Alarms and Excursions
The occupation of Bloemfontein by the British Army in March, 1900,
ushered in the second or _guerilla_ period of the war. Hitherto the
struggle had been mainly, though not entirely, maintained against
considerable bodies of Boers, who though widely dispersed acted more or
less under a common direction; but after the capture of the Free State
capital, a system of partisan and irregular warfare was adopted by the
enemy.
The change was not suddenly effected. It was an instinctive, almost an
imperceptible, development rendered necessary by circumstances. The
reverses on the Modder, the failure at Ladysmith, the ill success which
attended the attempts to raise the fiery cross in the northern districts
of Cape Colony, indicated to the burghers the cause of the instability
of their military machine. They discovered, in time, that its centre of
gravity was too highly pitched and must be brought nearer the earth. For
five months the war had been carried on under the orders of a federal
syndicate composed of the two Presidents sitting with casual military
assessors, scarcely one of whom was a strategist or capable of viewing
the Boer cause synoptically. Cronje was gone into captivity; Joubert was
suspected to be half-hearted; and Botha, who had begun so well in Natal,
was a disappointment.
The Boers recognized that the British strategy had been astonishingly
successful, and that they could not hope to compete with it. But they
believed, not without justification, that in minor tactics and the
smaller operations of war they were the equals of their enemy and in
war-craft his superior. The power of a slender, well-led, and resolute
force was shown at Nicholson's Nek, Waterval Drift, and elsewhere, and
it began to dawn upon their lethargic minds that the individual efforts
of handy commandos acting to a great extent independently offered them
the best chance of resisting the invader.[39] The new method was almost
immediately put on trial and, with certain notable exceptions, continued
throughout the war, which mainly by its use was prolonged for twenty-six
months against an enemy daily increasing in numbers. Not that the Boers
were not at first greatly discouraged by the victories on the Modder,
which admitted Lord Roberts to Bloemfontein, and by the tranquillity
which suddenly brooded upon the arena of war. Even the Prieska
rebellion, from which so much was hoped owing to its proximity to the
line of communication with Capetown, was dying away under the vigorous
hands of Kitchener, who had been detached from Head Quarters to deal
with it.
Many of the burghers availed themselves of a proclamation issued by Lord
Roberts on March 15, under which, after taking an oath of neutrality,
they were allowed to return to their farms, and there remain during good
behaviour. Others took furlough, with or without permission, or fled to
Kroonstad. When Joubert remonstrated with De Wet for acquiescing in the
exodus, the latter replied that he could not help it. The burghers were
not accustomed to discipline and could not be coerced, but they would
return with renewed courage by and by.
The demoralization was, however, confined to the burghers who had been
fighting on the Modder River. The commandos which had been opposed to
Gatacre, Clements, and Brabant in the Cape Colony retired across the
Orange in good order under Olivier, Lemmer, and E.R. Grobler; and
although encumbered by lengthy trains of ox-wagons, marched up the right
bank of the Caledon along the Basuto Border, and established themselves
with a strength of 6,000 burghers on Lord Roberts' right flank near
Ladybrand and Clocolan: a daring exploit which was justified by its
success, as the left flank throughout the trek was exposed to a raid
from Bloemfontein or Edenburg. A mounted force 1,800 strong under French
was indeed sent eastward to show the flag, detach the waverers, and if
possible, intercept the retreat; but the information at Head Quarters
was imperfect and the strength of the commandos was greatly
underestimated. It was assumed that they had been subject to the
disintegration which obliterated the Modder River commandos; but a small
reconnoitring column, detached under Pilcher by French from Thabanchu,
found itself in presence of a force which outnumbered it thirty times,
and was recalled.
The presence of a considerable body of the enemy organized on the flank,
the necessity of accumulating a large stock of supplies and stores, and
a serious epidemic of fever among the troops, postponed the advance on
the Transvaal many weeks beyond the end of March, when Lord Roberts had
hoped to set out for the north. The apparent pacification of the country
and the alacrity displayed by the burghers in submitting to the generous
conditions of the proclamation of neutrality, had encouraged him in the
belief that prompt action before the enemy had time to take breath would
finally crush the dwindling opposition; but he soon became aware that it
was but a lull in the storm, of which the mutterings were almost
immediately renewed.
