Bloemfontein to Pretoria
[Sidenote: Map, p. 260.]
The agile mind of Lord Roberts rather than the heavy hand of his Chief
of the Staff is discernible in the method of the advance on the
Transvaal.
There were two courses open to the British Army. It might have
deliberately pulverized and extinguished each atom of opposition within
reach in the Free State, and have taken no step to the front until the
rear and the flanks were absolutely and finally clear of the enemy; or
it might have advanced boldly towards the Transvaal with the ordinary
precautions for the protection of the lines of communication and of the
flanks.
Lord Roberts adopted the latter course. He had tried it with success in
the Afghan War twenty years before, when he marched even more "in the
air" from Kabul to Kandahar. The tedious process of "steam-rollering"
the Free State was not to his taste, nor would the expectant British
public at home have understood it; and it would have been severely
criticized by the military experts. It would have concentrated before
him north of the Vaal all the Boer forces which could not be crushed on
the spot, and have left the resources of the Transvaal for some time
untouched: free communication with the outer world by way of the neutral
port of Lorenzo Marques, the treasury of the Johannesburg gold mines
upon which the enemy could draw, and the railway and mining workshops in
which munitions of war could be manufactured.
Lord Roberts therefore determined upon a swift advance from
Bloemfontein. He was confident that the occupation of places would bring
the war to an end without an excessive loss of life; and he would
probably have been right if he had been engaged in a European war. He
did not see, however, that the Boers derived little or no strength from
their towns, which were rather a source of weakness; they were men of
the veld and the veld was their strength.
De Wet's _guerilla_ advanced Chermside to the command of the IIIrd
Division, in place of Gatacre sent home. A new Division, numbered the
VIIIth, under a new commander, Sir Leslie Rundle, a general with an
Egyptian reputation, was assembled south of Bloemfontein in April.
The siege of Wepener called for activity from Bloemfontein as well as
from the Orange, and Lord Roberts sent Rundle to Dewetsdorp, where his
presence would, it was hoped, not only draw the Boers away from Wepener,
but deny them a retreat to the north. Pole-Carew with the XIth Division
and French followed Rundle, but De Wet abandoned the siege on the
approach of Hart and Brabant from the south, and his brother P. De Wet
scuttled away from Dewetsdorp on the approach of Rundle; and the
commandos ran the gauntlet successfully. Their hereditary trekking
instincts told them when to move and how to move, and their mobility had
not at that period been recognized by the British Staff. Wepener was
indeed relieved, though not from Bloemfontein, but the subsequent
divagations of the Boers baffled three British divisions which were
endeavouring to squeeze them northwards and head them off. A strong
rearguard was left by the Boers at Houtnek, ten miles north of
Thabanchu.
Lord Roberts' position at Bloemfontein, and on the line of
communication, had never been seriously endangered. The brilliant
affairs of Sannah's Post and Mostert's Hoek were no doubt annoying to
the British Army and encouraging to the enemy. At home the importance of
them was greatly exaggerated. If the advance on the Transvaal was
delayed by them and the subsequent operations arising out of the siege
of Wepener, more time was given to prepare for it; and the British Army
was usefully informed of a fact which hitherto had hardly been
suspected, namely, that the enemy derived much of his power from
mobility, resourcefulness, and aptitude for _guerilla_.
Lord Roberts' plan for the movement on the Transvaal was an advance in
line, on a front which extended from Ladysmith to Kimberley. It soon
became an echelon owing to the slow movements of Buller in Natal. In the
centre at Bloemfontein were the troops under the immediate orders of the
Commander-in-Chief; on the left at Kimberley were Methuen, and Hunter
with the Xth Division which had been brought round from Ladysmith.
Between the centre and the right the intervention of Basutoland and the
Drakensberg prevented the effective co-operation of the Natal Army with
Lord Roberts; and a portion of the interval was occupied by the enemy.
