CHAPTER IV

THE ENGLISH IN JAMAICA

Having sought light and information in relation to the future political

government of Cuba from both Cuban and Spanish sources, for the Marquis

de Apezteguia is more Spanish than Cuban, it may be well to ascertain if

any useful lesson may be found in British colonial administration. With

this thought in view, the author, after completing the work in Cuba,

made a brief visit to the island of Jamaica. Through the courtesy of the

American Mail Steamship Company, the S.S. _Admiral Sampson_ stopped at

Santiago and thus enabled me to reach Port Antonio, Jamaica, in seven

hours. At this point I met Captain L. D. Baker, the head of the vast

American fruit interests of Jamaica, and with him visited Kingston and

had an interview with the Governor-General of Jamaica, and with the

heads of nearly all the Departments of Government. In this connection it

affords me pleasure to mention the name of Dr. James Johnston, member of

the Jamaica Council for St. Ann's Parish and member of the Commission

now revising the revenue law of Jamaica. Dr. Johnston was a

fellow-passenger on the S.S. _Sampson_, on its return voyage to the

United States, and furnished much valuable explanatory information in

relation to the government of Jamaica, for which this opportunity is

taken to express thanks.

The information thus obtained and the data gathered from the various

blue books and the reports of the Royal Commission on the British West

India Islands, all have a special bearing on the problem the United

States is now confronting in Cuba, and hence on the political future of

the Island. Better to appreciate the present aims of British

administration in Jamaica, one should read the following extract from an

article in the December number of _Scribner's Magazine_, by the Right

Honourable Joseph Chamberlain, British Colonial Secretary:

"In the first period of this eventful history the territories

acquired by conquest or discovery were treated as possessions to be

exploited entirely for the advantage of the occupying nation, and

little or no thought was given to the rights or the interests

either of the original inhabitants or of the colonists who had

dispossessed them. This view of the relations between a state and

its outlying territories continued more or less throughout the

eighteenth century, although the War of Independence in America did

much to modify and dispel it. The success of the Revolution not

only destroyed the hope that colonies could be made tributary to

the mother country, but led ultimately to the conclusion that,

since they would never be a source of direct revenue, we should be

better without colonies at all. Assuming that an entirely

independent and separate existence was the ultimate destiny of all

our possessions abroad, and believing that this consummation would

relieve us of burdensome obligations, we readily conceded

self-government to the colonies in the temperate zones, in the

hopes that this would hasten the inevitable and desirable result.

We found, not without surprise, that in spite of hints to this

effect, our kinsfolk and fellow-subjects resented the idea of

separation and, fortunately for us, preferred to remain, each

'daughter in her mother's house and mistress in her own.'

Influenced by the same idea, we elaborated constitutions by the

score for every kind of tropical dependency, in the vain

expectation that the native population would appreciate forms of

government evolved in our own civilisation, and would learn quickly

to be self-supporting and to develop for themselves the territories

in which we began to think we had only a temporary interest. We

were disappointed, and we have had to recognise the fact that, for

an indefinite period of time, the ideas and standards of our

political and social order cannot be intelligently accepted or

applied by races which are centuries behind us in the process of

national evolution. The experience of Hayti and Liberia under

independent native government, of many of the South American

republics, of Egypt and of India, and the stagnation of all

tropical countries, in regard to matters dependent on local effort,

make it evident that wherever the white man cannot be permanently

or advantageously acclimatised and wherever, therefore, the great

majority of the population must always be natives, the only

security for good government and for the effective development of

the resources of the country consists in providing this native

population with white superintendence, and with rulers and

administrators who will bring to their task the knowledge derived

from the experience of a higher civilisation; and, constantly

changing, will be always under the influence of the standards and

ideals which they have been brought up to respect.

"This is the root idea of British administration in the tropics. At

the same time we have abandoned forever any desire to secure

tribute from these possessions, and we no longer seek any direct or

exclusive advantage.

