PHILOSOPHY.

Upon the contingency of a rainy day it is always pleasant to have

something to read in the mountains. A friend of mine gave me a pamphlet

written by one Herbert Spencer, entitled “Education.” A level-headed

appreciative friend who understands one’s needs, is a good thing to

have. Education was my necessity. After being educated I became hungry

for more. My friend had said there were “some good things in Herbert;

that he was a philosopher, but given to infidelity.” I discovered that

Herbert had written a library; I had, then, so to speak, the wide world

from which to choose. I am a seeker after happiness, so I selected

“Social Statics, or the Conditions Essential to Human Happiness.” If

there is any one thing that I enjoy more than another, it is happiness.

Having secured the key to the “Essential Conditions,” I felt as I

imagine a hungry and ragged prospector feels when the assayer tells him

he has “struck it,” and drew heavy drafts on the future, just as any

prospector does. The “Essential Conditions” being philosophy, is not dry

reading as you may imagine, that is on a rainy day in camp. It is good

as a comedy.

Dickens tells us that the editor of the Etanswill _Gazette_ employed a

savan to write an article on Chinese Metaphysics, and that the learned

gentleman did it after this fashion: He consulted the Encyclopedia

Britannica, first under the title “Chinese,” and second under the title

“Metaphysics,” and combined his information. The editor gravely informed

Mr. Pickwick that the essay caused a sensation, as no doubt it did, and

Her Majesty’s minions were put on the lookout for an escaped lunatic.

Sometimes, while studying the “Conditions”—you study and do not read

philosophy—I thought Herbert, when he labored on the “Conditions,” must

have been a very old man, in his second childhood, for instance, and

troubled with dyspepsia. Sometimes that he must have been young, very

young, staggering under a heterogeneous load of information that had

got the better of his mental calibre; that his mind, so to speak,

was in the condition of a few acres of undergrowth just after a

hurricane—demoralized, as it were. Sometimes—when his arguments

reminded me of a horde of inebriated aborigines, each ready to kill his

neighbor—that he must have been in good condition, with a view to

sensation and ducats, and that if his theories, conceding he had any,

could, by any conceivable method be put into practice, it would be when

“chaos was come again,” but that his Christian readers wouldn’t see the

joke, would take him to be serious, and advertise him with abuse.

“There are some good things in Herbert,” of course; I enjoyed them;

unless a thing is good you cannot enjoy it; the only one to doubt this

would be Herbert. He himself is an argument against total depravity, yet

if you can find that he admits the contrary as to all humanity, except

Herbert, call me Ananias, and his wife too.

What has Herbert Spencer got to do with Middle Park and trout fishing?

you inquire. Not anything, except that he says no fellow has a right to

own a mine; that if he—the fellow, I mean—finds a good mine, it

belongs to everybody, and he must ask everybody’s permission to work it

and convert the proceeds to his own use. I wish I were everybody, or

“Society,” as Herbert calls it, I’d go right over to Leadville or Rabbit

Ear Range and assert my rights. Being everybody, nobody else would be

around to say anything, except the fellow who had the mine. If he

undertook to draw his gun, I’d stand up in front of him and argue the

point, while I went round behind him and took away his six-shooter.

Being everybody, this would be easy to do. Then I’d let the fellow go

find another mine, and everybody would go and tell him he was a

claim-jumper and “must light out;” and I’d keep on until I had corraled

all the good mines in the state. Then I’d go down to New York and

interview Mr. Vanderbilt and other millionaires, and convince them that

they entertained a mistaken notion as to the ownership of the many odd

millions of government securities and sundry moneys and valuables, real

and personal, said to be in their names. When I’d got all that, I’d

buy—no, I wouldn’t—I’d take possession of New York; after that I

should be capable of anything—except managing Mr. Conkling.

But I hear you inquire again: What has all this to do with Middle Park

and trout fishing? Not anything. But that I am puzzled to know, under

the circumstances, what I am to do with the gentleman last above named.

If Herbert were only here he could, perhaps, help me out of my dilemma;

he can set up a dilemma and help himself out of it as easy as—falling

off a precipice, and there is nothing hard about that till you get to

the bottom. It must be because his dilemmas are all imaginary, or that

mine is not a dilemma. Let us see what he says of one of his: “Of this

(dilemma) nothing can be said, save that it seems in part due to the

impossibility of making the perfect law recognize an imperfect state,

and in part to that defect in our powers of expression. As matters

stand, however, we must deal with it as best we may.” See how he has

helped himself out of that! There is a world of wisdom in it all,

especially the last sentence, I know, if I could only find it. But

that’s the trouble with Herbert—You ask him for bread and he gives you

a stone. I know I can do as best I may, but I want to know what to do

with Conkling; I cannot go on and perfect my monopoly according to

Herbert’s philosophy without disposing of Roscoe. This planet is not big

enough for both. I am in possession of all worth having. It is well

demonstrated that two bodies cannot occupy the same space. He is too old

to educate. I am, as Herbert’s disciple, opposed to coercion. Everybody,

that’s me, is entitled to his own free will, but here I can’t have mine.

