note an interpolation that took place in the Hungarian Diet on 11th
March with respect to it. In answer to Deputy Pollit, Mr Tisza, the
Minister President, stated “in the answer to the question as to
whether the Hungarian Government approves of the intervention, _there
is no question of intervention, but only of good advice_, which had
been given in concert with the European Powers, and which had been
accepted in the most friendly manner by the Porte.... In answer to
the question as to the action of Hungary if the pacification was not
effected, and if Servia intervened, _such an eventuality was most
improbable_ ... but in that case the policy of the Empire would be
guided by the interests of Europe.... With reference to the question
of the refugees, the Empire had not disregarded the interests of
humanity ... as was shown by the subvention amounting to nearly
1,000,000 florins which had been already given to them.... The
speaker concluded by expressing a hope that the House would accept
his explanation.” If they did, they were easily satisfied, these
Hungarian Deputies. Not a word about the capital question of shutting
the frontier to the rebels. Servia, too, was arming to the teeth, and
was to declare war on Turkey three months later.
We shall see the literal fulfilment of this prediction. Bosnia
was the first to follow suit with the Herzegovina. On the 8th
February 1876, Sir H. Elliot writes to Lord Derby: “The Porte is
much disturbed by the unsatisfactory account received from the
Governor‐General of Bosnia, who has applied for fresh troops. _Bands
supposed to consist of old Grenzers are stated to have passed the
Save from Austria at four different points, but have been repulsed.
The body which invaded Bosnia is stated to have consisted of 400 or
500 men all well‐armed._ Much excitement is said to prevail on both
sides of the Servian frontier, and apprehensions are entertained
of an aggression from that quarter. Reschid Pasha tells me that
Count Zichy has given him, on the part of Count Andrassy, the
strongest assurance ... that measures shall be adopted to prevent the
recurrence of such acts, and has promised ... that those who have
taken part in them shall be disarmed and _internés_.”[71]
It would be difficult to carry intentional bad faith further. All
this time, notes and memorandums were flying about the Chancelleries
of Europe to force the Porte to give guarantees for suppressing
an insurrection which was being organised and fed by bands “all
well‐armed” across a friendly frontier, its suppression being thus
rendered materially impossible. As well might one try to extinguish
a conflagration, over an unlimited area, that was being continually
fed by petroleum springs, the sources of which could not be got
at. Nor let it be supposed that to guard such a line of frontier
was impossible. The rebels had it all their own way. And so had
the Diplomatists of the “Allied Courts of Berlin, Vienna, and St
Petersburg.” Russian Committees were joining their efforts to
Austrian.
On the 14th February 1876, Sir H. Elliot writes to Lord Derby: “The
accounts of the encouragement given to the insurgents at Ragusa
greatly exceeds all that I was prepared for. The Russian Consulate is
the open resort of the insurgent chiefs; their correspondence is sent
to the Consul, who is a party to all their projects, and associates
himself intimately with them. He does not appear to make any attempt
to conceal the part he is playing, for on the occasion of the death
of the chief Maxima, in one of the late encounters, the Russian flag
at the Consulate was hoisted at half‐mast, and M. Jomini himself
joined the funeral procession.
“Some of the wounded when asked why they continue the struggle when
the Porte is ready to grant all their demands, have answered plainly
that they are bound to go on as long as they are told by Russia to do
so. The assurances given at St Petersburg of the wish of the Imperial
Government that the insurgents would lay down their arms, must
naturally go for nothing as long as its official Representative, with
whom they are in communication, encourages them to go on.”[72] Pretty
plain speaking this! and Austria that continued the “exequatur” to
a foreign Consul, acting thus on its territory towards a friendly
Power. So gross and palpable was this assistance given by Austria
to the insurgents, whilst pretending all the time to be so keenly
anxious for its suppression, that Lord Derby thought it necessary
on the 10th March 1876, to give the following instructions to Sir
A. Buchanan, the English Ambassador at Vienna: “I have to inform
Your Excellency that it has come to the knowledge of Her Majesty’s
Government, through Her Majesty’s Ambassador at Constantinople,
that the Porte had received information that a severe fight took
place on the Dalmatian frontier on the 4th inst., and that on the
following day, the combat was renewed by a force said to be _700
strong, who came from Austrian territory with large supplies of
ammunition, and that this having occurred so immediately after the
assurances of the Austro‐Hungarian Government that their frontier
would be officially guarded_, has caused great discouragement to
the Turkish Government, and it is feared that the effect of it in
Montenegro will be very mischievous, and I have therefore to request
Your Excellency to call the serious attention of the Imperial
Government to this matter.”[73] But these remonstrances, which were
evidently sincere and well‐meaning, had not the very slightest effect
at Vienna. The Hungarian Chancellor was always ready to give any
amount of assurances and promises to the credulous Sir A. Buchanan.
On the 3rd April 1876, Sir H. Elliot was obliged to write again:
“I learn that the Porte has received information of the passage
of considerable bands _said to be accompanied by two pieces of
artillery_ from Dalmatia and Croatia, into the north‐western district
of Bosnia.”[74] And further, on the next day, 4th April, he writes:
“A telegram from the Governor‐General of Bosnia, which has been read
to me by Reschid Pasha, gives a very alarming account of the state
of things in that province. _Armed bands are passing freely from the
Austrian territory_, and there are symptoms indicating a probable
insurrection of the populations along the rivers Save and Una. The
Governor‐General states that he has been unable to re‐establish the
line of telegraph along the Save, _as the workmen are continually
fired at from the Austrian bank of the river, and his remonstrances
addressed to the Austrian authorities have been unattended to_.”[75]
The reason why Austria was not content to confine her operations
to Herzegovina, but had extended them to Bosnia, was clear. The
Porte was succeeding, in spite of all difficulties, in pacifying
the former, and as the Berlin note was being drawn up at Berlin for
the three “Allied Powers” and would be presented in a month, such a
precipitation would derange all their plans.
The following despatch of Sir H. Elliot of 7th April 1876 clearly
indicates this state of things. “The enclosed report from Mr Sandison
of the account received at the Porte from Haidar Effendi (the Turkish
Commissioner) gives a very serious aspect to the state of affairs
in Bosnia. It is evident that the Austro‐Hungarian Government _have
failed lamentably in their engagement to guard their own frontier,
and by means of well‐armed bands coming from their territory, a
formidable insurrection has been excited in districts which have
hitherto remained quiet. Although the news received from the
Herzegovina is good, and gave hopes of a pacification_, it would be
too much to expect that the movement in Bosnia should not produce its
effect in the districts which have been so long in insurrection.”[76]
In the month of May we arrived at another stage of the business. It
is time that diplomacy should register another point of “terrain
acquis.” On the 4th May 1876 Lord Derby, writing to Sir A. Buchanan,
says: “The Austrian Ambassador called upon me this afternoon and
placed in my hands for perusal a despatch which he had received from
his Government. The purport of the despatch was to state that there
is _an entire agreement between the Governments of Austria, Germany
and Russia as to affairs in the East_, and that any reports that may
have been circulated to the contrary are simple inventions.”[77]
The purport of making this communication could be no other than a
warning to all whom it may concern, that they could join or not
join the “European Concert,” as they thought proper. It would make
no difference to the European Concert. It was a notice certainly
calculated to open the eyes, even of the blind, to what was going on.