"We find our profit in the increased prosperity of the people for

whose interests we have made ourselves responsible, and in the

development of, and access to, markets which we open at the same

time to the rest of the world. Our primary obligation is to

maintain peace, and safety of life and property, and equal justice

for all irrespective of race or class. Subject to these conditions,

we interfere as little as possible with native religions, customs,

or laws; and under this system we are successfully administering

the affairs of hundreds of millions of people of almost every race

under the sun, with trifling cost to the British taxpayer, and with

the smallest army of white soldiers of any of the powers of Europe.

In India, where three hundred millions of people acknowledge the

Queen as Empress, the total white garrison is only seventy thousand

men; in Egypt, with a population of nine millions, the normal white

garrison is thirty-five hundred men; while in Ceylon, the Straits

Settlements and protected States, the West Indies, and West Africa

not a single white regiment is stationed for the maintenance of our

rule, which is secured entirely by coloured soldiers and police

under British officers. Our experience should at least go far to

satisfy the objections of those Americans who anticipate that the

occupation of tropical countries would involve the retention of

vast numbers of American soldiers in an unhealthy climate, and

would lay an intolerable burden on the American treasury."

The Spanish idea in its government of Cuba was purely and absolutely the

idea of possession, and the facts pointing to this will be abundantly

set forth in the several chapters in this volume relating to the fiscal,

commercial, and industrial condition of the Island of Cuba. The work of

reconstruction already so auspiciously begun by the United States

Government in Santiago, and described in a subsequent chapter, is

absolutely in line with what Mr. Chamberlain aptly terms the root idea

of British administration in the tropics. The primary obligation of the

United States in Cuba is to maintain peace, the safety of life and

property, and equal justice for all, irrespective of race or class. The

final instructions given by the President of the United States, last

August, to the author, leaving for Cuba, were to the effect that the

United States desired to secure no tribute from Cuba, that the work of

reconstruction must be performed in the interests of the people of Cuba,

only, and that the profit to the United States must come in the

increased prosperity of the people of Cuba, and in the benefits accruing

from a peaceful, instead of a constantly warring neighbour. According to

Mr. Chamberlain, this is the fundamental principle underlying England's

operation in her tropical colonies.

[Illustration: ON THE ROAD TO CASTLETON, JAMAICA.]

In comparing British administration in Jamaica with any possible

operations of the United States Government in Cuba, the fact of the

great difference in the population must be considered. In Jamaica not

over 15,000 of the 700,000 population are white. When England began to

treat this island as a trust, and not as a possession,--say about

1834,--the population was made up of 311,070 slaves, 15,000 whites,

40,000 coloured, or brown people, as they are called in Jamaica, and

5000 free blacks. In Cuba a majority of the population are white--the

census of 1887 showing 1,102,889 white and 528,798 coloured--in all

provinces; Matanzas, with forty-five per cent. coloured, and Santiago,

with forty-two per cent. coloured, representing the strongest coloured

sections of the Island. That half a century of British rule in Jamaica

has improved the population of Jamaica, nearly all of whom were slaves

when the work was begun, is self-evident, though it is equally true that

similar government in Cuba would have resulted, by reason of the

preponderance of white population, in more far-reaching results. That

is, Cuba, under such a government as England has given Jamaica, would,

in all reasonable probability, have numbered at this time a population

of from four to five millions, with a greatly increased commerce,

diversified industries, magnificent main and parochial roads, an

adequate railway system, many prosperous and well-built cities, and a

degree of prosperity and civilisation far in excess of that which the

United States officials found when they took possession of the Island.

With the disadvantages of race, with the scars of slavery, and, until

recently, with the single industry of sugar and its allied product, rum,

the policy set forth so clearly by Mr. Chamberlain has been successful

in making habitable and law-abiding and measurably prosperous a tropical

island which might have been in a condition little better than that of

savagery.

