The Mechanical Phase
I. ORANGE RIVER COLONY
The year 1901 was drawing to its close, and the three chief Boer leaders
were still at large. Delarey was lurking in the difficult kloofs of the
Western Transvaal; Botha was on watch in the high veld of the Eastern
Transvaal, just outside the "protected area"; and De Wet was awaiting
his opportunity in the N.E. of the Orange River Colony.
De Wet, who had been lying low for some months, was roused by a certain
communication from Botha as well as by action taken against him by Lord
Kitchener. A carefully devised and accurately carried out centripetal
drive of fourteen columns converging, like meridian lines on the Pole,
on a certain point ten miles N.E. of Reitz, was abortive. When the
columns reached it on November 12 they found that the enemy had wriggled
through the intervals, leaving scarcely a burgher at the place of
meeting; and while they were blankly staring at each other, De Wet at
Blijdschap, only twenty miles away, was in conference with Steyn and
discussing with him a suggestion made by Botha that peace negotiations
with Lord Kitchener should be opened.
To this an answer similar to that which had been given to Botha in May
was returned. De Wet and Steyn scouted the idea of reconciliation with
the enemy. A Council of War was summoned and a concentration of burghers
ordered. By the end of November De Wet had collected at Blijdschap a
force of 1,000 men undetected by Elliott's columns, which, having taken
part in the centripetal failure, were again on the move after a brief
rest at Harrismith. Elliott, while on the march to Kroonstad, actually
brushed past De Wet.
A column under Rimington then came upon the scene. He had heard of the
Council of War from a captured Boer, who probably with intent refrained
from reporting the concentration. Thus when Rimington expected that the
easy task before him was the capture of De Wet and Steyn and the units
of a Council of War, he suddenly found himself opposed by a considerable
force, a detachment of which passed by him and attacked his train in
rear. After an encounter in which a gallant young cavalry subaltern,[61]
who but a few weeks before had joined the Inniskilling Dragoons from the
Militia, laid down his life for his country, Rimington extricated his
convoy, but refrained from attacking De Wet's main body, which was
reported to be strong.
Each side thereupon withdrew, Rimington to Heilbron and De Wet to
Lindley, from which he found it advisable to retire on coming into
contact with a column forming part of another Elliott drive, the second
of the series, suggested by Rimington on his return to Heilbron. De Wet
then trekked towards Bethlehem, halting at Kaffir Kop, where, nine days
later, he foiled a third Elliott drive by promptly dispersing his
burghers, who soon reassembled on a range of hills beyond Bethlehem.
Elliott's units then returned to their respective bases to refit. A
column under Dartnell at Bethlehem, which had recently been reinforced
from Rundle's command by a strong detachment under Barrington Campbell,
was on the point of returning to Harrismith, when it was informed that
De Wet's re-united commandos were lying in wait at a spruit about twenty
miles out on the road to Harrismith. Dartnell marched on and maintained
himself without much difficulty when he arrived at the spruit. Campbell
came up, and De Wet's commandos withdrew without orders; but no attempt
was made to convert their retirement into a rout. Dartnell continued his
march to Harrismith.
After the affair at the spruit De Wet again dispersed his burghers, with
orders to hold themselves in readiness to muster at short notice. He had
not long to wait before he saw another opportunity of employing them.
A small force, less than 1,000 strong, was covering, half-way between
Harrismith and Bethlehem, the construction of the main blockhouse line
to Kroonstad, under the personal superintendence of Rundle. The force
was broken up into three detachments, which were too far apart to render
each other effective support in case of a sudden attack.
The strongest detachment, consisting, however, entirely of Yeomanry, was
posted on Groen Kop, three miles distant from Rundle's Head Quarters.
The position is fairly strong, and resembles a wedge lying on the veld,
with a gentle ascent from the east to a plateau to which the normal
level rises steeply on three sides. A mile or two to the S.E. it is
commanded by a higher eminence, from which a party of Boers had already
been expelled. It was not, however, occupied, and De Wet promptly made
use of it as an observation post, for which it was admirably adapted, as
it looks down into the British position on Groen Kop. Moreover, the
customary movements for protection, such as the relief of outposts, were
carried out with such extraordinary laxity and neglect that De Wet was
soon able to acquaint himself with almost every detail of the defence.