As the fact of armed bands could not be disputed, it was obviously
the interest of Austria to endeavour to throw the blame on others,
Montenegro and Servia especially. We shall come to these little
States later, but _à propos_ of shifting the blame on Servia, there
is a very significant despatch from Consul‐General White, dated
Belgrade, 28th April 1876. “The Prince (of Servia) takes no pains to
conceal that, more than ever, he considers a collision with the Porte
as within the range of possibilities; but he continues to disclaim at
the same time any intention to act as the aggressor. He pointed out
to me the other day that the portion of Bosnia which is conterminous
to Servia has been entirely free from armed bands since last
November, when the Papas Zarko was repulsed into Servia, _whilst the
insurgents who had within the last few weeks made their appearance
on the river Unna between Bihatch, Novi and Kostainitza, were all in
proximity to the Austrian frontier_, and he defied anyone to show
that Servia had been instrumental in fostering insurrection in that
department of Bosnia, though he added that such an accusation had
been made somewhere, evidently alluding to Austrian Authorities.”[78]
The explanation of these apparent mysteries was really simple enough.
Servia was reserving herself for Bulgaria, which was within the
sphere of her action, as she herself was within the orbit of Russia’s
influence, and she had no intention of playing Austria’s game for
Austria’s sole benefit.
Unless strongly backed by Russia, Servia knew well enough that
Austria, posted in the conterminous province of Bosnia, would be a
most awkward neighbour, and render any hope of future independence
on her part purely illusory. Turkey’s yoke would be light indeed
in comparison to that of Austria, if she were surrounded on three
sides by the Kaiserlich. A great deal of the apparent contradiction,
see‐sawing and hesitation of this period is to be accounted for by
these conflicting inner currents, set in motion by two of the three
allied Governments, whose agreement Count Beust was instructed to
inform Lord Derby was “entire.” It was entire as regarded Turkey,
there was no doubt about that, but there was a very pretty little
by‐play going on besides, within the circle of the larger drama. No
wonder this state of things created a situation, as Consul Holmes
pithily described it, “in which everyone seems to profess precisely
what he fails to practise.”
BERLIN NOTE.
Whatever light friction there may have been between Russia and
Austria in the Spring of 1876, it seems to have been smoothed over,
probably by the intervention of the third disinterested partner in
the Alliance; for on Saturday, the 13th May 1876, Lord Odo Russell,
the British Ambassador at Berlin, received an invitation from Prince
Bismarck to call on him that day in order to meet Count Andrassy
and Prince Gortchakoff, together with the Ambassadors of France
and Italy; M. de Bülow and Baron Jomini were also present at the
interview. “After a few preliminary words from Prince Bismarck,
Prince Gortchakoff and Count Andrassy confirmed the cordial
understanding that exists between them, and expressed their sincere
hope and anxious desire that the Governments of England, France
and Italy, _who have given their moral support_ to the attempted
pacification of the Herzegovinians, will equally agree to support
the further attempts they have now met to concert, in consequence
of the alarming state of affairs in Turkey. Baron Jomini was then
invited to read the enclosed document to us, and the proposal to
which they solicit the co‐operation of the Great Powers.... Prince
Gortchakoff observed that he and Count Andrassy would remain till
Monday (15th inst.) at Berlin, and that they hoped the Governments of
England, France and Italy would be able to express an opinion on the
telegraphic summary of their proposal, before they left.”[79]
It is no part of the purport of this book to comment on the
_procédés_ of the “three Allied Powers” vis‐à‐vis of the other
so‐called Great Powers, England, France and Italy. That is a matter
of their interior _ménage_. We are exclusively concerned with their
conduct, severally and collectively, towards Turkey. If it were
otherwise, one might have something to say concerning the strangeness
and singularity of the proceeding among Great Powers, supposed to
stand on a footing of equality, of three of their number convoking
the rest to hear a document of the very highest international
importance read to them for their assent to it, if possible by
telegraph, within two days! But let us proceed with the narrative.
The document referred to, which goes in history by the name of
the “Berlin Note,” was a very curious document. It started with
the declaration that “the alarming tidings which come from Turkey
are of a nature to _impel the three Cabinets to draw closer their
intimacy_. The three Imperial Courts have deemed themselves called
upon to concert among themselves measures for averting the dangers of
the situation, _with the concurrence_ of the other great Christian
Powers.” After referring to the history of the question up to the
Andrassy Memorandum, by which the Powers acquire a moral right and an
obligation to insist on “pacification,” and enumerating the causes
that have prevented the success of that action, and especially the
agitation caused by the prolongation of the strife in other parts of
the Turkish Dominions, and laying stress on the deplorable events at
Salonica, it declares that it is most essential to establish certain
guarantees of a nature to insure beyond doubt the loyal and full
application of the measures agreed upon between the Powers and the
Porte.”
As the first step in this direction, the three Imperial Courts
propose to insist with the Porte on a suspension of arms for
two months, and to open negotiations between the Porte and the
rebel delegates _on the basis of the wishes that the latter have
formulated_, and which may be enumerated as follows:—
(1) That materials for the reconstruction of their houses should be
provided the refugees by the Turkish Government.
(2) The appointment of a mixed commission to superintend reforms.
(3) The concentration of the Turkish troops on some points to be
agreed upon.
(4) Christians and Mussulmans to retain their arms.
(5) The Consuls or Delegates of the Powers to keep a watch over the
application of the reforms in general, and on the steps relative
to the repatriation in particular.
And then the Note concludes: “If, however, the armistice were
to expire without the efforts of the Powers being successful in
attaining the end they have in view, the three Imperial Courts
are of opinion that it would become necessary to supplement their
diplomatic action by the sanction of an agreement with a view to such
efficacious measures as might appear to be demanded in the interest
of general peace, to check the evil and prevent its development.”