To be sure, England has not made Anglo-Saxons of these people, but it

has made of them peaceful, law-abiding, and, in the main,

self-respecting citizens. There is little doubt that the bulk of the

inhabitants of Jamaica are in a position which compares not unfavourably

with that of the peasants of most countries in the world. The facts

given farther along show that the condition of the labouring classes of

Jamaica is infinitely better than that of the labouring

classes--especially the coloured population--of Cuba, who are in a

deplorable state, even on plantations where work is abundant. The number

of holdings in Jamaica is 92,979, of which 81,924 are under ten acres

each. In 1882 there were only 52,608 holdings, of which 43,707 were

under ten acres each. Even allowing for the fact that some persons may

hold two or more plots of land, it is clear that the island already

contains a very large and increasing number of peasant proprietors. The

Crown Land Regulations offer facilities for the settlement of the

labouring population on the land, and as sugar estates are abandoned

some of them will probably fall into the hands of small cultivators. In

the last ten years the number of savings-bank accounts of the amount of

twenty-five dollars and under has nearly doubled. The census returns of

1891 show that in the ten years, 1881 to 1891, there had been an

increase of thirty per cent. in the number of persons able to read and

write. The acreage of provision grounds has increased more than thirty

per cent. in ten years. There are 70,000 holdings of less than five

acres. The area in coffee, usually in small lots, increased in ten years

from 17,000 to 23,000 acres. More than 6,000 small sugar-mills are owned

by the peasantry. The number of enrolled scholars was 100,400 in 1896,

as against 49,000 in 1881; while the actual average daily attendance at

schools had increased from 26,600 to 59,600. These facts indicate

considerable advance, though no doubt in certain districts the people

are poor. The Royal Commission appointed to investigate and report on

the agricultural, commercial, and industrial condition of the West

Indies came to the conclusion that the depression in Jamaica was the

result of the almost entire dependence of the island on a single

industry. Here is what they say:

"The general statement regarding the danger of depending on a

single industry applies with very special force to the dependence

of the West Indian Colonies upon the sugar industry, for the

cultivation of sugar collects together a larger number of people

upon the land than can be employed or supported in the same area by

any other form of cultivation. In addition to this it also unfits

the people, or at any rate gives them no training, for the

management or cultivation of the soil for any other purpose than

that of growing sugar-cane. The failure, therefore, of a sugar

estate not only leaves destitute a larger number of labourers than

can be supported upon the land in other ways, but leaves them also

without either the knowledge, skill, or habits requisite for making

a good use of the land. In those colonies where the sugar industry

cannot be carried on without imported coolie labour the position of

dependence upon this one industry is still more dangerous. In these

cases not only is there a yearly charge upon the public revenue to

meet the cost of immigration, but a liability for back passages is

incurred, which a failure of the industry would leave the colony

without funds to meet. Whilst, therefore, the vital importance of

the sugar industry to the present prosperity of nearly all the

colonies is beyond dispute, we wish to observe that so long as they

remain dependent upon sugar their position can never be sound or

secure. It has become a commonplace of criticism to remark upon the

perpetual recurrence of crises in the West Indian Colonies, and we

submit that the repeated recurrence of such crises, as well as the

fact that the present crisis is more ominous than any of the

previous ones, illustrates the danger to which we have referred,

and adds much force to our recommendations for the adoption of

special measures to facilitate the introduction of other

industries."

The special remedies recommended were as follows:

"1. The settlement of the labouring population on small plots of

land as peasant proprietors.

"2. The establishment of minor agricultural industries, and the

improvement of the system of cultivation, especially in the case of

small proprietors.

"3. The improvement of the means of communication between the

different islands.

"4. The encouragement of a trade in fruit with New York, and,

possibly, at a future time, with London.

"5. The grant of a loan from the Imperial Exchequer for the

establishment of central factories in Barbadoes.

"The subject of emigration from the distressed tracts also requires

the careful attention of the various governments, though we do not

find ourselves at the present time in a position to make

recommendations in detail."

The fact is, Captain L. D. Baker, of the Boston Fruit Company, and the

other companies engaged in the banana and orange business of Jamaica,

have pointed a way out of the present difficulties, and that industry,

in the course of a short time, bids fair to be as important as the sugar

industry was in former times. Last year this single company shipped five

million bunches of bananas to New York. There are now over one hundred

thousand orange trees planted in Jamaica, which in a few years will be

bearing finely and give additional prosperity to the country. With the

American fruit market inadequately supplied, and the English market

practically untouched, there is hope both in Jamaica and

Cuba--especially Santiago province--for diversified industries created

by rapid transportation. The recent establishment of a fleet of fast

steamships between New York, Philadelphia, Boston, and Baltimore, and

the various ports of Jamaica, and the probability that these or similar

lines will be established between the United States and Cuban ports, are

all factors of promise for the industrial future of both the British and

the American West Indies.

