THE MEANING AND PROCESS OF EDUCATION
"Of all the animals with which the globe is peopled, there is none
towards whom nature seems, at first sight, to have exercised more
cruelty than towards man, in the numberless wants and necessities with
which she has loaded him, and in the slender means which she affords to
the relieving of these necessities. In other creatures these two
particulars generally compensate each other. If we consider the lion as
a voracious and carnivorous animal, we shall easily discover him to be
very necessitous, but if we turn our eye to his make and temper, his
agility, his courage, his arms, and his force, we shall find that his
advantages hold proportion with his wants.... In man alone this
unnatural conjunction of infirmity and of necessity may be observed in
the greatest perfection. Not only the food which is required for his
sustenance flies his search and approach, or at least requires his
labour to be produced, but he must be possessed of clothes and lodging
to defend him against the injuries of the weather: though to consider
him only in himself, he is provided neither with arms, nor force, nor
other natural abilities which are in any degree answerable to so many
'necessities.' 'Tis by society alone he is able to supply his defects
and raise himself up to an equality with his fellow-creatures, and even
acquires a superiority over them."[3] In these terms Hume draws the
distinction between man and the animals, and if, for the term Society,
we substitute the word Education, then we shall more truly describe the
means by which man overcomes his natural infirmities and meets his
necessities.
But we have to ask, Wherein does man differ from the animals? what power
or faculty does he possess over and above those possessed by himself and
the animals in common? and how does it happen that as his wants and
needs increase and multiply the means to satisfy them also tend to
increase? Now, the animal is guided wholly or mainly by instinct. In the
case of many animals the whole conduct of their life from birth to death
is governed by this means. In the case, indeed, of some of the higher
animals, there is a limited power of modifying this government by
instinct through the experience acquired during the lifetime of the
individual. But man alone possesses the power or faculty of reason. And
it is through the possession of this power that he alone of all
creatures can be educated; it is the possession of this power which
places him above the rest of creation, and it is in the possession of
this power that the possibility of his greatness, and also of his
baseness, lies. Now, an instinct may be defined as an inborn and
inherited system of means for the attainment of a definite end of such a
nature that once the appropriate external stimulus is applied the system
tends to work itself out in an automatic manner until the end is
attained, and independently of any control exercised by the individual.
The working out of such an action may be accompanied by consciousness,
but the power of memory would only be valuable in so far as the instinct
was imperfect, and in so far as the better attainment of the end was
fostered by direct individual experience. Thus the greater the range of
instinct the less the scope of and the less the need for
education--_i.e._, for acquiring experiences that will function in
rendering more efficient future action; and conversely, the less the
range of instinct the greater the need for education, for acquiring
experiences that may function in the guidance and direction of future
action.
Now, in man the range of instinct is small. In fact, it is questionable
whether in the strict usage of the term he possesses any one perfect
instinct. But to overcome this weakness of his nature he possesses the
power or faculty of reason, and this consists in the ability to
self-find, to self-adapt, and to self-establish systems of means for the
attainment of definite ends. "Man's splendid power of learning through
experience and of applying the contents of his memory to forecast and
mould the future is his peculiar glory. It is this which distinguishes
him from and raises him above all other animals. This it is that makes
him man. This it is that has enabled him to conquer the whole world and
to adapt himself to a million conditions of life."[4] This it is that
also makes possible the education of the child, and raises the hope that
by a truer and deeper conception of the process of education we shall be
enabled to mould the character of the children to worthy ends.