Even the emplacements of a field gun and a pom-pom were disclosed by
shots casually fired for range-finding purposes.
On Christmas Eve De Wet saw that he had before him a prey that would
fall into his hands as easily as Sannah's Post or Waterval Drift, and he
resolved to clutch it at once. His burghers, though dispersed, were
within call, and a force of over 1,000 was quickly assembled. With
unerring instinct he selected the steep N.W. corner of the Groen Kop
wedge as the point of attack, reasoning that the defenders would think
themselves adequately protected in that direction by the nature of the
ground. On Christmas morning, soon after midnight, over 1,000 Boers were
in position under the broad end of the wedge. They were not discovered,
as no patrols had been sent to watch the ground beneath, and the
sentries on the crest gave no sign.
The pioneers of the storming party attained the crest at 2 a.m.; and not
until then was the alarm given to the dormant camp. The position, after
a struggle which lasted but an hour and a quarter, was captured by De
Wet, who, ere the midsummer sun had risen, was hurrying away with
British prisoners of war, guns and wagons, which neglect of the ordinary
precautions by a body of unprofessional troops had delivered into his
hands.
At Rundle's Head Quarters, only three miles away, the sound of the
firing had attracted attention, and a weak body of Mounted Infantry, the
only mounted force at his disposal, was sent out to see what was the
matter. It was unable to intervene with effect, and returned to report
the situation.
The remaining detachment of Rundle's force, consisting of two companies
of slow-moving Infantry only, was still further from his Head Quarters;
but thirteen miles away in the direction of Harrismith lay a force of
Colonial Horse. When a telegram from Rundle to summon them to the rescue
miscarried, his staff-officer galloped away in the dawn and put them on
the trail of De Wet; but he had had a long start and escaped into the
hills near Bethlehem. Here he remained for a few hours, and then went
towards Reitz.
During a temporary absence for the purpose of conferring with Steyn he
left his commandos in charge of Michael Prinsloo, who on December 28 was
engaged in a rearguard action with Elliott, who was conducting yet
another drive and whom he easily evaded.
On the last day of the year De Wet disbanded his commandos a few miles
from the spot on which he had assembled them at the end of November. In
the interval he had evaded all the Elliott drives; he had captured a
strong British post; he had marched without damage along the sides of a
triangle on which lay the towns of Reitz, Lindley, and Bethlehem, each
of which was from time to time in the possession of his enemy; and had
never been more than thirty miles distant from the central point of the
triangle. The captured guns were sent away beyond the Wilge River under
Mears.
No blame can be imputed to Rundle for the unsatisfactory issue of the
operations. He had little reason to suspect that any considerable force
of the enemy was in his vicinity. He was engaged in mechanical work, the
laying out of a blockhouse line. It was the immediate task before him,
and to the best of his ability he used the untrustworthy and meagre
instruments at hand. It would, however, have been more in accordance
with military principles if he had employed his mounted troops in duties
more suited to their arm, instead of holding with them the infantry
position of Groen Kop.
Only a few days before, a similar misadventure had attended the
construction of the Heilbron-Vrede blockhouse line. Rimington and Damant
had hardly returned to Heilbron after Elliott's third drive when they
were ordered out beyond Frankfort, to the assistance of the blockhouse
builders, who were being worried by a commando under Wessels, which De
Wet had sent out after the Council of War. Near the Wilge River they
acted on a front too extended; and a portion of Damant's force was
deceived by the slim tricks of a party of Boers working in cavalry
formations and many of them dressed in khaki uniforms. In order to keep
up the illusion they fired at detached parties of their own side, and in
the end Damant was overwhelmed on a hill, with a loss of nearly 90 per
cent. of casualties, before the rest of his command came up and drove
away the assailants. Rimington was too far away either to prevent or to
retrieve the disaster.