It is not intended here to criticise at length these five heads,
but one interesting and significant point must be noted. The Note
says, in a passage _underlined_ above, that these five heads were
framed “on the basis of the wishes formulated by the Bosnian and
Herzegovinian Delegates.” Who were these Delegates? On the 27th
May, the _Times_ quoted an article from the _Nord_ of April 1876,
in which another Note was addressed by one Golub Babitch, in the
name of the Bosnian insurgent chiefs, confirming full powers on one
Gabriel Vasilitchki (a Russian subject who had made himself very busy
in these matters) to treat on their behalf for peace on the basis
of four points which were absolutely identical with four points of
the Berlin Note.[80] Now, who was this Golub Babitch, who describes
himself in this Note as “voivode,” and who signs in the name and on
the behalf of the “chief Bosnian chiefs”? Mr Consul Freeman, who was
by no means prejudiced against the insurgents or in favour of the
Turks, and knew his _monde_ well, describes him. He was a “former
brigand,” now the chief of one of the principal bands, consisting of
3000 men, all well armed, that had invaded Bosnia.[81]
This, then, was the source of the inspiration of the five heads of
the famous Berlin Note. It might certainly be more justly described
in history as the “Golub Babitch Note.” The five heads, however, seem
to have been admirably adapted to secure the object perhaps intended,
viz., to perpetrate and aggravate the bloodshed between the armed
Mussulmans and the armed returning refugees, and so by “bleeding
Turkey to death” to justify the action of the last and most important
notice thrown in carelessly, and almost as an afterthought, and at
the end of the Berlin Note, but which was, of course, the whole point
of it, viz., that if the measures proposed did not produce their
effect (or, let us add, produced the exactly opposite effect), “the
three Imperial Courts would consider it necessary to supplement their
diplomatic action by the sanction of an agreement,” etc., etc. If
ever there was a case of the sting being in the tail, it was in this
“Berlin Note.”
Lord Derby was not deceived either as to the intrinsic value, or
worthlessness, of the four points which he politely but mercilessly
dissected in an interview with Count Munster, the German Ambassador
in London, on the 15th of May 1876,[82] nor was he intimidated by
the “still closer intimacy of the three Imperial Courts,” which
the Note ostentatiously declared. France and Italy thought fit to
adhere to it. The rejection of it by England made its rejection by
Turkey doubly certain. It was certain in any event. The courteous but
unshakeable resolution of the English Cabinet to have nothing to do
with the Berlin Note, in spite of the “still closer intimacy of the
three Imperial Courts,” and the adherence of the other two Cabinets,
brought the whole proposal down like a house of cards. But the allied
quiver was not empty.
A stage, however, was reached in the Berlin Note which it is
necessary to note carefully, as a new departure, involving a
readjustment of compasses all round, became henceforth necessary.
We have seen the apparently unaccountable hurry that Austria was
in to get matters in Bosnia and Herzegovina diplomatically settled
to her satisfaction. The Consular intervention in August 1875, the
Andrassy Note in December 1875, General Rodich’s parley with the
insurgents in April 1876, and the Berlin Memorandum on 15th May
1876, were the different stages of this pragmatical interference.
The reason was clear. Austria was quite well aware, through her
Intelligence Departments, that Russia was making superhuman, albeit
unofficial, efforts to catch up the advance that Austria had secured
for her operations in the Turkish provinces, and that every day made
it less probable that the lead in the negotiations would be left in
her hands.
We shall see that from this moment, _i.e._, on the rejection of the
Berlin Memorandum, Austria’s precipitation no longer exists, and that
she takes ample time to readjust her compass to the altered condition
of things. The principal object of this Appendix being to describe
the conduct and follow the policy of Austria in these matters, it is
necessary to examine a little more closely the relations of Austria
with Montenegro, end the part played by this principality in this
so‐called rebellion.
It was generally taken for granted that Montenegro was completely
and exclusively under Russian influence and protection, that it was
a citadel and outpost of Russia in this part of the world, and that
its prince moved in obedience to orders from St Petersburg alone.
This belief, which assumed the character of an axiom in men’s minds,
served admirably the purpose of Austria in the general mystification
with which it suited her to surround her policy at this time.
As the active and effective action of Montenegro in the insurrection
was a secret to none in Europe, and as Russia exclusively pulled
the strings which moved its prince, it was obvious that Russia was
at the bottom of the Herzegovinian insurrection which Austria was
doing all she could to assist the Porte in suppressing—_quod erat
demonstrandum_. Now, there can be no doubt that Russia had for a
very long time past preponderating influence in the Black Mountains,
and that during the whole period that Austria followed what we have
called her “normal policy” with respect to the Ottoman Empire, the
influence of Russia over Montenegro was exclusive of any other
followed in the nature of things; but Consul‐General White, at any
rate, knew better than to suppose that this meant that no steps
had been taken by Austria (and the nature of the steps is evident)
to acquire that influence over the prince that the “new policy” of
Austria rendered desirable and necessary. In a despatch of the 25th
of February 1876, Consul‐General White, writing from Belgrade to
Sir H. Elliot, says: “I beg to inform Your Excellency that I have
been assured, from a source which I have hitherto found reliable,
that the chief reason that has prompted Prince Milan to assume a
bolder and quasi‐martial attitude is the growing suspicion in his
mind that a bait in the shape of an accession of territory was about
to be offered by Austria on behalf of the Porte to the Prince of
Montenegro. This opinion is strongly entertained here by persons _who
are supposed to be well acquainted with the nature of the relations
which have existed during the last two years between the Court of
Vienna and that Prince_.”[83]
Not only did money pour into the principality, and arms, munitions
and military science, as we shall presently see, were lavishly
provided to these interesting mountaineers, but when the conditions
of peace between Servia and Montenegro on one side, and the Porte
on the other, came to be discussed (in the month of August 1876),
Austria, who opposed the claim for any accession of territory to
Servia, advocated a considerable extension for Montenegro. There can
be slight doubt that this was one of the conditions of the bargain
arranged “during the last two years between the Courts of Vienna and
that Prince.” It is, of course, a noteworthy coincidence that the two
years mentioned at the beginning of these intimate relations brings
us exactly to the date when Count Andrassy became Chancellor of the
Austro‐Hungarian Empire.
Mr Monson, the English political agent at Ragusa—afterwards sent
on a special mission to Cettinje, and now H.B.M.’s Ambassador at
Paris, who will certainly not be accused of prejudice against the
Prince of Montenegro, by whom, on the contrary, he seems to have been
quite fascinated, be it said in passing—in writing to Lord Derby
from Ragusa, on the 14th June 1876, says: “The town of Ragusa, the
capital of Dalmatia, is daily visited by armed insurgents who, at
Vienna, are represented to be peaceful Dalmatians from the rural
districts ... or Montenegrins on their travels, whose costumes would
be incomplete without the traditional carbines and poniards....
During the period in which the export of munitions of war was
suspended, _the contraband traffic was openly carried on at Ragusa
and Meglina without hindrance; cases of dynamite were passed across
the frontier, to be used for the destruction of the Turkish forts
and block‐houses_; and it is alleged that certain _military stores_
have been furnished to the insurgents at Grebgi by way of Ombla....