The centre columns under Lord Roberts were about 43,000 strong. Hunter
and Methuen in the west had each under his command about 10,000 troops,
while Buller's force, which was much nearer to the Transvaal objective
than the centre, and which was still lingering on the banks of the Klip
River two months after the relief of Ladysmith, numbered about 45,000.
Ian Hamilton, who had done so well in the Elandslaagte and Caesar's Camp
affairs, was not allowed to waste himself in the Natal lethargy. He was
recalled from Ladysmith, and after taking part from the Bloemfontein
side in the Wepener operations, was given command of a column which was
sent on, a few days before the general movement, in the direction of
Winburg to protect the right flank of the central advance and to fend
off from it the hovering Boer commandos which had been pressed
northwards by the April operations. He started from Thabanchu on April
30 and was soon in action with the Boer force a Houtnek under P. Botha.
The battle lasted until nightfall and was renewed next day, when, with
the help of reinforcements from French and Colvile, Ian Hamilton forced
the Boers to retire on Clocolan.
Meanwhile there was energy on the left. Methuen had been for some time
in occupation of the Boshof district, where he was in a position to
threaten Kroonstad as well as the commandos at the Vaal bridge at
Fourteen Streams between Kimberley and Mafeking. The relief of the
latter was to be undertaken by a flying column under Mahon supported by
Hunter's division. On May 3 Lord Roberts left Bloemfontein for the
north. Kelly-Kenny's Division remained in charge of the Free State
capital, while Chermside's policed the railway and the country in rear.
Rundle at Thabanchu was instructed to prevent the enemy from regaining a
footing in the districts east and south of Bloemfontein, and Methuen to
push on towards the left bank of the Vaal beyond Hoopstad. No definite
orders were sent to Buller, but for two months there had been a constant
interchange of suggestions, counter-suggestions, plans, and projects for
co-ordinate action.
Lord Roberts' objective was now Pretoria. The country in front of him
was not difficult and he had a railway behind him. The line of
communication with the south was fairly safe, and it was estimated that
not more than 12,000 Boers with twenty-eight guns, under Delarey and L.
Botha, who had been brought round from Natal to take chief command
during the crisis, barred the way into the Transvaal; not including the
loosely associated commandos operating on the right flank under the
general control of De Wet, the Prince Rupert of the Boer War.
The nearest Boer post was at Brandfort, a few miles north of Karee
Siding. On the right was the Winburg intervening column, 14,000 strong,
under Ian Hamilton, who dragged in his train a weak supporting Division
under Colvile, his superior officer in an anomalous position obliged to
conform to his movements, and without authority to direct them.
Brandfort was occupied that evening by Lord Roberts at the cost of six
men killed. Vet River, the next obstacle, was secured on May 5, and
crossed on the following day by the greater part of the main column. Ian
Hamilton went into bivouac eight miles north of Winburg, which was
occupied by his henchman Colvile.
Up to this time, Lord Roberts was acting without the cavalry under
French, who since the Sannah's Post affair had been working in the
Thabanchu district, and who joined the main column on May 9. Though his
horses were not in good condition, his arrival increased the power of
the centre to strike rapidly at the next obstacles, the Zand River and
the town of Kroonstad forty miles beyond, which was now the seat of the
Free State Government. The drifts on a section of the river nearly
twenty miles in length were seized, the most easterly being taken by Ian
Hamilton, who had gradually converged on the centre column and was now
on the right of the line. Next day the passage of the river was
effected; but Lord Roberts' hope of getting round and grappling each
flank of the enemy, who numbered about 3,000 Transvaalers and 5,000 Free
Staters, was not realized, and Botha withdrew without serious loss. That
night the Army went into bivouac astride the railway between Zand River
and Kroonstad.