When the "drives" were renewed in the northeastern districts of the
Orange River Colony at the end of January, 1902, the experience of the
last few months had shown that they must be conducted on new methods.
Hitherto the typical "drive" had been a net or nets cast too often
hastily and at random, the meshes of which were large, irregular, and
easily cut. The new "drive" was a bar of steel pushed steadily forward
by simultaneous action throughout its length, and with its ends resting
on the two completed blockhouse lines running eastward from Heilbron and
Kroonstad.
[Sidenote: Map, p. 260.]
The Drive, Mark II, was inaugurated on February 3. De Wet, who on
January 10 had had a hurried interview with Steyn near Reitz, was lying
at Elandskop between Heilbron and Reitz, and again concentrating his
scattered burghers and planning an escape with them to the south across
the Kroonstad-Bethlehem blockhouse line. Mears, on his way to rejoin De
Wet, ran into a column under Byng, to whom he lost the guns captured by
De Wet at Groen Kop.
On February 5 a force of 9,000 men under Elliott, Rawlinson, Byng, and
Rimington formed up on a line stretching from Frankfort to Kaffir Kop.
The composition of this force showed the altered conditions of warfare.
It included very few field guns, but no less than 2,200 horse and field
gunners acting as Mounted Riflemen.
Next day the first impulse was given to the Bar, the blockhouse lines
north and south, as well as the railway, having been strengthened. The
whereabouts of De Wet were approximately known.
The first drive of the new pattern lasted three days, the columns
reaching the railway on February 8. It was so far effective that none of
the enemy broke back through the advancing line, which was vigorously
maintained in continuity of pickets by night and of scouts by day; but
De Wet was not on the roll of nearly 300 Boer casualties. Although
hampered with live stock from which his followers refused to be parted,
and in spite of two hovering columns which were acting in support of the
southern blockhouse line, he not only broke through it owing to its want
of vigilance, but even succeeded in dragging the cattle across it after
him. He then retired as usual to the Doornberg. Other parties of Boers
broke through the northern blockhouse line; and thus the first of the
new drives ended with poor results. As soon as the trouble was over De
Wet with his followers again crossed the southern blockhouse line and
quietly returned to Elandskop, where he dispersed them.
A second drive to sweep those districts which had not been touched by
the first drive was soon put in hand. It was to be performed in two
movements by two sets of columns. A force under the Driver-in-Chief
Elliott starting eastwards from Kroonstad and the Doornberg would
advance in line, resting its right first on Lindley and then on
Harrismith, in the vicinity of which it was proposed that it should meet
the other set of columns, under Rawlinson, Byng, and Rimington. These,
starting on an extended front which ran from near Johannesburg to within
a few miles of Heilbron with their centre astride the Vaal and their
right touching the Natal Railway, would advance S.E. to near Vrede; then
wheeling to the right march southwards with their left on the
Drakensberg; finally, in conjunction with Elliott, pushing the fugitives
on to the eastern section of the Harrismith blockhouse line. The
operation may be likened to the sweep of two brooms, one acting with a
semicircular and the other with a forward movement.
It was begun by Elliott, who started on February 13, and after an
abortive attempt to snap up De Wet reached Wilge River on February 22
and awaited the arrival of the other columns; his left being near
Tafelkop.
Rawlinson and Byng meanwhile were advancing. On February 19 they wheeled
to the right and with their centre near Vrede were now wholly within the
Orange River Colony. The two forces were now disposed at right angles to
each other, one of the lines containing the angle being the Wilge River,
which Elliott was unable to hold in sufficient strength as his front was
widely extended. In the vicinity of Harrismith the southern blockhouse
line was reinforced by Brook, who succeeded Rundle in the command of the
district.