He says that nothing can be said, and yet all the newspapers of the

country, for three or four months, have been saying a great deal. Then

he tells me of the difficulty of making the perfect law—that’s me,

again—recognize the imperfect state—that’s Roscoe. But the latter

makes me recognize him. What use is there in telling me I may deal with

him as best I may? I didn’t need a philosopher to tell me that. I want

that impossible possibility of Herbert’s—a perfect law. I am in some

degree mercenary; everybody is. If I had that law it would be a

curiosity, valuable as some of the mines voluntarily surrendered, as

already stated, and particularly valuable at this crisis. I want to know

how to dispose of Conkling.

You ask me again: What has this to do with trout fishing and Middle

Park? and what good is it? Nothing, except it is some of Herbert’s

philosophy considered in a light atmosphere; where the air is thin, and

you can see a great way, it is easier discovering obscure objects in the

distance. Herbert could not have expressed himself more clearly.

Well, all right; I’ll stop right here. But I would like to say just a

word about Herbert’s style. I like his style—when I can understand what

it is. His arguments are something between black-letter Norman-French

and a fashionable bonnet. The one is incomprehensible to the ordinary

mind, and the other is a delightful combination of vagaries. Good-bye,

Herbert. I hope you will have a good time. But if you don’t find it

harder work traveling over your own turnpike with the load you have on

than driving a jack train over a blind trail, you can set me down for a

fool or a philosopher—the difference is so slight that one may be happy

as either.

The conditions essential to happiness are three, and may be described

thus: Two primary, and one primary and secondary, or primary or

secondary, depending altogether upon the existence of the two primary.

Thus: the first condition essential to happiness is—that is human

happiness; “I do not wish to be misunderstood,” nor have the happiness

of which I am now writing “confounded (nonsense! No, sir) with some

other” happiness—an appetite; this is the first primary. (No, sir! I am

not a ward politician.) Let me repeat: the first condition essential to

happiness is an appetite. The second primary condition essential is a

good digestion. Dependent upon these two is the third condition

essential, which may be called something to eat. Thus, if the appetite

and digestion are good, the third—something to eat—becomes an

essential condition and primary. If the appetite and digestion, or

either, is impaired, the third essential condition becomes secondary or

useless, so to speak. These, the essential conditions, concurring in one

man, he is capable of happiness, mental and physical, otherwise not.

Observe, I do not affirm he will be or is happy, but that he is capable,

merely, of happiness. The conditions essential must concur, however, and

in one man. This is a necessity more than a condition, and may be called

properly a concurrent necessity, rather than a condition essential. But

the appetite requires food. I mean by this that the appetite of the

man—and the term is used in a generic sense and includes women—the

most superficial thinker will concede without argument that there must

be a man to have the appetite; the man, therefore, will be understood,

thus: The appetite of the man requires food. If he have the appetite and

not the food, the conditions are non-concurrent. If he have the food and

not the appetite, there is a similar, but not exactly parallel,

non-concurrence. If he have the appetite and the food and the dyspepsia,

which is the corollary of indigestion, and the opposite of good

digestion, or equivalent to no digestion at all, there is a lack of the

conditions essential. It would seem, therefore, that there are only

three conditions essential, but those three must necessarily concur in

one man before he can be happy.

I like positive people with positive opinions, not people who are

perpetually preferring exceptions. Now I have one of those non-committal

mortals, who is willing to admit that my conclusion is correct,

indisputable in fact, _except_ that I have not taken into consideration

the possible non-concurrence of the conditions essential in the event

that the food, admitted, has not been properly prepared. While I am free

to admit that I have not as yet discovered anything esthetic about the

mere operation of eating, and, farther, that it is purely an animal

necessity, yet I must contend that the preparation of the food is so far

secondary as to be a condition non-essential, as I will now proceed

to——.

Well, just as you say; I’m never disposed to bore one if I can help it,

though you might have so augured in the premises, after reading the

title. Do not swear. I give Herbert up with regret; the sun has come out

after the rain, and it is delightful outside this canvas house of mine.

The air is fresh with the new dampness, and the rain-drops will not

linger long in the shirt fronts of the mountain daisies. What could I

have done this afternoon if not for Herbert?

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