On the left was the cavalry under French, who next morning raided
northwards; but although he was unable, owing to the opposition of a
force which came out of Kroonstad, to reach the railway north of the
town, a small party of pioneers whom he had sent on succeeded during the
night in blowing up the line at America Siding within a few yards of the
high-road by which the enemy was retreating. This daring exploit, which
although it had not much effect on the situation was not the less
meritorious, was carried out by Hunter-Weston, who, just two months
previously, had similarly cut the line north of Bloemfontein. The Boers
had taken up a position at Boschrand to defend Kroonstad on the south,
but French's turning movement scared them, and the position as well as
the town was abandoned, in spite of efforts made by Steyn and Botha to
arrest the flight. The seat of Government was transferred to Lindley.
The Zand River affair was an incident in the advance rather than a
battle. Lord Roberts suffered but 115 casualties. Its effect on the
enemy was chiefly moral. The Transvaalers, whose country had not yet
heard the sounds of war, were alarmed, but the Free Staters were
dismayed. The ties of race and kindred had engulfed them in a war which
was not for their own cause, and the brunt of which they had borne for
ten weeks. They thought that they had done all that could be expected of
them and that the Transvaal must now look after itself. From that time
there was no organized co-operation between the allies.
On May 12 Lord Roberts entered Kroonstad. In his advance, averaging
thirteen miles per day, he had outstripped the reconstruction of the
railway, of which almost every bridge and culvert had been blown up by
the retreating Boers, and many miles of the permanent way had been
destroyed. A halt was therefore necessary until the railhead could be
brought nearer, and to give the Army an opportunity of pulling itself
together, which was especially required by the cavalry. Little more than
one-half of the 6,000 horses with which French marched out of
Bloemfontein on May 6 were fit for service at Kroonstad seven days
later.
Ian Hamilton was sent out in chase of the flitting Free State
Government. He found it not at Lindley, nor at Heilbron, for it had
trekked away to Frankfort. Between Lindley and Heilbron he was attacked
in rear by a body of Boers, who emerged from the presumed vacuum behind
him, but they were beaten off.
The bulk of the enemy's force which had evacuated Kroonstad, was now in
the triangle formed by the railway, the Vaal and the Rhenoster. On its
left flank was Ian Hamilton; and French was ordered out to hook the
right flank, a repetition of the movement which had failed at Zand
River. On May 22 Lord Roberts left Kroonstad.
The enemy, however, again evaded the net. Reconnaissances by French on
May 23 showed that Botha had been frightened by the appearance of Ian
Hamilton at Heilbron, and had crossed into the Transvaal. The discovery
necessitated the recasting of Lord Roberts' plan, and brought about an
interesting and entirely successful strategic movement. It was evident
from Botha's dispositions that he expected Ian Hamilton to march
straight to his front and endeavour to cross the Vaal above the railway
bridge at Vereeniging. The difficult drifts and country below it were
considered to be a sufficient protection, and were not strongly held by
Botha, who on this occasion was completely out-generalled by his
opponent.
Lord Roberts ordered Ian Hamilton to march from the right flank to the
left, across the front of the main Army, and then in conjunction with
French to wheel round to Meyerton on the line between Johannesburg and
Vereeniging. On the evening of May 26 he entered the Transvaal at
Wonderwater Drift. But Ian Hamilton's column had not the honour of being
the first troops of the main body to enter the Transvaal, for he found
the cavalry in front of him. French,[43] who had been sent out from
Kroonstad on May 20, reached the Vaal at Paris on the 24th, and at once
threw part of his force into the Transvaal, the rest crossing higher up
at Old Viljoen's Drift. He thus fittingly celebrated the last birthday
festival of Queen Victoria, which was also appropriately honoured by a
proclamation issued on the same day by Lord Roberts, by which the Orange
Free State was annexed to the dominions of Her Majesty under the
designation of the Orange River Colony--a suitable birthday offering
from a distinguished soldier to his Sovereign.
