2. Let us first examine whether this (latter intelligible) matter
exists, how it exists, and what it is. If (the nature) of matter
be something indeterminate, and shapeless, and if in the perfect
(intelligible beings) there must not be anything indeterminate or
shapeless, it seems as if there could not be any matter in the
intelligible world. As every (being) is simple, it could not have any
need of matter which, by uniting with something else, constitutes
something composite. Matter is necessary in begotten beings, which make
one thing arise out of another; for it is such beings that have led to
the conception of matter (as thought Aristotle).[282] It may however be
objected that in unbegotten beings matter would seem useless. Whence
could it have originated to enter in (among intelligible beings),
and remain there? If it were begotten, it must have been so by some
principle; if it be eternal, it must have had several principles; in
which case the beings that occupy the first rank would seem to be
contingent. Further, if (in those beings) form come to join matter,
their union will constitute a body, so that the intelligible (entities)
will be corporeal.