_The share taken by Austrian subjects in the late battles of the
Douga Pass is notorious; it is now known that 179 Crevoscians were
killed during the three days’ fighting; but, as far as I am aware, no
measures have been taken to prevent a repetition of such violations
of neutrality_.... My own conviction is that had it not been for the
money spent by Russia and by Dalmatian Panslavic Committees upon
certain influential chiefs, _the insurrection would long since have
collapsed_.... If these considerations are correct, as I honestly
believe them to be, it is clear that, as far as the Herzegovina is
concerned, a great step in the suppression of the insurrection would
be effected _if the Austrian Government would dissolve the Panslavic
Committees, enforce a strict surveillance of the frontier, and would
absolutely forbid and put down the export of arms and ammunition to
Montenegro._”[84]
The facts stated in this important despatch need no addition, and
would be only weakened by any commentary.
Let us proceed with others. Consul Holmes, writing from Bosna Serai,
on the 15th June 1876, to Lord Derby, says: “On the 6th inst., the
authorities at Mostar announced to the Baron Rodich (Governor of
Dalmatia) the fact that 1800 cases of rifles and their cartridges
were being landed at Cattaro for the Montenegrins. On the 9th, Baron
Rodich thanked them for their information, and said he would order
an enquiry into the matter and punish any illegality. Of course, the
arms will all be at Cettinje before he commences....”[85]
This is what Consul Holmes, who had resided fifteen years in the
country, and who knew more of it than any foreigner alive (it was he
whom the English Government lent to Baron Calice at the Conference,
on account of his special knowledge of the country, and who received
the thanks of both Governments for his services), says: “To people
residing in these countries, and who know the real state of parties,
_and the true nature of the insurrection_, the idea of securing
pacification by concessions to the insurgents appears simply absurd.
In the first place, reforms and concessions cannot be executed until
pacification is obtained, and in the next, for reasons which I have
frequently explained to your Lordship, those who are in arms and who
keep up the insurrection, _care nothing about them; they have other
objects and other interests_.”[86]
Such was Austria, that was at peace with Turkey, entertaining
friendly relations with the Porte, and protesting in every tone of
diplomatic expressions to every Cabinet in Europe her earnest and
anxious desire for the pacification of the Turkish Provinces!
APPENDIX C
BULGARIAN‐ATROCITIES
The Slav Committees that had been for thirteen years “working up”
the recalcitrant materials of rebellion in Bulgaria, were proceeding
leisurely in their work when Count Andrassy stole a march upon
them in the Herzegovina; but in spite of every effort on the part
of Austria to precipitate a diplomatic crisis before the Bulgarian
plot was ripe, the Slav Committees, whose venue was Bulgaria, caught
him up before his work was completed. The head Slav Committee was
at Moscow, and there were two central Committees at Kichenew and
Bucharest. They had been established for about thirteen years, but
although their activity had been intermittent, it was through their
influence that the Bulgarian Church had been separated from the
Greek Patriarchal, and that a Bulgarian School under Government
patronage had been established at Odessa to form young Bulgarians
into missionary propagandists of the Slav idea. When, however, the
Herzegovina insurrection broke out, and matters were fast ripening
on that side, a revival of energy at once manifested itself in the
action of these Committees with reference to Bulgaria. As General
Tchernagoff wrote in his paper, the _Russki Mir_ (on 11th May 1876):
“I chose the route by way of Kischenew and the Danube, _along the
whole course of which_, commencing from the Russian frontier to the
Servian boundary, _Committees were formed towards the end of last
year_ for organising the plans of the Bulgarians in their approaching
struggle for independence. Commencing from Bolgrad (a Bulgarian
colony that fell away from Russia and became incorporated with
Roumania by virtue of the Treaty of Paris), I everywhere heard the
same thing, which was to the effect that all had been done that was
possible by the people for the impending struggle.... The movements
of the insurgents are regulated by a fixed programme.”
We have seen (p. 43) during Midhat Pasha’s Governorship of Bulgaria,
how a raid over the frontier, following the usual tactics of
exasperation, had endeavoured to excite a rising, which was promptly
suppressed by the energy of the Vali. In the beginning of 1874
unrest began to show itself again in the districts of Trianova,
Kezanlic, and Zagra, but, warned by the effects of neglect in
a recent instance, the authorities had all the leaders of the
movement arrested. Thereupon General Ignatieff made such energetic
representations to the Porte, that orders arrived, not only for the
release of the imprisoned, malcontents, but for the dismissal of all
functionaries concerned in their arrest. The effect of this novel
and original mode of dealing with an insurrection was soon apparent
in the effervescence and excitement it caused among the Mussulman
population throughout the Province. They saw rebel bands organising
without disguise, and approaching their own hearths, the leaders of
which were patronised by foreign consuls and supported by foreign
embassies, whereas defensive measures on the part of their own
natural leaders were discountenanced and punished.
It was in this frame of mind of the Mussulman population of the
Empire, that the troubles both at Salonica and in Bulgaria occurred.
In October 1875, a local rising took place in the village of Eski
Zagra. Mr Vice‐Consul Brophy writes to Sir H. Elliot:—“In October
1875 everything was settled for a rising in Bulgaria, in eight or ten
places simultaneously. Something occurred which made it advisable
that the rising should be put off, and messengers were sent to all
the centres, but the “put off” for Eski Zagra arrived twenty‐four
hours late, and that town rose in the full conviction that it was
being seconded by all the force of the insurgents. In fact, the
_émeute_, revolt, rebellion, revolution, or whatever it was, of May
last (1876) was to have come off in October 1875, but did not.”[87]
The Committees were not ready. But the unrest continued, and when
the Provincial Governors begged the Porte to send regular troops
into the district, General Ignatieff dissuaded Mahmoud Nedim, the
Grand Vizier, from doing so, on the ground that “the presence of
regular troops would have the effect of still further increasing the
excitement.”
We will now allow Vice‐Consul Dupuis, writing on 7th August 1876, to
give an account to Lord Derby of the origin of the outbreak: “This
was the condition of things when, on the 2nd of May, the insurrection
organised and planned by the Revolutionary Committees, established
during the last thirteen years in Bucharest and Moscow, suddenly
exploded at Avrat Alan. The plan of operation of the revolutionists,
assisted by the village priests and schoolmasters, was to destroy
the railways and bridges throughout the vilayet, to set on fire
Adrianople and Philippopolis, and to attack Tatar Bazardjik with 5000
men, and seize upon the Government stores there.” An accident caused
the premature explosion of the revolt. “A sergeant of Zaptiés, who
had gone to Avrat Alan, either to collect taxes or to effect some
arrests, was suddenly attacked by armed Bulgarians (who thought their
plans had been betrayed), and had to fly for his life. Shortly after,
troubles broke out at Otloukeuyi and Bellowa; at the same time, the
inhabitants of several Bulgarian villages, it would appear, under the
impression that the impending massacre was at hand, left their homes
and fled to Otloukeuyi and Avrat Alan.