The northern blockhouse line was unable to stem the tide of fugitives
flying before Rawlinson and Byng, whose columns were now strung out on a
much wider front than that on which they had begun their march. The
advance of Elliott had also driven various Boer details into the right
angle, in which were now conglomerated not only combatants, but women,
children, stock, and transport. Included among the fugitives from
Elliott were De Wet and Steyn, who had again come together. With Elliott
at their heels, their only chance of escape was to break through the
attenuated line of Rawlinson's columns. De Wet's good fortune did not
fail him, and with Steyn and a few hundred burghers he severed it at
Langverwacht at midnight on February 23 and was again at large. The
remnant of the commandos was left behind within the pale with their
women, children, cattle, and stuff; and these, augmented by the
Harrismith commando, were the prisoners of Elliott and Rawlinson when
the drive, in which 30,000 British troops were directly or indirectly
engaged, completed its task.
Yet another drive, the third of the new series, ensued. It had, of
course, for its objective the capture of De Wet, as well as the "tidying
up" of the district, in which certain commandos, which had not been
netted in former drives, still lurked. It was composed, like the second
drive, of two sets of converging columns and traversed the terrain of
the first drive.
It happened that the point of convergence lay near the spot, not far
from Reitz, where De Wet and Steyn were in hiding. The propinquity of
the columns drove them out of their retreat, and taking a circuitous
route past Heilbron and thence along the left bank of the Vaal they
crossed the river near Commando Drift, and on March 17 joined Delarey
near Wolmaranstad in the Transvaal. Little was done after the junction
of the two sets of columns, and they returned to the railway on March
11, with a stray commando in front of them, which easily rushed the
blockhouse line near Heilbron. A portion of the troops was hastily
withdrawn to deal with the crisis in the Transvaal.
Hardly had the dust raised by the trampling of the third drive settled
down upon the veld when the fourth drive was in progress, and 14,000 men
on a front which stretched from one blockhouse line to the other were
plodding eastward to the Drakensberg. It was held up for a time by two
rivers in spate, the Wilge and the Liebenberg's, and when released it
trudged on to the mountain range, where on April 5 its components were
dissolved, having disposed of less than 100 of the enemy.
Yet one more drive, the fifth and last of the series, was called for.
Early in May Bruce Hamilton swooped down from the Eastern Transvaal upon
the harassed land, and in co-operation with Elliott worried it for the
space of ten days. Many small parties of Boers broke through--the last
wriggle in the Orange River Colony.
II. EASTERN TRANSVAAL
[Sidenote: Map p. 292]
The episode of Bakenlaagte called for vigorous measures to be taken
against Botha and the men of the high veld in the Eastern Transvaal; and
in November, 1901, a second and revised edition of French's programme at
the beginning of the year was issued.
The new campaign was placed in charge of Bruce Hamilton, and the general
idea, at least in its earlier movement, was the same as that furnished
to French, namely the outward sweep of columns having for its object the
rounding-up, pursuit towards the Swaziland border, and capture of the
various _guerilla_ commandos, which with the Transvaal Government in
their midst haunted the Ermelo and Bethal districts.
Bruce Hamilton, with 15,000 men in twelve columns, either under his
immediate command or co-operating with him, started on November 16, his
immediate objective being the same as French's ten months before,
namely, Botha on the high veld. He advanced the Constabulary posts
fifteen miles, so that the line now ran between Brugspruit and Waterval;
and proceeded to carry out a movement on Ermelo, in which he was
supported on either flank by columns acting from the Natal and Delagoa
Bay Railways. Botha, however, had had warning of his approach, and
having conducted the Transvaal Government out of the area of immediate
danger and dispatched it to its old seat at Paardeplatz, returned to
deal with Bruce Hamilton, who, on reaching Ermelo on December 3, found,
as French had found in February, that he had nothing to strike at. The
Transvaal Government had vanished, and Botha and his chief lieutenant,
P. Viljoen, instead of being on the run towards Swaziland, had broken
back and were now behind him.
In order to deal with them, a pause in the operations became necessary.
A series of night raids was instituted. In the first of these Botha, who
was lying twenty miles west of Ermelo, was nearly taken. He succeeded in
escaping towards the S.E., but was headed by a column under Pulteney
operating from Wakkerstroom and was forced towards the upper waters of
the Vaal. The raid upon P. Viljoen in the Bethal district was so far
successful that in it 200 of his burghers were made prisoners, and one
of the guns taken at Bakenlaagte was recovered: while he himself not
only escaped, but succeeded in putting 300 of his followers under J.