Pole-Carew, who shortly after the occupation was sent south with a
brigade to establish touch with Gatacre and Clements and open up the
railway, heard of the Boer movement along the Basuto Border and at once
reported it to Lord Roberts, whom he rejoined at Bloemfontein on March
17. Before the end of the month the line was cleared and trains were
passing to and fro between Capetown and the capital of the Free State,
which had lately been renamed the Orange River Colony. From that time
forward the enemy succeeded on one occasion only, and then but for a few
hours, in cutting the Springfontein-Bloemfontein railway; and the
hazardous advance along the Modder River, which involved the possibility
of the Army being left in the air at Bloemfontein, was fully justified.
The Boers, who were supposed to be hypnotized, soon began to show signs
of returning animation. At a Krijgsraad which assembled at Kroonstad on
March 17, and at which Steyn and Kruger were present, plans for the
renewal of the struggle were discussed and measures for enforcing
discipline on the burghers were taken. Steyn professed to have
information that a Russian advance on India was imminent. The idea of
resistance _en masse_ was abandoned, and a policy of flying columns
unencumbered with wagons and acting aggressively against the British
lines of communication was adopted. It was hoped that a timely
demonstration would lure the enemy out of his hold, and that a little
encouragement would revive the Prieska rebellion. The determination to
continue hostilities in which even Joubert, who after the fall of
Ladysmith joined the commandos operating in the Free State, acquiesced,
was a proof of the courage and the steady patriotism of the Boer
leaders, and the events of the next two years justified their
resolution. Joubert, who had attended the Krijgsraad in feeble health,
died a few days after its adjournment, and L. Botha was appointed to the
thankless office of Commandant-General.
The only direction from which Bloemfontein appeared to be vulnerable was
the north, which also was the direction in which Lord Roberts hoped soon
to be leading his troops. At a distance of a day's march from the
capital, the railway to Pretoria crosses the Modder at Glen, and again
the river which had recently figured so prominently in the campaign came
upon the stage of war, and not as a last appearance. The railway bridge
had been destroyed by the Boers, who thus excluded themselves from
action on the left bank. A considerable force was sent out from
Bloemfontein to hold the position while the bridge was being rebuilt,
and to keep at arm's length the enemy skirmishing on the right bank. It
was soon found necessary to hold a more advanced post at Karee Siding,
north of Glen, and a force which seems out of proportion to the
resistance which, according to the ideas then prevalent at Head
Quarters, might be expected, was assembled at Glen on March 28. The
VIIth Division under Tucker was brought up from Bloemfontein, and French
was recalled from Thabanchu to lead the cavalry. With him, in command of
the mounted infantry, was Le Gallais, a remarkable association of two
soldiers whose names, though in different languages, were identical.
Bloemfontein was denuded of cavalry, but the combined strength of the
two cavalry brigades was much under 1,000. The force under Tucker and
French, which judging from its strength Lord Roberts seems to have
detailed rather as the advanced guard of an immediate march on Pretoria
than as the minimum with which the opposition could be safely
encountered, numbered about 9,000 men with thirty guns. At Karee Siding
were 3,500 burghers under T. Smuts, who had come up to carry out the
Krijgsraad idea of enticing the British out of Bloemfontein.
Next day a battle of the usual type was fought. The mounted troops
worked upon the flanks of the enemy, who was posted on a line of kopjes
on each side of the railway, while the infantry attacked frontally with
success and drove back the burghers, who retired in good order towards
Brandfort unmolested by the cavalry, which was as before too much
exhausted for effective pursuit. Thus, at a cost of less than 200
casualties, Lord Roberts made good the first stage on the road to the
north.
Soon after his entry into Bloemfontein Lord Roberts sent out a small
mounted column under Amphlett to Sannah's Post, where the water which
supplied the capital was drawn from the Modder River. This had been cut
off by the enemy, and the Army was dependent upon the disused and
tainted wells within the city. The Boer commandos, which under the
command of Olivier had retreated from the Cape Colony to Ladybrand and
Clocolan, now began to threaten Broadwood, who, when French was sent to
Glen, succeeded to the command of the mounted column. Broadwood was
compelled to retire from Thabanchu on March 30. Early on the following
morning he bivouacked at the Waterworks, whither his convoy under
Pilcher had already preceded him; and simultaneously the IXth Division
under Colvile and a brigade of Mounted Infantry under Martyr were
ordered out from Bloemfontein to help him in.
