PAYMENT OF INSURGENT SOLDIERS
The question of the payment of insurgent soldiers and of certain
legitimate indebtedness incurred by the insurgent government has an
important bearing upon the civil, if not the industrial reconstruction
of the Island of Cuba. This matter was referred to a commission of Cuban
officers, consisting of General Garcia, General José Miguel Gomez,
Colonel Manuel Sanguily, Colonel José Ramon Villalon, Dr. José Gonzales
Lanuza, Señor Gonzalo de Quesada, and Mr. Horatio S. Rubens, who acted
as interpreter. This commission came to Washington in November for the
purpose of aiding in the pacification of the people of Cuba. General
Garcia unhappily was taken ill of pneumonia and died. This delayed the
work somewhat and took from the commission one of its strongest members.
The commission had several informal interviews with the President, the
members of the Cabinet, and finally with the author, who, as Special
Commissioner for the United States to Cuba, took the testimony of these
gentlemen and prepared a report on the subject for the consideration of
the President and Secretary of the Treasury. The substance of this
report is of permanent public interest, as it was the first official
step towards the settlement of a question that must be adjusted before
the entire Cuban army will disband and go to work. It also has
considerable bearing upon the industrial future of Cuba.
The gentlemen comprising this commission were briefly informed by the
author as to the work committed to him, namely, an inquiry into the
economic condition of the Island of Cuba and the recommendation of such
measures for the commercial and industrial reconstruction of that
country as might appear advisable after impartially consulting all
interests. They were told that so far as the United States was
concerned, Cuba had won her economic and industrial freedom. That the
work had been performed with scrupulous regard to the interest of the
people of Cuba. That the aim had been the rehabilitation of its
industries and the building up of the country generally with as little
friction as possible. That in accordance with instructions received from
both the President and Secretary of the Treasury the tariff of Cuba had
been framed so that there should be no discrimination in favour of the
United States, and that the same tariff laws would be applied alike to
all countries, so that Cuba was now free to purchase her supplies in the
world's markets wherever they were best and cheapest, and not compelled
to buy in a dear market, as under Spanish rule. They were furthermore
informed that hereafter the revenues of the country were to be used
exclusively for the economical and honest government of the Island and
that the largest portion would not be drained away to pay the enormous
interest charged (aggregating $10,500,000) upon an indebtedness which
had unrighteously been saddled upon a people already bowed down under
the double yoke of war and debt. Lastly they were asked to state fully
and frankly, as citizens of Cuba, their views on any subject bearing
upon the reconstruction of Cuba.
In reply, these gentlemen said, in substance, that they were entirely
satisfied with the course the Government of the United States had
pursued in relation to these economic questions, and realised the fact
that Cuba had become free, commercially and industrially. They then
proceeded to discuss the important problem of how the existing
transitory condition of the Island could best be changed to a permanent
civil life, without friction in Cuba or trouble and annoyance throughout
the United States. Their purpose, they avowed, was simply to co-operate
with the United States toward the restoration of order, without which,
in their opinion, there could be no reconstruction of industries and no
return of prosperity. Their purpose was, they assured the author, to
advise with the people of the United States, to the end that everything
might be harmonious and that the people of Cuba might get to work as
soon as possible.
Speaking for all the gentlemen above named, Colonel José R. Villalon
said:
"The discharge of the army of Cuba is a very complex and difficult
problem. It has to be done for humanity's sake, in one sense; those
men who have been working and suffering have to be remunerated in
some way. But that is not the only point of view. We have got to
look towards the maintaining of order and we have got to give them
compensation or gratification or a certain amount of money with
which they can go back to their homes and their agricultural
labours. In doing that we have a duty to our country so far as the
Cubans are concerned, but, at the same time, it seems to me that it
is a high political measure on the part of the United States to
prevent now what would afterwards be very difficult to suppress. If
we scatter these 30,000 men (approximately) throughout the country
without any resources whatever--men who for the last two or three
years have been accustomed to live upon the resources of the
country or forage on the enemy and who are used to the hardships of
the campaign--it will not be very difficult to foresee that in
spite of the good nature and good disposition of the people these
men will be forced to do what they do not wish to do by their
nature. If the men are left as they are, with their present needs
unsupplied, they will go to the woods and will be a source of
disorder and brigandage, which will be very difficult for the
United States to suppress; and for the sake possibly of saving a
few million dollars now the nation will be obliged afterwards to
spend many more millions, in addition to the sacrifice of many
lives. It is an economic question. Unless something is done to
relieve their needs the disorder of the Island will be prolonged
indefinitely. As an example, I would call attention to the case of
your Indians in this country, who now and then break away. In
Cuba the condition will be worse, for there they would have the
shelter of the woods, and besides the Americans would not be able
to stand the climate as well as they stand their own. Ultimately,
of course, they will succumb, but it will be at the cost of a great
many lives and a great many millions of dollars.
[Illustration: MORRO CASTLE, SANTIAGO DE CUBA.]
"Besides, there is another thing; that if to-day we provide for
their needs and restore order, it is the wish of every inhabitant
of Cuba to contribute their share towards this. If these men are
supplied now, they will not have the moral support of the people of
Cuba should they not go to work; but the people of Cuba will see
that they are punished. If, however, they had the moral support of
the people of Cuba it would be difficult to punish them.
