POLEMIC AGAINST THE STOIC PREDOMINATING PART OF THE SOUL.

Shall we have recourse to the (Stoic) "continuity of parts"[359]

to explain the sympathy which interrelates all the organs? This

hypothesis, however, is useless, unless this continuity eventuate

in unity. For we cannot admit, as do certain (Stoic) philosophers,

who deceive themselves, that sensations focus in the "predominating

principle" by "relayed transmission."[360] To begin with, it is a wild

venture to predicate a "predominating principle" of the soul. How

indeed could we divide the soul and distinguish several parts therein?

By what superiority, quantity or quality are we going to distinguish

the "predominating part" in a single continuous mass? Further, under

this hypothesis, we may ask, Who is going to feel? Will it be the

"predominating part" exclusively, or the other parts with it? If that

part exclusively, it will feel only so long as the received impression

will have been transmitted to itself, in its particular residence; but

if the impression impinge on some other part of the soul, which happens

to be incapable of sensation, this part will not be able to transmit

the impression to the (predominating) part that directs, and sensation

will not occur. Granting further that the impression does reach the

predominating part itself, it might be received in a twofold manner;

either by one of its (subdivided) parts, which, having perceived the

sensation, will not trouble the other parts to feel it, which would be

useless; or, by several parts simultaneously, and then we will have

manifold, or even infinite sensations which will all differ from each

other. For instance, the one might say, "It is I who first received

the impression"; the other one might say, "I received the impression

first received by another"; while each, except the first, will be

in ignorance of the location of the impression; or again, each part

will make a mistake, thinking that the impression occurred where

itself is. Besides, if every part of the soul can feel as well as the

predominating part, why at all speak of a "predominating part?" What

need is there for the sensation to reach through to it? How indeed

would the soul recognize as an unity the result of multiple sensations;

for instance, of such as come from the ears or eyes?

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