The main body of the Army with the Commander-in-Chief at its head
entered the Transvaal at Viljoen's Drift on May 27, and, like the
pioneer columns of French and Ian Hamilton, met with no opposition. It
was of good augury for the speedy subjugation of the South African
Republic. The expected firm stand of the enemy along the right bank of
the Vaal, where the great battle of the war was to be fought, was not
made. Vereeniging and subsequently Meyerton were abandoned in spite of
all Botha's efforts to keep his burghers' faces to the front. He held a
strong line enclosing Vereeniging and the drifts and extending from near
Heidelberg to Potchefstroom, but it impotently watched the British
troops crossing the river. Some opposition was indeed offered to French
when he was a day's march from the drift by which he had crossed into
the Transvaal, but the bulk of the commandos fell away to the north and
took up positions between Johannesburg and Krugersdorp. By arrangement
between the Governments, none of the Free Staters accompanied Botha into
the Transvaal; but he was in communication with De Wet at Frankfort, and
was urging him to act against the railway in the Free State. He must
have regretted that the strong hand and will of the man of Waterval
Drift, Kitchener's Kopje, Sannah's Post, and Mostert's Hoek, were not
with him on the right bank of the Vaal to animate the shrinking burghers
of the South African Republic.
The immediate purpose of Lord Roberts was now the capture of
Johannesburg, the relations of some of whose inhabitants towards
Pretoria had brought on, not only the Jameson raid, but also the war.
Although it was not defended by permanent military works, the burghers
had taken up a position before it which might be very hard to capture,
and there was another and greater cause for anxiety. The task before
Lord Roberts may be likened to an attack on a ship manned by pirates,
who threaten to fire the magazine as soon as a hand is laid upon the
bulwarks. It was seriously proposed by certain persons in authority
under Kruger, that on the appearance of the British Army before the
city, the mines in which so many millions of British capital were
invested should be wrecked; and it is probable that the threat would
have been carried out with official sanction if Botha had not set his
face resolutely against such a piratical act.
[Sidenote: Map, p. 240.]
Lord Roberts proposed to effect the capture of Johannesburg by
surrounding it. While with the main body of his Army he occupied
Elandsfontein on the east, French and Ian Hamilton, the pioneers of the
advance from Bloemfontein, would deal with the enemy posted south of the
city and then establish themselves, the former near Klipfontein, north
of it, and the latter near Florida, west of it. The right and the most
vulnerable part of the Boer line was posted on Doornkop near the scene
of the surrender of Jameson, the enthusiast, who, a few years before,
had endeavoured with a few hundred adventurers and soldiers of fortune
to solve the South African question which Great Britain was now tackling
with a quarter of a million of trained soldiers.
On May 29 Ian Hamilton attacked the Doornkop position and won it after
some hard infantry fighting; French, reinforced by the loan of
Hamilton's mounted troops, having thrown a grappling iron round it,
thereby rendering it untenable. At nightfall the two leaders were firmly
planted west of the city. The movement deceived the enemy, to whom the
advance of the main body under Lord Roberts on Elandsfontein came as an
unwelcome surprise, though Botha had to some extent prepared for it. The
detachments posted by him at various places east of the city offered no
effectual resistance, and Lord Roberts went into bivouac that night at
Elandsfontein. Johannesburg was entrapped between him on the east, and
French and Hamilton on the north and west.
On May 30 the city agreed not unwillingly to surrender, but having
regard to the presence in it of splinters of the lately shattered
commandos, to the probability of street fighting, and to the risk of
injury to the mines, Lord Roberts consented to postpone his formal entry
until the following day; by which time the judicious action of the
representatives of the Boer Government had averted the impending danger,
and the troops took peaceful possession of Johannesburg.
In spite of disquieting news from the Free State, Lord Roberts remained
firm in his purpose of advancing on Pretoria without delay. Not only was
it the head quarters of Krugerism, but also the place in which the Boer
harvest of war--more than 4,000 British prisoners, some of whom had been
in captivity since the day of Talana Hill--was garnered.
