WITHDRAWING FROM THE PRE-PARLIAMENT. THE VOICE OF THE FRONT

Before withdrawing from the membership in the Pre-Parliament where,

according to Kerensky's and Tseretelli's political statistics, we were

entitled to some half a hundred seats, we arranged a conference with the

left S. R. group. They refused to follow us, claiming that they still

had to demonstrate practically before the peasantry the insolvency of

the Pre-Parliament. Said one of the leaders of the left S. R.'s:

"We deem it necessary to warn you that if you want to withdraw from the

Pre-Parliament in order forthwith to go into the streets for an open

fight, we shall not follow you."

The bourgeois-fusionist press accused us of striving to kill prematurely

the Pre-Parliament, for the very purpose of creating a revolutionary

situation. At our faction meeting in the Pre-Parliament, it was decided

to act independently and not wait for the left S. R.'s. Our party's

declaration, proclaimed from the Pre-Parliament rostrum and explaining

why we were breaking with this institution, was greeted with a howl of

hatred and impotence on the part of the majority groups. In the

Petrograd Soviet of Deputies, where our withdrawal from the

Pre-Parliament was approved by an overwhelming majority, the leader of

the tiny "internationalist" Menshevik group, Martof, explained to us

that the withdrawal from the temporary Soviet of the Republic (such was

the official appellation of this little-respected institution) would be

sensible only in case we proposed immediately to assume an open

offensive. But the point is that this is just what we intended. The

prosecutors for the liberal bourgeoisie were right, when accusing us of

striving to create a revolutionary situation. In open insurrection and

direct seizure of power we beheld the only way out of the situation.

Again, as in the July days, the press and all the other organs of

so-called public opinion were mobilized against us. From the July

arsenals were dragged forth the most envenomed weapons which had been

temporarily stored away there after the Korniloff days. Vain efforts!

The mass was irresistibly moving toward us, and its spirit was rising

hour by hour. From the trenches delegates kept arriving. "How long,"

said they, at the Petrograd Soviet meetings, "will this impossible

situation last? The soldiers have told us to declare to you: if no

decisive steps for peace are made by November 1st, the trenches will be

deserted, the entire army will rush to the rear!" This determination was

really spreading at the front. There the soldiers were passing on, from

one unit to another, home-made proclamations, summoning them not to

remain in the trenches later than the first snowfall. "You have

forgotten about us," the delegates on foot from the trenches exclaimed

at the Soviet meetings. "If you find no way out of the situation, we

shall come here ourselves, and with our bayonets we shall disperse our

enemies, including you." In the course of a few weeks the Petrograd

Council had become the center of attraction for the whole army. After

its leading tendency had been changed and new presiding officers

elected, its resolutions inspired the exhausted and despondent troops at

the front with the hope that the way out of the situation could be

practically found in the manner proposed by the Bolsheviks: by

publishing the secret treaties and proposing an immediate truce on all

fronts. "You say that power must pass into the hands of the Soviets,

grasp it then. Yon fear that the front will not support you. Cast all

misgivings aside, the soldier masses are with you in overwhelming

majority."

Meanwhile the conflict regarding the transfer of the garrison kept on

developing. Almost daily, a garrison conference met, consisting of

committees from the companies, regiments and commands. The influence of

our party in the garrison was established definitely and indestructibly.

The Petrograd District Staff was in a state of extreme perplexity. Now

it would attempt to enter into regular relations with us, then again,

egged on by the leaders of the Central Executive Committee, it would

threaten us with repressive measures.

Above, mention has already been made of organizing, at the Petrograd

Soviet, a Military Revolutionary Committee, which was intended to be, in

fact, the Soviet Staff of the Petrograd garrison in opposition to

Kerensky's Staff. "But the existence of two staffs is inadmissible," the

representatives of the fusionist parties dogmatically admonished us.

"But is a situation admissible, wherein the garrison mistrusts the

official staff and fears that the transfer of soldiers from Petrograd

has been dictated by a new counter-revolutionary machination?" we

retorted. "The creation of a second staff means insurrection," came the

reply from the Right. "Your Military Revolutionary Committee's task will

not be so much to verify the operative projects and orders of the

military authorities as the preparation and execution of an insurrection

against the present government." This objection was just: But for that

very reason it did not frighten anybody. An overwhelming majority of the

Soviet was aware of the necessity of overthrowing the coalition power.

The more circumstantially the Mensheviks and S. R.'s demonstrated that

the Military Revolutionary Committee would inevitably turn into an organ

of insurrection, the greater the eagerness with which the Petrograd

Soviet supported the new fighting organization.