But although man is pre-eminently the rational animal, yet reason only
operates, and can only operate, in so far as it is called into activity
by the need of satisfying some inborn or acquired desire. That is, man
possesses not only reason, but also certain instinctive tendencies to
action. In early life, the instincts of curiosity, of imitation, of
emulation, and the various forms of the play instinct are ever inciting
the child to action, and ever evoking his reason-activity to acquire new
experiences which shall function in the more efficient performance of
future action. At a later stage other instinctive tendencies make their
appearance, as _e.g._ the parental instinct, and serve as motives for
the further acquisition of new experiences--for the establishment of
other systems of means for the attainment of desired ends. But as the
child passes from infancy to youth and manhood, these instinctive
tendencies, although ever present, alter their character, and acquired
ends or interests become the motives of actions. But these acquired ends
or interests are not something created out of nothing: they are grafted
upon and arise out of the innate and inherited instinctive tendencies of
man's nature. Thus, _e.g._, the instinct of mere self-preservation may
pass into the desire to attain a certain standard of life, or to
maintain a certain social status; the instinct of curiosity into the
desire to find out and to systematise knowledge for its own sake. But
for the realisation of these instinctive ends, whether in their crude or
acquired forms, the finding and the establishment of systems of means in
every case is necessary, and in order that they may be realised man must
acquire the requisite capacities for action. In the case of the animal
the instinct or impulse to action is inherited, but the capacity for
action is also inborn or innate. Man possesses all the innate ends or
interests which the animal possesses. Moreover, upon these innate ends
or interests can be grafted ends or interests innumerable and varied in
character, but in order that they may be satisfied he must through the
evoking into activity of reason find and adapt means for their
attainment. Thus the general nature of our conscious human life is that
throughout we are striving to attain ends of a more or less explicit
nature, and endeavouring to find out and to establish means for their
attainment. Whether in the performance of some simple, practical act, or
in trying to observe accurately what is presented to us through the
senses, or in endeavouring to realise imaginatively something not
directly presented to the senses, or in performing an abstract process
of thought, the activity of reason in its formal aspect is ever one and
the same. Hence in education we have not to do with the development of
many powers or faculties but with the development or the evolution of
the one power or faculty of reason, and the process of development in
its general nature is always the same in kind--viz., the process of
systematically building up knowledge which shall function in the future
determination of conduct. What varies in each case, at each stage of
development, is the nature of the material which goes to form this or
that system, and the character of the identity or link of connection
which binds part to part within any given system. A system of knowledge
may be built up of perceptual elements, of ideas derived directly
through the medium of the senses. Of such a character are the systems of
knowledge possessed by the artist and the musician. Again, a system of
knowledge may be composed wholly or mainly of images--of remembered
ideas, so altered and so modified as to form and fit into a new whole.
Lastly, the elements which go to form the component parts of the system
may be of a conceptual character. Thus we may select the number aspect
of things for consideration and treatment, and so build up and establish
within the mind of the child a number system. But in each and every case
the power at work is the activity of reason, and the end ever in view in
the selection and in the formation of the system is the satisfaction of
some end or interest desired either for its own sake or as a means to
some further and remoter end.
Further, a system of knowledge may differ not only in the nature of the
materials of which it is composed, but also in the mode of its
formation; _i.e._, the nature of the identity which binds part to part
within the system may vary in character. Now it is upon the nature of
the systems which we ultimately form in the mind of the child and upon
the method which we pursue in our process of system or knowledge making
that the resultant character of our education depends.
A system of knowledge may be related as regards its parts by some
qualitative or quantitative bond of identity. All sciences of mere
classification are formed in this way, and the formation of such systems
is in some cases a necessary preliminary to the evolution of the higher
forms of system. But the important point to note is that all such
systems are valuable only as a means to the further recognition, the
further classification, of similar instances. An individual whose mind
was wholly formed in this way might be compared to a well-arranged
museum, where everything is classified and arranged on the basis of
qualitative identity. But manifestly this mere arranging and classifying
of knowledge has only a limited value. Such systems can never be used as
means for the realisation of any practical need of life, can never by
themselves lead us to intrinsically connected knowledge.
A second and higher form of system is established whenever the bond of
connection between part and part is an identity of function or of law.
All language systems are of this nature, and the more highly synthetic
the language the more intrinsic the connection there is between the
parts of the system. Further, it should be noted that systems of this
character can be used for the attainment of other ends than those of
mere recognition and classification. They, of course, can be used as
instruments of intercourse, of culture, and of commerce. But they may
further be utilised in education in the training of the pupil to
self-apply a system of knowledge to the solution of relatively new
problems, and it is for this reason mainly that the ancient languages
possess their value as educational instruments.