The alarm then appears to have become general. The Christians were
afraid that they would be massacred by the Mussulmans, while the
latter were afraid that they were going to be exterminated by the
Christians. The numerical strength of the insurgents was stated to be
15,000. The Mutassarifat of Philippopolis was at that time a Tatar
Bazardjik. Troops were telegraphed for to the Governor‐General of
Adrianople, who, it is said, replied that _as he had no military
force at his disposal_, he thought the best plan would be to
raise irregulars. On the 4th May, a meeting of some notables at
Philippopolis was held, under the presidency of the Mollah, when
the recommendation of the Governor‐General, for raising Nefer Ami
(public soldiers) was approved of, and a decision to that effect was
signed and forwarded to Adrianople. Orders were then immediately
sent to different parts of the vilayet for enlisting irregulars or
Bashi‐bazouks.”[88] These Bashi‐bazouks attacked Peroushtitza Batak
and Klissoura and Otloukeuyi, and there is no doubt that very great
excesses were committed by them. But Mr Dupuis goes on to say:
“It is said, without any attempt at concealment, that the Russian
Vice‐Consul in Philippopolis is solely responsible for the sad
disasters which have befallen Peroushtitza. In many instances, too,
the villages were set on fire by the Bulgarians themselves in order
to compel their inhabitants to take up arms. The village of Singerli,
now a complete mass of ruins, was in the first instance set on fire
by a priest. This man, in order to force the people to rise against
the Government, rushed about the place, knife in hand, telling
them that their hour of deliverance had arrived, and that Russian
soldiers were at hand to aid them against the Turks. I am assured, on
reliable and independent authority, that the Bulgarian insurrection
was carefully and skilfully planned by men possessing knowledge and
experience in military tactics from foreign parts. Had their plans
succeeded, and if the Bulgarians had got the upper hand of the Turks,
there is little doubt the existence of Turkey in Europe would have
been endangered, and the Bulgarians would have committed far greater
excesses than are laid to the charge of the Mussulmans, from the
fact that the former had, from the commencement of the disturbance,
_killed every Turk they came across, regardless as to age or sex, and
by the practising upon them, in several instances, of unspeakable
atrocities_. Atrocities have, undoubtedly, been committed by the
Bulgarians as well as by the Turks. Thus at Carlowo, it was related
to me, on good authority, that a Turkish boy had both his arms flayed
to the elbows by the Bulgarians; while at Otloukeuyi, the Bulgarians
massacred eighty Mussulmans, and cut up a child into pieces, and
publicly offered the flesh for sale, and committed other unspeakable
atrocities on females.”[89]
As for the Russian Vice‐Consul at Philippopolis, Mr Gueroff,
Vice‐Consul Dupuis says of him: “The news of the Russian Vice‐Consul
at Philippopolis having been insulted, though repeated, is not
generally confirmed. Some say, if he was not insulted, he is trying
his best to provoke it by his conduct.”[90]
Sir H. Elliot, on 11th August, writes to Lord Derby: “A letter from
Mr Baring, received yesterday, contains these words: ‘There is not
the slightest doubt that the Russian Consul at Philippopolis had a
leading part in creating the late insurrection.’”[91]
As to the menacing character of the insurrection, there is cumulative
evidence to that effect. On 13th May, Vice‐Consul Brophy, writing
to Sir H. Elliot, says: “I have the honour to express to your
Excellency my belief that the Bulgarian insurrectionary movement,
commenced in the Caza of Philippopolis, will not be confined to that
district. I have some reason for thinking that the plans of the
insurgents embrace six centres of revolt, most of them in the high
Balkan (Kodga Balkan, Stari Planina), in each of which localities
depôts of arms—rifles, revolvers, etc.—ammunition, and provisions are
hidden.”[92]
The cruelties practised by the insurgents on the Turks were also
beyond all doubt. They were, moreover, in strict conformity with the
practice and instructions of the insurgents in all similar risings.
On 12th May, Mr Dupuis informs Sir H. Elliot: “The burning of Bellowa
seems to have been attended with horrible cruelties to the small
Turkish guard in charge of the place, which, being overpowered,
was hacked to pieces by the Bulgarians. My informant adds that,
shortly after this occurrence, a party of about a hundred and fifty
well‐mounted and equipped insurgents, led by the priests, presented
itself in the village, declaring, with crucifixes in hand, that that
was the way to exterminate Islamism.”[93] Mr Sandison, the first
dragoman of the English Embassy, writing to Sir H. Elliot on 11th
July 1876, says, _à propos_ of these cruelties: “I may here quote the
testimony of the artist employed by the _Illustrated London News_,
who in his travels through Bulgaria came across the body of a Turk
who had been impaled and roasted by Bulgarians. Such acts could not
but lead to reprisals, and to the consequent destruction of many
thousand lives, as well as of a large number of villages, amongst
which must also be included a good many Mussulman ones.”[94] Consul
Reade reports from Rustchuk on 19th July (1876) that “Some Bulgarian
insurgents one day seized two Mussulman women, whose breasts they cut
off _and then put_ them to death.”[95]
Vice‐Consul Calvert, writing from Philippopolis on 29th August
1876, says; “The Christian Commissioners, one of whom, Yovantcho
Effendi, is himself a Bulgarian, state themselves to be satisfied
that deeds of great atrocity on the part of the insurgents marked
the commencement of the rising in May last, and that _cruelties
were designedly committed by the insurgents as being the means
best calculated to bring on a general revolution in Bulgaria_,
by rendering the situation of the Christians, however peaceably
inclined, so intolerable under the indiscriminate retaliation
which the governing race was sure to attempt, as to force them in
self‐defence to rise. Among other instances of this Blacque Bey
mentioned to me that the Christian inhabitants of a village near
Tirnovo related to him, how, at the beginning of the revolt, the
insurgents had seized a wealthy Turk of the locality, beloved by
Christians and Moslems alike, for his justice and benevolence, had
buried him up to the waist in the earth, and then stoned him to
death.”[96]
With reference to the invariable mode of procedure of the leaders of
the insurrection for the very purpose of exciting reprisals, Sir H.
Elliot, in a communication to Lord Derby, says: “The inhabitants of
another village stated that at the beginning of the insurrection,
they were told by _the priests and the schoolmasters_ that the Turks
were advancing, that they must leave this village or they would be
killed by the Turks, and that those who objected were driven out
by force. The Mussulmans who happened to be there were murdered;
their number was differently estimated at twelve and thirty‐two; the
village was then set on fire. The Mussulmans in the neighbourhood
seeing part of the village in flames, went there and pillaged and
burnt the remaining houses.”[97] The revolutionary agents from the
Slav Committees had, since the recrudescence of their activity in the
winter, been working zealously among the Bulgarians. On 4th May Sir
H. Elliot, in acquainting Lord Derby with the movement at Otloukeuyi,
says: “It was known that revolutionary agents were working actively
among the Bulgarians, and that arms and ammunition have latterly been
introduced in considerable quantities.”[98] They knew, too, pretty
well what they were about and when to strike, so that reprisals could
be most surely counted on. Consul Reade, from Rustchuk, informs (9th
May) Sir H. Elliot: “I have also just heard of an event said to
have occurred near Avrat Alan, which, if true, may bring on serious
complications. It is said that a Circassian village in that vicinity
has been burnt; if so, the Circassians, generally a lawless set, are
sure to take their revenge, and this may severely tax the Government
to put down, when once commenced.”[99] Prophetic words indeed! The
revolutionary agents of the Committees found this work difficult
in the face of the repressive measures taken. On the 16th May 1876
Consul Reade reports from Rustchuk: “Many of the revolutionary
Bulgarians in Wallachia are said to be entering this vilayet, and
some have already been discovered and arrested.”[100] Here, then, we
have revolutionary agents coming from abroad and exciting the people
already long worked upon by priests and schoolmasters brought up in
Russia, to rise in rebellion and to commit every species of atrocity
on the Mussulman population with the direct object of provoking them
to reprisals, which could be exploited against them all over Europe.