Prinsloo across the recently established Brugspruit-Waterval line of
Constabulary posts and in planting them in the "protected area" as seeds
of future mischief.
Bruce Hamilton now resumed the general operation eastwards with fair
success. Botha at Beginderlyn was faced by the columns supporting the
right flank of the advance, and had the Ermelo-Standerton blockhouse
line behind him. One of his lieutenants named Britz went out and
ambushed a night raid sent out from the line on December 19 at Holland,
making nearly 100 prisoners; and a few days later he squeezed through an
enveloping movement in which he lost somewhat heavily, but he eventually
succeeded in rejoining Botha.
It was now necessary to drive on to Bruce Hamilton a compact little
force of over 800 burghers, which on New Year's Day, 1902, Botha had
under his command; and this task devolved upon Plumer and the other
column commanders operating from the S.E. corner of the Transvaal. Botha
was engaged at Bankkop, between Ermelo and Amsterdam, by a strong
scouting party acting in advance of the main columns, which he was on
the point of overwhelming when it was reinforced. He escaped without
difficulty, taking with him eighty prisoners. The plan of throwing him
into Bruce Hamilton's arms had failed.
Bruce Hamilton returned to Ermelo, and late in January again swept the
country, with scanty results. His operations had been successful to the
extent that they finally denied the high veld to Botha, who in February
withdrew to the Vryheid district, and secreted himself among the
mountains. Bruce Hamilton was sent after him and hunted him for a month.
His next appearance was neither as a prisoner of war nor as an opponent
in battle, but as the representative of his country on the way to attend
the Peace Conference which assembled at Pretoria on April 12.
P. Viljoen, as soon as Bruce Hamilton was out of the way, discussed the
situation with his followers. It was decided that he should take action
in what was apparently the direction of greatest risk. With 400 men he
burst through the line of Constabulary posts, and on January 24 joined
J. Prinsloo in the Wilge River Valley, within the so-called "protected
area." Prinsloo, even before Viljoen's arrival, had maintained himself
without difficulty; and for some weeks after February 24, when an
unsuccessful effort was made at Klippan to crush them, they were
practically left to roam as they willed, no British troops being
available to deal with them effectively.
In the N.E. Transvaal B. Viljoen and Muller had been quiescent
throughout the summer. The former lay usually at Pilgrim's Rest; the
latter haunted the hilly country west and S.W. of Lydenburg; neither
leader being able to get much work out of passive and spiritless
followers. When Schalk Burger, the Acting President of the Transvaal,
and the rest of the Government were driven across the Delagoa Bay
Railway by Bruce Hamilton in December, Park, who was in command of the
solitary British force north of the line, aided by a column from
Belfast, made an unsuccessful attempt to capture the wandering
Government.
B. Viljoen was anxious for its safety and persuaded it to take refuge
with him at Pilgrim's Rest. It started on the journey with him; but
fortunately its courage failed it, and Viljoen was left to return alone
and to be taken prisoner near Lydenburg on January 25. Troops were
slipped at it but were evaded; and it withdrew to the west across the
Olifant's River. It maintained itself until March 12, when by leave of
Lord Kitchener it passed through Balmoral into conference with Steyn and
the remnants of the Orange Free State Government at Kroonstad and thence
to Klerksdorp.
In the "protected area" P. Viljoen had perforce to be left unmolested
until the end of March, when the conclusion of the third drive in the
Orange River Colony set some troops free for work elsewhere. His
commandos, about 800 strong, were discovered in laager twenty miles east
of Springs by a cavalry column under Lawley during a night raid on April
1. After a temporary panic they not only rallied, but drove away the
attacking force and pursued it until restrained by the intervention of
another portion of Lawley's command which had remained in camp. The
incident called for strenuous measures. During the last three weeks of
April the whole district was driven by Bruce Hamilton; at first from
north to south starting from the vicinity of Carolina, then by a counter
march from south to north through the "protected area," the latter
movement being repeated in the reverse direction. P. Viljoen was not
found in the wilderness, while his colleague Alberts escaped with 500
burghers into the Orange River Colony, whither he was followed by Bruce
Hamilton.