Lastly, systems of knowledge may be formed in which the inter-relation
of part to part within the system is that of identity of cause and
effect. In the establishment of scientific knowledge the aim is to show
the causal inter-relation of part to part within a systematic whole or
unity. Hence also, as in the case of language systems, systems of this
nature are capable of being used to train the pupil to self-apply
knowledge in the solution of practical and theoretical problems, and in
the realising of the practical ends of life. Once again it must be noted
that in the establishment of the various systems of knowledge the one
activity ever present is that of reason seeking ever to connect part to
part in order that some end or interest may be attained. Moreover, we
may misuse the power of reason, and employ it in the attainment of ends
which are valueless in the sense that they further no real interest or
end in life. This is done whenever knowledge is crammed, whenever the
bond of connection between one part of knowledge and the other is
extrinsic, and whenever facts are connected and remembered by bonds of a
more or less accidental or factitious nature. And since such knowledge
can further no direct interest or end in life, its acquisition must, as
a rule, be motived by some strong indirect interest. As a consequence,
whenever the indirect interest, whatever its nature may be,--the fear of
punishment, or the passing of an examination,--ceases to operate, then
the desire for further acquisition also ceases. Hence it follows that
the establishment of any such system is of comparatively little value.
It may pave the way at a later period for the formation of a system of
intrinsically connected knowledge, but as a general rule such systems,
because they cannot be used, tend soon to drop out of mind, and to be of
no further consequence in the determination of conduct. But further,
this misuse of reason, this inciting of the mind to memorise facts
unrelated except by their mere accidental time or space relations, will
if persisted in tend to render the individual dull, stupid, and
unimaginative.
The systems of knowledge, then, of most value are those which establish
intrinsic connections between part and part; for it is only by means of
systems of this character that action can be determined and knowledge
extended. In this sense we may agree with Herbert Spencer[5] that
science or systematised knowledge is of chiefest value both for the
guidance of conduct and for the discipline of mind. At the same time we
must not fall into the Spencerian error of identifying science "with the
study of surrounding phenomena," and in making the antithesis between
science and linguistic studies one between dealing with real things on
the one hand, and mere words on the other.
Further, since the establishment of a system of means is always through
the self-finding and the self-forming of the system, this furnishes the
key to the only sound method of education--viz., that the child must be
trained in the self-discovering and the self-connecting of knowledge.
This does not mean that the method should be heuristic in Rousseau's
sense, that the child should be told nothing, but be left to rediscover
all knowledge for himself. But it does mean that in the imparting of the
garnered experience of the race the child must be trained in the methods
by which the race has slowly and gradually built up a knowledge of the
means necessary for the realisation of the many and complex ends of
civilised life.
Before passing on to consider the ends at which we should aim in the
education of the child, it may be well briefly to summarise the
conclusions reached.
1. Man is distinguished from the rest of creation by the possession
of reason: the animal life is mainly or wholly guided by instinct.
2. Man like the animals possesses instincts or instinctive
tendencies, but for their realisation he must seek out and
establish systems of means for their attainment. Bereft of these
instinctive tendencies of his nature, man would have no incentive
to acquire experiences for the more efficient guidance of his
future conduct.
3. In the course of the development and extension of experience
there gradually becomes grafted upon these innate instincts,
interests or ends of an acquired nature, and one of the main
functions of education is to create, foster, and establish on a
permanent and stable basis, interests of ethical and social worth.
4. The power of reason is no occult power: it is simply the
capacity for finding and establishing systems of means for the
attainment of ends; or it may be defined as the power of acquiring
experience and of self-applying this experience in the future
guidance of conduct.
5. The evolution of intelligence in man is the evolution of this
reason-activity to the attainment of new and more complex
theoretical and practical ends or interests. At an early stage the
systems of knowledge established are for the attainment of the
relatively simple needs of life, and are composed of perceptual and
imagined elements. At a later stage the systems formed may be of
the most complex nature, and are composed of conceptual elements.
6. Man is the only being capable of education in the strict usage
of the term. He alone must acquire the means for the realisation of
the various desired ends of life.
7. The process of education is a process which, utilising as
motives to acquirement the instinctive tendencies of the child's
nature, seeks to establish systems of means for their realisation,
and upon these innate or inborn instincts to graft acquired ends or
interests which shall hereafter function in the attainment of ends
of economic, ethical, and social worth.
8. The only truly educative method is the method which trains the
pupil to find, establish, and apply systems of knowledge in the
attainment of ends of felt value.
FOOTNOTES:
[3] Hume's _Treatise of Human Nature_, Bk. III. part ii. sec. 2.
[4] _Principles of Heredity_, by G. Archdall Reid, p. 235.
[5] Cf. Herbert Spencer, _Education_, especially chap. i.