We have further the Consul of a friendly Power, one of the chief
leaders of the insurrection, and the “Ambassador of the same friendly
Power” at Constantinople, strongly counselling against the despatch
of regular troops to districts where the Governor‐General urges the
necessity of their presence, and when the Mussulman inhabitants, in
their defence and under the impulse of panic and exaggerated fear
of what was going to happen, without any regular force to protect
them, arm irregular bands from any quarter they can procure them
with, likely enough, not sufficient discrimination and examination
as to their character, scenes are, no doubt, enacted, and atrocities
committed, which every human being, be he Christian or Mahometan,
would in cold blood deprecate and deplore.
As Sir H. Elliot says: “An insurrection or civil war is everywhere
accompanied by cruelties and abominable excesses, and this being
tenfold the case in Oriental countries where people are divided into
antagonistic creeds and races, the responsibility and sin of those
who incite a peaceful province to rise becomes doubly heavy, and
they now endeavour to throw them upon others.”[101] Nobody outside
Timbuctoo approves or condones cruelties, but the charge against the
Ottoman authorities really amounts to their arming and employing
irregular troops, Pomaks, Circassians, Gipsies, etc., over whom they
could exercise very imperfect control. But as Mehemet Rushdi Pasha
told the English Ambassador, “the emergency was so great as to render
it indispensable at once to stamp the movement out by any means
that were immediately available.”[102] Mehemet Rushdi himself, it
will be remembered, only came into office after those acts had been
committed. He was consequently in no way responsible, neither he nor
Midhat, either for their commission or for the events that led up to
them.
With reference to the _Daily News_ article on Turkish atrocities,
which started the agitation against Turkey in England, Sir H.
Elliot, writing on the 25th July 1876, says: “I have reason to
believe that the credulity of the correspondent of the _Daily
News_, whose letters on the subject of the Bulgarian atrocities
attracted so much attention in England, has been imposed upon by
two Bulgarian relatives of one of the presumed ringleaders of the
revolt, inhabiting Philippopolis. One of these was for a time editor
of a Bulgarian journal in Constantinople, and it is evident that
information derived from such a source can only be regarded as
untrustworthy.”[103]
As the very aim and purpose of the insurrection was to create
excitement and provoke hatred of the Turk in Europe, it is no wonder
if the most monstrous exaggerations passed current as peremptory
truths.
Sir H. Elliot, writing on 6th July, says: “The excesses committed
in the suppression of the insurrection have unquestionably been
very great, as was inevitable from the nature of the force which
the Porte was, in the first emergency, obliged to employ, but it
is equally certain that the details which have been given, coming
almost exclusively from Russian and Bulgarian sources, are so
_monstrously exaggerated_ as to deprive them of much claim to much
attention. Cases of revolting cruelty have been mentioned to me in
such a circumstantial manner as to make it almost impossible to
doubt this truth, but which proved, on investigation, to be entirely
fictitious.... Turkish ministers deny that the cruelties have been on
a scale at all approaching to what they are represented; they point
out that the horrors committed on Turkish women and children are
passed over in silence, and they plead that they had no alternative
_but_ to use the irregular force at their disposal to put down an
unprovoked insurrection fomented from abroad, the authors of which
are responsible for the sufferings which have been entailed upon both
Christians and Mahometans.”[104]
Some of the fictions invented were quite picturesque and dramatic.
These fictions and legends were not confined to Bulgaria, and Canon
Liddon and a Rev. Mr MacColl carried off the palm for ingenious
credulity. On the 2nd October 1876, Sir H. Elliot telegraphs to
Her Majesty’s Consul at Bosnia Serai: “Canon Liddon and a friend,
who went to Servia by the Bosnian frontier, state that they saw
examples of revolting cruelties practised by Turkish officers of the
regular army, who have _impaled_, at all military stations along the
frontier, men and women. Report as to truth of these statements.”
On the 5th inst. the startled Consul sends the following reply:
“Everything known here would make statement in your telegram of 2nd
inst. perfectly incredible, _but_ for the name of your Excellency’s
informant. I will write of this by next post.”[105] The statement of
the distinguished ecclesiastic created a great sensation. It turned
out, however, that he had obtained his information from passengers
in a steam vessel on the Save, and that they had not travelled along
the frontier at all, as Sir A. Buchanan, who first reported to Sir
H. Elliot, had been led to believe. “The whole story, therefore,”
adds Sir A. Buchanan, “probably resolves itself, as suggested by Mr
Holmes, to heads or even bodies having been exposed on poles, as I
have myself seen hanging in chains during the British Protectorate
of Corfu.”[106] Mr Holmes, in his report, after demonstrating the
absurdity of the story, politely adds: “Now, if Canon Liddon states
that he saw what he describes, of course I can say nothing to the
contrary; but if he has only been assured of these atrocities, it
is most certain that he has been grossly deceived, with a view to
make use of his voice and influence as a means of increasing and
confirming public opinion in England, in the belief of the barbarous
conduct attributed to the Turks, and in hostility to them.”[107]
These reverend gentlemen had evidently been the victims of, as Mr
Holmes further says, “a monstrous joke,” and he proceeds to explain
the matter. “After much reflection, however, the matter is, I think,
as clear as possible. Near most Bosnian farm‐houses there are stakes,
such as Mr MacColl describes, around which the haricot beans ... are
fixed up to dry with something above them to keep off the birds....
At the time of Mr MacColl’s voyage down the Save, it is probable that
most of the beans had been garnered, but a portion might have been
left on one of the stakes which attracted his attention. This, on
being pointed out to some practical joker amongst the officers of the
steamboat, with its accidental likeness to a body, together, perhaps,
with the previous conversation of the travellers, suggested the hoax,
which, on seeing that it was seriously accepted, was kept up till the
end of the journey.”[108]
Another and most probable explanation of this astounding story was
that what Canon Liddon and his friend really saw, “was a watchman who
had mounted on his stake, probably to look at the steamer descending
the Save.”[109] Anybody may be mistaken, even distinguished
ecclesiastics; but what, in such quasi‐sacred persons was scarcely to
be expected, was the tenacity with which they stuck to the impalement
theory, after it was exploded in the minds of all impartial persons.