While Jamaica is a well-governed country, and its revenue is all

honestly expended for the public good of the people, it is far from an

economically administered government. Order is thoroughly established,

laws are obeyed, justice for the humblest is easily obtainable,

education is general, sanitary matters admirably administered, roads

maintained, the rights of all conserved, and the revenue honestly

collected and expended. In these particulars the government of Jamaica

differs widely from that which the author found in Cuba. In that unhappy

Island all is absolutely the reverse of this. The cost of governing

Jamaica, however, is nearly twenty-five per cent. of the value of its

commerce, whereas the cost of governing Cuba--if gauged by the actual

revenue raised--under Spanish rule ranged from 12-1/2 to 15 per cent. of

the value of its commerce. The comparison, however, is of little value,

because Cuba got nothing for the money exacted by taxation, while

Jamaica not only gets all, but also the taxpayers are informed in

advance of the purposes for which much of the money is wanted, and the

sums thus raised are rigidly applied to the purposes for which they are

appropriated. The most useful lessons for those responsible for

administering the affairs of Cuba can be learned by a study of the

Jamaica Budgets. The methods of raising the needed revenue are

intelligent and simple, and the method of expenditure not only enables

the authorities to get as much as possible for the money, but also makes

possible the strictest accountability. The Legislative Council of

Jamaica discusses every item of the budget as closely as the Town

Council of Glasgow or the County Council of London, both model public

bodies, so far as honesty of purpose goes, even if some of their

legislative experiments fail. The humblest Jamaica negro, if he can read

and write, may at least know the purposes for which the revenue he pays

in taxes is expended. He may even have the pleasure of deciding which of

these items of expenditure he regards the least important. At the

present moment the annual cost of education, $350,000, is regarded as

too high, and a proposition to reduce it to $250,000 is pending. The

total expenditures of Jamaica have reached nearly $4,000,000 and

additional revenue is necessary to meet these expenses. The customs

tariff is in course of revision, with a view of increasing the revenue,

and many articles formerly on the free list will have to be put upon the

dutiable list, while the general ad valorem rates of duty must be raised

from 12-1/2 to 16-2/3 per cent. Before going into the future sources of

revenue, it may be well to look at the present sources, and for that

purpose the subjoined table has been compiled from official sources:

COMPARATIVE TABLE OF REVENUE OF JAMAICA, 1896-97

REVENUE. Pounds. Dollars.

Customs 321,780 1,608,900

Excise 122,735 613,675

Licences 732 3,660

Stamps 23,947 119,735

Post-Office 24,072 120,360

Telegraph 5,364 26,820

Tax on Stock[3]

Court Fees 8,284 41,420

Tax in lieu of Education Fees 11,243 56,215

Fines, etc. 4,412 22,060

Jamaica Railway 208 1,040

Reimbursements 35,969 179,845

Miscellaneous 13,992 69,960

Revenues now appropriated 181,663 908,315

Interest on Sinking Funds 14,199 70,995

Savings Bank 3,927 19,635

------- ---------

Total 773,527 3,867,635

IMMIGRATION REVENUE.

Capitation Tax, etc., Laws 7 of 1878 and 14 of 1891, 1,476 7,380

Miscellaneous 205 1,025

----- -----

Total 1,681 8,405

APPROPRIATED REVENUE.

Poor Rates 39,339 196,695

Kingston Streets 4,354 21,770

Market Dues

Pounds

Main Road Revenue, Law 17 of 1890 28,091 140,455

Parochial Roads 45,538 227,690

Sanitary 7,862 39,310

Fire Rates, Kingston 1,561 7,805

Trade, Metal, Hawker, and Gunpowder Licences,

Surplus Fund[4] 13,271 66,355

Gas Rates, etc. 3,793 18,965

Parochial General Purposes 4,503 22,515

Agricultural Produce Licences Law, 37 of 1896 3,685 18,425

Miscellaneous 8,544 42,720

Advances from General Revenue in aid of Funds 21,122 105,610

------- -------

Total 181,663 908,315

Customs, excise, and appropriated revenue, as will be seen above, are

the principal sources of income, while the expenditures for the same

period are divided under the following heads:

COMPARATIVE TABLE OF EXPENDITURE OF JAMAICA, 1896-97

EXPENDITURE. Pounds. Dollars.