On June 3 the advance on Pretoria, which it was hoped would be the last
important movement of the war, was resumed; Wavell, with a brigade of
Tucker's Division, being left behind as Bank Guard over the treasure in
the mines. Botha had retired on the capital, but no one knew whether he
would endeavour to defend it, or whether the vaunted forts would
imperiously address the invader. In view of possible eventualities,
however, a siege train, in which were included two 9.45" howitzers which
had been hastily acquired in Austria, was taken up to answer Forts
Schanzkop, Klapperkop, Wonderboom, and Daspoort if they should speak.
Throughout the month of May there had been alarms and excursions in the
capital of the South African Republic. The sound of the _plon-plon_ of
the British Army was daily growing more distinct. The house of Ucalegon
was on fire. The Volksraad met on May 7, and after a session of three
days handed over the situation to the wavering executive Government,
which had already made arrangements for an eastward retirement. Kruger,
fearing lest his retreat by the Delagoa Bay railway should be cut off,
slipped away to Machadodorp on May 29; the forts were emptied and
abandoned, and Botha was bidden to do the best he could with the
remnants of the Transvaal forces. On June 3 he took up a position on a
ridge a few miles south of the city and prepared for the worst.
French, on the left front of the advance, was ambushed in a defile by a
commando which had come up out of the west, but cleared himself with
slight loss. The forts were dumb. Only the ridges between the city and
Six-Mile Spruit were found to be held. The southern ridge was taken, and
when the northern ridge was turned by Ian Hamilton, who was recalled
from acting at large in support of French, the Boers retired. French
passed through Zilikat's Nek and marched on Pretoria north of the
Magaliesberg. On June 5 the capital of the South African Republic
surrendered to Lord Roberts.
The Boers streamed away towards the east. An attempt made a few days
before to cut the Delagoa Bay railway failed, not, however, through the
fault of Hunter-Weston, who led the enterprise. The force given to him
was insufficient for the purpose, and he was unable to repeat the
exploits of Bloemfontein and Kroonstad.
The prisoners of war, whom to the number of 3,000 the Boers had not been
able to drag away with them in their hurried flight, and who were in
confinement at Waterval twelve miles north of the city, were brilliantly
liberated on June 4 by some squadrons of cavalry; which not only ran the
gauntlet of the Wonderboom defile, but passed through the Boer posts at
the further Poort and snatched away the prize from under the eyes of
Delarey, who was covering Waterval with 2,000 burghers and some guns.
On the day of Lord Robert's entry into Pretoria, Buller was still in
Natal. They had started simultaneously, and in thirty-four days the main
body had marched 300 miles, but the tardigrade Natal Army was now on
Lord Roberts' right rear. It had been his hope that Buller would advance
step by step with him, and having reached the Transvaal, would strike
northwards and establish himself on the Delagoa Bay railway and deny it
to Kruger. At Kroonstad, Lord Roberts, seeing that he could not expect
assistance from Buller, contemplated detaching Ian Hamilton and sending
him into the Eastern Transvaal, but the fear of unduly weakening the
main body in view of probable opposition at the Vaal, Johannesburg, and
Pretoria, caused him to give up the project. As events turned out, it
would in all probability have been successful.
Pretoria was in the hands of the British Army, Kruger was in flight, the
war was over said the experts. Without having fought a single action
that could be termed a battle, and at a cost of less than 500
casualties, of which but sixty-one men were killed, Lord Roberts had
passed from Bloemfontein and had seized the perverse city in which most
of the South African troubles of the past twenty-five years had been
brewed. The Free State, though kicking, was apparently helpless. There
were, however, not a few observers on the spot to whom the easy success
and the few casualties were of ominous import. A change in the method of
the opposition to be offered in the future to the invader was indicated.
The Boers were discovering that they were incapable of waging systematic
warfare and were on the point of resorting to _guerilla_, for which
they, as well as the arena, were by nature particularly well adapted.
[Illustration: Sketch map of Magaliesberg district.]
