change direction and be in
possession of Fauresmith as soon after daybreak as possible. Whoever
is in possession of Fauresmith will be in possession of the bridge
over Riet River. Mr Intelligence, it will be your business to make it
sufficiently well known in this metropolis that our destination is
Koffyfontein for Kimberley. Don't make them suspicious by being too
emphatic about it."
_Brigade-Major._ "Very good, sir; but we shall have to cover at least
forty miles!"
_B._ "True for you; what's the odds?"
_B.-M._ "Only the ox-transport. It can't reach Fauresmith by daybreak,
night-marching. There ain't anything of a moon--in fact it's going to
be devilish dark with all these clouds about."
_B._ "True again: but we will dodge all that. As soon as we have
changed direction to our true line, we will leave the transport to
come along as best it may: it can follow us to Fauresmith."
_B.-M._ "What escort shall I give it?"
_B._ "How many dismounted men are there? It can have just as many
cripples as we possess. I am not going to worry about transport. If I
am wrong in my calculations and De Wet attempts to cross behind me, I
want that transport to deceive him. He would never dream of it being
unprotected. He cannot be in any strength; besides, I shall want every
mounted man I have got for my scheme. The transport, ox and mule, must
take its chance. But see that it doesn't straggle. The mule can keep
up with us as long as possible, but it must keep together. Likewise
the ox-transport, taking its own time, must keep closed up. I assure
you the only object of these people on this journey will be to get
away. Two blocks of moving waggons will mystify them, not attract
them. Right away,--not a word about the change of direction until
after dark--not even to C.O.'s. Tell 'em any story you like."