Charges of Debt ................................ 82,417 412,085

Governor and Staff ............................. 7,368 36,840

Privy Council .................................. 62 310

Legislative Council ............................ 2,469 12,345

Colonial Secretariat ........................... 5,612 28,060

Director of Public Works ....................... 17,979 89,895

Audit Office ................................... 3,629 18,145

Treasury ....................................... 4,634 23,170

Savings Bank ................................... 3,275 16,375

Stamp Office ................................... 1,106 5,530

Post-Office and Telegraphs ..................... 35,910 179,550

Revenue Departments ............................ 39,969 199,845

Judicial ....................................... 45,611 228,055

Ecclesiastical ................................. 2,927 14,635

Medical ........................................ 59,307 296,535

Police ......................................... 60,889 304,445

Prisons and Reformatories ...................... 27,836 139,180

Education ...................................... 67,540 337,700

Harbour-Masters and Harbours and Pilotage ...... 2,741 13,705

Colonial Allowances and Military Expenditure ... 12,814 64,070

Miscellaneous .................................. 29,571 147,855

Census .........................................

Steam Communication ............................ 1,800 9,000

Stationery and Printing ........................ 7,989 39,945

Library and Museum ............................. 2,404 12,020

Plantations and Gardens ........................ 6,484 32,420

Railway[5] .......................................

Main Roads and Buildings ....................... 80,467 402,335

Pensions, etc. 16,962 84,810

Purposes now supplied by Appropriated Revenue .. 135,842 679,210

-------- ---------

Total Expenditure from Income ............ 765,607 3,828,035

Sinking-Funds, etc. ............................ 14,199 70,995

-------- ---------

Total Payments from Income ............... 779,806 3,899,030

Less Debt Payments as above .................... 14,199 70,995

-------- ---------

765,607 3,828,035

Add Expenditures from Moneys raised by Loans ... 8,125 40,625

-------- ---------

Total .......................................... 773,732 3,868,660

-------- ---------

Immigration .................................... 979 4,895

A glance at the above tables and then a glance at the budget of Cuba,

which will be found in a subsequent chapter, is all that is necessary to

show the vast difference between the British and the Spanish methods of

dealing with the fiscal interests of their colonies. The business-like

methods of the one, and the blind, slip-shod methods of the other, are

in sharp contrast. In dealing with Cuba, it may be difficult to follow

entirely these English methods of accounting at once. The sooner,

however, the United States inaugurates its own clear methods of national

bookkeeping and official accountability, the quicker the people of Cuba

will appreciate sound business principles in the conduct of their own

affairs. It makes no difference whether Cuba is annexed to the United

States or established as an independent government; these lessons must

be learned in either event, or the Island will come to grief. It is

hardly necessary to do more than call attention to the principal items

of expenditure.

First of all come roads. England has discovered that good roads are not

only an important factor in mountainous countries in keeping order, but

also the basis of industrial development and prosperity. In the budget

given above the following items must be added together in order to

ascertain the amount expended in 1897 for roads:

Main Roads and Buildings $402,335

Parochial Roads 227,690

--------

$630,025

Here may be found a good illustration of England's policy which is a

great contrast to the policy of Spain in Cuba. No money has been spent

on the roads of Cuba, all of which are in a deplorable condition.

Attention should at once be given to this important question and a

liberal sum out of both local and general revenues of the Island set

apart for this purpose. The debt of Jamaica is not excessive; it is in

the neighbourhood of $10,000,000, with an annual charge of about

$400,000. Police and medical charges are about the same, averaging about

$300,000 each, or in all $600,000.