On the Boer side there was a transitory interval of weakness. Even
before Lord Roberts' occupation of Pretoria Kruger wrote doubtfully to
Steyn; and after it Botha was inclined to negotiate with the invader. He
was with his commandos at Hatherley, a few miles east of Pretoria. A
Council of War was held in the office of a Russian Jew, who was a
distiller of whisky. The leaders complained that they had been deserted
by Kruger, who had slunk away with the civil government and all the
money he could lay his hands on, and the general opinion was in favour
of abandoning the struggle. A meeting between Lord Roberts and Botha was
even arranged, when suddenly De Wet intervened. The news of his
successful raids on the line of communication in the Free State relaxed
the tension of the minds of the despondent commandants. Easily
disheartened and easily reassured, they leapt in an instant from one
psychological pole to the other. Botha announced that he was ready to
meet Lord Roberts, not only in conference, but in battle. The
negotiations were, however, not definitely broken off until after the
Battle of Diamond Hill.
Lord Roberts had sent Kitchener with a column to see to the trouble in
the Free State, and could not put more than about 16,000 men into the
field against Botha, who, with 6,000 men, had taken up a strong position
astride the Delagoa Bay railway sixteen miles east of Pretoria. His
centre was at Pienaar's Poort, where the railway passes through a
defile, and his front, which his former experience of Lord Roberts'
tactics led him to extend greatly, was nearly twenty-five miles in
length, and ran along an irregular chain of hills, kopjes, and ridges.
Facing the Diamond Hill and Donkerhoek range, south of the centre, is
another range of heights through which the two poorts Tyger and Zwavel
pass, and which circles round the source of Pienaar's River towards the
Diamond Hill range. North of the centre runs a broken range ending
abruptly at the Kameelfontein ridge, which overlooks the broad
Kameelfontein valley leading to the Krokodil Spruit; and across the
valley rises the Boekenhoutskloof ridge, a detached feature with
triangular contours, which, being somewhat in advance, commands the
approaches to Kameelfontein ridge, where the Boer right flank under
Delarey was posted.
The left flank was on Mors Kop and curved round indefinitely to
Kameelzyn Kraal with detached posts in the direction of Tygerpoort. The
centre north and south of Pienaar's Poort was the strongest section of
the line, and for this reason and for another it was held by
comparatively small numbers. Botha was an acute observer and had learnt
the moves of the British autumn manoeuvre opening, a holding attack on
the centre not intended to be pushed home in order to eke out paucity of
numbers operating on a wide front. Lord Roberts, in spite of his
superiority of strength, could not hope to inflict a decisive defeat
upon Botha's well-posted commandos, but only to remove them out of
striking distance of Pretoria, and he was successful.
The earlier movements of the attack on June 11 were in the nature of a
reconnaissance in force, as it was uncertain how far to the north and
south the Boer front extended. The usual tactics were adopted. French
with the 1st and 4th Cavalry Brigades under Porter and Dickson was to
work round the enemy's right flank and to endeavour to circle round it
to the railway; a demonstrating attack on the centre would be made by
Pole-Carew; while Ian Hamilton acted against the left flank.
French approached the Kameelfontein valley and won a footing on
Boekenhontskloof ridge, which the Boers were only now moving out to
occupy, with his left. His right soon came under heavy fire from
Krokodil Spruit Hill on the Kameelfontein ridge, but he succeeded in
seizing Louwbaken, which he held tenaciously in spite of Delarey's
attempts to work round it and of the shells of a heavy gun posted six
miles away near Edendale. Meanwhile his left had been struggling for
several hours on the Boekenhoutskloof ridge, which it eventually
cleared, and was then able to support the right, which was still
clinging desperately to Louwbaken. Throughout the afternoon the Boers
continued their attacks on French, but were unable to shift him. At
nightfall he found that instead of turning the enemy's right, he had
only plastered himself against it. He had already reported the situation
to Lord Roberts, who authorized him to withdraw if necessary, at the
same time cautioning him "not to risk too many casualties."
[Illustration: Diamond Hill.]
Pole-Carew, in the centre, was in action with his heavy guns only,
"demonstrating" according to the rules, pending the development of the
flank attacks.
