But even earlier, previous to the Congress of Northern Soviets, there
occurred an event which was destined to play a most important role in
the subsequent political struggle. Early in October there came to a
meeting of the Petrograd Executive Committee, the Soviet's
representative in the staff of the Petrograd Military District and
announced that Headquarters demanded that two-thirds of the Petrograd
garrison should be sent to the front. For what purpose? To defend
Petrograd. They were not to be sent to the front at once, but still it
was necessary to make ready immediately. The Staff recommended that the
Petrograd Soviet approve this plan. We were on our guard. At the end of
August, also, five revolutionary regiments, complete or in parts, had
been taken out of Petrograd. This had been done at the request of the
then Supreme Commander Korniloff, who at that very time was preparing to
hurl a Caucasian division against Petrograd, with the intention of once
for all settling with the revolutionary capital. Thus we had already the
experience of purely political transfer of regiments under the pretext
of military operations. Anticipating events. I shall say, that from
documents brought to light after the October Revolution it became clear
beyond any doubt that the proposed removal of the Petrograd garrison
actually had nothing to do with military purposes, but was forced upon
Commander-in-Chief Dukhonin, against his will, by none else but
Kerensky, who was striving to clear the capital of the most
revolutionary soldiers, i.e., those most hostile to him. But at that
time, early in October, our suspicions evoked at first a storm of
patriotic indignation. The Staff people were pressing us, Kerensky was
impatient, for the ground under his feet had grown too hot. We, on the
other hand, delayed answering. Danger undoubtedly threatened Petrograd
and the question of defending the capital loomed before us in all its
terrible significance. But after the Korniloff experience, after
Rodzyanko's words concerning the desirability of the German occupation,
whence should we take the assurance that Petrograd would not be
maliciously given up to the Germans in punishment for its seditious
spirit? The Executive Committee refused to affix its seal blindly to the
order to transfer two-thirds of the garrison. It was necessary to
verify, we said, whether there really were military considerations back
of this order, and therefore it was necessary to create an organization
for this verification. Thus was born the idea of creating--by the side
of the Soldiers' section of the Soviet, i. e., the garrison's political
representation--a purely military organization, in the form of a
Military Revolutionary Committee, which subsequently acquired enormous
power and became the real tool of the October Revolution. Undoubtedly,
even in those hours, when putting forth the idea of creating an
organization in whose hands would be concentrated the threads for
guiding the Petrograd garrison on the purely military side, we clearly
realized that this very organization might become an irreplaceable
revolutionary tool. At that time we were already openly heading for the
uprising, and were preparing for it in an organized way.
As indicated above, the All-Russian Congress of Soviets was ret for
October 25th. There could be no longer any doubt that the Congress would
declare itself in favor of power being handed over to the Soviets. But
such a resolution must forthwith be put into actuality, else it would
turn into a worthless, Platonic demonstration. The logic of events,
therefore, required us to set the uprising for October 25th. Exactly so
the entire bourgeois press interpreted it. But in the first place, the
fate of the Congress depended upon the Petrograd garrison: would it
allow Kerensky to surround the Congress of Soviets and disperse it with
the assistance of several hundred or thousand military cadets, ensigns
and thugs? Did not the very attempt to remove the garrison mean that the
Government was preparing to disperse the Congress of Soviets? And
strange it would be if it were not preparing, since we were, before the
entire land, openly mobilizing the Soviet forces in order to deal the
coalition forces a death blow.
Thus the conflict at Petrograd was developing on the basis of the
question of the garrison's fate. First and foremost this question
touched all the soldiers to the quick. But the working-men, too, felt
the liveliest interest in the conflict, fearing as they did that upon
the garrison's removal they would be smothered by the cadets and
cossacks. Thus the conflict was assuming a character of the very keenest
nature and developing on a soil extremely unfavorable for Kerensky's
government.
Parallel with this was going on the above-described struggle for
convoking the All-Russian Congress of Soviets--we, openly declaring, in
the name of the Petrograd Soviet and the Northern Region Congress, that
the Second Congress of Soviets must set Kerensky's government aside and
become the true master of the Russian land. As a matter of fact the
uprising was already on. It was developing quite openly before the eyes
of the whole country.
During October the question of the uprising played an important role in
our party's inner life. Lenin, who was in hiding in Finland, insisted,
in numerous letters, upon more resolute tactics. The lower strata were
in ferment, and dissatisfaction was accumulating because the Bolshevik
party, which had proved to be in the majority in the Petrograd Soviet,
was drawing no practical conclusions from its own mottos. On October
10th a conspiratory meeting of the Central Committee of our party took
place, with Lenin present. The question of the uprising was on the order
of the day. By a majority of all against two votes it was decided that
the only means of saving the Revolution and the country from final
dissolution lay in armed insurrection which must transfer power into the
hands of the Soviets.