Meanwhile De Wet at Brandfort was watching his opportunity of working at
the task assigned to him under the Krijgsraad scheme, of attacking the
British lines of communication. His anticipation that the burghers would
return with renewed vigour from the furlough which they had granted to
themselves proved to be accurate. While Smuts was standing up to Tucker
and French at Karee Siding, 1,600 men with five field guns under C. De
Wet, whose second in command was his brother Piet, were circling to the
Waterworks. The initial direction of the march was N.E., in order to
conceal the real objective of the raid even from his own men. His
intention was to seize Amphlett at the Waterworks, and there lie in wait
for Broadwood's convoy. Before reaching his destination he handed over
two-thirds of his force to his brother, who early in the morning took up
a position on the right bank of the Modder east and north of the
Waterworks, while he himself went to the Wagon Drift on the Korn Spruit,
where the bed is deep enough to afford perfect concealment to a large
body of men in ambush. He occupied it at 4 a.m. on March 31.
A farmer, brought in by a patrol from Amphlett's post, reported to the
officer in command of the connecting post at Boesman's Kop that the
enemy had been seen; but the officer did not pay much attention to the
report, though he communicated it to the connecting post at Springfield
in the direction of Bloemfontein; at the same time sending back the
patrol to Amphlett at the Waterworks with a reinforcement of his own
men. The patrol was fired on while attempting to return to the
Waterworks, and retired to Boesman's Kop.
[Illustration: Map.]
Broadwood, whose column had already been in bivouac near the Waterworks
for some hours with the convoy which had preceded it, was at sunrise
shelled by Piet De Wet, of whose presence on the right bank of the
Modder he had only a few minutes previously been made aware, and in the
belief that his front was clear, he at once determined to take up a
position on Boesman's Kop.
Rarely had two leaders about to meet in battle been more strangely
deceived by the Fog of War. C. De Wet, although cut off from his guns
and the main body of his command by an unfordable river, was confident
in his lurking place in the Korn Spruit that he could easily repeat his
exploit of February 15 and annex another British convoy; yet he suddenly
discovered that he had to deal not with a mere escort, but with a strong
mounted force and two batteries of Horse Artillery, and he was equal to
the occasion.
Broadwood, equally confident that the whole force of the enemy was on
his flank on the right bank of the Modder, marched heedlessly into the
ambush which De Wet had laid for him in the Korn Spruit, on the direct
line between two adjacent British posts, and which neither of them had
discovered, although the usual patrols had been sent out. When the
patrol from the Waterworks to Boesman's Kop did not return in due course
on the morning of March 31, its absence seems to have caused no anxiety
to Amphlett.
Broadwood, groping in the Fog of War, believed that the force on his
flank was Olivier's, who had driven him out of Thabanchu, and who now,
as he thought, had overtaken him. The possibility of a raid from the
north did not occur to him. He pressed on towards Boesman's Kop and
carelessly approached the sunken and treacherous cutting through which
the Korn Spruit trickles to the Modder, between banks of even height
which almost up to the brink make no perceptible break in the surface of
the veld. His ground scouts and advanced guard were Cape carts full of
refugees followed by the wagons of his convoy. Next in succession came U
Battery of Horse Artillery with its mounted escort of colonial troops.
Preceded by the Cape carts, which De Wet, in order to disarm suspicion,
allowed to cross to the left bank, the column lumbered down the slope
into the spruit and was quickly sucked into the trap. In silence broken
only by the rumble of the wheels and the Kaffir cries of the drivers,
and unseen by the gunners close behind the leading wagons were seized by
quiet, determined burghers and placed under guard. The approach to the
drift was soon blocked, and in the heart of the entanglement was U
Battery. When it reached the incline, men sprang up out of the spruit
and lined the bank, and without firing a shot made prisoners of the
gunners, who, jammed by the transport, could neither fight nor retire,
and were easily taken from their teams and guns, and conducted by their
captors down to the bed of the spruit. Only the Major commanding the
Battery and the Serjeant-Major got away. Q Battery and its mounted
escort narrowly escaped being drawn into the ambush, but were warned in
time and galloped back to the railway station buildings.
