DIVISION AS THE PROPERTY OF BODIES, BUT NOT THE CHARACTERISTIC OF SOUL.

In no way does the unity of this essence resemble that of the body;

for the unity of the body consists in the unity of parts, of which

each is different from the others, and occupies a different place. Nor

does the unity of the soul bear any closer resemblance to the unity of

the qualities. Thus this nature that is simultaneously divisible and

indivisible, and that we call soul is not one in the sense of being

continuous (of which each part is external to every other); it is

divisible, because it animates all the parts of the body it occupies,

but is indivisible because it entirely inheres in the whole body, and

in each of its parts.[356] When we thus consider the nature of the

soul, we see her magnitude and power, and we understand how admirable

and divine are these and superior natures. Without any extension, the

soul is present throughout the whole of extension; she is present in a

location, though she be not present therein.[357] She is simultaneously

divided and undivided, or rather, she is never really divided, and she

never really divides; for she remains entire within herself. If she

seem to divide, it is not in relation with the bodies, which, by virtue

of their own divisibility, cannot receive her in an indivisible manner.

Thus division is the property of the body, but not the characteristic

of the soul.

Plotinos: Complete Works, v. 1 In Chronological Order, Grouped in Four Periods · 第 461 / 467 题