III. WESTERN TRANSVAAL
[Sidenote: Map. p. 292.]
Meanwhile in the Western Transvaal Delarey had remained undisturbed save
by the building of blockhouse lines. The situation elsewhere had not
suffered active measures to be taken in the district controlled by him,
which extended from the corner between the Vaal and the Western Railway
almost to the Magaliesberg, and for which on the British side Methuen
and Kekewich were the commanders chiefly responsible. During the earlier
summer months some small incidents occurred which were usually
favourable to the British cause.
In February, however, the tide of fortune turned. Delarey came down from
the north, apparently to watch his chance of intervening on behalf of De
Wet in the Orange River Colony, and heard from Liebenberg that a convoy
was on its way from Wolmaranstad to Klerksdorp. On February 25 the
convoy, which was escorted by 700 men and two guns, was near Yzer Spruit
within a day's march of its destination, when it was ambushed in the
dawn and captured by Delarey, Kemp, and Liebenberg, who thus easily
obtained what they were most in need of, namely transport animals, guns,
and ammunition to the amount of half a million rounds.[62] The capture
was effected within hearing not only of Klerksdorp, but also of a small
column on the march from Klerksdorp to Hartebeestfontein. Kekewich, who
was near Klerksdorp, then left for Wolmaranstad and sent a column under
Grenfell in pursuit of Delarey; but the column failed to find Delarey.
Methuen at Vryburg promptly set himself to work, with such tools as he
could lay his hands on, to avenge the disaster. He put together a column
of which about one-third was regular infantry with four field guns, and
the remainder samples of almost every irregular corps that had been
raised during the previous twelve months; and he set out at the head of
it to intercept Delarey, who was reported to be making for the Marico
River. He ordered Kekewich to co-operate with him from Klerksdorp.
Grenfell's column was accordingly ordered to meet Methuen at
Roirantjesfontein seventeen miles south of Lichtenburg. He arrived there
on March 7; Methuen, who was delayed by the difficulty of finding water,
having reached Tweebosch on the previous day.
It was now incumbent on Delarey, who was marching up from the south with
1,100 burghers, to attack either Methuen or Grenfell before they could
join hands. He chose the former's heterogeneous host as the easier prey,
and fell first upon his rearguard soon after he left Tweebosch at dawn
on March 7, and then upon his right flank. The mounted troops, which
were promptly disposed as a screen, failed ignominiously, the greater
part of them leaving the field in disorder. The regular infantry stood
fast with the guns, but were soon overwhelmed. Grenfell was unable to
intervene, but he strengthened Lichtenburg in case Delarey should come
that way. Delarey, however, went to the south to meet De Wet and Steyn,
whom he cheered with the news of the capture of four British field guns
and of 600 prisoners of war, among whom was Methuen, severely wounded.
Steyn remained with Delarey; De Wet returned to the Orange River Colony.
Yzer Spruit and Tweebosch introduced the Drive into the Western
Transvaal. Troops from all quarters reinforced Kekewich at Klerksdorp,
and soon a force 14,000 strong was assembled there and elsewhere. The
difficulty of the task before it was enhanced by the absence of a
network of blockhouse lines, which had only been laid out along the
Schoon Spruit and thence to Lichtenburg and Mafeking, and also along the
Vaal.
The troops had to begin operations from a faulty strategical base, as
they were aligned along or near the Schoon Spruit blockhouse line, and
between the Boers and that line. To drive Delarey on to it, they must
rapidly place themselves west of him; and this could be done only by a
night march of mounted men darting through his commandos and then
pressing him on to the Schoon Spruit in the opposite direction.
The operation, which was of spirited and ingenious conception, was
carried out on March 23. In proportion to the effort--the force engaged
in it numbered 11,000 mounted men--the results were paltry. A few score
prisoners and three guns were taken. As in the earlier drives in the
Orange River Colony, the meshes of the net were spacious and fragile.