Up to that moment not a shot had been fired, but as Q Battery wheeled
the Boers lining the bank opened upon it, and in the scrimmage another
gun was lost.
The derelict and riderless teams of U Battery at the spruit were shot
down by the Boers to prevent the escape of the guns, but not before one
gallant team had wrenched its gun out of the enemy's grasp and had
broken away. The Boers were now in possession of five guns of U Battery
and of one gun of Q Battery. The spruit was shelled with little effect
by Q Battery, which unlimbered near the station buildings. Only a
plunging fire could have harmed the enemy hidden in it.
It is hard to say whether De Wet or Broadwood was in the greater danger
at 9 a.m. on March 31. The former had, it is true, just obtained a
dramatic and most encouraging success. He laid a trap for a convoy and
found himself in action with a force numerically equal to his own. He
had made many prisoners, and almost without striking a blow had captured
not only Broadwood's convoy but also six of Broadwood's guns. His force,
however, was divided. The portion of it under his own command could not
be effectively supported by his brother's command, and was confined in a
spruit out of which he could not move, and which was commanded in rear
by higher ground.
Broadwood had been outwitted by De Wet and very roughly handled. With a
crippled and maimed force he was lying between the jaws of a vice which
might at any moment close and crush him. The loss of the convoy was,
from a tactical point of view, not an unmixed evil, as he gained thereby
greater freedom of action, but the loss of half his guns was for the
time being irremediable. The careless and haphazard scouting from the
Waterworks and Boesman's Kop, in which he complacently trusted, had
lured him on.[40] When it was reported to him that the spruit was in
possession of the enemy, he could scarcely believe it possible. Whether
he or the officers in command of the artillery and the mounted escort
were responsible for the extraordinary omission to send out ground
scouts in advance of the column is not known, but the guns and wagons
would not have been lost had this simple and customary precaution been
taken.
Broadwood, who had no information that Colvile and Martyr were
approaching from the west, and that the latter was actually at Boesman's
Kop, acted in the belief that he would have to deal with the situation
unaided. He ordered the mounted infantry under Alderson to hold P. De
Wet's force on the Modder, while the cavalry, supported by fire from Q
Battery at the station buildings and working south and west of the Korn
Spruit Drift, endeavoured to turn C. De Wet's precarious position.
Neither of these operations was successful. Alderson could barely hold
his own; the turning movement, although aided by a few companies of
Martyr's force, was frustrated by small parties of marksmen whom C. De
Wet had posted on the ridge in rear; and Q Battery was losing heavily.
At 10 a.m. Broadwood ordered a general retirement. No attempt seems to
have been made to communicate with him by heliograph, and he was still
unaware that Martyr had been on Boesman's Kop for three hours, and was
actually assisting in the turning movement; and that Colvile was
hurrying forward to the sound of the firing with the IXth Division. As
the battle had begun in the Fog of War, so also therein did it end.
With the utmost difficulty Q Battery, which had been fighting in the
open until only Phipps-Hornby and less than a dozen gunners were left to
work five guns, was withdrawn. The enemy's fire was so heavy that the
teams could not be brought up to the guns, four of which were run back
by hand to the station buildings, which afforded some cover. The fifth
gun was abandoned, but by the heroic efforts of Phipps-Hornby and a
handful of gunners and volunteers from the mounted infantry escort, four
guns were brought away.
Meanwhile Alderson was fighting a rearguard action against P. De Wet, to
cover the retirement of the guns, and when this was effected, he
followed them, closely pursued as far as the Korn Spruit by P. De Wet's
burghers, who crossed the Modder at the Waterworks. Before noon the
remains of Broadwood's column were formed up near Boesman's Kop. He had
lost seven[41] guns, seventy-three wagons and nearly a third of his
strength in killed, wounded, and prisoners.
Broadwood's withdrawal gave C. De Wet the opportunity which he could
hardly have dared hope would ever be offered to him. He was reinforced
by his brother, and at once drew his spoils out of the spruit and easily
got away with them to the right bank of the Modder, where at noon he met
the advanced guard of Olivier's force. Although he was in presence not
only of Broadwood's force, but also almost in touch with a division of
infantry and a brigade of mounted infantry his movements were so little
impeded that he was able to bring two of the captured guns back to the
left bank, and to bring them into action against a detachment of mounted
infantry which was holding Waterval Drift.
