SYMPATHY DOES NOT FORCE IDENTITY OF SENSATION.

It is therefore by no means necessary that when one member of the

universe experiences an affection, the latter be clearly felt by the

All. The existence of sympathy is natural enough, and it could not

be denied; but this does not imply identity of sensation. Nor is it

absurd that our souls, while forming a single one should be virtuous

and vicious, just as it would be possible that the same essence be at

motion in me, but at rest in you. Indeed, the unity that we attribute

to the universal (Soul) does not exclude all multiplicity, such a

unity as befits intelligence. We may however say that (the soul) is

simultaneously unity and plurality, because she participates not only

in divisible essence in the bodies, but also in the indivisible,

which consequently is one. Now, just as the impression perceived by

one of my parts is not necessarily felt all over my body, while that

which happens to the principal organ is felt by all the other parts,

likewise, the impressions that the universe communicates to the

individual are clearer, because usually the parts perceive the same

affections as the All, while it is not evident that the particular

affections that we feel would be also experienced by the Whole.

Plotinos: Complete Works, v. 1 In Chronological Order, Grouped in Four Periods · 第 263 / 467 题