Delarey, Kemp, and Steyn escaped; and even Liebenberg, when about to
suffer the _peine forte et dure_ upon the Schoon Spruit blockhouse line,
found a discontinuity through which he wriggled at midnight. Delarey
mustered his burghers to the number of over 2,000 on the Hart's River.
To deal with the embarrassing situation the British columns were again
marched to the west, with instructions to form a line of three
entrenched camps distant one or two days' march from the Schoon Spruit.
The centre column under the command of W. Kitchener having reached its
destination, made a reconnaissance in force still further to the west on
March 31. Cookson, who was in charge of the expedition, at the end of a
march of thirty-five miles, during which he had pushed back small
parties of the enemy, halted at Boschbult, where two farms lay on the
banks of the Brak River.
Cookson soon found himself in presence of 2,500 Boers with four field
guns, his own strength being 1,800 with the same number of guns. The
position was a bad one as the ground rose on each side of the river; the
bush offered cover to the attack, and the only cover available to the
defence was the almost dry bed of the river. He threw out screens and
proceeded to entrench and form a laager; while the screens faced in the
open the fire of the enemy under cover in the bush on the high ground.
Liebenberg made one attempt from the south to charge the main position,
but was driven back by the southern screen which had been brought into
the river bank; and after a second unsuccessful attempt, this time from
the east, withdrew to the high ground on the north.
When the work at the laager at the farms, which was impeded by artillery
fire from the S.W., was sufficiently advanced, the northern screen was
withdrawn. Some confusion ensued, as the Boers in the bush immediately
fell upon it, but their attempt to get at the main position on the
river, though supported by artillery, failed. It never attained the
crisis of an assault; and late in the afternoon it was called off by
Delarey, who arrived from his Head Quarters near Hart's River.
Meanwhile the sound of the action had reached the ears of W. Kitchener,
who twenty miles away was laying out his entrenched camp. He hurried to
the rescue, but the cessation of the firing and the reports of
stragglers led him to the conclusion that Cookson had been annihilated.
He reported to that effect to his brother, Lord Kitchener, and returned
to camp. Next day he again went out, and found to his satisfaction that
Cookson was still a military asset.
Kekewich, meanwhile, was searching for Delarey elsewhere. He had
bespoken at Head Quarters W. Kitchener's co-operation in the quest and
was relying on it; but a column commander on trek _in partibus Boerum_
is hard to find, and no instructions reached Kitchener.
The need of a General Manager on the spot to co-ordinate the activities
of the syndicate of column commanders who had so signally failed to
bring Delarey to book was now manifest; and Ian Hamilton, who had
greatly distinguished himself in two of the early combats of the war,
was now chosen to bring it to an end. On April 8 he joined Kekewich at
Middelbult.
Ian Hamilton quickly formulated a plan of using the three columns,
11,000 strong, of Kekewich, W. Kitchener and Rawlinson, who had lately
been in pursuit of De Wet in the Orange River Colony, as a scythe to
sweep over the country with a swing at first grazing Hart's River, then
the Vaal, and finally coming to rest at Klerksdorp. Only four days were
allotted to the movement, which began on April 10 and called for a daily
march of more than forty miles. Delarey had been summoned to take part
in the negotiations for peace, and Kemp was in charge of the Boer
commandos, which numbered about 2,600 burghers.
It happened that Kekewich, whose force was detailed as the right of the
advance, bore too much to the left on the first day's march, and found
himself in rear of Rawlinson. Kemp was observing the movement, and
assumed that he had located the British right, whereas Kekewich had
partly regained his position by moving towards Roodeval, where Kemp was
hovering for a chance to fall on the rear or the flank of Ian Hamilton's
columns.