The force on the right under Ian Hamilton was strong in mounted troops.
He entered the arena through Zwavelpoort, and thrust at the bristling
but indeterminate left flank of the enemy. The 2nd Cavalry Brigade under
Broadwood evicted a small body of Boers from Tygerpoort, and when the
3rd Brigade under Gordon came up to hold the position until the arrival
of an infantry regiment, Broadwood advanced across the valley in the
direction of Mors Kop, and soon was not only under shell fire from
Diamond Hill, but also under rifle fire from some vague detachments of
Boers on his right rear.
Nor was this all, for as he proceeded, the enemy was seen pouncing down
from Diamond Hill on to the Kleinfontein ridge upon the line of his
advance, and simultaneously he was fired on from the right. Two horse
artillery guns, which had been sent out, with an insufficient escort, to
deal with the swoop, were almost captured, and were only saved by Lord
Airlie at the cost of his own life. The attack on the right was soon
checked, but the cavalry instead of outflanking the enemy was itself
outflanked and unable to make a further advance.
Gordon had now come away from Tygerpoort, and, in touch with Broadwood,
screened the right flank of Ian Hamilton's infantry attack; which after
the failure to turn the enemy's left flank, had necessarily to be a
frontal movement against the strongest section of his line. Bruce
Hamilton, with a brigade of Ian Hamilton's command, crossed Pienaar's
River near Boschkop and expelled the Boer advanced front from the
Kleinfontein ridge. Ian Hamilton was now face to face with Diamond Hill,
but the afternoon was too far spent for further action.
The general idea for the right attack on the following day was a
movement by Bruce Hamilton, reinforced by the Brigade of Guards from
Pole-Carew's command in the centre. Diamond Hill was taken without much
difficulty early in the afternoon, and the Donkerhoek plateau was
cleared. A gap was now made in the Boer line, the commandos driven off
making for the Donkerpoort ridge on the one side, or the
Rhenosterfontein heights on the other. From three positions a double
rain of bullets poured upon Bruce Hamilton on the plateau, until the
heights were reached by De Lisle's mounted infantry from Broadwood's
brigade. Bruce Hamilton's right flank was thus relieved, but between him
and the enemy clustering on the ridge intervened the impassable ravine
of the Donkerpoort. Night was approaching and nothing more could be
done.
On the left, French held his own but no more during the day, and
Pole-Carew in the centre had no opportunity of going into action. The
capture of the Rhenosterfontein heights occurred at an opportune moment
and perhaps averted a disaster. At Delarey's request Botha was on the
point of sending reinforcements to the Boer right to enable it to drive
away French and fall upon the weak British centre, when De Lisle's
success vitally changed the situation.
Next morning, June 13, the British Army found that it had won a victory
without knowing it. The Boers had faded away during the night and had
abandoned the strongest position which they had ever held in the Free
State or the Transvaal. French and Ian Hamilton went in pursuit with no
results. Delarey succeeded in circling round towards the Western
Transvaal, Botha retired to the east. The casualties on the British side
were 176; the Boers professed to have lost but four burghers killed and
twenty wounded.
Lord Kitchener was away in the Free State, and the battle was fought
under the usual restrictive conditions, that no operation likely to
entail serious loss of life was to be undertaken: and the enemy found
that the ordeal of combat was not very dreadful.
With the occupation of Pretoria, which was not virtually effected until
Botha's retreat from Diamond Hill, the ranging phase of Lord Roberts'
campaign was nearly at an end. At the two capitals and at other towns
already occupied, he had places of arms, from which without wide
divagations of large bodies of troops, he could hope soon to control and
eventually to dominate the Republics.
To see to the long and lonely furrow which he had ploughed across the
veld from the Orange to the Magaliesberg, and to prevent its being
obliterated by the wayward and shifting sand of the desert, was the
present task before him.
Notes:
[Footnote 43: Plumer raided across the Limpopo into the Transvaal as far
back as December, 1899, and Hunter occupied Christiana on May 15.]