"There is another point, and that is with regard to the amount of
money required. Although they have not said anything about this,
nevertheless, there is a tendency to lessen this amount. We want to
say that although the measure, in principle, will be very good,
even if it does not attend to all of the needs at present; though
it will be a moral obligation from ourselves to the United States,
it will not solve the problem, because the sum determined upon is
not enough. If the revenues of the Island of Cuba ought to be
mortgaged to repay whatever advances they have received from the
United States now, it will not be a very difficult matter to make
this amount a few millions more."
The above gives a fair summary of the general tenor of the testimony
taken, and it is believed fairly represents the views of these
gentlemen. Testimony was also taken in relation to the payment of
certain legitimate debts which, as these gentlemen felt, the good faith
of the people of Cuba had been pledged to pay. On being asked the
probable amount of this indebtedness, they said it was not in excess of
$2,250,000 or $2,500,000. The first and most important matter and the
one which, they insist, will have much to do with the pacification of
the Island, is the payment of some sort of compensation to the
impoverished Cuban soldiers. These gentlemen were asked if they had in
their possession any estimate as to the number of soldiers, the length
of service, and the amount of money necessary for the purpose they had
in mind. An itemised account, they were told, would make a useful
supplement to the interesting and instructive testimony given.
In compliance with this request, these gentlemen prepared and presented
certain tables, with additional verbal testimony. This testimony was
subsequently reduced to writing. It purports to be a statement showing
the number of officers and privates of the Cuban army and their time of
service. On behalf of Cuba, these gentlemen informed the author that had
Cuba been recognised as an independent nation, their first duty would
have been to pay all legal obligations contracted during the struggle
for independence. They request that the United States, acting as trustee
for Cuba, will give this subject a careful hearing and enable the people
of Cuba to disband the army and complete the pacification of the Island.
They recognise the fact that $3,000,000 has been appropriated for a
purpose similar to this, but regard it as inadequate. The figures
submitted by these gentlemen, as representing the pay which the
insurgent army, in their opinion, has earned, are somewhat startling.
The summary is as follows:
ESTIMATE FOR PAYMENT OF INSURGENT TROOPS
11 Major-Generals $ 179,450
19 Generals of Division 296,175
54 Brigadier-Generals 682,825
153 Colonels 1,491,750
290 Lieutenant-Colonels 2,362,800
578 Majors 3,870,240
965 Captains 4,561,800
1245 Lieutenants 3,763,800
1794 Sub-Lieutenants 4,952,880
2130 1st Sergeants 3,796,200
3123 2d Sergeants 4,605,600
4509 Corporals 5,238,240
30,160 Privates 21,502,620
------ -----------
45,031 $57,304,380
The pay promised the Cuban army is very much higher (except in the grade
of generals) than the amounts actually paid the officers and men in the
United States army, as will be seen from the following comparison of the
salaries of the two armies:
SALARIES PAID CUBAN AND UNITED STATES ARMIES PER MONTH
United
Cuban. States.
Major-General. $500 $625
General of Division 450 --
Brigadier-General 400 458.33
Colonel 325 290.67
Lieutenant-Colonel 275 250
Major 220 208.33
Captain 130 150
Lieutenant 100 125
Sub-Lieutenant 90 116.67
1st Sergeant 60 25
2d Sergeant 50 18
Corporal 40 15
Private 30 13
It is not assumed by the gentlemen who prepared the above estimates that
claims of such magnitude could be seriously considered by an independent
Republic. The resources of the Island at present are entirely inadequate
to shoulder such a debt. Upon the reduced basis of the salaries paid the
United States soldiers, the reduction would be about one half, or less
than $30,000,000, an equally impossible sum. On the other hand, that
some aid should be rendered by the United States to enable these
soldiers to disband and go to work would seem both feasible and just. It
could easily be met by the revenue of the Island, and would have a
decided effect in securing permanent peace and the early establishment
of a stable government in Cuba. If done now under the guidance of the
United States it would prevent excessive payment to the troops
hereafter. In the same manner the liquidation of the small amount of
outstanding obligation--not exceeding $2,500,000--might settle the debt
question for all time to come. Especially if all other advances for
these purposes were prohibited until such debt was adjusted to the
satisfaction of the United States. In case the ultimate solution of the
Cuban question should be, as it is quite within the range of
probability, annexation, the independent government will not previously
have had the opportunity of incurring improvident indebtedness, which
ultimately may have to be assumed by the United States. In short,
whatever may be done in this matter, or however it may be done, the
United States should control and safeguard the finances of the Island
for a considerable period. It has been very truly stated that should an
independent government be established and recognised, the United States
will no longer be able to control the financial legislation of the
Island. It can, however, by the plan proposed, and very properly, not
only save money for Cuba while under its military possession or control,
but also prevent the making of unnecessary improvident or other loans by
such independent government, except with the consent, or approval in
advance, of the United States. This can be readily done, if, when making
an advance for the benefit of Cuba, the right to apply the customs
receipts and other revenues of the Island to the repayment of the
principal and interest of such advance be reserved to the United States.
In this way all reckless expenditure may be prevented and all
speculative or independent bond issues be avoided and at the same time
quick assistance be rendered those whose position at present is
deplorable in the extreme.