Martyr reached Boesman's Kop at 7 a.m., where in the course of the
morning he was joined by Colvile, whose Division was also on its way to
Waterval Drift. Broadwood, who was about two miles away, was ordered by
Colvile to come to him, but he refused to leave his command so long as
there was any chance of recovering the guns. He technically committed a
breach of discipline, but Lord Roberts subsequently approved of his
action. He requested Colvile to advance against the spruit, but the
message was not delivered; and Colvile said that it would not have
modified his dispositions. He had already refused to listen to the
obvious suggestion made by his staff that he should go to Broadwood, who
after waiting for two hours in the expectation that something would be
done by the infantry division, gave up hope and retired towards
Springfield.
Colvile's appreciation of the situation was that it would have been
useless to pursue De Wet's mounted troops with infantry. He therefore
carried out the letter of his instructions from Lord Roberts, and,
seeing that Broadwood's column was apparently safe, went on towards
Waterval Drift: whither also Martyr had already sent the greater portion
of the mounted infantry. Thus the brothers De Wet gained not only an
actual, but also a moral success of the greatest importance to their
cause, and took away the prizes they had so unexpectedly won, under the
eyes of a strong British force helplessly watching the commandos
trailing away across the veld.
Waterval Drift had been indicated to Colvile and Martyr as their
objective by Lord Roberts, and they considered that it was their duty to
make for it. They did not, however, recognize that instructions must be
read in the light of the information at the disposal of the superior
officer at the moment of issue, and they adhered to them
pedantically.[42] Lord Roberts could not have anticipated Broadwood's
plight when he ordered Colvile and Martyr to Waterval Drift.
Meanwhile, the news of the disaster had reached Bloemfontein. French's
attenuated cavalry brigade, still panting with the fatigue of the Karee
Siding affair, was ordered out, and Colvile was instructed to endeavour
to make a turning movement, and with French's assistance to act on the
Boer line of retreat. By sunset Colvile, after some opposition, was in
possession of the Waterval Drift; the enemy having despatched the
prisoners, the loot, and the captured guns to the north, was still in
occupation of the Waterworks; Broadwood's mangled column was on its way
back to Bloemfontein; and French was expected to appear upon the stage
at sunrise next morning. The approach of the cavalry, which had picked
up Broadwood at Springfield, was delayed by a report, which proved to be
unfounded, that a body of the enemy was on the right flank marching on
Bloemfontein, and French did not come into touch with Colvile until
nearly midday on April 1. After reconnoitring the Waterworks and the
Boer positions on the right bank of the Modder, Colvile came to the
conclusion that he was not strong enough to attack them. Next day all
the troops were ordered by Lord Roberts to fall back upon Bloemfontein.
Broadwood was not wholly, not even mainly, responsible for the Sannah's
Post disaster. He was unable to retrace that unlucky first false step
when, rashly assuming that the ground had been properly reconnoitred and
patrolled, he pushed into the angle between the Modder and its
tributary; and there can be no excuse for the negligence which tossed
the convoy and the guns into the abyss. But he received neither support
nor information until it was too late. No serious attempt was made to
let him know that a strong force was on its way from Bloemfontein.
Martyr failed to report himself, and Colvile was content to be an
interested spectator of the closing scene of the drama. Each leader
assumed that the moves of the Kriegspiel had been correctly played and
that there was nothing more to be done.
After the occupation of Bloemfontein, the columns operating south of the
Orange River were drawn into the Free State. Clements crossed at
Norval's Pont, and Gatacre at Bethulie on March 15; Brabant, who
commanded the colonial troops of the latter's Division, having reached
Aliwal North four days previously. Clements' force advanced in a
peaceful procession through the districts west of the railway, meeting
with no opposition, and receiving what, under the circumstances, was
almost a welcome from the inhabitants. Early in April he joined Lord
Roberts at Bloemfontein.