In this connection attention is called to the annual expenditure on

roads in Jamaica for fourteen years:

EXPENDITURE FOR MAIN AND PAROCHIAL ROADS IN

JAMAICA, FROM 1883-84 TO 1896-97, INCLUSIVE

-----------+------------+-----------+------------------

Year. |Appropriated|Expenditure|

|revenue for |for Main | Total.

| Parochial | Roads and |

| Roads. |Buildings. |

-----------+------------+-----------+---------+--------

| Pounds | Pounds | Pounds |Dollars.

|sterling. |sterling. |sterling.|

1883-84 .. |39,514 | 48,156 | 87,670 |438,350

1884-85 .. |40,496 | 47,614 | 88,110 |440,550

1885-86 .. |38,246 | 52,285 | 90,531 |452,655

1886-87 .. |39,670 | 48,080 | 87,750 |438,750

1887-88 .. |42,935 | 52,318 | 95,253 |476,265

1888-89 .. |42,146 | 57,632 | 99,778 |498,890

1889-90[6] |20,740 | 32,210 | 52,950 |264,750

1890-91 .. |50,317 | 91,659 |141,976 |709,880

1891-92 .. |44,845 | 91,659 |136,504 |682,520

1892-93 .. |48,520 | 83,718 |132,238 |661,190

1893-94 .. |50,169 | 58,460 |108,629 |543,145

1894-95 .. |47,111 | 65,647 |112,758 |563,790

1895-96 .. |48,398 | 68,654 |117,052 |585,260

1896-97 .. |45,538 | 80,467 |126,005 |630,025

-----------+------------+-----------+---------+--------

Total for | | |1,477,204|7,386,020

14 years | | | |

Average | | | |

per year | | | | 527,573

-----------+------------+-----------+---------+---------

The necessity of liberal expenditure for maintaining the health of the

community is of first importance. A study of this budget may be found a

preparation for the subsequent study of the Cuban budget, to which the

reader's attention will be invited presently.

The present Jamaica tariff was evidently framed with the two ideas of

revenue for the island and a market for British goods. Food products,

for example, such as bacon, beef, beans, bread, butter, cheese, corn,

meats, oats, oil, pork, rice, salt, sausages, wheat, sugar, tea, coffee,

and many other staple articles are all on the dutiable list, some paying

a fairly stiff rate of duty. On the other hand, many articles of

merchandise, bricks, bridges, carts and waggons, clocks, diamonds,

machinery, locomotives, and a host of other things, which England

supplies the island, are all exempted from duty. Under a general ad

valorem clause, 12-1/2 per cent. is collected on all articles not

enumerated. The enumerated list of the Jamaica tariff is not large, so a

large amount of merchandise has been actually imported under this

clause. The proposed new tariff, which will probably go into effect next

year, takes many articles off the free list and puts them on the

dutiable list. It also increases the ad valorem rate to 16-2/3 per cent.

This has been found necessary because there has been a deficit in the

revenue. The new tariff is expected to yield £400,000, or about

$2,000,000, and from internal revenue or excise £150,000, or $750,000,

and £250,000, or $1,250,000, from appropriated revenue which will really

come from the land and householders. Here it is summarised:

Revenue from Customs ......................... $2,000,000

" " Excise .......................... 750,000

" " Appropriated Revenue (land and

household taxes, etc.) ........ 1,250,000

----------

$4,000,000

If this amount can be secured, the revenue of Jamaica will be a trifle

more than expenditure, and the result will be happiness. If not,

expenses must be reduced. Some members of the Legislative Council favour

this latter plan. The Commission has the whole fiscal question now in

hand, and within a short time will probably reach conclusions.

There is much more of interest that might be said about the present

economic condition of Jamaica, but the points herein brought out appear

to be the only ones that bear especially on the problem continually

facing the reader in a volume dealing with the industrial and commercial

reconstruction of Cuba. It will also be interesting to compare the

British method of colonial administration with the idea set forth in the

previous chapter by the Marquis de Apezteguia, whose point of view in

such matters is wholly Spanish. That is, the idea of possession is

paramount. The Marquis evidently has no faith in the ability of the

United States to administer the affairs of Cuba as a trust.

Industrial Cuba Being a Study of Present Commercial and Industrial Conditions, with Suggestions as to the Opportunities Presented in the Island for American Capital, Enterprise, and Labour · 第 4 / 29 章