Kekewich reached Roodeval early on April 11, and at once pressed forward
to Hart's River. His advanced guard almost immediately discovered a
large body of mounted men on the left front, who, until they opened
fire, were by some strange misconception taken to be a portion of
Rawlinson's column. They were in fact more than a thousand Boers under
Potgieter, who as soon as he had disposed of the advanced guard, made
for the main body, which was not yet formed up, and by which Potgieter's
men were again mistaken for a portion of Rawlinson's column. The error
was discovered, but not too late. The Boer attack, which for sheer
reckless bravery could hardly be surpassed, and which has been compared
to the Dervish charge at Omdurman, was made in the open against a
considerable force, was repelled; and Potgieter fell dead at the head of
his commandos. Rawlinson hurried up to the sound of the firing and drove
away the enemy, who retired, but not in disorder, to the south. A
remnant, however, broke back and even sniped the main body. In less than
three hours after the first shot had been fired by Potgieter, Kekewich
and Rawlinson started in pursuit. Kemp, however, saved himself, and
escaped with what was, under the circumstances, the inconsiderable loss
of the two field guns which Delarey had taken from Methuen at Tweebosch.
The two Hamiltons rang down the curtain of the War Tragedy. While Bruce
Hamilton was driving for the last time through the Orange River Colony,
Ian Hamilton with Kekewich, W. Kitchener, and Rawlinson, assisted by a
column from the Vaal under Rochfort, began a westward drive in the
Transvaal, with 17,000 men. Kemp followed the usual practice of Boer
commandants when hard pressed by the enemy, and scattered his commandos;
thus when Ian Hamilton's 17,000 crossed the border and reached the
Western Railway on May 11, they found less than 400 Boers, among whom
Kemp was not, impaled upon the barrier of blockhouses and armoured
trains.
IV. CAPE COLONY
During the early part of the summer of 1901-2 the Cape Colony was,
comparatively speaking, quiet, though dormantly rebellious. Little
positive progress was made, either by French or by the inflammatory
elements opposed to him, of which the leader was J.C. Smuts. These were
for the most part acting in a spacious and inaccessible area, which
included the districts of Kenhart, Carnarvon, Sutherland, Fraserburg,
and Calvinia. A blockhouse line, which when completed would stretch from
Victoria West to Lambert's Bay, was in course of construction through
these districts.
In December Kritzinger headed a raid from the Orange River Colony; but
although he was soon captured near Hanover, the greater portion of his
followers escaped to the south and infested the districts of Cradock and
Somerset East. Stephenson was put in immediate charge of the operations
against Smuts, who had established himself on the Zak River between
Kenhart and Calvinia, and who in January moved eastward. It was a false
move, because it brought him into the Fraserburg district, and made him
more accessible to the columns opposed to him. It was made apparently
with the intention of breaking across the railway in the vicinity of
Beaufort West.
The operations against Smuts, the flank bases of which, Beaufort West
and Lambert's Bay, were over 300 miles apart, attained only negative
success. A large convoy drawn by donkeys fell into the hands of the
rebels between Beaufort West and Fraserburg, and a smaller convoy in the
Sutherland district.
French now took in hand the Drive, the last weapon left in the British
Armoury, which his colleagues in the Transvaal and the Orange River
Colony had been wielding for some months. It was brandished northwards
from Beaufort West on February 17; but it only dispersed without
destroying the rebels, most of whom had retired to the north and N.W.
Not a few scraped round the right flank of the drive, crossed the
railway, and plunged into the Graaff Reinet and Aberdeen districts,
where they were joined by a band under Fouché, which had been lurking
and conniving far away to the N.E. between Dortrecht and Aliwal North.
Smuts withdrew to the N.W. and laid siege to Ookiep, which was relieved
on May 3 by an expedition sent from Capetown through Port Nolloth; Smuts
having in the meantime retired in order to attend the Peace Conference.
He had done his best to carry out the instructions given to him by the
Boer Council of War held in June, 1901, to foment a general insurrection
in the Cape Colony, but he had failed.
Notes:
[Footnote 61: L.M.O. _Requiescat in pace_.]
[Footnote 62: It is not easy to understand why an empty convoy on the
march, not from, but to a base of supplies, should have taken over 700
rounds per man.]