The Military Revolutionary Committee's first act was to appoint

commissioners to all parts of the Petrograd garrison and all the most

important institutions of the capital and environs. From various

quarters we were receiving communications that the government, or more

correctly, the government parties, were actively organizing and arming

their forces. From various arms-depots-governmental and private-rifles,

revolvers, machine guns and cartridges were being brought forth for

arming cadets, students and bourgeois youths in general. It was

necessary to take immediate preventive measures. Commissioners were

appointed to all arms-depots and stores. Almost without opposition they

became masters of the situation. To be sure, the commandants and

proprietors of the depots tried not to recognize them, but a mere

application to the soldiers' committee or the employees of each

institution sufficed to cause the immediate breakdown of the opposition.

After that, arms were issued only on order of our Commissioners.

Even prior to that, regiments of the Petrograd garrison had their

commissioners, but these had been appointed by the Central Executive

Committee. Above, we said that after the June Congress of Soviets, and

particularly after the June 18th demonstration which revealed the ever

growing power of the Bolsheviks, the fusionist parties had almost

entirely deprived the Petrograd Soviet of any practical influence on the

course of events in the revolutionary capital. The leadership of the

Petrograd garrison was concentrated in the hands of the Central

Executive Committee. Now the task everywhere was to put in the Petrograd

Soviet's Commissioners. This was achieved with the most energetic

cooperation of the soldier masses. Meetings, addressed by speakers of

various parties, had the result, invariably, that regiment after

regiment declared it would recognize only the Petrograd Soviet's

Commissioners and would not budge a step without its decision.

An important role in appointing these Commissioners was played by the

Bolsheviks' military organization. Before the July days it had developed

a widespread agitational activity. On July 5th, a battalion of cyclists,

brought by Kerensky to Petrograd, battered down the isolated Kshessinsky

mansion where our party's military organization was quartered. The

majority of leaders, and many privates among the members were arrested,

the publications were stopped, the printing shop was wrecked. Only by

degrees did the organization begin to repair its machinery afresh,

conspiratively this time. Numerically it comprised in its ranks but a

very insignificant part of the Petrograd garrison, a few hundred men all

told. But there were among them many soldiers and young officers,

chiefly ensigns, resolute, and with heart and soul devoted to the

Revolution, who had passed through Kerensky's prisons in July and

August. All of them had placed themselves at the Military Revolutionary

Committee's disposal and were being assigned to the most responsible

fighting posts.

However, it would not be superfluous to remark that precisely the

members of our party's military organization assumed in October an

attitude of extraordinary caution and even some skepticism toward the

idea of an immediate insurrection. The closed character of the

organization and its officially military character involuntarily

inclined its leaders to underestimate the purely technical and

organizational resources of the uprising, and from this point of view we

were undoubtedly weak. Our strength lay in the revolutionary enthusiasm

of the masses and their readiness to fight under our banner.

Parallel with the organizing activity a stormy agitation was being

carried on. This was the period of incessant meetings at works, in the

"Modern" and "Chinizelli" circuses, at clubs, in barracks. The

atmosphere at all the meetings was charged with electricity. Each

mention of the insurrection was greeted with a storm of plaudits and

shouts of delight. The bourgeois press merely increased the state of

universal panic. An order issued over my signature to the Syestroyetsk

munitions factory to issue five thousand rifles to the Red Guard evoked

an indescribable panic in bourgeois circles. "The general massacre" in

course of preparation was talked and written about everywhere. Of

course, this did not in the least prevent the workingmen of the

Syestroyetsk munitions factory from handing the arms over to the Red

Guards. The more frantically the bourgeois press slandered and baited

us, the more ardently the masses responded to our call. It was growing

clearer and clearer for both sides that the crisis must break within the

next few days. The press of the S. R.'s and Mensheviks was sounding an

alarm. "The Revolution is in the greatest danger. A repetition of the

July days is being prepared--but on a much wider basis and therefore

still more destructive in its consequences." In his Novaya Zhizn,

Gorki daily prophesied the approaching wreck of all civilization. In

general, the Socialistic veneer of the bourgeois intellectuals was

wearing off at the approach of the stern domination of the workers'

dictatorship. But, on the other hand, the soldiers of even the most

backward regiments hailed with delight the Military Revolutionary

Committee's commissioners. Delegates came to us from Cossack units and

from the Socialist minority of military cadets. They promised at least

to assure the neutrality of their units in case of open conflict.

Manifestly Kerensky's government was losing its foundations.

The District Staff began negotiations with us and proposed a compromise.

In order to size up the enemy's full resistance, we entered into

pourparlers. But the Staff was nervous; now they exhorted, then

threatened us, they even declared our commissioners to be without power,

which, however, did not in the least affect their work. In accord with

the Staff, the Central Executive Committee appointed Captain of Staff

Malefski to be Chief Commissioner for the Petrograd Military District

and magnanimously consented to recognize our commissioners, on condition

of their being subordinate to the Chief Commissioner. The proposal was

rejected and the negotiations broken off. Prominent Mensheviks and S.

R.'s came to us as intermediaries, exhorted, threatened and foretold our

doom and the doom of the Revolution.

From October to Brest-Litovsk · 第 16 / 32 题