Even high dignitaries of the Church don’t like being laughed at.
FOOTNOTES:
[1] “History of the Ottoman Empire,” vol. ii. p. 356.
[2] “La Motraye,” La Haye, 1727, vol. i. pp. 383, 462.
[3] See the “Relation du Baile Garzoni,” of 1586.
[4] See Gervinus’ “Insurrection et Régéneration de la Grèce,” vol. i.
p. 16.
[5] Pozzo di Borgo to Count Nesselrode, November 1828.
[6] _“The First Dragoman of the Russian Embassy to Mahmoud Nedim._[A]
“MY DEAR HIGHNESS,—I have communicated the observations of your
Highness to His Excellency the Ambassador, who has assured us in his
reply that he will use his influence to arrest the Herzegovinian
insurrection. No one desires more earnestly than ourselves the success
of Your Highness’ projects.
“Your Highness may give the necessary assurances to whom they may
concern.” (1873).
[Taken from a pamphlet called “Ussi Inkillab,” which was published at
the beginning of the reign of Abdul Hamid—an interesting document in
proving this fact.]
[A] _Nineteenth Century_, January 1903.
[7] See Appendix.—“Bulgarian Atrocities.”
[8] See Appendix—“Bulgarian Atrocities.”
[9] See Appendix.
[10] _Nineteenth Century_, February 1888.
[11] Boat.
[12] _Nineteenth Century_, January 1903.
[13] “Blue Book,” _Turkey_, 2, No. 105.
[14] _Nineteenth Century_, February 1888, p. 279.
[15] Although a man of this description, unfit for Parliament, was
quite fitted to represent his Sovereign at one of the most important
Courts of Europe.—AUTHOR.
[16] The Director‐General of official and private correspondence
between the Palace and the Sublime Porte.
[17] Blue Book, _Turkey_, 2, 1877, No. 152.
[18] _Nineteenth Century_, January 1903.
[19] Blue Book, _Turkey_, 1, 1877, No. 985.
[20] _Times_, 10th February 1877.
[21] Mr Blunt, H.B.M. Consul at Salonica, addressed the following
despatch to Lord Derby:—
“SALONICA, _10th February 1877_.
“MY LORD,
* * * * *
“The leading men with whom I have conversed, and the people in general
here, manifest much surprise and some irritation at the sudden
dismissal of Midhat Pasha from the Grand Vizierate, in whom they had
full confidence that he would carry out reforms.
“The prevailing impression here is, especially among the Turks, that
the fall of this popular statesman has been prepared and effected by
the Sultan’s immediate _entourage_.
“In case there is any demonstration at Constantinople, in favour of
Midhat Pasha, the popular feeling at Salonica would, I think, coincide
with it.[B]—I have, etc.,
J. E. BLUNT.”
[B] Blue Book, _Turkey_, 15, 1877, No. 171.
[22] At the accession of Abdul Hamid, he was his favourite First
Secretary, and was thereupon appointed Grand Vizier.
[23] He had been Grand Vizier in the time of Abdul Aziz, and ruined the
Empire by his wretched and Russophil policy.
[24] “_Turkey. Constantinople, 11th May._—The doubts I expressed in
a recent despatch, concerning the veracity of the chief witnesses in
the enquiry about the death of Abdul Aziz, are being confirmed, and
the Sultan now hesitates about bringing the affair before a public
tribunal. Several important personages, who cannot be suspected of
complicity, declare openly that the raising of the question was the
result of an intrigue, and at the Palace the opinion is gaining ground
that the matter will terminate with the degradation and exile of the
Sultan’s two brothers‐in‐law, and the temporary imprisonment of their
supposed accomplices, without any formal trial. When the enquiry was
first instituted, an old and devoted friend of the dynasty reminded the
Sultan of an unsavoury Turkish saying, equivalent to our proverb about
the wisdom of letting sleeping dogs lie, and His Majesty has now reason
to regret that he did not follow his advice.”—_Times_, 12th May (p. 5,
col. 3).
[25] “Midhat Pasha, on taking refuge at the French Consulate, sent
letters to all the other Consuls, requesting the protection of the
Powers. The Consuls accordingly held a meeting, and decided to ask
instructions from their respective Governments. The reason alleged
by Midhat is that he is a victim of personal animosity, and that he
is in danger of personal violence, but this ground of defence has
been anticipated by the Imperial decision that the whole affair shall
be submitted to the regular tribunal, the sittings of which will
be public. His Majesty is evidently anxious that the whole matter
should be thoroughly sifted, and for this purpose has appointed a
sub‐commission to interrogate the native and foreign doctors who held
the post‐mortem examination on the body of the late Sultan, as it has
been rumoured that the medical report made at the time, is not quite in
accordance with the testimony of certain witnesses recently examined.
This procedure seems to remove effectually the danger of personal
violence, which Midhat alleges as the reason for having put himself
under foreign protection.”—_Times_, 19th May (p. 5, col. 4).
_By Indo‐European Telegraph._
“_Constantinople, 18th May._—On receiving instructions from his
Ambassador, the French Consul at Smyrna requested Midhat Pasha to quit
the Consulate, whereupon the latter proceeded to surrender himself to
the Turkish Military Governor. A judicial enquiry will be commenced at
Smyrna.”
“_Turkey. Constantinople, 21st May._—Letters from Smyrna give some
details concerning the arrest of Midhat Pasha. Between one and
two o’clock on Tuesday morning he was awoke by a bugle‐call. He
discovered that troops were advancing under the command of Hilmi Pasha,
accompanied by one of the Sultan’s aides‐de‐camp, who had recently
arrived from Constantinople. He at once suspected the motive of the
nocturnal visit, and as a small body of soldiers were entering the
courtyard, he made his escape by a door in the wall of the harem
garden, and reached safely the French Consulate. At an early hour the
Consul assembled his colleagues, and Midhat Pasha declared to them that
he placed himself under the protection of the Powers. Then followed the
interchange of despatches with Constantinople and Paris, which I have
described in a previous telegram. Midhat Pasha declared that he had no
wish to leave the country, and was ready to proceed to Constantinople
if he could obtain the necessary guarantees that he would be fairly
tried, but Hilmi Pasha thought it prudent to take precautionary
measures against a second flight by preventing small boats from
approaching that part of the quay. Meanwhile, the French Consul had
received stringent orders to withdraw the temporary protection which he
had afforded, and accordingly, after having again called his colleagues
together, he formally surrendered the fugitive to the Military. Next
morning the Minister of Justice arrived in a special steamer to make a
judicial enquiry. Midhat Pasha is being carefully guarded in a room in
the barracks.”—_Times_, 23rd May 1881 (p. 7, col. 2).
[26] The Sheik‐ul‐Islam Haïroullah Effendi, and the two brothers‐in‐law
of Abdul Hamid—Damad Mahmoud Djelaleddin and Damad Nouri Pashas.
