1. While studying the nature ("being") of the soul, we have shown
(against the Stoics) that she is not a body; that, among incorporeal
entities, she is not a "harmony" (against the Pythagoreans); we have
also shown that she is not an "entelechy" (against Aristotle), because
this term, as its very etymology implies, does not express a true idea,
and reveals nothing about the soul's (nature itself); last, we said
that the soul has an intelligible nature, and is of divine condition;
the "being" or nature of the soul we have also, it would seem, clearly
enough set forth. Still, we have to go further. We have formerly
established a distinction between intelligible and sense nature,
assigning the soul to the intelligible world. Granting this, that the
soul forms part of the intelligible world, we must, in another manner,
study what is suitable to her nature.