Not so with Gatacre and Brabant, who were soon seriously involved. Lord
Roberts' view of the situation, which although mistaken was not
unwarranted, was that the majority of the Boers were inclined to submit,
and would do so but for the malign influence of a small belligerent
party; and in order to encourage the waverers to assert themselves, and
to give protection to them when they took the oath of neutrality and
returned to their homes, he sent out flying columns in various
directions to register names, take over arms, and make known the
conditions on which surrenders would be accepted.
The story of the Thabanchu column has already been told. Other columns
were detached from Gatacre's and Brabant's commands, and Smithfield,
Wepener, and Dewetsdorp, and smaller towns were occupied. Lord Roberts'
orders for the occupation of Dewetsdorp were conditional on Gatacre's
having enough troops for the purpose at his disposal. So little was it
expected that the columns would meet with serious resistance that they
were unaccompanied by guns, and all Gatacre's artillery was sent to
Bloemfontein.
De Wet, a soldier possessed of more power of initiative than many of his
opponents, took "upon himself the responsibility of varying the
instructions" he had received from the Kroonstad Krijgsraad. The chance
of snapping up isolated garrisons allured him from the less brilliant
but more practically useful work of hacking at the railway upon which
Lord Roberts depended for his communications, and his wonderful and
unexpected success at Sannah's Post encouraged him to persevere. He
became aware that small columns were scouring the country, administering
lightly taken oaths and giving receipts for arms handed in by burghers
who protested that they were "sick of the war"; and he determined to
deal promptly with these ominous signs.
Between Sannah's Post and Reddersburg he in one day persuaded more than
a hundred sworn burghers to break their oaths of neutrality and join
him. Whether the energy and resource which he displayed would not have
been more profitably expended in a vigorous effort to shrivel up the
line between Bloemfontein and the Orange is a matter for speculation.
Kruger watched his proceedings with misgiving, and proposed that he
should retire northwards, as soon as he had cut the railway, or even
without doing so.
Korn Spruit opened Lord Roberts' eyes. He became alarmed for the safety
of the railway, and ordered Gatacre to evacuate Dewetsdorp and to
concentrate the weak pacificatory columns wandering helplessly over the
country. The column of 550 men without guns, sent by Gatacre to garrison
Dewetsdorp, had not been there many hours before it was ordered to
retire on Reddersburg, and at daybreak on April 2 was again on the
march, and soon De Wet was in touch with it. On the following morning he
was close to it. In his own account of the affair he says that there was
a sort of a race, which was won by the British column, for a ridge near
Reddersburg, named Mostert's Hoek. He had with him 2,000 men with four
guns, but an invitation to surrender was promptly declined by the
defenders, who all that day were beaten on by bullet and by shell. After
sunset the last drop of water was served out. Next morning De Wet rushed
the western spur of the ridge, which now became untenable, and at 9 a.m.
on April 4 the column surrendered and was swept into his net.
Another hour of resistance would probably have saved it. On the previous
evening Gatacre and Lord Roberts received the news that it was in
trouble, and a relieving force was hurriedly collected at Bethany from
Springfontein and Bloemfontein, and sent out under Gatacre's command.
His scouts heard the last shot fired, and the silence which followed
seemed to show that all was over. When reports of the surrender reached
him near Reddersburg, and before De Wet, only six miles away, had
cleared out of Mostert's Hoek, he abandoned the attempt; although some
of his advanced mounted troops did indeed come into touch with the
rearguard of De Wet hurrying away with his prisoners.
Next day he was recalled to Bloemfontein by Lord Roberts, who held him
responsible for the disaster. He had occupied Dewetsdorp, an exposed and
isolated position, with an inadequate force, although expressly
instructed to leave it alone if he had not sufficient troops for the
purpose. Mostert's Hoek supervening on Stormberg ended the career of a
most gallant, energetic, and enthusiastic soldier. _Bic peccare in bello
non licet_. He was removed from his command and sent back to England.
After leaving Sannah's Post, De Wet seems to have recognized that he was
not exactly carrying out the Krijgsraad policy, for he informed Steyn
that he was going to Dewetsdorp to "collect the burghers and to obtain
dynamite for our operations" against the railway between Bloemfontein
and Bethany. Next day he heard that the British had occupied Dewetsdorp,
and soon after that the garrison was retiring on Reddersburg, and the
attack on the line, which perhaps he never seriously intended to make,
was indefinitely postponed.