[27] Who had killed the Ministers in Midhat Pasha’s house in 1876.
[28] _Times_, 5th June 1882, page 8, col. 2.—“Constantinople, 3rd
June. According to a despatch from Djeddah, the Dragoman of the British
Consulate at that place has gone to Mecca, the bearer of a letter from
the British Government to the Grand Shereef, expressing the friendly
sentiments of England towards him, and asking for news of Midhat Pasha.
“The Grand Shereef, in reply, is stated to have assured the Dragoman
that Midhat Pasha was in no danger of any kind. This step on the part
of England has produced considerable sensation among the Arabs, who
continue to attribute to the British Government designs of gaining
ground and influence in Arabia.”
[29] Afterwards General of Division with title of Pasha, and
transferred from Adrianople to Yemen.
[30] About midnight European time.
[31] The following is a list of the officers and men who assassinated
Midhat, 29th Redjeb, 1301 of the Hegira, or 12th May 1883.
Captain Ibrahim Circassian.
Non‐Commissioned Officer Lieutenant Nouri Native of Coumla.
Soldiers
1st Company of Foot The Sergeant Ahmed Native of Adremid.
1st ” Coundirédji Ismail ” Yozgad.
2nd ” Ahmed ” Kutahia.
2nd ” Mehemet ” Kutahia.
2nd ” Redjeb ” Kumuljina.
4th ” Osman ” Kara Hissar.
2nd ” Berber Ismail[C] ” Adrianople.
The following persons were commissioned to deal with Mahmoud Pasha.
Non‐Commissioned Officer Lieutenant Memiche Native of Sparta.
Non‐Commissioned Officer Lieutenant Mehemet ” Eudemiche.
Soldiers
2nd Company of Foot The Sergeant Hassan Native of Kutahia.
2nd ” The Sergeant Suleiman ” Kara Hissar.
4th ” Corporal Mehemet ” Antalia.
1st ” Osman Baltadji ” Kara Hissar.
1st ” Ahmed ” Tchoroum.
1st ” Ali (Roumelian) ” Samanli‐Kieuï.
4th ” Berber Mustapha ” Dimétoka.
4th ” Ali ” Zile.
[C] These soldiers belong to the conscription of 1296 S.T. except the
one who belongs to 1300 S.T.
[32] _Turkey_, 3, 1876, No. 422.
[33] _Ibid._, 3, 1877.
[34] _Turkey_, 3, 1876, Nos. 529 and 530.
[35] _Turkey_, 3, 1876, No. 1.
[36] _Turkey_, 1, 1877, Incl. No. 554.
[37] _Ibid._, No. 559.
[38] _Ibid._, No. 452.
[39] _Ibid._, Incl. No. 479.
[40] _Turkey_, 1, 1877, No. 452.
[41] _Ibid._, No. 197.
[42] _Ibid._, 1, 1877, No. 325.
[43] _Ibid._, No. 324
[44] _Ibid._, 1, 1877, No. 564.
[45] _Ibid._, Nos. 470 and 498.
[46] _Ibid._, No. 508.
[47] _Turkey_, 1, 1877, No. 516.
[48] _Ibid._, No. 540.
[49] _Ibid._, 1, 1877, No. 584.
[50] _Ibid._, 1, 1877, No. 612.
[51] _Turkey_, 1, 1877, No. 952.
[52] _Turkey_, 1, 1877, No. 986.
[53] _Ibid._, No. 952.
[54] _Ibid._, No. 950.
[55] _Ibid._, No. 950.
[56] _Turkey_, 1, 1877, Nos. 166 and 239.
[57] _Ibid._, 3, 1876, No. 23.
[58] _Ibid._, 1, No. 544.
[59] _Ibid._, 3, 1876, Nos. 459 and 517; and _Turkey_, 1, 1877, Nos.
551 and 898; and _Turkey_, 2, 1877, No. 27.
[60] _Ibid._, 1, 1877, Nos. 528, 541, 551, and 552.
[61] _Ibid._, 1, 1877, No. 52.
[62] _Turkey_, 1, 1877, No. 718.
[63] Blue Book, _Turkey_ 2, 1876, No. 1.
[64] Blue Book, No. 2.
[65] _Ibid._, No. 32.
[66] _Turkey_, 2, 1876, No. 16.
[67] _Ibid._, No. 47.
[68] _Turkey_, 2, 1876, No. 70.
[69] _Ibid._, No. 71.
[70] _Ibid._, No. 63.
[71] _Turkey_, 3, No. 6.
[72] _Turkey_, 3, 1876, No. 11.
[73] _Ibid._, 3, 1876, No. 44.
[74] _Ibid._, 3, 1876, No. 121.
[75] _Turkey_, 3, 1876, No. 128.
[76] _Ibid._, 3, 1876, No. 130.
[77] _Ibid._, 3, 1876, No. 195.
[78] _Turkey_, 3, 1876, No. 221.
[79] _Turkey_, 3, 1876, No. 248.
[80] _Turkey_, 3, 1876, Incl. No. 313. (Lord Odo Russell pronounces
this document authentic. 3rd July 1876, No. 363.)
[81] _Ibid._, 3, 1876, No. 185.
[82] _Turkey_, 3, 1876, No. 259.
[83] _Turkey_, 3, 1876, No. 51, Incl.
[84] _Turkey_, 3, 1876, No. 479.
[85] _Ibid._, 3, 1876, No. 491.
[86] _Turkey_, 3, 1876, No. 491.
[87] _Turkey_, 1, 1877, No. 674 Incl.
[88] _Turkey_, 3, 1877, No. 57 Incl.
[89] _Ibid._
[90] _Turkey_, 3, 1876, No. 343, Incl.
[91] _Ibid._, 1, 1877, No. 24.
[92] _Ibid._, 3, 1876, Incl. 4 in 289.
[93] _Ibid._, 3, 1876, No. 289, Incl.
[94] _Ibid._, 5, 1876, Incl. 1 in No. 18.
[95] _Ibid._, 5, 1876, Incl. 2 in No. 21.
[96] _Turkey_, 1, 1877, Incl. in No. 222.
[97] _Ibid._, 5, 1876, No. 22.
[98] _Ibid._, 3, 1876, No. 252.
[99] _Ibid._, 3, 1876, No. 273, Incl.
[100] _Ibid._, 3, 1876, No. 315, Incl.
[101] _Turkey_, 1, 1877, No. 221.
[102] _Ibid._, 3, 1876, No 513.
[103] _Ibid._, 5, 1876, No. 24.
[104] _Turkey_, 3, 1876, No. 538.
[105] _Ibid._, 1, 1877, No. 539.
[106] _Ibid._, 686.
[107] _Turkey_, Incl. in No. 687.
[108] _Ibid._, Incl. in No. 961.
[109] _Ibid._, 2, 1877, Incl. in No. 179.
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