For as soon as he had disposed of the prisoners of Mostert's Hoek, he
cast his eye round the horizon and descried two other isolated
garrisons, at Smithfield and Wepener. Against the former he sent one of
his lieutenants, who, however, found the little town evacuated, while he
himself made for Wepener, and longing to teach a lesson to Brabant's
loyal colonials, sat down before it on April 9 with ten guns and 6,000
men. In the course of the northward advance from the Orange it had been
occupied by a detachment from Brabant's force, which was increased by
subsequent reinforcements to a strength of nearly 1,900 men under
Dalgety, of whom little more than 100 were regular troops, with seven
guns. The town itself was not held, but a circular position outside it
with a perimeter of seven miles was taken up on the right bank of the
Caledon.
De Wet maintained the siege for sixteen days. The failure of an attempt
by night on April 10 to storm a post on the southern section of the
perimeter deterred the Boers, as at Ladysmith after the abortive attack
on Caesar's Camp two months before, from further offensive action; but
the position was vigorously bombarded from time to time, and an almost
unceasing hail of Mauser bullets fell upon it. De Wet did his best to
add Wepener to the scalps of Sannah's Post and Mostert's Hoek; but when
two columns detailed for the relief by Lord Roberts under the command of
Brabant and Hart, who had come round from Natal with his brigade,
reached Wepener from Aliwal North on April 25, they found that the siege
had been raised, and that De Wet had trekked away to the north.
At Waterval Drift, Kitchener's Kopje, Sannah's Post, and Mostert's Hoek,
De Wet showed himself to be a daring and successful partisan leader. He
was instinctively drawn towards helpless or unwary detachments. He
played his own hand without reference to his partner's, and seemed to be
incapable of co-operating in a general scheme of strategy. Perhaps he
had not much confidence in those who directed the campaign of defence.
He did not act in accordance with the instructions he had received from
the Krijgsraad; but who could find fault with a leader who was ever
sending in batches of prisoners of war? Many critics say that he was
wanting in the true military instinct and spirit, and that he lost the
greatest opportunity in his career when he allowed himself to be
attracted away from the British lines of communication by the feeble,
peregrinating columns. He says that his reason, or it may be his excuse,
for not raiding vigorously towards the south, instead of sitting down
before Wepener, was the fear lest the Transvaalers should think that the
Free Staters had abandoned them to their fate. If his action is open to
criticism when judged by the generally accepted principles of warfare,
it should be remembered that these are framed from experience only, and
are subject to accommodation. By all the rules of the game, the Boers
must have been beaten in six months: yet when, after the occupation of
Bloemfontein, the cause seemed to be hopeless, the De Wet revival
prolonged the contest for two years and more. It is almost certain that,
but for De Wet, the war would have been brought to a close in 1900. One
man only, and he was Napoleon, added a greater sum to the British
National Debt.
The fortune which proverbially attends the bold never deserted him. To
the Boer forces at large he was what the pirate adventurers and
buccaneers of the Elizabethan period, and the privateersmen of the
eighteenth century, were to the National Navy. He sailed where he would
under letters of marque from the Presidents. He is the most interesting
and the most original personage of the South African War: and when its
history is mellowed by time, and its epic is written by some Walter
Scott or Homer of the future, De Wet will be the central figure, and his
exploits will be sung.
Five years later, having thrown aside his sword, he became a controller
of ploughshares as Minister of Agriculture in the Government of the
Orange River Colony, and the father-in-law of a British officer who had
fought against him.
Notes:
[Footnote 39: At the Krijgsraad at Kroonstad Delarey maintained that the
commandos were too large and must be subdivided.]
[Footnote 40: The scouting of the British Army in South Africa has been
compared to a housemaid searching for an escape of gas with a lighted
candle.]
[Footnote 41: A The gun of U Battery, which had broken away at the
Drift, was recovered.]
[Footnote 42: In the official handbook on _Combined Training_ issued
after the war, it was expressly laid down that "officers, must take upon
themselves, whenever it may be necessary, the responsibility of
departing from or varying the orders they may have received." This
responsibility had been laid by Napoleon upon his officers nearly a
century before. Seep. 251.]